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Comments 
  
Proximity operations only. 
No rendezvous due to IRT balloon failure. 
Station-keeping test of proximity operations autopilot. 
Station-keeping test of proximity operations autopilot.   
GRO used as target for star tracker navigation test. 
Approached to within 37 feet of Mir on +V Bar. 
STORRM DTO (after undock) on an Orion rndz profile. 
 
  
Retrieved and repaired after second rendezvous. 
Both maneuvered to meet downrange and planar constraints 
and retrieved by an astronaut flying the MMU. 
Contingency rendezvous after deployment and activation failure.  
Rendezvous & EVA planned in four months.  Elliptical orbit. 
Hybrid Control Box, 3 rendezvous.  Lambert targeting problem. 
Servicing Mission 1 
Servicing Mission 2 
Servicing Mission 3A 
Servicing Mission 3B 
Servicing Mission 4 
 
 
Incorrect SPARTAN attitude at retrieval. 
On-board targeted proximity operations.  
Most complex deploy/retrieve profile flown. 
Laser range and range rate sensor test. 
Long range, in-front and behind station-keeping. 
WSF-1 problems prevented deployment. 
First successful test of Trajectory Control Sensor laser. 
Football for data collection.  +R Bar Mir approach corridor test. 
Deploy day after Mir rendezvous.  Traj. designed to avoid Mir. 
1. Incorrect SPARTAN attitude at retrieval. 
2. Long range, in-front station-keeping. 
Also called SPARTAN-206 
1. Inflatable Antenna Experiment 
2. Three rendezvous and station-keeping (650 m on -V Bar). 
1. Relative GPS test for ISS ESA ATV. 
2. Long range, in-front station-keeping.  
Tested ISS TORVA & +V Bar approach using keel camera.  
SPARTAN activation failure, EVA retrieval.  VGS test.   
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Hybrid control box.  Solar array retraction failure & jettison. 
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 This technical history is intended to provide a 
technical audience with an introduction to the rendezvous 
and proximity operations history of the Space Shuttle 
Program.  It details the programmatic constraints and 
technical challenges encountered during shuttle 
development in the 1970s and over thirty years of shuttle 
missions.  An overview of rendezvous and proximity 
operations on many shuttle missions is provided, as well 
as how some shuttle rendezvous and proximity operations 
systems and flight techniques evolved to meet new 
programmatic objectives. 
 Since the publication of the first edition in October of 
2006 additional historical information has been collected.  
This revised edition provides additional information on 
Mercury, Gemini, Apollo, Skylab, and Apollo/Soyuz.  
Some chapters on the Space Shuttle have been updated 
and expanded. 
 Four special focus chapters have been added to 
provide more detailed information on shuttle rendezvous.  
A chapter on the STS-39 mission of April/May 1991 
describes the most complex deploy/retrieve mission 
flown by the shuttle.  Another chapter focuses on the 
Hubble Space Telescope servicing missions.  A third 
chapter gives the reader a detailed look at the February 
2010 STS-130 mission to the International Space Station.   
The fourth chapter answers the question why rendezvous 
was not completely automated on the Gemini, Apollo, 
and Space Shuttle vehicles. 
 Unfortunately, the brief coverage given in this history 
to these missions, and the Mir and ISS missions in 
particular, does not do justice to the tremendous amount 
of work required to overcome challenges and 
successfully fly.  The diligence of the NASA civil servant 
and contractor team was the key to the success of shuttle 
rendezvous and proximity operations.  Now that the 
Program is ending I have wondered how factors behind 
this success could be described to personnel working on 
future flight programs, either human or robotic. 
 In November of 1998 Space Shuttle Program Manager 
Tommy W. Holloway published a memo titled “The 
Future.”*  The first shuttle mission in support of the ISS 
was to be launched in about two weeks and the flight 
manifest was challenging.  Holloway mentioned several 
close calls within the Shuttle Program and referred to 
several space and aviation incidents not connected with 
human spaceflight.   Holloway went on to detail 8 points 
that were required to ensure flight safety and mission 
success.  The first time I read this list I recognized it as a 
description of the flight safety culture I had seen 
demonstrated by rendezvous and proximity operations 
personnel in my 25 year career with the Shuttle Program.   
PREFACE 
* Holloway, Tommy W., “The Future,” MA-98-068, Space 
Shuttle Program, NASA Johnson Space Center, November 20, 
1998. 
  
 The technical achievements portrayed in the pages of 
this history are due to the following: 
 
1. Each member of the Space Shuttle Team is 
accountable and responsible for his/her task, 
function, or project.  The Program, Safety, and 
Mission Assurance, or the phantom “They,” etc., are 
not.  We, individually, are responsible. 
 
2. Individual Space Shuttle Team member skills and 
expertise must be continually pursued and honed.  
Thinking we know it all and complacency are 
enemies. 
 
3. Adequate and thorough analysis is mandatory.  
Understanding the limitation of the analysis is just as 
important.  Using “similarity” and “gut feeling” or 
“extrapolation” is dangerous.  The Mission 
Evaluation Room’s motto, “In God we trust, all 
others bring data,” will serve us well. 
 
4. Adequate and thorough testing in the best possible 
environment is mandatory.  Understanding the 
limitations of the test is as important as 
understanding the results.  Bad tests are worse than 
no tests; they mislead you. 
 
5. Individual rigor and discipline to do it right are 
mandatory.  Lackadaisical attitude, lack of attention 
to detail, and not implementing procedures correctly, 
etc., are precursors to failure. 
 
6. Take time to do it right, to ensure there will be a 
tomorrow.  Cutting corners and hurrying to do a job 
are sure ways to fail.  If you don’t think you have the 
time to do it right, take time out! 
 
7. Communication and sharing of data, concepts, and 
ideas across the Space Shuttle Team are the checks 
and balances that keep us on track.  Not having data 
is bad; not sharing is worse. 
 
8. Learn from close calls.  We should not only 
investigate the specific close call but review like 
areas in other systems, processes, and designs. 
 
Mr. Holloway’s instructions are timeless. 
 
John L. Goodman 
JSC – 63400 
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 In the late 1950s rendezvous and docking was 
recognized as necessary for building space stations and 
assembling vehicles in low Earth orbit to perform 
exploration missions.  Rendezvous and docking was a key 
component of the Apollo lunar orbit rendezvous 
architecture adopted by NASA in 1962.  During Project 
Gemini rendezvous and docking technology and mission 
techniques were developed and successfully demonstrated 
in preparation for the Apollo lunar missions.  Nominal 
rendezvous and docking was successfully performed on 
the Apollo missions.  Lunar missions also required 
extensive development of contingency mission techniques 
to ensure crew safety and successful return to Earth.  
Knowledge and experience gained from the Gemini and 
Apollo missions was later successfully applied to the 
Skylab and Apollo/Soyuz missions. 
 In 1972, at the time of the Shuttle Program contract 
awards, rendezvous and docking technology and flight 
techniques were considered to be mature and the 
challenges well understood.  Space Shuttle software and 
hardware sub-system design introduced more automation 
into rendezvous and lowered crew work-load compared to 
Gemini and Apollo vehicles.  Space Shuttle missions were 
intended to require less pre-flight preparation than Gemini 
and Apollo missions to achieve low life cycle costs.  This 
included simplified and standardized mission planning 
and training, lower number of mission support personnel, 
high flight rates, elimination of extensive flight-to-flight 
analysis, no computation of flight specific trajectory data, 
and no generation of customized onboard charts for each 
mission.   
 However, the differences between rendezvous and 
docking as flown with Gemini and Apollo vehicles and 
the proposed Space Shuttle mission requirements were 
only gradually understood as the 1970s proceeded, after 
much Space Shuttle hardware design had been completed.  
While the Space Shuttle was a far more capable and 
flexible spacecraft than Gemini and Apollo, these 
differences required extensive mission specific procedure 
and trajectory development.  The challenges presented by 
these differences included:  
 
1) Space Shuttle rendezvous as an optional service 
(secondary to satellite deployment) that had a lower 
priority for spacecraft and ground system development 
funds and resources.  
 
2) Rendezvous as a mission success objective as opposed 
to safety critical rendezvous and docking (i.e. return the 
lunar exploration crew to Earth).  
 
3) Rendezvous with spacecraft not originally designed 
and equipped to support Space Shuttle rendezvous.  
4) Use of the Space Shuttle to perform space station 
construction, large scale space station re-supply, satellite 
retrieval, and satellite repair.  
 
5) Rendezvous with spacecraft that did not possess 
cooperative relative navigation aids (i.e. no radio-
frequency transponders or lights).  
 
6) Capture and berthing of a spacecraft with a robotic arm 
rather than docking.  
 
7) Adaptation of piloting and relative motion trajectory 
design techniques to ensure safe spacecraft deployment, 
including deployment of spacecraft with high energy 
upper stages.  
 
8) Plume impingement on target spacecraft caused by 
Space Shuttle Reaction Control System (RCS) jets that 
were designed to support atmospheric entry and orbital 
flight without rendezvous considerations.  
 
9) Integration of rendezvous operations with Extra-
Vehicular Activity (EVA, i.e. space walks).  
 
10) Execution of rendezvous activities in parallel with 
multiple secondary payload objectives (all having equal 
priority) by a single team or round the clock teams of 
astronauts. 
 
11) Use of the Space Shuttle to perform space station 
orbit raising and debris avoidance burns while docked. 
 
12) Integration of Space Shuttle thermal protection 
inspections by the shuttle and International Space Station 
(ISS) crews into the rendezvous procedures and flight 
techniques. 
 
 As these challenges emerged they were primarily 
overcome through the development of crew and ground 
personnel procedural work-arounds (nominal and 
contingency).  Development of new piloting techniques 
and procedures was preferred over hardware and software 
development to meet cost and schedule constraints.  A 
new flight phase, called proximity operations, was 
defined by March of 1977 due to the considerable mission 
technique development required to successfully overcome 
plume impingement and propellant budget challenges 
associated with capturing target spacecraft.  In contrast, 
Gemini and Apollo final approach and docking was 
relatively straightforward and did not require mission 
specific procedure and trajectory development of later 
shuttle missions.   
 There were two notable cases of hardware and 
software development performed to enable the Space        
.       
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philosophy did result in proximity operations procedures 
and tools that were effective at enabling the crew to 
achieve mission objectives and meet safety and mission 
success requirements.  However, the resulting system was 
labor intensive and required close coordination between 
multiple crew members and ground support personnel. 
 In spite of unforeseen technical, requirements, budget, 
and schedule challenges the Space Shuttle was successful 
at meeting mission objectives associated with rendezvous, 
proximity operations, and docking.  From June 1983 to 
July 2011, 78 Space Shuttle missions had at least one 
rendezvous or proximity operations objective. These 
missions were successful in achieving the relative position 
and velocity required for grapple of or docking with the 
target spacecraft (in spite of on-board systems failures on 
several missions).  Several flights required multiple 
attempts at target spacecraft capture, but ultimately 
succeeded in accomplishing mission objectives.  An 
understanding of factors behind the success of shuttle 
rendezvous and proximity operations, and how 
programmatic and technical challenges shaped vehicle 
operation and mission design is essential for mitigating 
cost, schedule, and technical risk in current and future 
programs.1,2 
 
Reference 
 
1. Goodman, J. L., Knowledge Capture and 
Management for Space Flight Systems, NASA 
Contractor Report NASA/CR-2005-213692, NASA 
Johnson Space Center, October 2005.  See the NASA 
Technical Reports server at http://ntrs.nasa.gov/, or 
the Johnson Technical  Reports server at 
http://ston.jsc.nasa.gov/collections/TRS/. 
 
2. Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel Annual Report for 
2010, NASA, Washington, DC, January 2011.  See 
http://oiir.hq.nasa.gov/asap/index.html (accessed 
January 15, 2011). 
Shuttle to meet new mission objectives associated with 
proximity operations, docking, and docked operations 
with a space station (Mir and ISS).  The shuttle on-orbit 
Digital Autopilot (DAP) was modified to permit use of 25 
pound thrust vernier RCS jets to be used for orbit raising 
burns while the shuttle was docked to Mir and the ISS.  
Other DAP modifications were made to enable the shuttle 
to effectively control the attitude the mated stack. 
 The second case concerned precise relative navigation 
sensors during final approach and docking.  Gemini and 
Apollo vehicles did not posses relative navigation sensors 
to support manually piloted final approach (starting at 
approximately 100 feet) through docking due to the large 
docking capture envelopes.  In the 1970s shuttle 
rendezvous sensors were designed to support rendezvous 
burns at long ranges (tens of miles and thousands of feet).  
Simulations showed that manual piloting to completely 
stop relative motion to facilitate satellite capture with the 
robotic arm did not require precise, close-in relative 
navigation sensors.   
 By the late 1980s studies of shuttle docking with 
Space Station Freedom revealed that the shuttle 
rendezvous radar was not adequate in terms of minimum 
useable range and accuracy to support final approach and 
docking while meeting plume impingement and docking 
hardware capture envelope constraints.  This led to the 
development of crew hand-held and shuttle payload bay 
laser sensors and a laptop computer application that 
greatly enhanced crew situational awareness of relative 
motion.  These new proximity operations tools reduced 
proximity operations propellant consumption and eased 
the manual piloting task.   
 However, budget constraints forced the use of some 
off-the-shelf hardware and software (laptop computer 
hardware and operating system, and the hand-held laser).  
To meet cost and schedule constraints, certification of the 
new tools was at a lower level than software and 
hardware used for ascent and entry, resulting in a 
requirement that the crews be able to accomplish final 
approach and docking without them.  This development    
. 
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Comments 
  
Proximity operations only. 
No rendezvous due to IRT balloon failure. 
Station-keeping test of proximity operations autopilot. 
Station-keeping test of proximity operations autopilot.   
GRO used as target for star tracker navigation test. 
Approached to within 37 feet of Mir on +V Bar. 
STORRM DTO (after undock) on an Orion rndz profile. 
 
  
Retrieved and repaired after second rendezvous. 
Both maneuvered to meet downrange and planar constraints 
and retrieved by an astronaut flying the MMU. 
Contingency rendezvous after deployment and activation failure.  
Rendezvous & EVA planned in four months.  Elliptical orbit. 
Hybrid Control Box, 3 rendezvous.  Lambert targeting problem. 
Servicing Mission 1 
Servicing Mission 2 
Servicing Mission 3A 
Servicing Mission 3B 
Servicing Mission 4 
 
 
Incorrect SPARTAN attitude at retrieval. 
On-board targeted proximity operations.  
Most complex deploy/retrieve profile flown. 
Laser range and range rate sensor test. 
Long range, in-front and behind station-keeping. 
WSF-1 problems prevented deployment. 
First successful test of Trajectory Control Sensor laser. 
Football for data collection.  +R Bar Mir approach corridor test. 
Deploy day after Mir rendezvous.  Traj. designed to avoid Mir. 
1. Incorrect SPARTAN attitude at retrieval. 
2. Long range, in-front station-keeping. 
Also called SPARTAN-206 
1. Inflatable Antenna Experiment 
2. Three rendezvous and station-keeping (650 m on -V Bar). 
1. Relative GPS test for ISS ESA ATV. 
2. Long range, in-front station-keeping.  
Tested ISS TORVA & +V Bar approach using keel camera.  
SPARTAN activation failure, EVA retrieval.  VGS test.   
VGS test 
 
 
Hot final approach due to radar procedure issue. 
Solar array latch failure, corrected during EVA. 
Hybrid control box.  Solar array retraction failure & jettison. 
 
 
Docked to Buran port on Kristall Module.  Crew exchange. 
Installed Shuttle Docking Module on Kristall. 
Resupply & U.S. crew delivery. 
Resupply & U.S. crew exchange. 
Resupply & U.S. crew exchange. 
Resupply & U.S. crew exchange. GPS & laser test for ATV. 
Resupply & U.S. crew exchange. GPS test for ATV. 
Resupply & U.S. crew exchange. 
Resupply & U.S. crew return. 
 
Target 
  
SPAS-01 
IRT 
none 
radar reflector 
GRO 
Mir 
ISS 
 
  
Solar Max 
1. Palapa-B2 
2. Westar-VI 
SYNCOM IV-3 
SYNCOM IV-3 
INTELSAT VI (F-3) 
Hubble 
Hubble 
Hubble 
Hubble 
Hubble 
 
  
SPARTAN-101 
PDP 
IBSS-SPAS II 
SPARTAN-201-01 
ORFEUS-SPAS 1 
WSF-1 
SPARTAN-201-02 
CRISTA-SPAS 1 
SPARTAN-204 
1. SPARTAN-201-03 
2. WSF-2 
OAST-Flyer 
1. SPARTAN-207-IAE 
2. PAMS-STU 
1. ORFEUS-SPAS 2 
2. WSF-3 
CRISTA-SPAS 2 
SPARTAN-201-04 
SPARTAN-201-05 
 
  
LDEF 
EURECA (ESA) 
SFU (Japan) 
 
  
Mir 
Mir 
Mir 
Mir 
Mir 
Mir 
Mir 
Mir 
Mir 
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Comments 
  
Captured Zarya with RMS, attached Unity Node with PMA 1 & 2. 
 
First docking with ISS.  ISS resupply and outfitting. 
 
ISS resupply and outfitting. 
ISS resupply and outfitting. 
Radar failure.  Z1 Truss, PMA 3, Ku comm,  & CMGs installed. 
Delivered P6 truss (with solar arrays & radiators). 
 
Delivered Destiny lab.   
Tail forward approach. MPLM resupply. Crew exchange. 
Tail forward approach. Installed robotic arm. MPLM resupply.  
Delivered Quest Airlock (installed with ISS robotic arm). 
MPLM resupply. Crew exchange. 
MPLM resupply. Crew exchange. 
 
Delivered S0 truss and Mobile Transporter. 
MPLM resupply. Mobile base installation.  Crew exchange. 
Delivered S1 truss, radiators & CETA cart A. 
Delivered P1 truss, radiators & CETA cart B.  Crew exchange. 
 
MPLM Resupply.  CMG replacement.  First RPM. 
 
MPLM Resupply.  Add third ISS crewmember. 
P3/P4 truss. 
P5 Truss, SPACEHAB 
 
S3/S4 Truss  
S5 Truss  
U.S. Node 2, first flight of Lambert guidance upgrade. 
 
Columbus Laboratory  
Kibo Logistics Module, Dextre Robotics System  
Kibo Pressurized Module, Japanese Remote Manipulator System  
MPLM 
 
S6 truss segment  
Kibo JEM EF, Kibo Japanese ELM-ES 
Leonardo MPLM, LMPESSC, Vernier RCS failure. 
ELC1, ELC2 
 
Tranquility Node 3, Cupola.  TCS failure during approach. 
Leonardo MPLM, radar fail. 
ICC, MRM1, COAS bulb replacement. 
 
ELC4, Leonardo PMM 
ELC3, AMS-2, STORRM DTO during rndz & docking. 
Raffaello MPLM, LMC, return to Earth of failed ammonia pump.   
ISS yaw maneuver after orbiter undocking to facilitate engineering 
photos during orbiter half-lap fly-around. 
 
Mission  
 
ISS  
Assembly  
and  
Supply  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Flight
  
88 (2A) 
 
96 (2A.1) 
 
101 (2A.2a) 
106 (2A.2b) 
92 (3A) 
97 (4A) 
 
98 (5A) 
102 (5A.1) 
100 (6A) 
104 (7A) 
105 (7A.1) 
108 (UF-1) 
 
110 (8A) 
111 (UF-2) 
112 (9A) 
113 (11A) 
 
114 (LF-1) 
 
121 (ULF-1.1) 
115 (12A) 
116 (12A.1) 
 
117 (13A) 
118 (13A.1) 
120 (10A) 
 
122 (1E) 
123 (1J/A) 
124 (1J) 
126 (ULF2) 
 
119 (15A) 
127 92J/A) 
128 (17A) 
129 (ULF3) 
 
STS-130 (20A) 
STS-131 (19A) 
STS-132 (ULF4) 
 
STS-133 (ULF5) 
STS-134 (ULF6) 
STS-135 (ULF7) 
Year
  
1998 
 
1999 
 
2000 
2000 
2000 
2000 
 
2001 
2001 
2001 
2001 
2001 
2001 
 
2002 
2002 
2002 
2002 
 
2005 
 
2006 
2006 
2006 
 
2007 
2007
2007 
 
2008
2008
2008
2008 
 
2009
2009 
2009 
2009 
 
2010
2010
2010 
 
2011
2011
2011
  
Profile  
  
Ground-Up 
 
Ground-Up 
 
Ground-Up 
Ground-Up 
Ground-Up 
Ground-Up 
 
Ground-Up 
Ground-Up 
Ground-Up 
Ground-Up 
Ground-Up 
Ground-Up 
 
Ground-Up 
Ground-Up 
Ground-Up 
Ground-Up 
 
Ground-Up 
 
Ground-Up 
Ground-Up 
Ground-Up 
 
Ground-Up 
Ground-Up 
Ground-Up 
 
Ground-Up 
Ground-Up 
Ground-Up 
Ground-Up 
 
Ground-Up 
Ground-Up 
Ground-Up 
Ground-Up 
 
Ground-Up 
Ground-Up 
Ground-Up 
 
Ground-Up 
Ground-Up 
Ground-Up 
Target 
  
ISS 
 
ISS 
 
ISS 
ISS 
ISS 
ISS 
 
ISS 
ISS 
ISS 
ISS 
ISS 
ISS 
 
ISS 
ISS 
ISS 
ISS 
 
ISS 
 
ISS 
ISS 
ISS 
 
ISS 
ISS 
ISS 
 
ISS 
ISS 
ISS 
ISS 
 
ISS 
ISS 
ISS 
ISS 
 
ISS 
ISS 
ISS 
 
ISS 
ISS 
ISS
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A = Assembly, AMS = Alpha Magnetic Spectrometer, ATV = Automated Transfer Vehicle, CETA = Crew and Equipment Translation Aid, CMG = 
Control Moment Gyro, COAS = Crew Optical Alignment Sight, ELC = EXPRESS Logistics Carrier, ELM-ES = Experiment Logistics Module - Exposed 
Section, EVA = Extra Vehicular Activity, ICC = Integrated Cargo Carrier, ISS = International Space Station, JEM EF = Japanese Experiment Module 
Exposed Facility, LF = Logistics Flight, LMC = Lightweight Multi-purpose Carrier, LMPESSC = Lightweight Multi-Purpose Experiment Support 
Structure Carrier, MPLM = Multi-Purpose Logistics Module, MRM = Mini Research Module, ORBT = Optimized R-Bar Targeted Rendezvous, PMA = 
Pressurized Mating Adapter, PMM = Permanent Multi-Purpose Module, RCS = Reaction Control System, RMS = Remote Manipulator System, Rndz = 
Rendezvous, RPM = R Bar Pitch Maneuver, STORRM DTO = Sensor Test for Orion Relnav Risk Mitigation Detailed Test Objective, TCS = Trajectory 
Control Sensor, TORRA = Twice Orbital Rate R Bar Approach, TORVA = Twice Orbital Rate V Bar Approach, UF = Utilization Flight, ULF = 
Utilization & Logistics Flight 
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applying SAINT experience to the Gemini and Apollo 
programs.  A briefing on SAINT was given to Manned 
Spacecraft Center (MSC) personnel in Houston in April 
of 1962.  However, as details of Gemini rendezvous were 
the subject of much debate and not finalized until late 
1964, it is not clear how much influence SAINT had on 
Gemini rendezvous techniques at the time of the briefing.  
It is unlikely that SAINT, which involved rendezvous of 
an unmanned inspector spacecraft with an 
“uncooperative” target, took into account manual piloting 
concerns and safety of flight issues that needed to be 
addressed for Gemini and Apollo.  SAINT was canceled 
in December 1962. 
 
MORAD 
 
  By early 1961 studies had indicated that rendezvous 
was technically feasible and would be useful for space 
missions.  Some proposed missions could be flown using 
existing boosters to rendezvous and assemble spacecraft 
in orbit, rather than having to develop larger boosters.  
The Manned Orbital Rendezvous and Docking 
(MORAD) project was proposed by NASA Langley 
rendezvous investigators as an extension to Mercury in 
early 1961.  MORAD was intended to provide early proof 
of the feasibility of manned rendezvous and establish 
confidence in rendezvous techniques in the areas of 
control of the closure maneuver, handling of the docking 
phase, and manned operation in orbit.  It would have 
demonstrated rendezvous and docking using a modified 
single-seat Mercury spacecraft (passive) and an active 
target vehicle.  Two targets were discussed, one that 
needed to be developed and would be launched by a 
Scout booster.  The other was the SAINT vehicle.  
 A Scout would place the target on an intercept course 
with the Mercury spacecraft.  The astronaut was expected 
to acquire the target vehicle flashing light at a range of 
from 50 to 100 miles.  The target would maneuver during 
the terminal phase based on control inputs from the 
Mercury astronaut (Figure 1.2).  The Mercury periscope 
was to be replaced by equipment that enabled the 
astronaut to control the braking and docking of the target 
spacecraft via a radio command link (Figure 1.3).  Target 
spacecraft telemetry (such as attitude and range) would 
be displayed to the astronaut. 
 The piloting task involved yawing and pitching the 
Mercury so that the astronaut field of view was along the 
line-of-sight to the target, after which the Mercury 
automatic stabilization mode would then be engaged.  
The target would be maneuvered so that it achieved and 
maintained an appropriate attitude with respect to the 
line-of-sight to the Mercury.  The astronaut would then 
detect and null line-of-sight motion by watching the          
. 
Early Studies 
 
 The pace of theoretical work on rendezvous in the 
United States picked up in the late 1950s.1-4  Of particular 
importance were studies conducted by NASA Langley 
Research Center into manual and automatic rendezvous 
techniques.  Early Langley research was a key factor 
behind development, advocacy of (Figure 1.1), and 
acceptance of the Lunar Orbit Rendezvous mission 
profile for Apollo.5-6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Aldrin Dissertation 
 
 In 1959, Air Force Major Edwin E. Aldrin arrived at 
MIT to pursue a Masters, and eventually a PhD degree in 
astronautical engineering.  Aldrin chose rendezvous as 
his dissertation topic, hoping to work for the Air Force or 
NASA.  Many early rendezvous studies were written 
from a theoretical perspective.  Aldrin brought an 
aviator’s perspective to rendezvous techniques, having 
flown the F-86 in Korea (two MiG-15 kills) and later 
flew the F-100.  His dissertation and later work as an 
astronaut was to influence development of piloting 
techniques for Gemini and Apollo, and in particular the 
development of back-up techniques in the event of 
computer or other system failures.7-9  Of particular 
importance was Aldrin’s understanding of how relative 
motion of spacecraft differed from flying airplanes. 
 
Satellite Inspector (SAINT) 
 
 SAINT (later known as Program 621A or 720) was a 
United States Air Force sponsored satellite inspection 
program that grew out of studies conducted in 1959.10  
The SAINT profile was similar to the “first apogee 
rendezvous” technique frequently depicted in early 1960s 
era papers on rendezvous.  It has long been suspected that 
the support given by NASA Associate Administrator 
Robert C. Seamans for the Lunar Orbit Rendezvous 
profile was based on his experience at RCA with 
SAINT.11,12  In early 1962, NASA was interested in          
.       
CHAPTER 1 -  EARLY STUDIES 
Figure 1.1  John C. Houbolt discussing 
Lunar Orbital Rendezvous (LOR). 
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target against a star field background.  A braking 
schedule would be executed to attain the appropriate 
relative position and velocity for docking. 
__  The MORAD rendezvous demonstration was later 
deemed too dangerous for a one-man spacecraft.  
MORAD was dropped in favor of rendezvous 
demonstrations in the Mercury Mark II program, later 
renamed Project Gemini.12 
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 The ability of an astronaut to spot a target against a 
star or Earth background, judge distances, or estimate 
target spacecraft attitude with the naked eye had to be 
determined.  Several experiments were conducted during 
Project Mercury to gauge the ability of an astronaut to 
perform these tasks.1,2  Test results were used in planning 
for Gemini.   
 After separation of the Mercury spacecraft from the 
Atlas booster, John Glenn, Scott Carpenter, Wally Schirra 
and Gordon Cooper all maneuvered their spacecraft to 
visually acquire the booster through the large window 
(Figure 2.1).1-5  Glenn estimated the initial range as 200 
feet, which was later confirmed with ground analysis.  He 
tracked the booster for six or seven minutes, and 
estimated the range at the end of the tracking to be two 
miles behind and one mile below.  Carpenter observed 
and photographed the booster for about 8.5 minutes and 
was able to discern a tumbling motion.  Schirra 
maintained a track attitude using the Mercury fly-by-wire 
control system on the sunlit side of the Earth.  The 
booster appeared to him to be black, rather than the silver 
color observed by Glenn and Carpenter.  Booster relative 
motion appeared to be as predicted preflight, which 
Schirra took as verification that the Mercury gyros and 
horizon scanners were operating properly.4  Cooper 
observed the Atlas for about 8 minutes, and was able to 
discern hardware details and propellant vapor emissions 
from the sustainer engine.1-5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 During the flights of Aurora 7 (MA-7, Carpenter) and 
Faith 7 (MA-9, Cooper), a 20-inch, multi colored balloon 
was to be ejected from the antenna canister and inflated at 
the end of a 100-foot tether from the antenna canister.  
Atmospheric drag data was to be measured over one         
. . 
orbit, and the ability of the astronaut to observe the 
balloon would be determined.  On Aurora 7 the balloon    
was deployed but failed to fully inflate due to a seam 
failure.  Although the balloon failed to inflate properly, 
Carpenter was able to discern the various colors (Figure 
2.1).2,3,5  The balloon experiment underwent a thorough 
testing process before the flight of Faith 7, but failed to 
deploy from the antenna canister.5 
 A flashing light experiment was conducted on Faith 7.  
A 5.75-inch diameter sphere equipped with two xenon 
gas discharge lamps that flashed at a rate of about once 
per second was ejected towards the Earth from the Faith 7 
spacecraft.  This set up relative motion that would place 
the sphere against both an Earth and space background 
with increasing range from the spacecraft.  Cooper was 
unable to spot the light during the first daylight and night 
periods after deployment.  At the end of the second 
daylight period just before sunset, he spotted it as a 
continuous (non-flashing) light just below the horizon, 
apparently due to reflected sunlight (it was against a 
black background).  Flashing was observed at sunset, and 
the strobes remained visible through the night period.  A 
flashing light was easier to spot than a non-flashing light.  
It was estimated that the brightness at a range of about 15 
miles was about +2 magnitude.  He was not able to 
acquire the light during the next daylight period, but did 
spot it again halfway through the following night period, 
although it was dim.2,5      
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Figure 2.1  Scott Carpenter looks into his Aurora 7 
spacecraft before entering the spacecraft for the 
launch (May 24, 1962).  
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Introduction 
 
 President Kennedy's goal of sending Americans to 
and from the moon by the end of the sixties necessitated 
the development of rendezvous. Gemini served as a 
technology demonstration and risk reduction program in 
preparation for the lunar landings, and established an 
experience base of operational techniques and mission 
planning for Apollo.   An overall goal of Gemini was to 
prove that a human crew could manually accomplish 
activities in zero-gravity that were similar to those 
required for the Apollo Program.   
 Objectives included successful demonstration of 
rendezvous and docking, long-duration flight, guided 
(piloted or automated) lifting entry to a targeted 
splashdown point, and Extra Vehicular Activity (EVA).  
Technical challenges associated with rendezvous and 
docking included closed loop execution of using manual 
piloting techniques, crew training and simulation, 
mission planning for nominal and off-nominal 
conditions, launch windows that minimized out-of-plane 
insertion error, coordinated launch of target and chaser    
. 
  
spacecraft on the same day, and the development of 
contingency procedures (both pre-mission and in near 
real time) in response to vehicle performance problems.  
Ten rendezvous profiles and nine different dockings were 
successfully completed.  Gemini successfully 
demonstrated a number of rendezvous techniques that are 
listed in (Tables 3.1 and 3.2).  Many of these techniques 
were later used in the Apollo and Space Shuttle 
Programs.1-10 
• Coelliptic rendezvous from above and below 
• Stable orbit, direct ascent and equal period (football)   
   rendezvous 
• Rendezvous during both orbital night and day 
• Use of only optical measurements (no radar) 
• Station-keeping and docking  
• Simultaneous countdown of chaser and target launch    
   vehicles 
• Launch during a narrow launch window 
• Real time maneuver targeting using data from ground  
   based or onboard navigation sensors 
• Conducting multiple rendezvous operations in a      
   single mission within a propellant budget 
• Extra-Vehicular Activity while docked 
Table 3.1  Gemini Rendezvous Accomplishments 
Comments 
  
Station-Keeping attempt resulted in separation. 
Rendezvous canceled. 
 
 
REP deployed but rendezvous canceled due to 
fuel cell power down.  Successful radar test with 
other REP hardware at Kennedy Space Center. 
 
Approached to within 15 meters. 
 
 
GATV-5002 destroyed during launch, Gemini VII 
used instead.  First successful space rendezvous. 
 
First successful space docking.  Failed on Gemini 
thruster forced undocking and activation of re-
entry RCS system and contingency splash-down 
in the Pacific. 
 
GATV-5004 destroyed during launch, ATDA 
launched instead.  No docking as ATDA shroud 
failed to separate.  Three rendezvous profiles 
flown. 
 
Two rendezvous profiles flown.  Second 
rendezvous without radar and strobes due to 
Agena power loss. 
 
 
Two rendezvous profiles flown.  First stable orbit 
rendezvous. 
 
Radar failure, angles only rendezvous. 
Chaser
  
Gemini IV  
 
 
 
Gemini V 
 
 
 
Gemini VII 
 
 
Gemini VIA 
 
 
Gemini VIII 
 
 
 
 
Gemini IX 
 
 
 
 
Gemini X 
 
 
 
 
Gemini XI 
 
 
Gemini XII 
 
Flight
  
Gemini IV 
 
 
 
Gemini V 
 
 
 
Gemini VII 
 
 
Gemini VIA 
 
 
Gemini VIII 
 
 
 
 
Gemini IX 
 
 
 
 
Gemini X 
 
 
 
 
Gemini XI 
 
 
Gemini XII 
 
 
Year
  
1965 
 
 
 
1965 
 
 
 
1965 
 
 
1965 
 
 
1966 
 
 
 
 
1966 
 
 
 
 
1966 
 
 
 
 
1966 
 
 
1966 
Profile  
  
Station-keeping, 
separate &  
rendezvous 
 
 
 
 
 
Station-Keeping 
 
 
Ground-Up (M=4)1 
 
 
Ground-Up (M=4)1 
 
 
 
 
1. Ground-Up (M=3)1 
2. Football re-rendezvous 
3. Rendezvous from above 
 
 
1. Ground-Up (M=4)1 
2. Phase from in front,  
    above & behind to  
    set up coelliptic 
 
1. Ground-Up (M=1) 
2. Stable Orbit  
 
Ground Up (M=3)1  
Target 
  
2nd Stage 
 
 
 
REP 
 
 
 
2nd Stage 
 
 
Gemini VII 
 
 
GATV-5003 
 
 
 
 
1. ATDA 
2. ATDA 
3. ATDA 
 
 
1. GATV-5005 
2. GATV-5003 
 
 
 
1. GATV-5006 
2. GATV-5006 
 
GATV-5001 
Table 3.2  Gemini Rendezvous and Station-Keeping Missions 
ATDA = Augmented Target Docking Adapter, GATV = Gemini Agena Target Vehicle, M = revolution that rendezvous was 
completed on, REP = Radar Evaluation Pod, 2nd Stage = Titan II Booster Second Stage 
1 Ground-Up rendezvous profiles other than Gemini XI had a coelliptic phase before the TPI maneuver. 
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Gemini VI Profile Selection 
 
 In 1962, some Langley rendezvous specialists 
moved with the Space Task Group to the newly formed 
Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC) in Houston. NASA 
and contractor personnel from various disciplines at 
MSC, and the MSC Mission Planning and Analysis 
Division (MPAD) in particular, turned rendezvous theory 
into reality during Gemini.1  By the spring of 1964, three 
candidate rendezvous profiles (Figures 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3) 
had been identified and were under consideration by the 
Trajectories and Orbits Panel (chaired by Bill Tindall, 
Table 3.3) for Gemini VI, the first planned Gemini 
rendezvous and docking with an Agena.  Discussions 
were conducted in May and June of 1964.11-16 
 Tangential Orbit (Mission Plan 1) - This profile 
involved launching the Gemini spacecraft into an 
elliptical orbit tangential to the Agena Target Vehicle 
(ATV) orbit (Figure 3.1). Rendezvous would occur near 
the apogee of the fourth Gemini orbit. However, this 
technique did not guarantee proper lighting conditions or 
consistent relative dynamics in the terminal phase under 
dispersed conditions. 
 Concentric Flight Profile (Mission Plan 2) - This 
used the same maneuver plan as the ground targeted 
phase in the tangential orbit profile, but had a different 
terminal phase. Rather than ground targeting placing the 
spacecraft on an intercept trajectory, it placed the Gemini 
in a co-elliptic orbit with respect to the target spacecraft 
(Figure 3.2). The intercept maneuver, Terminal Phase 
Initiation (TPI), was executed while the chaser vehicle 
was on an orbit coelliptic with the Agena. The length of 
the co-elliptic phase could be controlled to ensure 
appropriate lighting during the terminal phase and 
adequate coverage by ground tracking. The terminal 
phase would begin once a trajectory criterion was met.  
 First Apogee or Direct Rendezvous (Mission Plan 
3) - The Titan II booster would place the Gemini 
spacecraft on an intercept trajectory with the Agena 
(Figure 3.3). Gemini would achieve radar lock on the 
target soon after orbit insertion. However, the short 
amount of time for the crew to conduct on-orbit checkout 
of Gemini systems and rendezvous procedures made the 
timeline impractical. Furthermore, the trajectory was 
highly sensitive to ascent dispersions and liftoff delays. 
Trajectory dispersions would have to be corrected by the 
on-board system, without help from ground tracking. In 
case of a dispersed trajectory that made rendezvous 
impossible, a backup rendezvous profile was needed. 
 After an extensive trade study, a coelliptic 
rendezvous profile was chosen for execution on Gemini 
VI at a meeting on June 15, 1964 (Figure 3.2).13  The 
length of the coelliptic phase permitted control over 
terminal phase lighting, and provided a terminal phase 
that was less sensitive to trajectory dispersions than the 
direct rendezvous and tangential orbit profiles.  Of the     
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Name 
 
M. Czarnik 
W. B. Evans 
R. R. Carley 
E. M. See, Jr. 
E. E. Aldrin, Jr. 
J. B. Jones 
G. S. Lunney 
A. D. Aldrich 
L. C. Dunseith 
E. C. Lineberry 
R. P. Parten 
H. W. Tindall, Jr. 
Table 3.3  First Gemini/Agena Mission 
Rendezvous Profile Selection Panel 
Organization 
 
McDonnell 
Gemini Program Office 
Gemini Program Office 
Astronaut Office 
Astronaut Office 
Flight Crew Support Division 
Flight Control Division 
Flight Control Division 
Mission Planning and Analysis Division 
Mission Planning and Analysis Division 
Mission Planning and Analysis Division 
Mission Planning and Analysis Division 
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three concentric provided the most flexibility, had a 
terminal phase that was the least sensitive to dispersions 
and facilitated easier definition of backup procedures.  
This helped ensure standardized crew procedures and 
training, even with mission-to-mission variations in the 
pre-terminal phase rendezvous profile. Furthermore, 
compared to the direct rendezvous profile, the crew did 
not have to conduct rendezvous activities during the first 
orbit, as it was preferred to spend the first orbit 
conducting spacecraft systems checks.  The coelliptic 
approach also facilitated the use of manual backup 
guidance techniques in the event of system failures 
(sensor failure, computer failure, or loss of 
communications with Mission Control).3  Two mid-course 
correction maneuvers followed TPI, allowing correction 
of dispersions before final braking.   Since most of the 
mission planning and Mission Control software 
development had concerned the tangential orbit profile, 
significant changes were required to support the 
concentric profile.  
 The profile from orbital insertion to radar acquisition 
was designed to use ground targeted burns to control 
phasing and out-of-plane dispersions.  Gemini terminal 
phase rendezvous profiles (Figure 3.4) were designed to 
maximize the success of manually piloted rendezvous in 
the presence of trajectory dispersions and systems 
problems.  A terminal phase initiated from a coelliptic 
orbit was selected that allowed control over terminal 
phase lighting, provided less sensitivity to trajectory 
dispersions, ensured standardized crew procedures and 
training, provided sufficient time for crew execution of 
nominal and backup procedures, and facilitated the use of 
manual backup guidance techniques in the event of 
system failures.  The crew flew an inertial final approach 
by controlling closing rate and the rotation rate of the 
inertial line-of-sight to the target. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Three different parameters had to be chosen for the 
terminal phase (Figure 3.4): 1) the ΔH for the co-elliptic 
orbit, 2) the angular transfer from Terminal Phase 
Initiation to intercept, and 3) a thrusting methodology that 
permitted burn execution in the event of spacecraft system 
failures.  For the relative geometry cue, elevation angle     
. 
Figure 3.4   Terminal phase for coelliptic rendezvous.   
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of the target with respect to the Gemini local horizontal 
was chosen over range, relative radial velocity, time and 
minimum ΔV.  In the presence of dispersions, range, 
relative radial velocity and elevation angle were equally 
insensitive.  Elevation angle determination was the least 
vulnerable to equipment failures and easy to incorporate 
into backup procedures.  Elevation angle was also a 
convenient attitude reference for the crew. 
 A transfer angle of between ~130 to ~140 degrees also 
ensured an approach from below, which enabled the crew 
to use the star field as a reference during the approach 
along a constant inertial line-of-sight vector.  Transfer 
angles in this range were the least sensitive to TPI Time 
of Ignition (TIG) and ΔV dispersions.  ΔH was chosen as 
a trade-off between visual sighting requirements, 
minimizing the impact of dispersions in the terminal 
phase, minimizing closure rate when approaching target, 
and minimizing ΔV.  Lower values of ΔH were favored.  
It was decided that the TPI burn should have a ΔV that 
was along the line-of-sight to the target.  The advantage 
of this burn over a horizontal ΔV was that it was easier to 
execute with backup procedures. 
  
Rendezvous Target Vehicles 
 
 The docking target for Gemini was a modification of 
the Agena upper stage and was launched by an Atlas.  
Agena was equipped with an L-Band radar transponder 
and strobes to facilitate relative navigation.  L-Band 
antennas were arranged to support radar tracking from 
any direction. Orbital adjustments could be performed 
using the Agena propulsion system based on either 
ground command before the docking phase or crew 
command after docking.  The crew could also command 
Agena systems before docking through the radar.  
Docking was performed with the Agena powered up and 
under stable attitude control using its own attitude control 
system.  The attitude control system of either the Gemini 
or the Agena could be used to control the attitude of the 
docked vehicles. 
 After the launch failure of the Agena for Gemini VI, 
the Gemini VII vehicle was modified with a radar 
transponder to serve as a target and was launched before 
Gemini VI (only station-keeping was performed, there 
was no capability for Gemini to Gemini docking).  Later 
in the program a back-up target, the Augmented Target 
Docking Adapter (ATDA) was built and launched by an 
Atlas to serve as the Gemini VIII rendezvous target.  The 
ATDA consisted of the cone hardware attached to a 
Gemini spacecraft entry RCS system module.   
 
Docking Hardware 
 
 The Agena used cone and latch hardware to capture 
three fittings on the nose of the Gemini.  Docking 
hardware design was driven by a need for high reliability 
and short development schedule.  The crew could view     
. 
GEMINI 
Approved for public release via STI DAA 
24483. See statement on title page. 22 
the docking hardware and an Agena mounted status 
display panel during docking.  The cone hardware was 
carried by the Agena and ATDA vehicles, and was built 
by the Gemini manufacturer.  Docking occurred at a 
relative approach velocity of approximately 0.75 
feet/second. 
 
Crew Interface, Procedures, and On-Board 
Computers 
 
 Gemini was the first human spacecraft to carry a 
digital computer.  For rendezvous the computer was used 
to compute maneuver solutions once radar data was 
available.  Since Gemini had an on-board computer and 
IMU, both were used to provide a back-up ascent 
guidance capability in the event of a Titan II radio 
guidance failure.  The crew could switch to the back-up 
guidance mode based on pre-defined criteria.  For entry, 
the computer could fly the vehicle automatically or 
provide the crew with cues for manual piloting.  The crew 
interface is shown in Figure 3.5. 
 Spacecraft and avionics design was simplified 
through the use of manual sequencing and systems 
management, taking advantage of the crew's ability to 
diagnose failures and take the appropriate corrective 
action.  Rendezvous crew procedures were developed to 
cover nominal systems performance, IMU failure, radar 
failure, and computer failure.18  
 
On-Board Navigation and Ground Navigation 
 
 The Mercury ground tracking network was upgraded 
to support Gemini.  Gemini required ground based orbit 
determination of both the chaser and target vehicles for 
computation of chaser orbital adjustments outside of 
radar range.16   Limitations in ground tracking accuracy 
drove the development of closed loop rendezvous 
techniques for the terminal phase.  A rendezvous radar 
and an associated L-Band transponder on the target 
spacecraft (another Gemini, Agena, or the Augmented      
. 
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Figure 3.5  Gemini Computer Keyboard and Displays 
Target Docking Adapter) provided measurements of 
range, range rate, and line-of-sight angles.17  Line-of-
sight angles could also be obtained from the IMU by bore 
sighting the Crew Optical Alignment Sight (COAS) on 
the target spacecraft.  While on-orbit the IMU was 
aligned using horizon sensors with respect to a local level 
reference frame.  Rendezvous procedures enabled the 
crew to successfully rendezvous and dock in the presence 
of an IMU, computer, or radar failure.   
 
On-Board Maneuver Targeting 
 
 Targeting for the Terminal Phase Initiation and Mid-
Course Correction maneuvers was performed using the 
Clohessy-Wiltshire equations in the digital computer, 
based on radar measurements.  Maneuver charts served as 
a back-up to the computer for terminal phase burn 
computations based on range and elevation to the target at 
specific times before the maneuvers.  Chart solutions 
were compared with on-board and Mission Control burn 
solutions.18 
 
Gemini IV 
 
 Gemini IV (June 1965) had an ambitious mission 
plan of station-keeping with the Titan II second stage, an 
Extravehicular Activity (EVA, or spacewalk) to the 
second stage, followed by a separation and rendezvous 
with the second stage.  Gemini IV was not equipped with 
radar, nor were the maneuvers to be targeted on-board.  
Two flashing lights were placed midway up the Titan 
second stage, 180 degrees apart, to assist the crew in 
tracking it.  If successful, these would have been the first 
station-keeping, EVA, and rendezvous activities 
conducted by the U.S. space program. 
 After completion of the spacewalk and station-
keeping activities, a separation and rendezvous sequence 
was planned (Figure 3.6).  After nulling the relative 
velocity on the +V Bar, a posigrade maneuver would be 
performed to initiate the separation.  90 minutes later, at a 
.  
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range of about 15 nautical miles behind the second stage, 
a maneuver would be executed placing the Gemini on an 
intercept trajectory over an orbital transfer of 309 degrees.  
At a range of about 4.6 nautical miles (Terminal Phase 
Initiation in Figure 3.6) the crew would begin trajectory 
control to null the rotation rate of the inertial-line-of-sight 
to the second stage.  This was to be accomplished by 
observing the two flashing lights against the star 
background.   If the star background were not available 
data from the Gemini inertial platform would be used.  
The final phase of the rendezvous was to be conducted in 
daylight.  After another period of station-keeping, the 
Gemini was to execute another posigrade separation 
maneuver and the crew would move on to other mission 
activities. 
  
Figure 3.6  Proposed Gemini IV rendezvous with 
Titan II second stage (June 1965).  
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 The crew performed thruster firings to separate from 
the second stage and set up the station-keeping phase.  
However, more ΔV was obtained than planned, possibly 
due to plume impingent effects on the second stage and 
Gemini.  Plume impingement from OAMS and/or force 
from separation pyrotechnics imparted a 3 foot/second 
ΔV on the second stage.  This complicated the station-
keeping phase (Figure 3.7), along with difficult lighting 
conditions, unexpected second stage tumbling, loss of an 
aft firing RCS thruster, difficulty judging range and range 
rate with eye observations, second stage propellant 
venting (particularly when going from orbital night to 
daylight), insufficient pre-flight training and simulations, 
and lack of crew understanding of the difference between 
flying an aircraft in the atmosphere and flying a 
spacecraft in orbit to achieve desired relative motion with 
another vehicle.  Propellant consumption and timeline 
concerns led to cancellation of the EVA with the second 
stage and the subsequent rendezvous with it.6, 8 The EVA 
was successfully conducted later in the mission.  After the 
mission changes were made to the crew training and 
mission planning processes to ensure that future station-
keeping and rendezvous activities would be successful.  
Gemini IV was an important learning experience.19-20 
 
Gemini V 
 
 Gemini V was the first Gemini mission to carry 
rendezvous radar and fuel cells.  The target was the Radar 
Evaluation Pod (REP) that was deployed from the back of 
the Gemini V adapter module (Figure 3.8).  It was 
equipped with a radar transponder and flashing lights.  
After deployment, about 23 minutes of radar data was 
obtained.  Cooper commanded RCS thruster firings to 
attempt to null the rotation rate of the inertial line-of-sight 
by observing REP motion against the stars.  However, the 
rendezvous activity was canceled after a cryogenic 
oxygen heater failure in a fuel cell forced the crew to shut 
down the radar and other systems to conserve power.  
Later in the mission Gemini V successfully tracked an 
identical Radar Evaluation Pod that was located at the 
Kennedy Space Center.   The crew also successfully 
performed a rendezvous with an imaginary target after 
performing four maneuvers based on data from Mission 
Control. 6, 8 
 
GEMINI 
Figure 3.8  Gemini V REP at rear of 
Gemini Equipment Module (Aug. 1965). 
N
A
S
A
 
Approved for public release via STI DAA 
24483. See statement on title page. 24  
HISTORY OF SPACE SHUTTLE RENDEZVOUS 
Gemini VIA 
 
 The first rendezvous and docking was scheduled for 
the Gemini VI mission. On October 25, 1965, the Agena 
GATV-5002 was launched on an Atlas. However, the 
Agena stage exploded at the start of a maneuver soon 
after separation from the Atlas. The launch of Gemini VI, 
which was scheduled to occur about 100 minutes after the 
Agena launch, was cancelled. NASA developed a revised 
mission plan so that Gemini VII would be launched next, 
and then Gemini VIA (renamed due to the new mission 
plan) would be launched and use Gemini VII as the 
rendezvous target. This would permit a rendezvous 
demonstration without a delay caused by the Agena 
failure investigation. No docking would be performed, 
but Gemini VII would be equipped with the same radar 
transponder and lights carried by the Agena. 
 Gemini VIA finally launched on December 15, after 
a delay caused by a failure to launch on December 12. 
The first spacecraft rendezvous was successfully flown as 
planned (Figure 3.9). Three revolutions of station-keeping 
were performed (Figure 3.10). An in-plane and out-of-
plane fly-around of Gemini VII was performed, and the 
Gemini VIA docking light was used during night station-
keeping. Gemini VIA approached no closer than one foot 
to Gemini VII. Gemini VIA separated and returned to 
Earth the next crew day.21-24 
Figure 3.9  Gemini VIA M=4 ground-up rendezvous 
profile. 
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Figure 3.10  Gemini VII photographed by the 
Gemini VIA crew after the first space 
rendezvous (Dec. 1965). 
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Gemini VII 
 
 Gemini VII was launched on December 4, 1966. 
Before the launch of Gemini VIA radar at the Kennedy 
Space Center was used to test the Gemini VII transponder 
as it flew near the Cape.  Gemini VII served as the target 
vehicle for Gemini VIA (Figure 3.10). 
 One objective of the Gemini VII mission was to 
conduct the station-keeping exercise with the Titan II 
second stage that was attempted, but unsuccessful, on 
Gemini IV.  The Gemini VII station-keeping plan took 
advantage of the Gemini IV experience by applying 
lessons learned to mission planning, crew procedures, and 
crew training.  The station-keeping and relative motion 
activities were conducted immediately after orbit 
insertion and 11 days before the launch of Gemini VIA. 
 After separation from the Titan II second stage the 
crew was to move ahead of the stage by about 100 feet, 
then turn around and approach the stage and perform 
station-keeping.  Establishment of station-keeping was to 
be performed more rapidly than on Gemini IV to avoid 
undesirable relative motion.  After station-keeping the 
crew was to perform a radial down burn to establish a 
relative motion football about 5 miles long (Figure 
3.11).25, 26  This football would bring Gemini VII back to 
the vicinity of the Titan II second stage after one 
revolution of the Earth.  The Titan II second stage was 
equipped with strobes to assist the crew in locating it 
visually.  However, no radar measurements were to be 
taken since Gemini VII was not equipped with the 
rendezvous radar (it did have the radar transponder to 
support the Gemini VIA rendezvous later in the flight), 
nor were there any on-board targeted burns to ensure 
good relative trajectory performance.  After 2.5 
revolutions of Earth the crew was to perform a posigrade 
perigee raise burn.  This burn would raise the Gemini VII 
orbital altitude and end the football relative motion. 
 However, the actual Gemini VII trajectory 
performance did not go as planned.*  In 1995 James 
Oberg published an analysis of the station-keeping and 
relative motion activity that was verified by the Gemini 
VII crew.† 25, 26  After orbit insertion the crew performed 
the standard manual 2 foot/second posigrade burn to         
. 
 * More detail is provided on Gemini VII and the Apollo 16 
brute force rendezvous (see the next chapter) than on other 
missions since both are examples of trajectory dispersions and 
undesirable relative motion that could have presented a crew 
safety hazard or placed mission success at risk. 
† James Oberg documented his Gemini VII analysis in part to 
transmit lessons about trajectory control and mission planning to 
Shuttle Program rendezvous personnel.  Another purpose of his 
analysis was to debunk claims that the Gemini VII crew had 
observed an Unidentified Flying Object (UFO) during this phase 
of the mission.  These claims were made based on 
misinterpretation of crew comments and a misunderstanding of 
Gemini VII relative motion with respect to the Titan II second 
stage. 
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Figure 3.11  Planned relative motion of Gemini VII  
with respect to the Titan II second stage.  Figure  
based on a 1995 analysis by James Oberg. 25   
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Figure 3.12  Likely relative motion of Gemini VII  
with respect to the Titan II second stage.  Figure  
based on a 1995 analysis by James Oberg. 25 
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separate from the Titan II second stage.  The crew then 
yawed Gemini VII 180 degrees so that they could observe 
the stage and film it with a 16 mm motion picture camera.  
The stage was venting propellant and was surrounded by 
small debris.  Additional RCS jet firings were performed 
to close in on the upper stage and establish station-
keeping at a range of approximately 50 to 60 feet. 25, 26   
 At this point the upper stage was backlit by the sun 
making crew observation difficult.  To remove the Sun 
from the line-of-sight the crew fired RCS jets to move 
Gemini VII out-of-plane in the orbital north direction.  
This set up cyclic out-of-plane motion that caused Gemini 
VII to periodically cross the orbital plane of the upper 
stage and re-encounter the associated debris cloud.  
Propellant venting caused the stage to tumble and induced 
translation.  The crew performed additional RCS jet 
firings to maintain station-keeping in response to the 
translation caused by the venting.  The crew later stated 
that the venting made station-keeping with the upper 
stage more difficult than the later station-keeping with the 
controlled Gemini VIA spacecraft. 25, 26   
 Approximately 15 minutes after separation from the 
upper stage the crew performed the radial down burn of 
approximately 9 feet/second to establish the football 
relative motion (Figure 3.11).  The desired spacecraft 
attitude for the burn was -25 degrees in pitch and zero 
degrees yaw.  However, the actual attitude was -41.5 
degrees in pitch and 49 degrees in yaw.  The large value 
for yaw was due to the earlier out-of-plane maneuver to 
remove the Sun from the crew line-of-sight.  The pitch 
attitude error added a small posigrade component to the 
burn.  This posigrade component resulted in a dispersed 
relative motion trajectory (Figure 3.12). 25, 26   
 Gemini VII returned to the general vicinity of the 
Titan II second stage after one revolution (Figure 3.12).  
However, according to Oberg’s analysis the dispersion     
. 
introduced by the posigrade burn component (in turn due 
to the burn attitude error) resulted in Gemini VII being 
behind the second stage (on the minus V Bar, Figure 
3.12), rather than ahead of it (on the plus V Bar, Figure 
3.11) as was planned.  The crew reported that the stage 
was tumbling and surrounded by a cloud of particles.  In 
addition, particles with out-of-plane motion were crossing 
the path of Gemini VII.  These were likely ice crystals 
from vented Titan II propellant or from Gemini VII RCS 
jet firings conducted to move the spacecraft out-of-plane 
to resolve the orbital lighting problem.  One revolution 
later the crew reported that the stage was ahead of them 
(Figure 3.12). 25, 26   
 About half a revolution later the crew performed the 
posigrade perigee raise burn of 59 feet/second.  This burn 
was supposed to have been performed ahead (on the plus 
V Bar, Figure 3.11) of the Titan II upper stage but due to 
the dispersed trajectory was performed behind it (on the 
minus V Bar, Figure 3.12).  During the burn Gemini VII 
encountered more particles from the upper stage. 25, 26   
 The dispersed trajectory resulted in Gemini VII 
moving in the direction of the upper stage (Figure 3.12), 
rather than away from it in the pre-mission plan (Figure 
3.11).  It is not known exactly how close Gemini VII 
came to the Titan II second stage, but if contact had 
occurred the relative velocity would have been high 
enough to result in loss of the crew and the Gemini VII 
spacecraft. 25, 26   
 Oberg estimated that translation from upper stage 
venting likely had little impact on the overall relative 
motion, but the posigrade football burn component 
(caused by the burn attitude error) and differential 
atmospheric drag caused the dispersed relative motion 
trajectory (Figure 3.12).25, 26   
 Gemini VII conducted the first successful proximity 
operations with another spacecraft (station-keeping with   
. 
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acquisition occurred at 76 nm. In the terminal phase, as 
Gemini VIII moved into daylight, the crew turned off the 
Agena lights by radio command. A fly-around of the 
Agena was performed, and the crew performed the first 
docking in space at a rate of 6 inches/second at sunset. No 
electrical discharge occurred when the spacecraft 
touched. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 The crew tested the ability of the Agena Attitude 
Control System (ACS) to maneuver the docked 
spacecraft. An uncommanded left roll occurred as the 
ACS was firing and the crew undocked and performed a 
separation maneuver thinking that there was a problem 
with the Agena ACS. After undocking, the Gemini roll 
and yaw rates increased due to a failed on Gemini RCS 
thruster. The rolling motion interrupted communications 
with the ground-tracking network. The crew shut off the 
Gemini Orbit Attitude and Maneuvering System 
(OAMS), engaged the re-entry RCS system and stabilized 
the vehicle. Later the OAMS was re-activated and the 
crew used the circuit breakers to determine which thruster 
was malfunctioning. A flight rule called for a contingency 
return if the re-entry RCS was activated on-orbit. 
Splashdown occurred in the western Pacific about 10 
hours and 42 minutes after launch. The Agena was parked 
in a higher orbit for possible use on a future mission. 
 
Gemini IX 
 
 A shorter rendezvous, on the third revolution (M=3) 
was planned as the concept for lunar rendezvous also 
involved an M=3 profile (Figure 3.14). Burns from the 
M=4 profile were combined to support the shorter 
timeline while preserving ground tracking opportunities. 
An Insertion Velocity Adjustment Routine (IVAR) burn 
was to be performed soon after separation from the Titan 
II second stage to correct in-plane insertion velocity 
errors. A phasing maneuver would be performed at the 
first apogee, and a corrective combination would be 
performed at the start of revolution three to adjust 
phasing, height, and wedge angle. The co-elliptic 
maneuver would be executed after 90 degrees of orbital 
travel, and the TPI burn would be performed later on the 
third revolution. 
 
Figure 3.13  Gemini VIII M=4 ground-up rendezvous 
profile. 
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the Titan II second stage).  It was also the first use of 
football relative motion. 
 Several lessons can be drawn from the Gemini VII 
experience.  Pre-planned canned burns simplify mission 
planning, crew procedures, and Mission Control 
procedures.  However, these burns assume that the 
spacecraft is in the correct attitude (or in some cases a 
particular position relative to the other spacecraft).  
Attitude errors (and in some cases relative position errors) 
can result in undesirable and potentially unsafe relative 
motion.   
 A chaser spacecraft should approach a target 
spacecraft only if it has some means of quantifying and 
verifying relative motion through relative sensor data.  In 
addition, a means of adjusting the relative motion based 
on sensor data is required.  Without relative navigation 
(radar) the crew was not able to verify desired relative 
motion, nor was it able to correct undesirable motion by 
performing on-board targeted burns.  Insight into 
dispersed relative motion would have permitted Mission 
Control to recognize the risk to safety of executing the 
pre-mission planned perigee raise burn behind the Titan II 
second stage, rather than ahead of it.  Had the safety risk 
been recognized a new burn could have been planned that 
could have met mission requirements while ensuring safe 
relative motion.   
 There is some risk (increased propellant 
consumption, collision, optical sensor contamination, etc.) 
to station-keeping with target spacecraft whose attitude is 
not controlled and that are venting propellants.  
Furthermore, mission design should ensure that orbital 
lighting is appropriate for accomplishing mission 
objectives without requiring unplanned and un-analyzed 
rotational and translational maneuvers.  Such maneuvers 
can result in increased propellant consumption and 
undesirable relative motion that can present a safety 
hazard or complicate subsequent mission activities. 
 
Gemini VIII 
 
 During the investigation of the GATV-5002 failure 
from Gemini VI, McDonnell proposed building a backup 
rendezvous target consisting of off-the-shelf hardware. 
An Agena Target Docking Adapter (ATDA) would be 
bolted to a Gemini re-entry RCS system module. The 
backup target would allow the Gemini Program schedule 
for rendezvous missions to proceed in the event the 
Agena problem could not be quickly resolved. The 
ATDA was delivered to KSC in February of 1966. 
Gemini VIII mission planning proceeded under the 
assumption that either an Agena or the ATDA would be 
used. 
 The Gemini Agena (GATV-5003) was successfully 
placed in orbit on March 16, 1966, and was followed by 
Gemini VIII. The Gemini VIA rendezvous profile (Figure  
3.13) was also used for this mission. Radar measurements 
were obtained at a range of 180 nm, and visual                 
. 
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 On May 17, 1966, the Atlas carrying the Agena 
target (GATV-5004) failed and the Gemini IX launch 
was scrubbed. The program decided to take the ATDA 
out of storage and launch it rather than use an Agena. 
This would ensure that all subsequent Gemini missions 
had an Agena target. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 The ATDA was successfully placed in orbit on June 
1. Telemetry indicated that confirmation of the 
aerodynamic shroud separation from the ATDA had not 
occurred and that the ATDA RCS system could not 
stabilize the attitude dynamics. The Gemini IX liftoff was 
scrubbed when a ground equipment problem prevented an 
update of launch targeting data in time to make the launch 
window. Gemini IX was successfully launched on June 3. 
 Radar lock was intermittent due to the shroud still on 
the ATDA. Solid lock and measurements were eventually 
obtained. During daylight the ATDA was visible at long 
range due to the white color of the shroud. At night the 
ATDA lights were not continuously visible, due to the 
shroud. The shroud had partially opened, but had not 
separated from the ATDA (Figure 3.15). The crew 
performed a fly-around of the slowly tumbling target and 
closed to within 3 feet to describe the shroud and 
associated separation hardware in detail to Mission 
Control. The crew backed away from the ATDA before 
the ground cycled the ATDA docking cone through a 
rigidize/derigidize sequence in an attempt to free the 
shroud. The attempt failed, and suggestions for the 
Gemini to nudge the shroud or perform an EVA to cut the 
shroud lose were turned down for vehicle and crew safety 
reasons. 
 About 45 minutes after intercept, the crew performed 
a radial burn to separate and start the equi-period football 
re-rendezvous sequence (Figure 3.16). A sextant was 
used to measure the angle of the line-of-sight to the 
ATDA above the horizon and radar was not used. The 
TPI maneuver involved an 80 degree transfer to intercept. 
The second rendezvous was successful and the crew 
separated from the ATDA to initiate phasing for a third 
rendezvous the next day. 
 The third rendezvous was to end with a final 
approach from above during daylight to evaluate 
proposed techniques for Command/Service Module 
active rendezvous with the Lunar Module in lunar orbit. 
After phasing in front of the ATDA, Gemini IX                
. 
Figure 3.14  Gemini IX M=3 ground-up  
rendezvous. 
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performed a height adjustment and flew a co-elliptic 
profile above and in front of the ATDA (Figure 3.17). 
Radar was used for the rendezvous. The crew had some 
difficulty visually observing the ATDA in daylight until.  
. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
the terminal phase, but radar performance was good and 
the rendezvous was successful. Additional attempts to 
free the shroud by moving the docking cone and firing the 
ATDA RCS thrusters were not successful. 
 
 
Figure 3.15  ATDA with shroud photographed 
by the Gemini IX crew (June 1966). 
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Gemini X 
 
 The plan for Gemini X was to perform an M=4 
docking (Figure 3.18) with the Gemini X Agena (GATV-
5005).  The Gemini X Agena would then be used perform 
some of the rendezvous burns to enable Gemini X to 
rendezvous with the Gemini VIII Agena (GATV-5003) 
that was in a higher parking orbit.  If the Gemini X 
Agena had been lost during launch, Gemini X would 
have flown a M=16 profile to rendezvous with the 
Gemini VIII Agena.  Accommodating both rendezvous 
plans resulted in a launch window of 35 seconds.4  
 Both the Agena (GATV-5005) and Gemini X were 
launched on July 18, 1966. A larger capacity computer 
enabled more maneuvers to be computed on-board.  The 
final braking was performed in darkness. An IMU 
misalignment resulted in an out-of-plane error at intercept 
of about half a mile.1  More propellant was used than 
planned due to the correction of the trajectory dispersion.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 The docking was successful. Mission Control 
decided to use the Agena for longer than originally 
planned to make up for the lower Gemini X propellant 
quantity.  Gemini X later undocked from the Agena 
(GATV-5005) in preparation for the rendezvous with the 
Gemini VIII Agena (GATV-5003). 
 The second rendezvous, with the Gemini VIII Agena 
(GATV-5003), was performed without radar or strobes 
since the GATV-5003 batteries were dead.  There was no 
power for the Agena radar transponder. The high apogee 
while phasing for the second rendezvous required 
mission planners to avoid crew radiation exposure in the 
South Atlantic Anomaly.  The Gemini VIII Agena, which 
no longer was capable of RCS attitude control, was in a 
gravity gradient attitude (engine to the Earth, docking 
cone to space). A docking was not performed.  Extended 
station-keeping was performed while a micrometeoroid 
package was retrieved from the Agena during an EVA.  
. 
Gemini XI 
 
 The Agena target (GATV-5006) and Gemini XI 
were launched on September 12, 1966. The primary 
objective was a demonstration of first orbit (M=1) 
rendezvous (Figure 3.19). The IVAR maneuver would     
. 
correct for phasing, height, and wedge angle errors. 
IVAR would set up a nodal crossing after 90 degrees of 
orbital travel, at which point another maneuver would 
correct the out-of-plane error. The TPI maneuver, 
designed to be near apogee, was to set up an intercept 
after 130 degrees of orbit travel. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 During the rendezvous it was noted that radar signal 
strength fluctuated. Rendezvous and docking was 
successful. Gemini XI then undocked and performed a 
fly-around as part of a charged particle experiment. 
Another docking was performed, this time by the pilot. 
While docked an EVA was performed to attach a tether 
between the Agena and Gemini XI. Later in the mission 
the spacecraft undocked and the tether experiment was 
conducted.  
 Due to the available propellant remaining, a second 
rendezvous profile, stable orbit, was test flown (Figure 
3.20). The term stable orbit comes from performing long 
range station-keeping on the –V Bar until a transfer to 
intercept is performed at a time that provides appropriate 
lighting, rather than using a coelliptic segment to control 
lighting at intercept.  This involved a 292 degree transfer 
from a point approximately 22 nm behind the Agena on 
the –V Bar.  Radar was not used due to the problem noted 
during the first rendezvous.4   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Gemini XII 
 
 In the spring of 1966, there was some discussion of 
the Gemini XII spacecraft performing a rendezvous with 
the Apollo AS-204 (later called Apollo 1) 
Command/Service Module (CSM) in the fall of 1966.       
. 
Figure 3.18  Gemini X M=4 ground-up rendezvous 
profile. 
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Since the Block 1 Apollo CSM for the flight was not 
capable of rendezvous, Gemini XII would be the active 
vehicle.   
 The Apollo would be launched first.  If CSM system 
checks could be performed on the first flight day, the 
Gemini would launch the next day.  The low Apollo orbit 
(lower than an Agena orbit, and driven by a requirement 
to be able to deorbit with the RCS thrusters in the event of 
a Service Propulsion System failure) would result in a 
lower catch-up rate and short Gemini launch windows.  
To provide two launch windows per day the Apollo 
orbital inclination would be higher than the Agena 
inclination on previous Gemini missions.  The CSM 
would probably execute plane change maneuvers to lower 
yaw steering requirements on the Titan II booster.  The 
standard Gemini VI rendezvous profile with rendezvous 
on the fourth orbit and a 15 nautical mile delta height 
during the coelliptic phase was suggested. 
 The Apollo vehicle was not equipped with a L-band 
transponder to enable tracking by the Gemini radar.  
While there were optical rendezvous navigation (no 
radar) procedures for Gemini, the capability was 
considered to be limited and placing a radar transponder 
on the CSM was considered mandatory.  
 In the end, the proposal was not approved and the 
AS-204 mission was delayed into 1967, beyond the end of 
the Gemini Program.  A later proposal for Gemini XII to 
rendezvous with the Orbiting Astronomical Observatory 
was also turned down.  The fire on January 27, 1967, 
ended the AS-204 mission. 
 Gemini XII was to rendezvous with the Agena on the 
third orbit. (Figure 3.21)  During the coelliptic phase 
radar range rate data was spurious and appeared to have 
lost lock on the Agena.  Rather than wait and see if the 
problem could be resolved Aldrin began taking sextant 
(optical) data to support targeting for the upcoming TPI 
maneuver.  The crew proceeded under the assumption of 
a no-radar rendezvous.  Although radar lock was 
occasionally obtained, the range rate data remained 
spurious.  The two Mid-Course Correction maneuvers 
were small, and Lovell spotted the Agena lights stationary 
against the star background, indicating a good trajectory.  
Rendezvous and docking was successfully accomplished 
(Figure 3.22).19, 27, 28 
 
References 
 
1. Lunney, G. S., “Summary of Gemini Rendezvous 
Experience,” AIAA Flight Test, Simulation and 
Support Conference, AIAA, Reston, VA, 1967. 
 
2. Kramer, P. C., E. E. Aldrin and W. E. Hayes, 
“Onboard Operations For Rendezvous,” Gemini 
Summary Conference, NASA SP-138, Manned 
Spacecraft Center, Houston, TX, February 1-2, 1967, 
pp. 27-40. 
 
3. Harland, D., How NASA Learned To Fly In Space, 
Collector's Guide Publishing Inc., Burlington, 
Ontario, Canada, 2004. 
 
4. Evans, W. B., and M. R. Czarnik, “Summary of 
Rendezvous Operations,” Gemini Summary 
Conference, NASA SP-138, Manned Spacecraft 
Center, 1967, pp. 7-20. 
 
5. Houbolt, J. C., “An Assessment of Rendezvous 
Accomplishments,” Applied Mechanics Reviews, 
Vol. 20, No. 1, January 1967. 
 
6. Hacker, B. C., and J. M. Grimwood, On The 
Shoulders Of Titans, NASA SP-4203, NASA, 
Washington, D.C., 1977. 
 
7. Young, J. W., “Gemini Status Report,” 10th 
Symposium of the Society of Experimental Test Pilots, 
Beverly Hills, Calif., Sept. 23-24, 1966. Society of 
Experimental Test Pilots Technical Review, Vol. 8, 
No. 2, pp. 23-43. 
 
8. McDivitt, J. A., and N. A. Armstrong, “Gemini 
Manned Flight Program to Date,” 9th Symposium of 
the Society of Experimental Test Pilots, Beverly Hills, 
CA, Sept. 24-25, 1965. Society of Experimental Test 
Pilots Technical Review, vol. 7, no. 4, 1965, pp. 134-
166. 
 
Figure 3.22  Agena target spacecraft  
photographed from Gemini XII  (Nov. 1966). 
N
A
S
A
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Introduction 
 
 The choice of the lunar orbit rendezvous mission 
profile for Apollo was announced on July 11, 1962, after 
a trade study comparing it to Earth orbit rendezvous and 
direct descent to the lunar surface.1  Rendezvous 
techniques developed and flight proven in the Gemini 
Program were applied to Apollo.  Piloting and mission 
planning techniques from TPI through docking were 
essentially those developed and flight proven during the 
Gemini Program.  However, Apollo required the 
development of new rendezvous profile concepts to 
cover both nominal and contingency rendezvous burns 
before TPI.2 
 
Contingency Rendezvous 
 
 Nominal Apollo rendezvous involved launch of the 
Lunar Module (LM) ascent stage (Figure 4.1) from the 
lunar surface, followed by lunar orbit insertion and 
rendezvous with the LM as the active vehicle performing 
burns and terminal braking.  However, in the event the     
. 
Comments 
  
1. Aligned CSM with docking target. 
2. CSM active angles only rendezvous 
 
Observe SLA Panel jettison & lighting. 
 
 
2. First LM active rendezvous in LEO.   
LM tracking light failure. 
 
 
2. First LM active rendezvous in lunar orbit. 
 
2. Docking performed with AGS due to IMU 
gimbal lock.  CSM VHF ranging break locks. 
 
2. LM tracking light failure.  No angle marks 
caused CSM TPM solutions to diverge.  
 
2. No rendezvous due to canceled lunar 
landing. 
 
1. Successful hard dock on 6th attempt. 
2. Hard dock on first attempt.  CSM docking 
probe returned to Earth for analysis. 
 
 
 
 
LM return to CSM before descent to Moon 
due to CSM gimbal problem. 
Chaser  
 
CSM 
 
 
CSM 
 
 
1. CSM Gumdrop 
2. LM Spider 
 
1. CSM Charlie Brown 
2. LM Snoopy 
 
1. CSM Columbia 
2. LM Eagle 
 
1. CSM Yankee Clipper 
2. LM Intrepid 
 
1. CSM Odyssey 
2. LM Aquarius 
 
1. CSM Kitty Hawk 
2. LM Antares 
 
 
1. CSM Endeavour 
2. LM Falcon 
 
1. CSM Casper 
2. LM Orion 
 
1. CSM America 
2. LM Challenger 
Flight
  
Apollo 7 
C  
 
Apollo 8 
C Prime 
 
Apollo 9 
D 
 
Apollo 10 
F 
 
Apollo 11 
G 
 
Apollo 12 
H-1 
 
Apollo 13 
H-2 
 
Apollo 14 
H-3 
 
 
Apollo 15 
J-1 
 
Apollo 16 
J-2 
 
Apollo 17 
J-3 
Year
  
1968 
 
 
1968 
 
 
1969 
 
 
1969 
 
 
1969 
 
 
1969 
 
 
1970 
 
 
1971 
 
 
 
1971 
 
 
1972 
 
 
1972 
Profile  
 
1. Station-keeping 
2. Coelliptic 
 
Station-keeping 
 
 
1. Transposition 
2. Coelliptic 
 
1. Transposition 
2. Coelliptic 
 
1. Transposition 
2. Coelliptic 
 
1. Transposition 
2. Coelliptic 
 
1. Transposition 
2. Coelliptic 
 
1. Transposition 
2. Short 
 
 
1. Transposition 
2. Short 
 
1. Transposition 
2. Short 
 
1. Transposition 
2. Short 
Target 
  
1. S-IVB 
2. S-IVB 
 
S-IVB 
 
 
1. S-IVB/LM 
2. CSM  Gumdrop* 
 
1. S-IVB/LM 
2. CSM Charlie  Brown †  
 
1. S-IVB/LM 
2. CSM Columbia †  
 
1. S-IVB/LM 
2. CSM Yankee Clipper †  
 
1. S-IVB/LM 
2. CSM Odyssey †  
 
1. S-IVB/LM 
2. CSM Kitty Hawk †  
 
 
1. S-IVB/LM 
2. CSM Endeavour †  
 
1. S-IVB/LM 
2. CSM Casper †  
 
1. S-IVB/LM 
2. CSM America †  
Table 4.1  Apollo Rendezvous and Station-Keeping Missions 
* For Apollo 9, LM active for docking.  † CSM active for docking.  AGS = Abort Guidance System, Coelliptic = Coelliptic Flight Profile, 
CSM = Command/Service Module, IMU = Inertial Measurement Unit, LEO = Low Earth Orbit, LM = Lunar Module, S-IVB = Third stage 
of Saturn IB or Saturn V, SLA = Spacecraft LM Adapter, Short = Direct Rendezvous, TPM = Terminal Phase Mid-course maneuver, 
Transposition = Transposition and docking maneuver to extract LM from S-IVB, VHF = Very High Frequency. 
CHAPTER 4 -  APOLLO 
LM was not able to continue as the active vehicle the 
Command Service Module (CSM, Figure 4.2) could 
become the active vehicle and complete the rendezvous.  
Unlike Gemini, Apollo rendezvous was safety critical 
and docking was required for the entire crew to return to 
Earth (Figure 4.3). 
 Contingency rendezvous could also be performed 
after CSM/LM separation and before the lunar landing.    
. 
Figure 4.1 Apollo 17 LM 
during   inspection by CSM 
before  docking (Dec. 1972) 
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The LM could abort the landing before or after the 
beginning of the powered descent.3  For contingency 
rendezvous after an aborted landing attempt the LM was 
nominally the active vehicle.  However, as with the 
nominal rendezvous, the CSM could become the active 
vehicle if LM performance issues prevented the LM from 
completing the rendezvous.  
 Contingency rendezvous scenarios were defined as 
follows.   
 
• Contingency rendezvous after CSM/LM undocking 
and separation. 
 
• Contingency rendezvous following abort from the 
LM descent orbit. 
 
• Contingency rendezvous following a LM abort 
during powered descent. 
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Figure 4.2  Apollo 15 CSM 
(July 1971). 
Figure 4.3  CSM active rendezvous after CSM 
bailout for a LM insertion underspeed of 18 
feet per second.  
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• Contingency rendezvous after LM abort from 
the lunar surface soon after landing (the stay/no 
stay decision). 
 
• Contingency rendezvous after nominal LM 
ascent stage orbit insertion. 
 
• Contingency rendezvous after an anytime LM 
ascent stage lift-off from the lunar surface (low 
mission planning priority). 
 
 Only one contingency rendezvous was flown during 
the Apollo Program, on Apollo 16 in April of 1972.  
After CSM and LM separation in lunar orbit a 
contingency brute force re-rendezvous was successfully 
flown. 
 
Rendezvous Target Vehicles 
 
 The LM or CSM could serve as the active or passive 
vehicles during a rendezvous mission. Both vehicles 
possessed relative navigation sensors, relative navigation 
software to process relative measurements, and software 
for targeting burns.4  During nominal or contingency 
lunar orbit rendezvous relative navigation and burn 
targeting functions were exercised, systems performance 
permitting, regardless of whether the vehicle was active 
or passive.  Data and status could be shared between the 
vehicles to aid in performance monitoring, decision 
making, and to provide redundancy.  CSM active 
rendezvous required that rendezvous procedures and 
piloting could be successfully executed by the only crew 
member in the CSM, the CSM pilot. 
 After the Trans Lunar Injection (TLI) burn the CSM 
separated from the Saturn V third stage (the S-IVB) and 
performed the transposition and docking maneuver 
(Figure 4.4).  The CSM then extracted the LM from the 
S-IVB.  Although this involved relative motion the 
maximum separation distance was on the order of 100 
feet and no relative navigation or burn targeting 
procedures of the type performed in lunar orbit were 
required. 
 
Figure 4.4 Apollo 9 view of LM and  
S-IVB during the transposition  
maneuver (March 1969). 
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 In lunar orbit the LM was nominally the active 
vehicle with rendezvous occurring after the completion of 
lunar surface activities.  However, in case of a systems 
issue after CSM and LM separation and before initiation 
of powered descent to the lunar surface, the LM could 
return to the CSM.  A LM performance issue during 
ascent from the lunar surface could cause the LM crew to 
perform a contingency rendezvous profile.  In case the 
LM could not complete a rendezvous with the CSM, the 
CSM could go active and rendezvous with the LM. 
 During the Apollo 7 Earth orbit rendezvous with the 
S-IVB the CSM served as the active vehicle for a test of 
the CSM single crewman piloting rendezvous capability.  
During the Apollo 9 Earth orbit rendezvous test of the 
LM the LM served as the active vehicle throughout 
rendezvous and docking.  However, starting with Apollo 
10, the CSM was the active vehicle during the final 
docking maneuver with the LM in lunar orbit, at ranges 
typically less than 100 feet.  This was due to the docking 
axis and CSM pilot line-of-sight axis being parallel.  LM 
active docking required the LM commander to rotate his 
head 90 degrees to view the CSM through an overhead 
window. 
 LM ascent stage lifetime of the thermal control, 
power, and life support systems was a constraint on 
rendezvous.  The ascent stage lifetime was 7.5 to 8 hours 
fully powered.  This could be extended to ~14 hours with 
some equipment powered down.  While on the lunar 
surface consumables were drawn from the descent stage. 
 
Docking Hardware 
 
 An innovation over the Gemini docking hardware 
was that the Apollo probe and drogue permitted crew 
transfer between vehicles in a pressurized environment.  
However, probe and drogue hardware had to be removed 
from the docking tunnel by the crew before transfer could 
take place.  An advantage to this design was that 
malfunctioning docking hardware could be returned to 
Earth for inspection.  The probe was returned to Earth on 
Apollo 14 since five attempts were required to 
successfully engage the capture latches before the LM 
could be extracted from the S-IVB.5  The probe was 
normally abandoned with the LM ascent stage after the 
lunar EVA crew returned to the CSM. 
 The LM originally had two docking ports.  The top 
one was to be used when the CSM docked with the LM 
and extracted it from the S-IVB stage.  This aligned the 
thrust vector of the LM descent and ascent engines with 
the CSM/LM center of mass in the event either LM 
propulsion system was needed in a contingency, as during 
Apollo 13.6  The front port (which also served as the lunar 
EVA hatch) was to be used when the LM (as the active 
vehicle) docked with the CSM in lunar orbit.  Later the 
forward docking port was eliminated to simplify the LM 
structural design, the forward hatch was customized for 
lunar EVA, and a docking window was added above the   
. 
head of the commander to support LM active docking. 
 The LM was equipped with a docking target mounted 
on the top of the LM to support a CSM active docking.  
To support a LM active docking, a docking target was 
placed in one of the CSM rendezvous windows by the 
CSM pilot.  
 
Relative Navigation 
 
 The LM and CSM Apollo relative sensors had a 
sufficient acquisition envelope and maximum range to 
support relative measurement processing throughout the 
nominal and contingency rendezvous profiles.  The 
ranging limit for both the CSM and LM was about 320 
nautical miles.  Both the CSM and LM had flashing lights 
to aid visual tracking.  Although the LM was nominally 
the active vehicle during rendezvous, the requirement for 
CSM active contingency rendezvous required the 
execution of relative navigation functions by the CSM 
pilot during nominal LM active rendezvous.   
 State vectors from rendezvous navigation on both 
vehicles were available to Mission Control, and could be 
uplinked to either vehicle.  Normally the LM post orbit 
insertion state vector was the only one uplinked to the 
CSM.  The LM Primary Guidance and Navigation Section 
(PGNS), LM Abort Guidance Section (AGS), and CSM 
Primary Guidance, Navigation, and Control System 
(PGNCS) all used Kalman filters for relative 
measurement processing and state vector updates.7, 8 
 The primary LM relative navigation sensor was 
rendezvous radar providing measurements of range, range 
rate, shaft angle, and trunnion angle for Kalman filtering.9 
LM rendezvous navigation using the radar was active 
before and after each burn.  The covariance matrix was 
reinitialized after each burn, before more radar data was 
processed. In addition, raw radar measurements of range, 
range rate, and line-of-sight angle rates were available to 
the LM crew for piloting cues.  The radar had both 
cooperative (with a transponder on the CSM) and passive 
skin tracking modes.  LM radar weight, reliability, 
accuracy, and thermal issues led the Apollo Program to 
consider replacing the radar with an optical system 
consisting of a hand held sextant for the LM pilot, a LM 
star tracker, and a xenon strobe on the CM.  However, the 
radar was retained in 1966 due to the success of a LM 
weight reduction program and performance concerns with 
not having a direct source of range and range-rate 
measurements.  The LM radar was available in time to 
support the first test of LM active rendezvous on Apollo 9 
in March of 1969.   
 The LM was equipped with a Crew Optical 
Alignment Sight (COAS) for backup line-of-sight angle 
data.  Strobes were located on the CSM and to facilitate 
COAS optical tracking with the human eye by the LM 
crew using a COAS.  The LM COAS could be mounted 
in one of two positions.  The first position was in the LM 
commander’s window.  After rendezvous but before          
. 
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docking, the COAS was moved to the overhead docking 
window (above the commander).  This enabled the 
commander to sight on the CSM docking target in a CSM 
rendezvous window.  However, the CSM was normally 
active during docking.  Apollo 9 was the only Apollo 
mission during which the LM was active for docking.  
During Apollo 13 the COAS was used in the 
commander’s window for burn attitude cues.6 
 CSM rendezvous radar was deleted in 1964 as part of 
a weight reduction effort.  At that time it was believed 
that sextant line-of-sight angle measurements would be 
sufficient for CSM relative navigation.  However, by 
1967 it became apparent that angles only relative 
navigation was insufficient to support CSM active 
rendezvous.  VHF ranging was added to the CSM/LM 
VHF communications system later to provide a CSM 
ranging measurement capability.   VHF ranging first flew 
on Apollo 10 in May of 1969.10  In case of a LM radar 
failure, CSM VHF ranging data could be voiced from the 
CSM to the LM and manually entered into the LM AGS.   
 For angle measurements, the CSM was equipped 
with a sextant and a COAS, with a corresponding strobe 
on the LM to support optical tracking.  CSM state vectors 
for both vehicles were used by the PGNCS for vehicle 
pointing to aid in sextant tracking and pointing the 
rendezvous radar transponder at the LM.  Sextant marks 
and VHF ranging marks were taken at a rate of about one 
per minute.   
 
Crew Interface, Procedures, and On-Board 
Computers 
 
 The LM was the first U.S. human spacecraft with 
redundant computers and Inertial Measurement Unit 
(IMUs).  The primary flight computer and stable member 
IMU in the LM PGNS were the same as was used in the 
CSM PGNCS.    The CSM and LM primary computers 
had a simple display and keyboard interface (Figure 4.5).  
The display could show three 5-digit numbers in either 
decimal or octal formats.  The Apollo user interface and 
computer capacity was a significant improvement over 
Gemini.  Crew communication with the LM PGNS and 
CSM PGNCS computers used a noun and verb 
nomenclature that was limited to 99 of each type.  
 The AGS was a backup LM GNC system with a 
computer and strapdown IMU.  It provided basic 
functionality to permit the LM to establish a safe orbit 
and rendezvous with the CSM after a LM PGNS failure.  
It also had a rendezvous navigation and maneuver 
targeting capability.  The AGS was available during all 
LM flight phases (pre-descent orbit coast, powered 
descent, lunar surface, powered ascent, rendezvous and 
docking).  However, the AGS could not support a lunar 
landing.  AGS hardware and software were developed by 
different contractors than the PGNS hardware and 
software.  The AGS concept was similar to that of the 
Shuttle Backup Flight System (BFS).   
 .  
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Figure 4.5  Apollo Display and Keyboard Panel (DSKY). 
 The mission commander executed maneuvers and 
managed the PGNS while the LM pilot managed the 
AGS.  As with the LM PGNS, the CSM PGNCS had a 
complete rendezvous capability.  
 
On-Board Maneuver Targeting 
 
 Both the LM (PGNS and AGS) and CSM (PGNCS) 
computers could compute lunar rendezvous maneuvers 
for either vehicle to perform Coelliptic Flight Profile, 
short rendezvous profile (Apollo 14 and subsequent 
missions), or contingency rendezvous profiles.  The CSM 
and LM computers used a Lambert algorithm and other 
targeting routines designed for the lunar rendezvous 
profiles. Due to the safety critical nature of rendezvous, 
computer independent burn chart solutions were also 
computed on-board both the LM.  The LM crew had five 
maneuver solutions available to them for cross checks.  
These included maneuver solutions from the LM PGNS, 
LM AGS, LM charts, CSM PGNCS, and Mission 
Control.  On-board LM and CSM burn solutions based on 
relative navigation were primary, ground solutions served 
as backup.  Stable orbit targeting software was also 
available in the CSM PGNCS and LM PGNS computers 
but was never used.11, 12 
 The delta-velocity vector burned by the LM was 
voiced to the CSM pilot for incorporation into the CSM 
navigation estimate of the LM state vector.  Starting with 
Apollo 10 the CSM PGNCS could compute LM 
maneuver solutions for those burns before TPI.  The CSM 
pilot normally computed and voiced over to the LM out-
of-plane maneuver solutions.  CSM sextant navigation 
provided more accurate estimates of out-of-plane 
dynamics than LM rendezvous radar navigation. 
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Automation 
 
 Although the CSM was nominally the passive vehicle 
during rendezvous, the CSM pilot performed relative 
navigation and targeting tasks in case a LM systems 
problem kept the LM from completing the rendezvous.  
CSM procedures for both the passive and active vehicle 
roles were complex and labor intensive.  The first test of 
Apollo CSM single crew member piloting for rendezvous 
occurred during the Apollo 7 rendezvous with its own S-
IVB stage (October 1968). 
 Comments made after the return of Apollo 11 by 
CSM pilot Michael Collins about the heavy workload 
(approximately 850 keystrokes) led the Apollo Program 
to seriously consider automating CSM rendezvous 
procedures in the fall of 1969.  This resulted in the 
MINKEY program that was flown on the last three lunar 
missions (the J series).  The level of automation in the 
CSM passive and active rendezvous procedures was 
limited by on-board computer capacity and the need for 
the CSM pilot to manually take sextant marks.  When 
available, ground monitoring of CSM systems was very 
helpful in reducing the workload of the pilot so he could 
concentrate on guidance, navigation, and control 
procedures and performance monitoring.  The addition of 
automation did not reduce the flexibility inherent in the 
CSM PGNCS rendezvous procedures.13 
 
Other Relative Motion Analysis 
 
 Relative motion analysis and flight techniques 
developed for rendezvous were also applied to ensure that 
undesirable contact between Apollo spacecraft and other 
spacecraft components did not occur.  Re-contact analysis 
was applied to both nominal and contingency procedures.  
The analysis involved the Command Module, Service 
Module, Launch Escape Tower, Lunar Module ascent 
stage, Lunar Module descent stage, Saturn S-IVB stage, 
Spacecraft Lunar Module Adapter Panels, Apollo lunar 
sub-satellite (deployed on Apollo missions 15 and 16), 
CSM experiment instrument booms, the Service Module 
Scientific Instrument Module bay door, and the 
Command Module docking ring and probe adapter. 14 
 
Development and Evolution of the Nominal Lunar 
Orbit Rendezvous Profile 
 
 Three types of nominal lunar rendezvous profiles 
were developed for Apollo.  These were the direct ascent 
(never flown), the four burn coelliptic flight profile 
(CSI/CDH), and the short rendezvous.  The goal 
throughout the development and evolution of the 
rendezvous profiles was a standard terminal phase that 
was insensitive to orbit insertion dispersions, could be 
easily flown manually by the crew, and did not exceed the 
propellant capacity of the LM ascent stage RCS.2  This 
goal was achieved with the CSI/CDH and short                    
. 
 
rendezvous profiles.  Nominal profile development went 
through eleven phases, from early 1963 through late 
1969.15, 16 
 
Phase 1 – Direct Ascent 
 
 The direct ascent profile was conceived in the early 
1960s before the vehicle hardware and dispersions were 
defined (Figure 4.6).  LM ascent guidance established an 
intercept trajectory at orbit insertion.  The transfer angle 
from insertion to intercept varied from 120 degrees to 300 
degrees depending on when the launch occurred within 
the approximately 5 minute launch window.  Two mid-
course correction maneuvers were added before intercept 
so that delta-velocity requirements during the terminal 
phase (braking) were within the capability of the LM 
ascent RCS.  This also enabled ascent dispersions to be 
corrected before the final approach.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 However, there were three problems associated with 
this profile.  First, the final approach angle (direction) in 
the terminal phase was variable, which complicated crew 
procedures.  Secondly, much of the profile occurred 
behind the Moon, therefore there was no ground support 
available due to the lack of communication.  Third, since 
an intercept trajectory was targeted at orbit insertion the 
insertion (ascent guidance) targets were a function of the 
lift-off time within the launch window.  The launch 
window was sensitive to unsafe perigee after insertion. 
 
Phase 2 – Standard Insertion Parking Orbit with 
Standard Direct Intercept at Variable Time 
 
 A profile using a parking or phasing orbit concept 
was developed that would standardize the final approach 
direction, permit insertion into a standard orbit, and 
permit communication with Mission Control during some 
portions of the rendezvous (Figure 4.7).  The insertion 
orbit was standardized to an 8 to 10 nm insertion altitude 
with a 10 to 20 nm apolune.  This eliminated the unsafe 
perilune problem with the previous profile.  There was a 
standard 160 degree transfer from the Terminal Phase       
. 
Terminal 
Braking 
Insertion 
CSM in 80 nm  
circular orbit 
Figure 4.6 Phase 1, Direct Ascent. 
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Initiation (TPI) burn to intercept.  The TPI time was 
variable and was a function of the lift-off time within the 
launch window.  In addition, the profile provided a planar 
correction (wedge angle) before the terminal phase.  TPI 
also occurred on the near side of the Moon, permitting 
Mission Control support for that burn. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Phase 3 – Original Three Burn Coelliptic Profile 
 
 By early 1965 three issues became apparent that had 
to be addressed.  First, the TPI time varied based on the 
lift-off time within the launch window.  This in turn 
resulted in variable orbital lighting conditions during the 
terminal phase (braking, station-keeping, and docking).  
Second, slow and relatively constant approach rates 
before the TPI burn were needed to assist relative sensor 
tracking and crew monitoring activities.  Third, the 70 nm 
delta-height at TPI resulted in final braking burns too 
large to be executed by the LM ascent stage RCS.  Use of 
the ascent engine would require an attitude maneuver to 
burn attitude causing the crew to lose sight of the CSM 
for a period of time during the final approach.  This was 
not desirable from a safety standpoint. 
 These issues were addressed in a new three burn 
profile that incorporated a coelliptic orbit before TPI 
(Figure 4.8).  The insertion orbit apolune varied as a 
function of lift-off time.  The coelliptic burn, called 
Constant Delta Height (CDH), was executed half a 
revolution after insertion.  The launch window limited the 
coelliptic delta-height to between 15 nm and 50 nm.  
Braking requirements associated with the 50 nm delta-
height were within the capability of the LM RCS.  The 
variation in the insertion orbit, and the resulting coelliptic 
delta-height, caused TPI to be executed at a fixed time, 
independent of the lift-off time with in the launch 
window.  This provided a standard 150 degree transfer to 
intercept. 
Terminal 
Braking 
PC 
Insertion TPI 
CSM in 80 nm 
circular orbit 
Figure 4.7 Phase 2, standard 
insertion parking orbit with standard 
direct intercept at variable time. 
TPI 
Insertion 
CDH 
TPF 
Figure 4.8 Phase 3, Direct 
Coelliptic Sequence. 
CSM in 80 nm 
circular orbit 
  
 
Phase 4 – The Original CSI/CDH Profile 
 
 Dispersion analyses conducted from late 1965 to mid 
1966 revealed that orbit insertion dispersions could result 
in large TPI time slips.  The variable insertion orbit was 
believed to require complex crew monitoring techniques.  
A Coelliptic Sequence Initiation (CSI) burn was added to 
the profile between insertion and CDH to correct for 
dispersions (in conjunction with the CDH burn) and 
permit a standard insertion orbit (Figure 4.9).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 The new standard insertion orbit was 10 by 30 nm, 
with insertion occurring at perigee.  The CSI burn was 
executed 30 minutes after insertion.  It was constrained to 
the local horizontal to ensure that the perilune would not 
be lowered.  CDH was executed at the next apolune 
following CSI to minimize propellant consumption.  It 
was usually a horizontal burn due to the circular 80 nm 
CSM orbit.  Delta-height at CDH varied from 15 to 50 nm 
and the transfer time from CSI to CDH varied from ~51 
to ~28 minutes due to the variation in lift-off time within 
the launch window.  CSI adjusted the phasing rate, or the 
delta-height of the post CDH orbit, to permit launch 
within the nominal launch window and to correct for         
. 
Insertion 
CSI 
CDH 
TPI 
TPF 
CSM in 80 nm 
circular orbit 
Figure 4.9 Phase 4, original 
CSI-CDH Coelliptic Sequence. 
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dispersions.  The TPI burn occurred approximately over 
the landing site, permitting Mission Control support of 
TPI.  The TPI to intercept transfer angle was standardized 
at 140 degrees. 
 This new profile made the TPI time less sensitive to 
orbit insertion dispersions.  More standardized range and 
range rate profiles permitted the development of backup 
burn solution charts.  Desired standard insertion 
conditions also decreased procedural complexity. 
 
Phase 5 – Optimized Terminal Phase 
 
 By early 1967 the profile lighting became standard 
with TPI occurring at a fixed lunar longitude.  The 
priority of Mission Control support for burns before TPI 
was changed to be higher than support for post TPI 
activities.  The profile was modified to provide a 130 
degree TPI to intercept transfer angle to optimize the 
terminal braking phase.  TPI was changed to occur 20 
minutes before orbital sunset to provide optimum terminal 
phase lighting.   
 
Phase 6 – CSM Orbit Decrease to 60 nm 
 
 By early 1968 three problems with the rendezvous 
profile became apparent. 1) The LM RCS and the SM 
RCS (for the CSM rescue of the LM case) had 
insufficient propulsion capability to complete a 
rendezvous with the large delta-heights associated with 
the nominal launch window.   2) Raising the apolune 
insertion orbit was not feasible given the small LM ascent 
propulsion system propellant margin.  3)  In some 
dispersed cases the LM could be outside the 400 nm 
range of the LM radar during the early part of the 
rendezvous.  These issues were resolved by lowering the 
CSM parking orbit from 80 nm to 60 nm.  This also 
lowered propellant requirements for the LM ascent stage 
during LM aborts and the descent stage during landing.  
Elimination of the 4 to 5 minute launch window bounded 
the acceptable coelliptic delta-height to ~25 nm.  The 
lower delta-height variation allowed the crew timeline 
between CSI and TPI to become more standardized. 
 
Phase 7 – Extended CSI-CDH Profile 
 
 Shortcomings of the Phase 6 profile were insufficient 
time between insertion and the CSI burn for IMU 
alignments and CSM VHF ranging and sextant tracking 
of the LM.  In addition, there was a need to perform a 
planar correction burn (wedge angle) at some point 
between insertion and the TPI burn.  Such a burn would 
avoid the need for large out-of-plane burns during the 
final approach.   
 The extended CSI-CDH sequence had increased time 
between insertion and CSI, and CSI and CDH.  Both 
transfer times were 50 minutes.  The additional time 
before CSI permitted an IMU alignment and sufficient      
. 
relative tracking, both of which increased the accuracy of 
the CSI burn.  The additional time between burns also 
made the crew timeline more manageable.  A Plane 
Change (PC) burn was placed ~29 minutes before CDH.  
PC established a nodal crossing at CDH for the out-of-
plane correction.   This provided a nearly co-planar 
terminal phase even with out-of-plane dispersions at orbit 
insertion.  TPI lighting was delayed to the mid-point of 
orbital night since CDH now occurred a few minutes 
before the Phase 6 TPI time.  
 
Phase 8 – Controlling the CSI to CDH Transfer Time 
 
 By late 1968 it became apparent that the transfer time 
between CSI and CDH could significantly decrease under 
dispersed conditions.  CDH was performed at the first 
apsis after CSI.  Completion of the plane change at CDH 
could result in a large out-of-plane delta velocity 
component at CDH. 
 The timeline between CSI and CDH was 
standardized regardless of dispersions by performing 
CDH one half a revolution after CSI, instead of at the first 
apsis after CSI (Figure 4.10).  CSI was performed at 
apolune, 55 minutes after insertion, to avoid a large radial 
delta-velocity component at CDH.  This resulted in nearly 
horizontal CDH burns unless there was a large radial 
dispersion at orbital insertion.  The nodal crossing was 
targeted by CSI to occur at the PC burn point.  Using CSI 
to establish the nodal crossing at PC saved propellant 
since the CSI delta-velocity was normally larger than the 
CDH delta-velocity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Phase 9 – Insertion Orbit Changed to 45 nm by 10 nm 
 
 Simulations involving the crew revealed that the LM 
was outside the CSM VHF ranging tracking range before 
CSI.  This was resolved by inserting the LM into a 45 nm 
by 10 nm orbit.  Under nominal conditions CSI occurred 
at the desired coelliptic delta-height of 15 nm, resulting in 
a near zero CDH delta-velocity.  TPI occurred at the mid-
point of orbital night, 33 minutes after the CDH burn. 
 
CSM in 60 nm 
circular orbit 
Insertion 
CSI 
TPF 
PC 
CDH 
TPI 
Figure 4.10 Phase 8, CSI-CDH 
Coelliptic Sequence with 
controlled CSI to CDH transfer 
time. 
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Insertion 
Figure 4.11 Phase 10, Coelliptic 
Flight Profile as flown on Apollo 
11 and Apollo 12. 
Phase 10 – Apollo 11 CSI-CDH Profile 
 
 It was desired to increase the CDH to TPI transfer 
time by 5 minutes to accommodate possible early TPI 
time slips due to navigation and burn execution 
dispersions.  To increase the transfer time between CDH 
and TPI by 5 minutes without delaying TPI, lunar orbit 
insertion targeted an upward radial component of 30 
feet/second.  This decreased the transfer time from 
insertion to CSI and CSI continued to be performed at 
apolune. 
 This profile (Figures 4.11 and 4.12) was flown on 
Apollo 11, Apollo 12, and was planned for Apollo 13.  
However, there were four unresolved issues with the 
profile.  1) The terminal phase lighting was not optimum. 
2) Under certain dispersions CDH could have a radial 
delta-velocity component.  3) The LM ascent propulsion 
system had low margins.  4) The total time between orbit 
insertion and docking was too long. 
 
Figure 4.12  Nominal Apollo 11 (Mission G) Profile 
 Terminal Phase Initiation (TPI) 
 
• Elevation angle of 26.6 deg. 
• DV along line-of-sight to CSM, 
  provides a visual reference in 
  the event of system failures. 
• Nominal DV 25 ft/sec, 130 
  degrees transfer over 43 min. 
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              Insertion 
 
• 10 nm x 45 nm orbit. 
• CSM in 60 nm orbit. 
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   ascent. 
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   min. from insertion to    
   station keeping on +V  
   Bar. 
Coelliptic Sequence Initiation (CSI) 
                        
• Adjust catch-up rate to achieve 
   26.6 deg. elevation angle at mid- 
   point of lunar darkness (TPI). 
• Raise perilune to 45 nm. 
• DH may vary from 15 nm due to 
   ascent dispersions. 
• DV constrained to be horizontal 
  to avoid lowering perilune. 
• Varying DH permits CSI to be  
  horizontal while maintaining  
  terminal phase timing. 
• If CSM tracking indicates sizable  
  out-of-plane dispersion, DV    
  added to set up nodal crossing 90   
  deg after CSI (PC burn). 
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Figure 4.13 Phase 11, Short (Direct) 
rendezvous profile as flown on 
Apollo missions 14 through 17. 
Phase 11 – Short Rendezvous Profile 
 
 The CSI-CDH coelliptic profile was successfully 
flown on Apollo 11 (July 1969) and Apollo 12 
(November 1969).  However, the time from insertion to 
station-keeping with the CSM was approximately 3.5 
hours.  Planning for the Apollo 14 mission indicated a 
crew day of 23.5 hours.  Excellent vehicle performance 
on Apollo 11 and Apollo 12 coupled with concerns about 
the length of the crew day led to development of a short 
rendezvous profile that saved about 2 hours.  Much of the 
design of this profile was complete by January of 1970.  
The profile was similar to one flown on Gemini XI 
(September 1966).  This profile was successfully flown 
on Apollo missions 14, 15, 16, and 17. 
 Short rendezvous was a precisely timed orbit 
insertion providing a TPI burn relative position that in 
turn yielded appropriate terminal phase lighting (Figures 
4.13 and 4.14).  TPI was executed on a fixed time after 
orbit insertion, 38 minutes for Apollo 14, 45 minutes for 
Apollo 15, and 47 minutes for missions 16 and 17.  Short 
rendezvous lift-off time was about 2.5 minutes earlier 
than the lift-off time for the CSI-CDH profile.  CSM and 
LM IMU platforms were aligned before lift-off.  For a 
nominal mission no alignments were conducted between 
lift-off and docking due to the short timeline.  The 
maximum range between the CSM and LM during the 
rendezvous was about 145 nm, well within the tracking 
ranges of the relative sensors.  
 
 
20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200 220 240 260 280 
20 
40 
•  
•  
CSI 
INSERTION 
•  
CDH 
•  
TPI •  •  
MCC1 
•  
   Planar  
Correction 
MCC2 
ΔH = 15 nm (nominal) 
Lunar Surface Units are in nautical miles. 
•  •  
INSERTION 
TWEAK 
Start Radar Flown on Apollo 11 and 
12, and planned for 13. 
Flown on Apollo 
14, 15, 16, and 17. 
Figure 4.14  Comparison of Short and Coelliptic Rendezvous Profiles  
 The required insertion orbit was approximately that 
required for the CSI-CDH coelliptic profile.  Short 
rendezvous nominally was a 10 nm x 48 nm insertion 
orbit, while the CSI-CDH coelliptic profile had a 
nominally 10 nm x 45 nm insertion orbit.  Apolune of the 
insertion orbit could vary from 45 nm to 50 nm, and the 
transfer time from insertion to TPI varied from 38 
minutes to 45 minutes.  Variations were due to the CSM 
parking orbit and lunar stay time.  A Mission Control 
computed tweak burn performed 2 or 3 minutes after orbit 
insertion could correct for nominally expected insertion 
dispersions. 
 The TPI delta-velocity was no longer along the line-
of-sight vector to the CSM.  TPI had to be performed with 
the LM ascent propulsion system, or the CSM Service 
Propulsion System in the event of a CSM rescue of the 
LM.  TPI was targeted to force a nodal crossing 90 
degrees later, at the second Mid-Course Correction burn, 
to permit correction of out-of-plane dispersions.   
 The terminal approach geometry was the same as the 
CSI-CDH rendezvous.  TPI was executed on time rather 
than on elevation angle since on a nominal short 
rendezvous the desired elevation angle occurred twice 
(nominal TPI time and ~18 minutes after insertion).  In 
addition, in some dispersed cases the desired TPI 
elevation angle did not occur in the desired time frame. 
 In the event of degraded systems performance on 
either vehicle before lift-off, the CSI-CDH profile would 
be flown.  If degraded systems performance occurred 
during ascent, the crew could switch (also called a 
“bailout”) to the CSI-CDH profile ~5 minutes after 
insertion (Figure 4.15).  For example, if the post insertion 
tweak burn delta-velocity was greater than 60 feet/second 
or the insertion out-of-plane wedge angle was greater 
than 0.5 degrees a bailout to the CSI-CDH was 
performed.  The CSI-CDH coelliptic profile was also 
retained for pre-descent aborts and powered descent 
aborts before lunar landing. 
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Figure 4.15  LM active rendezvous following a LM 
bailout for an insertion underspeed of 50 feet per 
second.  
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Apollo Missions 
 
 This section provides a summary of rendezvous 
activities that occurred on the Apollo missions.17  Most of 
the activities described include the transposition and 
docking maneuver after Trans Lunar Injection, undocking 
in lunar orbit before LM powered descent to the surface, 
and rendezvous after completion of lunar surface 
exploration.  More details may be found in the references. 
 
AS-204 (Apollo 1, Scheduled for February 1967) 
 
 At the time of the fatal fire on January 27, 1967, the 
AS-204 (later known as Apollo 1) mission was scheduled 
for launch on Tuesday, February 21, 1967.  The mission 
was to test Block 1 Apollo systems.  The Block 1 vehicle 
was not equipped for rendezvous and docking, nor was 
AS-204 to carry a Lunar Module.   
 Near the end of the second orbit, the CSM was to 
separate from the S-IVB stage. The crew would perform 
the transposition maneuver that would be flown on 
subsequent missions before docking with and extraction 
of the LM (no LM was to be carried on Apollo 1). 
Station-keeping was to be performed while the crew 
photographed and filmed liquid oxygen and liquid 
hydrogen venting by the S-IVB. After leaving the S-IVB, 
the CSM would not have re-rendezvoused with it.18 
 
Apollo 7 (C Mission, October 1968) 
 
 Apollo 7 (October 1968) was the first crewed flight 
of the Command/Service Module and performed 
extensive systems checks over a 12-day mission in low 
Earth orbit.  After separation from the S-IVB the crew 
performed a transposition and simulated docking 
maneuver.  A LM was not carried on the mission but a 
docking target was installed on the S-IVB.  One S-IVB 
adapter panel only deployed to about 25 degrees rather 
than the desired 45 degrees.  The crew aligned the CSM 
with the docking target, but did not approach too close 
due to the angle of the one panel.  The panels would be     
. 
jettisoned on all subsequent flights after CSM separation 
and before docking with the LM.  After completion of the 
station keeping and photography activities the CSM 
separated and phased ahead of the S-IVB.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 On the second day of the mission a rendezvous was 
conducted with the S-IVB (Figure 4.16).  This was to 
evaluate the CSM contingency LM rescue rendezvous 
capability planned for later missions in the event of an 
aborted lunar landing or LM system problems.19  The 
ability of one crewmember, the CSM pilot, to fly the 
rendezvous would also be evaluated.  The rendezvous 
could have been delayed one day in the event of a change 
to the mission timeline caused by vehicle performance 
issues.  Atmospheric drag and orbital lifetime 
uncertainties of the S-IVB ruled out any delay in 
rendezvous execution beyond one day. 
 About 26.5 hours into the mission, at a range of about 
70 nm in front of the S-IVB, a burn was conducted to 
initiate the rendezvous.  Sextant marks were taken during 
daylight periods to support computation of burns.  Unlike 
subsequent Apollo flights, no LM navigation or burn 
solution data was available for cross checking CSM burn 
and navigation data.  Mission Control computed burn 
solutions were available to the CSM crew for comparison.  
A coelliptic approach as flown on Gemini and planned for 
the lunar missions was conducted.  The TPI delta-velocity 
was designed to occur along the line-of-sight to the target, 
but the crew could not see the S-IVB flashing lights 
through the CSM windows during TPI execution. 
 Execution of the rendezvous procedures by one 
crewmember proved to be challenging.  The crew was 
able to use COAS subtended angles to estimate range to 
the S-IVB during braking, but would have felt more 
comfortable with radar data.  Range derived from 
subtended angles could be more difficult with the much 
smaller LM.  Starting with Apollo 10 (May 1969) VHF 
range measurements were available to the CSM pilot.  
LM rendezvous radar data (if available) could be voiced 
over by the LM crew during a CSM active rendezvous. 
Figure 4.16  Apollo 7 rendezvous with S-IVB stage 
(Oct. 1968). 
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 On the second and third days of the flight the S-IVB 
was tracked with the CSM sextant at ranges of 80, 160, 
and 320 nm.  On the fourth day the CSM, carrying a LM 
radar transponder, was tracked by a LM rendezvous radar 
located at White Sands, New Mexico.  Some 47 seconds 
of data over ranges from 390 to 415 nautical miles were 
obtained. 20, 21 
 
Apollo 8 (C-Prime Mission, December 1968) 
 
 Apollo 8 did not carry a Lunar Module and no 
rendezvous activities were performed. However, after 
separation from the S-IVB the CSM performed the 
transposition maneuver so that the crew could monitor 
Spacecraft LM Adapter (SLA) panel separation and 
orbital lighting. The panels separated from the S-IVB 
without any danger of re-contact and orbital lighting was 
adequate for docking. Since there was no LM, the crew 
did not take the CSM too close to the S-IVB. Formation 
flying with the S-IVB was accomplished without 
difficulty. An additional separation maneuver was 
performed to ensure adequate CSM separation from the 
S-IVB. 22, 23 
  
Apollo 9 (D Mission, March 1969) 
 
 Apollo 9 was the first flight of the LM.  The mission 
involved extensive tests of CSM and LM systems in low 
Earth orbit.  Included was a 6 hour 23 minute rendezvous 
activity that tested all CSM and LM systems associated 
with rendezvous (Figure 4.17).  Testing rendezvous in 
low Earth orbit was desirable before rendezvous in lunar 
orbit was conducted.  Successful rendezvous and docking 
was required to ensure the safe return to Earth of the LM 
crew.  Apollo 9 performed the first safety critical space 
rendezvous.  The profile included burns that progressively 
increased the separation distance between the CSM and 
LM as systems on both vehicles exhibited expected 
performance.  The profile ended with the execution of a 
coelliptic CSI-CDH-TPI rendezvous. 24 
 
Figure 4.17  Apollo 9 LM separation and rendezvous 
with the CSM in Earth orbit (March 1969). 
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 After orbit insertion the CSM separated from the S-
IVB.  The transposition maneuver was completed and the 
CSM successfully docked with the LM and extracted it 
from the S-IVB.  The crew encountered no difficulty 
removing the docking probe from the docking tunnel.  
The probe had to be removed for the crew to enter the 
LM. 
 On the fourth flight day, the day before the 
undocking, separation, and rendezvous, an Extra 
Vehicular Activity (EVA) was conducted.  The crew 
successfully tested a contingency procedure for EVA 
crew transfer from the LM to the CSM if the docking 
tunnel could not be used. 
 Undocking, rendezvous, and docking occurred on the 
fifth flight day.  After undocking LM attitude maneuvers 
were performed to permit the CSM pilot to visually 
inspect and photograph the LM.  The CSM then 
performed a 5 foot/second radial down separation 
maneuver to set up mini-football relative motion.  The 
mini-football permitted both vehicles to perform IMU 
alignments while not requiring precise station-keeping 
piloting at the same time, provided a large enough range 
between the vehicles to permit LM rendezvous radar 
checkout, and permitted a contingency re-rendezvous 
without performing relative navigation and on-board burn 
targeting.  The mini-football was the same as that planned 
for the lunar missions between separation and LM 
execution of the Descent Orbit Insertion (DOI) burn. 24 
 A 90.7 foot/second phasing burn, primarily radial up, 
was performed by the LM Descent Propulsion System 
(DPS) under the control of the LM AGS at a range of 
about 2 nm from the CSM.  This burn, computed only by 
Mission Control, established a larger football profile 
(equi-period orbit) with respect to the CSM.  The delta-
height of the achieved football was 12.2 nm.  
 From this orbit the LM could execute the nominal 
rendezvous plan or perform a contingency return to the 
CSM in the event the systems performance of either 
vehicle prevented continuation of the nominal rendezvous 
plan.  In the event that a LM or CSM performance 
problem required cancelation of the nominal CSI-CDH-
TPI rendezvous and required a sooner than planned 
docking, an abort TPI burn opportunity was placed in the 
equi-period orbit.  The TPI time was defined by a 27.5 
degree elevation angle of the LM to CSM line-of-sight 
with respect to the local horizontal.  On a nominal equi-
period football TPI would occur at a delta-height 10 nm 
below the CSM orbit.  Both the LM and CSM 
incorporated relative sensor measurements (LM radar, 
CSM sextant) and computed the abort TPI burn solutions.  
The abort TPI burn was not executed since both vehicles 
were performing as expected.  Good agreement between 
the nominal pre-mission, LM, CSM, and Mission Control 
abort TPI solutions indicated that systems on both 
vehicles were functioning well. 24, 25 
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 A Mission Control computed 42.7 foot/second 
phasing burn (item 3 on Figure 4.17), primarily posigrade, 
was executed to place the LM in a coelliptic orbit above 
that of the CSM.  The burn was performed with the LM 
DPS and was controlled by the LM PGNS.  After the burn 
the coelliptic delta-height was 12.2 nm.  Once the burn 
was executed there were no other contingency return 
options in the event of degraded LM or CSM systems 
performance.  Docking required execution of the entire 
CSI-CDH-TPI profile by either the LM (nominal) or the 
CSM (contingency mirror image burns). 
 The CSM pilot performed sextant tracking and mirror 
image burn targeting for the CSI, CDH, TPI, and the two 
mid-course correction burns.  Execution of mirror image 
burns would have been performed in the event a CSM 
rescue of the LM was required (i.e. the LM could not 
complete the rendezvous).  Mirror image burns would 
have to be executed within one minute of the planned LM 
ignition time for a burn.   
 CSI was a 40 foot/second retrograde (horizontal) 
burn performed with LM RCS.  The LM descent stage 
was jettisoned (staged) after the start of RCS thrusting.  
The CSI burn was constrained to be horizontal at a fixed 
time-of-ignition to place the LM at the desired TPI line-
of-sight elevation angle at a desired time.  It was 
computed by the LM, CSM, and Mission Control.  After 
CSI was performed a maximum range of 98 nm between 
the vehicles was reached. 
 After CSI the CSM pilot noted that the LM tracking 
light had failed.  The LM crew did not see any flashes 
from the tracking light reflected by the LM RCS quads.  
The failure of the LM tracking light during the CSI burn 
limited CSM sextant tracking to orbital daylight.  No 
sextant marks were taken between CSI and CDH, but 
sextant marks during orbital daylight between CDH and 
TPI were obtained.  The LM was visible during daylight 
out to the maximum range in orbital daylight of 70 nm.  
When operating the LM tracking light was also visible 
during orbital day.  CSM VHF ranging was not available 
until the Apollo 10 mission (May 1969). 25 
 The CDH burn occurred at the first apsidal crossing 
after CSI.  It was performed with the LM Ascent 
Propulsion System and consisted of a 39.2 feet/second 
retrograde (horizontal) component and a 13.7 radial up 
component.  It was designed to align the semi-major axes 
of the LM and CSM orbits, and establish equal 
differential altitudes at apogee and perigee.  The nominal 
differential altitude of 10 nm was achieved.   
 After CDH the LM maneuvered to the TPI burn 
attitude.  The LM crew noted a decrease in the radar 
signal strength.  It was later determined that this was due 
to a CSM maneuver to an attitude that placed the line-of-
sight to the LM 20 degrees above the CSM +X body axis.  
In this attitude the signal strength of the CSM radar 
transponder was reduced. 
 TPI was targeted to occur at the standard 27.5 degree 
elevation angle and 25 minutes before sunrise.  CSM         
. 
transfer angle from TPI time to intercept was 130 degrees.  
The TPI and terminal phase design was the same as that 
flown on some Gemini missions.  TPI was executed with 
the LM RCS.  It was a 21.7 feet/second burn along the 
line-of-sight to the CSM. 
 The two mid-course correction burns were under 2 
feet/second in each axis.  Due to the LM tracking light 
failure the CSM pilot was unable to take any sextant 
marks to support CSM computation of the two mid-course 
corrections.  Braking gate execution was nominal.  Only 
small corrections to inertial line-of-sight rate were 
required.  Station-keeping was established within 100 feet 
of the CSM. 
 After sunrise during final approach the CSM pilot 
determined the range to the LM using a diastimeter 
mounted in a forward looking CSM window.  This optical 
device permitted the CSM pilot to determine the range to 
a spacecraft of known dimensions out to a range of 3 nm.  
The range data was accurate and readily accessible to the 
CSM pilot.  It was carried on the Apollo 9 CSM as a 
backup source of range measurements to the LM radar.   
 The crew elected to dock as soon as possible to 
preserve margin in orbital daylight in the event of docking 
difficulties.  LM active docking was complicated and took 
longer than expected due to a brightly lit CSM, a poorly 
lighted CSM docking target, and a dim COAS reticle 
pattern.  The commander had difficulty distinguishing the 
illuminated COAS reticle pattern with the mirror-like 
surface of the brightly lit CSM in the background.  The 
CSM pilot talked the commander in to a range of 4 or 5 
feet.  At that point the COAS reticle became visible and 
the commander (in the LM) completed the docking. 
 The LM active docking was awkward from an 
ergonomic perspective due to position of the COAS in the 
LM docking window, above the head of the commander.  
The commander’s line-of-sight through the COAS during 
docking was 90 degrees from his view of the LM displays 
and controls.  For a CSM active docking the CSM 
displays and controls were much closer to the CSM pilot 
line-of-sight through the COAS mounted in the docking 
window.  CSM active dockings were performed on all 
subsequent missions, with LM active docking reserved as 
a contingency procedure. 
 The LM PGNS and AGS successfully processed 
radar measurements.  The CSM pilot managed CSM 
attitude to ensure proper pointing of the CSM radar 
transponder.  PGNS and AGS burn targeting solutions 
closely matched those of Mission Control throughout the 
rendezvous.  Relative navigation and mirror image burn 
targeting by the CSM was successful.  A Mission Control 
up link of state vectors to either vehicle was not required 
between separation and docking.  CSM pilot rendezvous 
procedures were successfully performed.  However, 
Mission Control monitoring of telemetry and systems 
status not associated with rendezvous permitted the CSM 
pilot to focus on the rendezvous procedures. 24, 25 
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Apollo 10 (F Mission, May 1969) 
 
 Apollo 10 was a lunar orbit dress rehearsal of the 
Apollo 11 lunar landing mission.  It was the first flight of 
the LM in lunar orbit.  The rendezvous profile was 
designed to exercise all CSM and LM rendezvous related 
systems and most procedures (Figure 4.18). 26  Apollo 10 
was the first flight of CSM VHF ranging for relative 
navigation.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Before the transposition and docking maneuver the 
mission commander and CSM pilot changed seats.  The 
crew wore helmets and gloves during this activity and 
through LM pressurization.  After completion of the TLI 
burn the CSM separated from the S-IVB and the adapter 
panels were jettisoned.  Maximum separation from the S-
IVB/LM was ~150 feet, about 100 feet further than 
planned.  A delta-velocity of about 1.2 feet/second was 
executed to close on the S-IVB.  The COAS reticle 
pattern was washed out due to the brightness of the LM, 
but the pattern became visible as the range during the 
approach decreased.  Minimal lateral and vertical 
translations were required to align the COAS with the LM 
docking target.  Sunlight was not a problem during 
docking.  Closing rate at docking was estimated at ~0.2 
feet/second. 27, 28 
 The 8 hour 10 minute lunar orbit rendezvous activity 
was planned for the 5th flight day.  The nominal mission 
plan was as follows.  On the fourth flight day, in lunar 
orbit, the CSM/LM orbit was to be circularized at 60 nm.  
Undocking was to be followed by 25 minutes of station-
keeping for CSM pilot inspection of the LM.  A 2.5 
foot/second radically down separation burn would be 
performed to set up mini-football relative motion with a 
nominal maximum relative separation of 2 nm.  At the 
mid-point of the mini-football the LM DPS would 
perform a 71 foot/second retro-grade burn, called Descent 
Orbit Insertion (DOI), to lower the LM perilune to 8 nm, 
resulting in an 8 x 60 nm orbit.   
 Later, with the LM below and phasing ahead of the 
CSM, the LM DPS would perform a 195 foot/second 
phasing burn to place the LM in a dwell orbit (8 x 194 
nm).  This orbit would take the LM ahead of, above, and   
. 
Figure 4.18  Apollo 10 LM separation from and 
rendezvous with the CSM in lunar orbit (May 1969). 
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then behind and below the CSM.  This burn would not be 
performed on a lunar landing mission.  After LM descent 
staging the LM ascent stage would perform a 207 
foot/second insertion burn (8 x 43.6 nm orbit) to set up 
the trajectory for the CSI burn, the first burn of the CSI-
CDH-TPI coelliptic rendezvous sequence.  The insertion 
burn design was to establish trajectory conditions similar 
to those after lunar lift-off and lunar orbit insertion. 26 
 The rest of the rendezvous sequence was similar to 
that flown on Apollo 9, except that CSI was below the 
CSM orbit rather than above it.  The maximum spacecraft 
separation during the rendezvous was planned to be 350 
nm.  All burns from CSI through establishment of station-
keeping would be performed with the LM RCS.  CSI 
would place the LM in a 42.9 x 46.2 nm orbit.  CDH 
would establish a constant delta-height of 15 nm and TPI 
would establish an intercept trajectory. 26 
 Actual rendezvous details were as follows.  The CSM 
and LM undocked on the 12th lunar revolution.  The 2.5 
foot/second separation burn had a retrograde 0.2 
feet/second component, rather than being purely radial 
down as planned.  This resulted in a 0.4 nm greater range 
at DOI than planned.  After separation LM radar and 
CSM VHF ranging tracking was initiated.  DOI 
successfully lowered perilune to 8.5 nm.  After DOI the 
CSM pilot tracked the LM with the sextant and VHF 
ranging.  The LM appeared as a bright star against the 
lunar surface until a range of ~125 nm, when it 
disappeared.  LM radar tracking of the CSM was also 
performed after DOI. 28 
 The phasing burn placed the LM in a 12 x 190 nm 
phasing orbit.  After the phasing burn the CSM pilot 
resumed sextant and VHF ranging relative navigation.  
The LM was tracked with the sextant during orbital night 
at ranges exceeding 230 nm, and in daylight out to 275 
nm.  VHF ranging marks were incorporated out to ~275 
nm, but higher range measurements were observed. 27 
 Ten minutes before the insertion burn the LM descent 
stage was jettisoned while the LM was under AGS 
control.  The LM crew donned helmets and gloves for 
staging.  The insertion burn placed the LM in a 11.0 x 
46.5 nm orbit.  The CSM was prepared to execute a 
mirror image insertion burn in case the LM could not 
execute the burn. 27 
 Both the LM and CSM began relative navigation to 
support targeting for the subsequent CSI burn.  On-board 
and Mission Control CSI burn solutions were in 
agreement.  CSI was a 45.3 foot/second posigrade burn.  
The CDH burn was performed with the LM RCS under 
AGS control.  CDH components were 0.1 feet/second 
posigrade and 3 feet/second radial down.  CDH 
established a near nominal delta-height of 14.9 nm. 27 
 TPI time-of-ignition slip was ~2 minutes late.  TPI 
was along the line-of-sight vector with components of 
21.7 feet/second posigrade, -5.7 feet/second out-of-plane, 
and 9.6 feet/second radial up.  Both mid-course correction 
burns were less than 2 feet/second.  Braking gates and      
. 
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line-of-sight control was performed behind the Moon and 
out of communications with Earth.  When the vehicles 
resumed communications with Mission Control they were 
station-keeping. The LM established station-keeping at 
about 20 feet.  The LM was placed in an AGS attitude 
hold and the CSM was active for docking. 27 
 The maximum VHF ranging measurement was 320 
nm, well above the maximum specified operating range 
of 200 nm.  At ranges from 3,000 to 300 feet VHF 
ranging and LM radar range agreed to within ~100 feet.27 
 Burn solutions computed by the LM (radar relative 
navigation) and CSM (sextant and VHF ranging relative 
navigation) were in agreement throughout the 
rendezvous.  Propellant consumption by both the CSM 
and LM was below the pre-flight predictions.  
Maintaining minimum attitude rates and efficient docking 
execution was a factor behind lower than anticipated 
CSM propellant consumption. 27 
 
Apollo 11 (G Mission, July 1969) 
 
 The transposition maneuver began as scheduled 20 
seconds after CSM separation from the S-IVB to provide 
at least 70 feet of separation between the spacecraft.  Per 
procedure the CSM pilot used the delta-velocity counter 
on the Entry Monitoring System (EMS) display to 
determine how much RCS jet thrusting was required to 
return to the LM/S-IVB stack.  However, the EMS data 
did not make sense to the CSM pilot.  The CSM approach 
to and docking with the LM/S-IVB stack was nominal.  
The CSM docking light was not required.  The COAS 
reticle pattern was dim but became more visible once the 
CSM was very close to the LM.  The approach rate at 
docking was estimated to be 0.1 feet/second. 29, 30 
 In lunar orbit after undocking the CSM maintained 
the undocking rate until the range between the vehicles 
was ~40 feet.  At that point the CSM pilot nulled the 
relative velocity based on visual viewing of the LM.  The 
LM performed a 360 degree yaw attitude maneuver to 
permit the CSM pilot to visually verify that the LM 
landing legs had properly deployed.  After separation the 
LM tracked the CSM with the rendezvous radar, and the 
CSM tracked the LM with VHF ranging.  Both sensors 
were in agreement.30  The CSM pilot updated the state 
vector using both VHF ranging and sextant 
measurements.  This was not part of the crew procedure 
between the DOI burn and the Powered Descent Initiation 
(PDI) burns but it gave the CSM pilot confidence that the 
relative navigation hardware and software was working 
before the rendezvous the next day. 29 
 After the lunar exploration activities were complete, 
lunar orbit insertion and a LM IMU alignment was 
performed, followed by initiation of rendezvous radar 
tracking.  The LM PGNCS, LM AGS, Mission Control, 
and CSM PGNCS CSI burns solutions agreed to within 
0.2 feet/second in each axis.  Due to the higher than 
expected elliptical nature of the CSM orbit (63.2 x 56.8     
. 
nm) the range rate was outside the envelope of range rate 
values needed for the CSI and CDH back-up chart burn 
solutions.  Therefore backup chart burn solutions for CSI 
and CDH were not available.  The LM insertion and 
overall rendezvous profile were nominal, including a 
nominal 15 nm delta-height (Figure 4.19). 29 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 The post-TPI intercept trajectory was nominal and 
line-of-sight rates during braking were low and easily 
controlled.  The commander used the line-of-sight rate 
needles driven by the radar for piloting cues.  After the 
LM began station-keeping with the CSM it maneuvered 
to the docking attitude.  The LM PGNS IMU went into 
gimbal lock as the crew maneuvered to the docking 
attitude while trying to avoid placing the sun in the fields 
of view of the LM windows.  As a result the AGS was 
used to maintain LM attitude during docking.  The CSM 
active docking was successful. 29, 30 
 
Apollo 12 (H-1 Mission, November 1969) 
 
 Transposition and docking after the Trans Lunar 
Injection burn were nominal.  The CSM docking light 
was not used.  Due to a problem with the Entry 
Monitoring System (EMS) velocity counter an accurate 
measurement of delta-velocity executed during the 
maneuver could not be made.  Propellant consumption 
and maximum separation distance were higher than 
expected.  The crew recommended that RCS thrusting be 
based on time rather than EMS delta-velocity 
measurement to simplify the procedures. 31, 32 
 After separation in lunar orbit the CSM pilot 
observed the LM DOI burn through the sextant.  Range at 
that point was ~3.5 nm.  After DOI the CSM pilot 
performed sextant and VHF tracking of the LM. 31 
 The CSM pilot was not able to track the LM ascent 
stage during powered ascent.  Near the end of lunar 
ascent a late switch throw resulted in a LM Ascent 
Propulsion System over-burn at insertion of ~30 
feet/second.  This was quickly corrected with a RCS trim 
burn.   
 After insertion the LM crew performed an in-flight 
alignment and radar tracking of the CSM was begun.        
. 
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Figure  4.19  Coelliptic Flight Plan, Apollo 
missions 11, 12, and planned for 13 (1969-1970). 
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Radar lock-on occurred at a range of about 235 nm.31  No 
out-of-plane corrections were required before the TPI 
burn.  All CSM and LM burn solutions during the 
rendezvous were in agreement.  Once the LM entered 
orbital darkness the CSM pilot observed that the LM 
tracking light was not working.  It apparently failed at 
some point after the CSI burn.  No further CSM sextant 
data was obtained and only VHF ranging measurements 
were processed by the CSM.  This led to expected 
inaccuracies in the CSM computed solutions for the two 
mid-course correction burns.32  The LM pilot commented 
that the AGS and chart solutions had a heavy work load 
with many opportunities for procedural error.  A more 
automated form of backup systems was needed. 31 
 During the terminal phase line-of-sight rate 
corrections were not required until a range of about 1,000 
feet, and the required corrections were small.  The 
docking was nominal and the closure rate was estimated 
to be ~0.2 or ~0.3 feet/second. 32 
 
Apollo 13 (H-2 Mission, April 1970) 
 
 After TLI the S-IVB maneuvered the stack to the 
transposition and docking attitude. Once this attitude was 
achieved the S-IVB maintained an inertial attitude hold. 
Maximum spacecraft separation during the CSM 
transposition and docking maneuver was about 80 feet, 
with a CSM pitch rate during the maneuver of about 1.5 
degrees/second. The CM pilot reported that sunlight on 
the LM docking target washed out the COAS. The COAS 
was therefore set at maximum brightness, making it 
difficult for the CM pilot to see the LM docking target. 
Just before docking the CSM shadowed the LM docking 
target and target visibility was improved. Closing rate at 
docking was about 0.2 feet/second. The docking and 
spring ejection of the LM/CSM from the S-IVB was 
nominal. 6, 33, 34 
 No rendezvous was performed since the lunar 
landing was canceled. Had the oxygen tank combustion 
and rupture not occurred, and the lunar landing had been 
performed, Apollo 13 would have flown the same 
coelliptic flight profile flown on Apollo 11 and Apollo 12. 
 Just before re-entry, the Service Module was 
jettisoned from the Command Module before the Lunar 
Module was jettisoned. The commander (flying from the 
LM) pitched the CM/LM stack so that the departing SM 
could be photographed for the accident investigation.6, 33 
 
Apollo 14 (H-3 Mission, February 1971) 
 
 Lighting was not a problem during transposition and 
docking, the COAS was always visible, and the docking 
light was not needed when the LM docking target was in 
shadow. However, the crew did have difficulty achieving 
a hard dock.  Hard docking was achieved on the fifth 
attempt. The crew verified that all 12 docking hardware 
latches were locked. 5, 35, 36 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Apollo 14 was the first mission to fly the short 
rendezvous profile (Figure 4.20). The concentric flight 
plan flown on earlier missions was a back-up procedure 
in case of performance or system problems. Ascent was to 
insert the LM into a 51x9 nm orbit with TPI occurring 38 
minutes after orbit insertion. The nominal liftoff time was 
~2.5 minutes before the nominal liftoff time for the 
coelliptic flight profile. The liftoff window duration was 
30 seconds to keep the orbit insertion perilune above 8 
nm.  If required a Mission Control computed tweak burn 
using the LM RCS could be performed after insertion to 
correct for off-nominal insertion conditions. The total 
time from insertion to rendezvous was ~85 minutes. 37 
 After the tweak burn a manual attitude maneuver to 
the radar tracking attitude was performed.  Radar 
measurements were successfully incorporated into the 
LM PGNS and AGS.  However, due to a VHF ranging 
problem only sextant measurements were processed by 
the CSM PGNCS Kalman filter.  TPI was successfully 
executed with the LM Ascent Propulsion System. 35 
 After TPI the CSM pilot obtained VHF ranging data.  
Both VHF range and sextant angle measurements were 
processed.  The two mid-course correction burns and the 
braking gates were nominal.  After the second mid-course 
correction burn the AGS failed and was not recovered.  
After the LM established station-keeping the CSM 
performed a 360 degree pitch maneuver for LM crew 
inspection of the CSM.  The LM then maneuvered to 
place the LM docking target in the field of view of the 
CSM pilot.  The CSM active docking was successful with 
no difficulties encountered. 35 
 
Apollo 15 (J-1 Mission, July-August 1971) 
 
 After TLI, the transposition and docking maneuver 
was nominal.  The LM was illuminated by the Sun, there 
were no problems with shadows and the CSM docking 
light was not used.  The closing rate before docking was 
~0.1 feet/second.  At contact there was no indication of 
probe capture latch engagement.  The crew applied one to 
two seconds of forward thrusting and the latch capture.      
. 
Figure 4.20  Short rendezvous profile, 
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was indicated.  After docking it was noted that one latch 
was not locked onto the docking ring.  The crew manually 
re-cocked and latched it. 38 
 In lunar orbit undocking was performed 25 minutes 
late since the crew had to re-plug a loose docking probe 
umbilical plug in the docking tunnel. 
 Before rendezvous all Scientific Instrumentation 
Module (SIM) bay experiments were deactivated.  This 
included retracting booms and closing covers of cameras 
and experiments.  CSM VHF ranging locked on at a range 
of about 136 nm (closer than normally seen in the 
simulators), during powered ascent and before orbit 
insertion. 39  The CSM pilot voiced the VHF range to the 
LM.  The LM crew verified that the measured range 
agreed with that computed by the PGNS and the AGS.  
Mission Control told the LM crew that the post-insertion 
tweak burn would not be performed.  Mission Control 
also informed the LM crew that due to the CSM orbit TPI 
would be off nominal and the final approach to the CSM 
would be near horizontal. 40 
 Apollo 15 was the first flight of the CSM MINKEY 
(minimum keystroke) rendezvous program and it worked 
as advertised, cycling through the burns and tracking 
periods.13, 40  The CSM pilot was not able to sight the LM 
through the sextant until after the LM passed into orbital 
darkness.  The CSM tracking lights were not visible to the 
LM crew until about 40 minutes after sunset at a range of 
18 nm.   CSM burn solutions were compared to the LM 
solutions and were within limits.  The LM solutions were 
used for all burns. 38 
 After the second mid-course correction burn the 
CSM was maneuvered to the COAS tracking attitude.  As 
the LM approached the 1500 foot braking gate the radar 
line-of-sight rate pointers were not providing data to the 
commander for line-of-sight control.  The commander 
controlled the line-of-sight rates by keeping the CSM 
centered in the COAS.  The CSM pilot verified line-of-
sight rates by observing the LM through the CSM 
COAS.39 
 The LM began station-keeping with the CSM at a 
range of about 100 feet.  As a result of the COAS back-up 
line-of-sight control procedure the LM was out-of-plane 
by about 20 degrees.  The CSM pilot maneuvered to an 
attitude that permitted the LM crew to photograph the 
SIM bay.  The CSM then maneuvered back to the docking 
attitude.  The CSM performed the docking maneuver at a 
closing rate of ~0.1 feet/second.  After docking the SIM 
bay experiments were re-activated. 40 
 
Apollo 16 (J-2 Mission, April 1972) 
 
 After Trans Lunar Injection the transposition and 
docking maneuver was performed.  The CSM pilot 
reported that at transposition maneuver completion the 
COAS cross hairs were almost exactly aligned with the 
docking target on the LM.  After contact additional RCS 
firings were required to center the vehicle.  Color              
. 
 
television was transmitted to Earth during transposition 
and docking. 
 In lunar orbit, just after undocking, on the 12th 
revolution of the Moon, the CSM was to perform a 1 
foot/second radial down SM RCS burn for separation.  
This burn was supposed to place the CSM on a mini-
football that would return the CSM to the vicinity of the 
LM after one lunar orbit if neither vehicle performed any 
subsequent burns (Figure 4.21).  About 1.5 hours after 
undocking, near the end of revolution 12, the CSM would 
perform a circularization burn.  CSM circularization had 
to be performed before the LM performed PDI. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 CSM and LM undocking occurred as scheduled on 
the 12th revolution.  Some LM inspection photographs 
were taken but the LM did not do any attitude maneuvers 
to facilitate photography by the CSM pilot.  At acquisition 
of signal on revolution 13 the CSM pilot reported to 
Mission Control that the circularization burn had not been 
executed as planned.  During the pre-ignition checklist a 
Service Propulsion System (SPS) secondary yaw gimbal 
check indicated a problem with the yaw gimbal drive 
servo.  A flight rule stated that four servo loops had to be 
operative for the circularization burn to be executed.41  If 
the servo problem could not be resolved the lunar landing 
attempt would be canceled, the spacecraft would have to 
dock, and the crew would perform a Trans Earth Injection 
(TEI) burn using the LM descent engine to return to 
Earth.  About 10 hours (5 revolutions) were available for 
the issue to be resolved and still perform a lunar landing.  
After 10 hours the LM ground-track would pass far 
enough away from the landing site that the LM descent 
stage could not fly the LM to the site. 42 
 The CSM pilot maintained visual contact with the 
LM.  At one point a maneuver to an optimum 
communications attitude was performed to permit 
Mission Control to monitor two gimbal tests in real time.  
Mission Control decided that the two spacecraft should 
re-establish station-keeping while the servo loop issue 
was worked by ground personnel.  This involved a CSM 
re-rendezvous with the LM.  The CSM was not 
performing relative navigation of the LM using the            
. 
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Kalman filter, per procedure.  The recommended re-
rendezvous procedure was to perform a CSM active 
brute-force rendezvous.  A delta-velocity (5 feet/second) 
from an empirical formula would be executed by the 
CSM at the predicted point of closest approach to the LM 
on revolution 14, a range of about 2,000 feet (Figure 4.21, 
GET 100 hours).  This procedure had been tested in a pre-
flight simulation. 41, 42, 43, 44 
 Both spacecraft were behind the Moon and out of 
contact with Mission Control at the predicted time of 
closest approach.  The CSM pilot began VHF ranging to 
obtain range data to the LM.  The LM performed an 
attitude maneuver, based on instructions from the CSM 
pilot, so that the LM radar would be pointed at the CSM 
to facilitate radar acquisition and tracking.   
 The CSM pilot began to execute the 5 foot/second 
burn to establish a closing rate, which was a retrograde 
burn.  However, he noted that the CSM continued to have 
an increasing opening rate with respect to the LM.  The 
CSM pilot then stopped the burn after 3 feet/second had 
been executed.  He then took out the 3 feet/second 
executed thus far due to a low perilune concern. The 
retrograde attempt to establish a closing rate began near 
apolune, which would lower the perilune altitude.  A low 
perilune altitude could represent a safety hazard.  The 
CSM pilot asked the LM if they had a burn chart for re-
rendezvous.  The LM crew did not.42  Figure 4.22 is a 
post-flight simulation plot showing relative  motion 
resulting from this burn if it had been executed to 
completion. 
  After acquisition of signal on revolution 14 it 
became apparent to Mission Control that the CSM pilot 
had not initiated the re-rendezvous and that the post           
. 
separation relative motion was not as predicted (i.e. the 
CSM was not on a mini-football relative trajectory that 
would return it to the vicinity of the LM).  The CSM was 
ahead of the LM rather than behind it and phasing away 
(Figure 4.23).  The on-board CSM state indicated a 
perilune of 6.3 nm but Mission Control ground tracking 
indicated a perilune of 9 nm. This led the CSM pilot to 
voice a concern about the quality of the CSM on-board 
state vector.  The CSM pilot requested that Mission 
Control perform short arc tracking to verify the integrity 
of the CSM state vector.44 
  Just before perilune the brute force rendezvous was 
re-initiated (Figure 4.24).  The LM crew provided the 
CSM pilot with piloting cues based on LM radar range,     
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APOLLO 
Figure 4.23  Post-flight reconstruction of Apollo 16 CSM relative motion with respect to the LM 
created by Allan DuPont.45  The first rendezvous burn began at a GET of 100 hours.  The brute force 
rendezvous is not shown. 
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range rate, and inertial line-of-sight rate measurements.  
The cues were in terms of thrusting north or south (out-
of-plane), or towards the Moon or away from it (in-
plane).  At times translating the line-of-sight rate 
measurement needle data into CSM pilot thrusting cues 
was difficult.  The CSM pilot kept the inertial line-of-
sight rate measurements nulled and maintained a closing 
rate. 42 
 The CSM VHF ranging and LM radar range were in 
close agreement throughout the rendezvous.  The CSM 
pilot could have computed range rate using VHF ranging 
data and a stopwatch, but it was simpler to rely on the LM 
range rate voiced by the LM crew. 43 
 At a range of about 4,000 feet the LM tracking light 
was turned on due to orbital night.  LM tracking light was 
visible to the CSM pilot.  At a range of about 2,400 feet 
Mission Control asked that the LM radar and tracking 
light be turned off as soon as was feasible to conserve 
power.  At a range of about 2,000 feet the CSM pilot 
could observe the LM due to Earth-shine.  Later the LM 
crew asked the CSM pilot to turn on the CSM lights.  The 
CSM spotlight was turned on at 500 feet.  By 300 feet 
Earth-shine had disappeared and the LM was visible 
using the CSM spotlight. The LM radar and tracking light 
were turned off to conserve power. 42 
 The CSM COAS was useful for verifying line-of-
sight control, particularly inside the 500 foot range where 
it was more useful than radar measurements of inertial 
line-of-sight rate.  The CSM pilot had to mentally 
calibrate the COAS to discern between line-of-sight rate 
and attitude dead-banding.  Range rate was difficult to 
assess visually, even at close range. 43 
 Eventually the crew was given a go to execute PDI 
on revolution 16 and a second separation burn was 
performed by the CSM.  The incident resulted in a 5.75 
hour delay (approximately three lunar revolutions) in 
execution of the CSM circularization burn and LM 
descent initiation.  The delay also required Mission          
Control to re-plan all subsequent mission activities in the  
. 
crew timeline.  The circularization burn was successfully 
performed using the primary servo loop.  The secondary 
loop was not needed. 41 
 Post flight analysis later indicated that the first 
separation burn had a small retrograde component, rather 
than being purely radial down.45  This resulted in the 
CSM separating below and ahead of the LM, rather than 
the CSM being on a mini-football (Figure 4.22). 
 As a result of this incident the Apollo 17 crew carried 
a mini-football re-rendezvous chart.  This chart had been 
developed earlier in the program and was carried on the 
initial lunar missions.  It provided the LM crew with 
required range rate and inertial line-of-sight rate data to 
be achieved by the CSM pilot.  This would facilitate a 
CSM active short range rendezvous without resorting to a 
CSM bailout and execution of a CSI-CDH rendezvous 
profile.  These required values would be used by the LM 
crew along with radar measurements of range rate and 
inertial line-of-sight rate to determine piloting cues to be 
voiced to the CSM pilot.  Using these piloting cues the 
CSM pilot could initiate a rendezvous from any point on a 
mini-football for various transfer times.  
 After lunar exploration activities were completed the 
ascent stage of the LM was inserted into a 40.2 nm x 7.9 
nm orbit at a range of about 170 nm from the CSM.  The 
range at insertion was about 33,000 feet too close and a 
10 foot/second tweak burn was executed to correct for the 
dispersion.  Two or three minutes after insertion the crew 
performed a pitch-up maneuver and radar tracking of the 
CSM was begun.  The crew also visually spotted the CSM 
at this time due to sunlight reflected from the CSM.  The 
crew maintained visual sight of the CSM until orbital 
sunset.  Radar tracking was maintained until the 
maneuver to the TPI burn attitude.  The CSM pilot 
spotted the LM through the sextant at ~100 nm, and 
observed the LM flashing light in the scanning telescope 
at ~70 nm. 41, 43 
 The TPI burn was 78 feet/second.  Once station-
keeping was established the LM performed a 360 degree 
yaw maneuver for photography and LM inspection by the 
CSM pilot.  Then the CSM pilot performed a pitch-over 
to permit the LM crew to photograph bubbles on the 
surface of the CSM.  Docking was successful.  The LM 
crew left their helmets and gloves on until docking due to 
the amount of lunar dust in the LM. 43 
 
Apollo 17 (J-3 Mission, December 1972) 
 
 The crew reported that the S-IVB was steady as a 
rock during transposition and docking.  Closing rate at 
docking was ~0.1 feet/second.  Once docking was 
achieved a talkback barber pole indicated a possible 
docking ring latch malfunction.  During hard docking the 
COAS indicated a one degree right yaw error with respect 
to the LM docking target.  After LM pressurization, hatch 
removal, and inspection it was discovered that the handles 
for latches 7, 9, and 10 were not locked.  The crew locked 
HISTORY OF SPACE SHUTTLE RENDEZVOUS 
Figure 4.24  Post-flight simulations of the brute 
force rendezvous for various start times, created by 
Allan DuPont.45  These are not exact 
reconstructions of the actual relative motion. 
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the handle for latch 10 by pushing on it.  Latches 7 and 9 
were locked and manually fired to lock the handles.  After 
hatch replacement the CSM/LM stack separated from the 
S-IVB about 45 minutes after CSM docking with the LM.  
During a subsequent LM activity it was discovered that 
docking latch 4 was not properly latched.  
Troubleshooting was delayed until later in the mission.  
Later the crew successfully cocked the latch. 46, 47 
 In lunar orbit undocking and separation were 
nominal.  The LM crew visually tracked the CSM as it 
maneuvered for landmark tracking over the landing site.46 
 After the lunar surface activities were complete the 
LM ascent stage was inserted into lunar orbit.  CSM VHF 
tracking of the LM began soon after insertion at a range 
of 155 nm. A 10 foot/second tweak burn was performed 
soon after insertion.  This placed the LM on a nominal 
trajectory for TPI.  VHF ranging broke lock during the 
tweak burn but was re-established after the burn.  The LM 
crew spotted the CSM during orbital daylight at a range 
of about 110 nm.46  After sunset the CSM was not 
visually observed again until the tracking lights were 
spotted at about 40 nm.  The CSM docking light was not 
discernable until well within 40 nm.  The LM crew stated 
that the rendezvous was nominal.  The TPI burn was 53.8 
feet/second.   
 The CSM pilot did not detect the LM flashing light 
using the scanning telescope or sextant until orbital 
sunset, when the LM was at a range of 80 nm.  The sun 
was not in the field of view during the daylight attempts 
to acquire and track the LM.  The CSM TPI burn solution 
agreed with the LM solution, but the CSM second Mid-
Course Correction solutions did not agree.  The CSM 
pilot mounted a television monitor on a strut beside the 
commander’s couch and kept the LM in the television 
field of view during the terminal phase of the rendezvous. 
 The LM did a fly-around of the CSM for inspection, 
particularly of the SIM bay.  The LM maneuvered to the   
.  
docking attitude and transferred station-keeping 
responsibility to the CSM.  After the CSM maneuvered to 
the docking attitude the LM performed pitch and yaw 
maneuvers, and then stood by for the CSM active 
docking.  The CSM pilot noted that the LM moved during 
docking more than the S-IVB/LM stack.  The first 
docking attempt, at a rate of probably less than 0.1 
feet/second, likely failed due to the slow closing rate.  
The CSM backed away about 3 feet and re-initiated the 
approach.  Docking was successfully accomplished.46-47 
 
Summary 
 
 Nominal Apollo rendezvous procedures from TPI 
through docking relied heavily on piloting and trajectory 
design techniques developed and flight proven during the 
Gemini Program.  However, Apollo rendezvous was far 
more complex.  Both the LM and CSM were capable of 
being either the active or passive vehicle throughout the 
rendezvous.  Between 1963 and 1969 nominal rendezvous 
profile development went through ten iterations, finally 
resulting in the CSI-CDH-TPI profile flown on Apollo 11 
(July 1969).  By late 1969 the confidence in LM and 
CSM systems performance led MPAD personnel to 
design a short rendezvous profile to shorten the crew day.  
The short profile was first flown on Apollo 14 (February 
1971).  The CSI-CDH profile was retained as a 
contingency profile to be flown in the event of off-
nominal systems performance.  The complexity of the 
CSM pilot task during rendezvous resulted in automation 
of many rendezvous procedures starting with Apollo 15 
(July-August 1971).  However, the most significant 
challenge of Apollo rendezvous was the development of 
contingency rendezvous flight techniques to be flown in 
the event of a LM abort before or after Powered Descent 
Initiation.  
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Programmatic and Mission Objectives 
 
 Skylab was the United States first space station 
(Figure 5.1).1-3  Three missions, Skylab (SL) 2, 3, and 4, 
were flown to perform medical evaluation of long 
duration human flight, solar astronomy, and Earth 
surveys.  The Apollo CSM was modified to serve as a 
crew and limited cargo transport vehicle to and from the 
Skylab station.  Like most Gemini missions rendezvous 
and docking was completed on flight day one.  This 
requirement was driven by a need to place flight day one 
medical samples in the Skylab freezer within 24 hours 
after they were obtained.  Orbital inclination was 50 
degrees and the nominal Skylab workshop insertion orbit 
was 234 nm circular. 
 All three Skylab missions successfully performed 
rendezvous and docking.  An additional objective was 
Skylab 2 CSM station-keeping on flight day one for a 
stand-up EVA in an attempt to free a partially deployed 
solar array.  This foreshadowed later Space Shuttle 
missions that combined proximity operations and EVA 
for satellite repair. 
Comments 
  
1. Inspection, then soft docking to prepare for EVA (2.). 
2. Stand-up EVA attempt failed to free solar panel.     
    Redocking difficulty, IFM required CM depressurization,  
    followed by successful hard dock. 
3. Before final separation and deorbit. 
 
2. Plume impingement observed on thermal parasol  
    during  pre-docking fly-around.  Fly-around after  
    undocking canceled due to RCS Quad leaks (some  
    RCS jets inhibited). 
 
1. No fly-around before docking.  Hard dock achieved on 
    the third attempt. 
2. Final inspection before deorbit. 
Chaser
  
CSM 
 
 
 
 
 
CSM 
 
 
 
 
CSM 
Flight
  
Skylab 2  
(SL-2) 
 
 
 
 
Skylab 3 
(SL-3) 
 
 
 
Skylab 4 
(SL-4) 
Year
  
1973 
 
 
 
 
 
1973 
 
 
 
 
1973/ 
1974 
Profile  
  
1. Coelliptic M=5, FA 
2. FA, Station-keeping 
3. FA 
 
 
 
1. Station-keeping 
2. Coelliptic M=5, FA 
 
 
 
1. Coelliptic M=5 
2. FA 
Target 
  
1. Skylab 
2. Skylab 
3. Skylab 
 
 
 
1. S-IVB 
2. Skylab 
 
 
 
1. Skylab 
2. Skylab 
Table 5.1  Skylab 
Coelliptic = Coellptic Flight Profile, CM = Command Module, CSM = Command/Service Module, EVA = Extra-Vehicular Activity, FA = Fly 
Around, IFM = In Flight Maintenance, M = docking on the Mth revolution, RCS = Reaction Control System. 
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Figure 5.1  Skylab viewed by 
Skylab 4 crew during the final 
fly-around before returning to 
Earth (Feb. 1974). 
Early Concepts – The Apollo Applications 
Program 
 
 The initial design of America’s first space station 
involved the on-orbit conversion by astronauts of a spent 
S-IVB stage, launched by a Saturn IB, into an orbital 
workshop.  This was known as the wet workshop.4-6   The 
Apollo Telescope Mount (ATM, a scientific package 
mounted on a LM ascent stage) would be launched on an 
unmanned Saturn IB.  A subsequently launched Apollo 
CSM was to rendezvous with the ATM, dock with it, and 
bring it to the workshop.  Two crewman would transfer to 
the ATM and dock to a workshop radial port, while the 
third crewman docked the CSM to an axial port.  There 
were Saturn IB/CSM payload capability concerns due to 
propellant needed to support the double rendezvous, and 
there were safety concerns with splitting the crew 
between the ATM and CSM during docking.   
 Studies were performed in 1968 of an automated or 
remotely controlled (from the workshop) docking of the 
ATM, rather than using a crewed Apollo CSM.  This 
would eliminate payload and safety concerns.  The 
workshop crew was to monitor (both via transmitted data 
and looking out a window) the terminal phase of either an 
automated or remote controlled rendezvous.  Lighting 
conditions required for crew visual monitoring dictated 
that the ATM (chaser) approach the workshop (target) 
from ahead and above, rather than from behind and below 
as was done when the chaser spacecraft was crewed.  The 
ATM would phase from below and behind, pass the 
workshop, then an NH burn would have been performed 
to arrive at a co-elliptic (CDH) start point above and 
ahead of the workshop.  The TPI and mid-course 
correction burns followed. 
 On July 18, 1969, the wet workshop was eliminated in 
favor of the dry S-IVB workshop assembled on Earth, 
launched by the first two stages of a Saturn V.  The dry 
configuration did not require on-orbit conversion.  The      
. 
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ATM was to be integral with the dry workshop, rather 
than launched separately and brought to the workshop by 
the LM.  This eliminated the need for complicated 
rendezvous operations to assemble the cluster.  The 
program was renamed Skylab in February of 1970.4, 5 
 
Rendezvous Target Vehicle 
 
 Skylab was the only rendezvous target vehicle in the 
program (Figure 5.1).  It carried strobes to facilitate 
sextant tracking out to a range of 300 nm during orbital 
night.  The strobes were turned off by Mission Control 
after the second Mid-Course Correction burn, just after 
orbital sunrise, so that the crew did not have to view the 
bright strobes during final approach.  Eight running lights 
were placed around Skylab, and were color coded to aid 
in attitude determination.  Four smaller lights were 
mounted on the ends of antennas.  Skylab was also 
equipped with a VHF transponder to support CSM VHF 
ranging. 
 Skylab was the first U.S. spacecraft equipped with two 
docking ports.  The Apollo probe and drogue hardware 
was used.  The axial port was the primary port and was 
used for all dockings.  The radial port served as a back-
up.  If a rescue mission was required the unusable CSM 
would be undocked from the axial port and disposed of 
without a crew onboard, enabling the rescue CSM to use 
the axial port.  If the unusable CSM could not be 
undocked from the axial port the radial port would have 
been used by the rescue CSM. 
 The normal Skylab attitude was solar inertial to 
facilitate power generation by the solar arrays.  During 
rendezvous a different attitude was maintained to 
optimize VHF ranging performance.  Skylab was 
maneuvered back to the solar inertial attitude for the 
nominal axial docking case.  Docking to the axial port 
occurred just after orbital noon, at which time the axial 
port was facing generally in the direction of flight.  For a 
rescue mission using the backup radial docking port, a 
different attitude was flown to ensure proper lighting at 
docking. 
 The Skylab attitude control system was the primary 
means of control with a CSM docked to the axial port.  
Momentum dumping was inhibited during docking.  For 
the case of two CSMs docked or one CSM docked to the 
radial port, the attitude control system of the radial port 
CSM was to provide the primary means of attitude 
control. 
 
Crew Interface, Procedures, and On-Board 
Computers 
 
 Extensive use was made of piloting procedures used in 
the Apollo Program.  The rendezvous procedure book for 
the nominal mission also served as the rendezvous book 
for the rescue mission.  The Minimum Keystroke              
. 
(MINKEY) program developed for the CSM and first 
flown on Apollo 15 was used to reduce crew workload. 
 Independent and complete rendezvous procedures for 
the nominal, computer failure, and IMU failure cases 
were in the rendezvous procedures book.  Additional 
procedures were created for optics failures (obscured 
visibility, frozen optics), no VHF ranging, a blank Entry 
Monitoring System Delta-Velocity/Range display, mark 
button inoperable, and Skylab tracking light failures. 
 
On-Board Navigation 
 
 Skylab was equipped with strobes to enhance visual 
acquisition and a VHF transponder to support VHF 
ranging.  Before TPI only sextant tracking was used to 
update the CSM state vector using a Kalman filter during 
both orbital day and night periods.  Data from VHF 
ranging was used for the chart maneuver solutions.  Both 
sextant and VHF ranging measurements were used by the 
Kalman filter to update the state vector after TPI.  A 
change from the Apollo missions was that range rate 
could be determined from the VHF tracking and 
displayed to the crew.  However, VHF range rate 
measurements were not processed by the Kalman filter in 
the PGNCS.  In the rescue case with a disabled CSM at 
the axial port VHF ranging may not have been acquired 
until short range.  COAS subtended angles were a backup 
method of range determination. 
 
On-Board Maneuver Targeting 
 
 Since the CSM flew a different rendezvous profile 
than the lunar missions, new targeting algorithms were 
written, tested, and certified for the Skylark CSM PGNCS 
software.  As with the lunar missions a chart solution was 
computed for comparison with the PGNCS and ground 
solutions.  A chart solution was only used if the onboard 
computer and Mission Control burn solutions were not 
available. 
 
Skylab Rescue (SL-R) 
 
 In the event of loss of CSM return to Earth capability, 
or the crew could not enter the CSM from Skylab, 
astronauts Brand and Lind were to fly a rescue mission 
using the next mission’s Saturn IB/CSM.  An additional 
CSM and Saturn IB launch vehicle was available to 
rescue the Skylab 4 crew if required.3 
 Response time varied from 10 to 45.5 days, depending 
on where the next vehicle was in the launch flow.4  
Trajectory planning was to be the same as the nominal 
Skylab mission, with a duration of five days.  Before 
rendezvous, a spring loaded device would be used by the 
Skylab crew to separate the malfunctioning CSM from 
the station.  In the event the CSM could not be separated, 
the rescue CSM would use the radial docking port.  In the  
. 
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event of a communications problem during a rescue  
mission, hand, spotlight, and Skylab running light signals 
were defined to allow the Skylab crew to signal the rescue 
CSM crew.  
 The rescue CSM would be modified before launch to 
accommodate five crewmembers.  Two would be 
launched and perform rendezvous and docking.  No more 
than 40 hours after docking the rescue CSM would return 
to Earth with the three Skylab crew and two rescue CSM 
crew members.5 
 The Skylab 4 CSM and Saturn IB launch vehicle was 
prepared for a rescue of the Skylab 3 crew due to two 
malfunctioning SM RCS quads.  However, the Skylab 3 
CSM was judged capable of returning the crew to Earth 
and a rescue mission was not flown.  Brand and Lind also 
trained for a proposed Skylab deorbit mission (SL-5), 
which was later dropped due to crew safety concerns.5 
 
Nominal Rendezvous Profile 
 
 The nominal profile (Figure 5.2) supported a docking 
on the fifth revolution (M=5).7  This was the earliest 
docking that could be supported by ground tracking 
coverage.  The first mission, SL-2 (May 1973) had a 
requirement for a flight day 1 docking so that medical 
samples taken could be placed in the Skylab freezer 
within 24 hours of collection.  Rendezvous profiles for 
SL-3 (July 1973), SL-4 (November 1973), and the Skylab 
rescue mission (not flown) were essentially the same.  
Nominal launch time for the M=5 rendezvous was the 
near the midpoint of the 16 minute launch window.  M=6, 
7, and 8 docking opportunities also existed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 The NC1-NC2-NCC-NSR-TPI-TPM1-TPM2 profile 
was designed to provide the following: 1) Attain a range 
of 300 nm or less 36 minutes before the NCC burn to 
facilitate VHF tracking acquisition, 2) Maximize ground 
tracking coverage, 3) Permit the same basic rendezvous 
plan to be flown for M=5 through M=8 dockings, and        
. 
Figure 5.2  Relative motion for nominal Skylab 2 
rendezvous on the fifth orbit (May 1973). 
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4) Conserve RCS propellant by using the SPS for all 
burns before the mid-course burns (TPM1 and TPM2).  
 The crew timeline from launch through NC1 was the 
same for the M=5, 6, 7, and 8 docking opportunities.  For 
an increase in M number beyond 5 the number of 
revolutions between NC1 and NC2 was increased by 1.  
For example, for M=6 there were 2.5 revolutions between 
NC1 and NC2, and 3.5 revolutions for M=7.   
 The CSM separated from the S-IVB with a 3 
foot/second posigrade burn with the S-IVB maintaining a 
local horizontal attitude hold.  NC1 was a horizontal 
phasing maneuver performed 1.5 revolutions after 
insertion, at apogee, with the CSM about 12 nm behind 
and slightly above the S-IVB.  A 1.5 revolution transfer 
was to permit sufficient time for ground tracking and 
Mission Control computation of the NC1 burn solution.  
The NC1 (phasing adjustment) and NC2 (targeted as a 
height adjustment) combination was designed to place the 
CSM within 300 nm of Skylab 36 minutes before NCC to 
permit VHF and sextant tracking.  NC1 was targeted on-
board but the ground solution was considered primary 
since no tracking data was incorporated into the on-board 
navigation state before NC1. 
 If an NPC were required NC1 would be targeted (zero 
out-of-plane velocity) so that NPC would occur at the 
second nodal crossing after NC1, ~69 minutes after NC1 
and before NC2.   
 Between NC1 and NC2 Mission Control uplinked 
attitude commands and maneuver times to Skylab.    
Skylab maneuvered to a Z body axis/local vertical attitude 
to facilitate CSM acquisition of the Skylab VHF 
transponder.  This attitude also facilitated sextant tracking 
by the crew.  The Skylab maneuver from solar inertial to 
the tracking attitude was completed by orbital midnight.  
The station maneuvered back to solar inertial two 
revolutions later, at orbital midnight, just after the TPI 
burn. 
 After NPC (if required) and before NC2 the crew 
optically tracked Skylab with the sextant and incorporated 
measurements into the navigation state.  For the nominal 
M=5 docking NC2 occurred 1.5 revolutions after NC1.  
The on-board solution was primary for NC2. NC2 was a 
horizontal height correction. 
 Sextant tracking was resumed after NC2 to update the 
navigation state in the CSM computer.  VHF tracking 
began before NCC.  VHF data was used for NCC, NSR, 
and TPI back-up chart planar (no out-of-plane 
component) targeting solutions.  It was not processed by 
the Kalman filter before TPI. 
 NCC was executed 0.5 revolutions after NC2.  It 
provided phasing, height, and planar control to clean up 
trajectory dispersions.  NCC and NSR were targeted as a 
pair since they had compensating errors that reduced 
dispersions at TPI.  If the NCC/NSR on-board solution 
was good the NSR solution was recorded by the crew for 
later execution. 
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 Sextant and VHF tracking was resumed after NCC. 
However, the NSR solution computed before the NCC 
burn was not updated based on this tracking data.  NSR 
was performed 37 minutes after NCC to place the CSM in 
a coelliptic orbit 10 nm below Skylab.  Sextant and VHF 
tracking resumed after NSR.  
 NC1, NC2, NCC, and NSR were executed in a heads-
down attitude to minimize the change in attitude between 
the tracking attitude and the burn attitude.  No sextant or 
VHF tracking was performed before NC1 but the NC1 
burn attitude was heads-down for consistency.  The 
minimum key-stroke (MINKEY) program that 
automatically sequenced the computer between 
navigation, IMU alignment, burn targeting, and burn 
execution was used. 
 TPI occurred 2 minutes before orbital midnight at an 
elevation angle of 27 degrees and a range of ~22 nm.  The 
maximum TIG slip for TPI was +/-10 minutes.  After TPI 
both sextant and VHF ranging data were processed by the 
Kalman filter to update the CSM computer navigation 
state.  VHF data continued to be used for back-up planar 
burn targeting solutions. 
 TPI was followed by two mid-course correction burns, 
TPM1 and TPM2.  After TPM2 the crew established line-
of-sight rate control and controlled range rate at 
procedure specified ranges.  Before docking Skylab 
momentum dumping was inhibited.  After docking 
momentum dumping was enabled once stable attitude 
control was established. 
 
SL-1 (Workshop Launch, May 1973) 
 
 The Skylab workshop was launched on May 14, 1973, 
by a Saturn V.  About a minute after launch, during the 
period of maximum dynamic pressure, telemetry 
indicated that a micrometeoroid shield had prematurely 
deployed.  Once on-orbit telemetry indicated that one 
solar array wing had released for deployment but was not 
fully extended.  Temperature telemetry indicated that both 
solar array wings were missing, along with an absence of 
voltage readings from both wings.1   The solar arrays 
attached to the Apollo Telescope Mount successfully 
deployed and were producing power.  If the two wings 
were gone the ability of Skylab to produce power was cut 
in half.  In addition, temperatures in the workshop were 
rising, suggesting that the micrometeoroid shield was 
gone. 
 The first Skylab crew (SL-2) was scheduled for launch 
on the next day, May 15, 1973.  However, the launch was 
delayed until May 25 to provide NASA personnel at the 
Johnson and Marshall Space Centers time to develop a 
sunshade that would be erected by the SL-2 crew.  In 
addition, extensive crew training was conducted for new 
procedures.  The Command Module (CM) was re-stowed 
with the sunshades and other items to replace those in 
Skylab that may have been damaged by the high 
temperatures.3 
SL-2 (First Visit, May - June 1973) 
 
 The first Skylab visit crew was launched on May 25, 
1973.  Rendezvous on the fifth orbit (M=5) was required 
since an M=6, 7, or 8 rendezvous would result in limited 
television coverage of the Skylab inspection and limited 
passes over the United States after rendezvous.8 
 About seven hours before liftoff two sunshades (also 
called parasols) arrived at launch pad 39B and were 
packed into the Command Module.3  Launch and orbit 
insertion were nominal.  After CSM separation from the 
S-IVB the CSM performed an automatic pitch around to 
allow the crew to observe the S-IVB and the launch 
adapter panels.  The panels were fully deployed at 45 
degrees.  They were not jettisoned as on lunar missions to 
reduce orbital debris.  Four revolutions later excess 
propellant was vented through the J-2 engine bell to 
deorbit the S-IVB into the Pacific Ocean north of Hawaii. 
 Some differences in crew positioning while executing 
rendezvous procedures were required to accommodate the 
re-stowage in preparation for the Stand-up Extra 
Vehicular Activity (SEVA) to be performed after the first 
docking.  The Science Pilot couch was stowed under the 
Commander’s couch and the Science Pilot performed 
rendezvous burn procedures while sitting on center 
stowage boxes.  The crew remain suited during the 
rendezvous but with helmets and gloves off. 
 Sextant tracking was not performed before NC-2 due 
to the special Skylab attitude for power generation and 
thermal control.  The Skylab tracking lights were not 
visible to the CSM crew in this attitude.  Sextant marks 
were obtained before NCC.  The NCC/NSR matched pair 
on-board targeting solution agreed with the Mission 
Control burn solution. 
 A chart solution was not available for the NCC burn 
due to the lack of VHF ranging measurements before 
NCC.  A chart solution for NSR was not computed since 
the NCC/NSR matched pair solution was deemed 
acceptable. Both NCC and NSR were successfully 
executed with burn residuals under 0.2 ft/sec in each axis. 
 VHF ranging was initiated at a range of 117.08 nm.  
Sextant tracking was performed after NSR.  The on-board 
TPI burn solution was in agreement with the Mission 
Control TPI solution.  The mid-course correction burn 
solutions were low.  Line-of-sight rates during braking 
were also low.9 
 The crew established station-keeping, then performed 
a fly-around of the workshop.  The crew inspection 
included verbal descriptions of the damaged workshop, 
still photography, and 15 minutes of television transmitted 
to Mission Control.8  The crew reported that solar array 
wing one was only partially deployed due to debris, solar 
array two was missing, and the micrometeoroid shield 
was gone.  During braking and the fly-around the crew 
noted that Service Module RCS jet firings disturbed the 
attitude of Skylab, resulting in Skylab workshop RCS 
firings.9 
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 The crew then soft docked, ate a meal, and prepared 
for the SEVA.  A suit integrity check was completed 
before undocking.  After undocking the CSM was piloted 
close to the end of solar array wing one.  The cabin was 
vented to vacuum, but thrust generated by oxygen venting 
through the open hatch was apparent to the commander as 
a translation.  However, it did not prevent the commander 
from maintaining station-keeping.9  Attempts by the EVA 
crew member to deploy the solar array wing resulted in 
unwanted CSM translation.  CSM jet firings to maintain 
station-keeping resulted in CSM RCS jet plume 
impingement on Skylab, which in turn perturbed the 
Skylab attitude and caused the Skylab RCS jets to fire.  
Several attempts to deploy the array failed and the stand-
up EVA was called off due to approaching orbital 
darkness. 
 The crew was unable to soft dock since the three 
capture latches would not capture the probe.  After 
executing three backup procedures the crew 
depressurized the CSM, opened the docking hatch, and 
removed probe.  If hard docking could not be achieved 
Mission Control provided the crew with a burn pad to set 
up overnight phasing away from Skylab.  The hatch was 
closed and hard dock was achieved without a soft dock, 
as had been done on Apollo 14.3  Eight docking attempts 
had been performed.  The length of the crew day was 22 
hours.8 
 At the end of the mission undocking was performed 
with an initial separation rate of 0.4 feet/second.  The 
crew was suited for undocking.  At a range of 300 feet the 
crew began a fly-around.  The Skylab inspection included 
still photography, television, and 16 mm motion picture.  
After 90 degrees of fly-around the crew noted that the 
vehicle was drifting away from Skylab.  Translational 
RCS firings caused the attitude to drift in pitch and yaw.  
RCS firings to correct the attitude impinged on the solar 
parasol, Apollo Telescope Mount solar arrays, and the 
Skylab discone antenna.  The impingement led to a 
decision to discontinue the fly-around.  The separation 
burn was executed in all three axes since the fly-around 
was not in-plane. 
 
SL-3 (July - September 1973) 
 
 After orbit insertion on July 28, 1973, the CSM 
separated from the S-IVB and the CSM crew performed 
an S-IVB observation activity.  The crew estimated the 
distance to the S-IVB to be 30 to 90 meters.  Range 
determination was not possible due to crew unfamiliarity 
with the exact size of the S-IVB and the lack of reference 
objects.  The crew reported that maintaining station-
keeping was a simple exercise.10 
 Before the NC-1 burn the crew reported fireflies 
passing by window #5.  Mission Control told the crew to 
isolate SM RCS Quad B due to a propellant leak.  VHF 
ranging lockon occurred at the predicted range, and the 
Skylab flashing beacon was sighted about 5.5 hours after    
. 
lift-off, also at the predicted range.10 
 VHF range and range rate data indicated that the first 
braking gate at 6,000 feet was successfully executed to 30 
feet/second.  Subsequent braking was almost continuous 
since only two RCS quads were available to support –X 
body axis braking.  The near continuous thrusting 
prevented accurate VHF range rate determination need by 
the crew for the braking phase.  The reduced control 
authority made it difficult to control line-of-sight rates, 
primarily in the vertical direction.10 
 Station-keeping was begun approximately eight hours 
after lift-off.  The crew found it easy to note when relative 
motion went to zero, but it was impossible to determine 
the exact range to Skylab.  Due to the difficulty in 
estimating range the crew had to reduce the range rate to 
zero before they approached close enough to visually 
estimate range rate.10  A fly-around inspection was 
performed with live television transmission to Mission 
Control.  The CSM flew too near to the thermal parasol 
due to the difficulty of piloting the CSM with two SM 
RCS quads isolated.11  Mission Control personnel 
observed via live television that the parasol erected by the 
SL-2 crew was flapping in response to SM RCS plume 
impingement.  The CSM was immediately flown away 
from the parasol. 
 Docking occurred about 30 minutes after arrival with 
a closing rate estimated to be less than 1 foot/second.  The 
crew opened the hatch and moved into Skylab about 10 
hours after launch.  The crew suffered from space 
adaptation syndrome during flight days one, two, and 
three.10 
 On flight day 6 SM RCS Quad D was isolated due to 
another propellant leak.  Mission Control and supporting 
personnel developed alternate flight control and deorbit 
procedures in response the loss of two RCS quads.  The 
CSM provided orbital adjustment capability for Skylab, 
but orbit trim burns scheduled for flight days 5, 31, and 
53 were cancelled due to the isolated RCS quads.3  In 
case the SM RCS problems prevented the crew from 
returning, the SL-4 Saturn IB and CSM were prepared for 
a rescue mission flown by two astronauts (Brand and 
Lind).  The CM would be modified to carry a total of five 
crew members and would dock to the back-up, or radial 
docking port.  In the end the rescue flight was not 
required.3 
 Skylab systems problems led NASA to consider 
launching the SL-4 crew before the SL-3 crew returned to 
Earth.  This would avoid a period when the station would 
be unmanned.  The SL-4 CSM could dock to the back-up 
radial port and SL-3 could undock and return the next 
day.  A second option was for the SL-4 CSM to station-
keep with Skylab while the SL-3 CSM undocked.  The 
SL-4 CSM would then dock to the primary axial port 
while the SL-3 crew returned to Earth.  However, neither 
of these options was exercised.3 
 After undocking on September 25, 1973, when the 
range had increased to over 30 meters, several CSM flight 
. 
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control systems tests were successfully conducted.10  A 
fly-around for Skylab inspection was not performed since 
SM RCS jets on Quads B and D were not available.  Due 
to the SM RCS problem the two burn deorbit sequence 
was changed to one SPS burn executed when the CSM 
was ~5,900 feet ahead of and below Skylab.3 
 
SL-4 (November 1973 - February 1974) 
 
 The SL-4 crew was launched on November 16, 1973.  
The launch and rendezvous were nominal.  Station-
keeping began about 7.5 hours after lift-off.  Soft capture 
and hard docking occurred about 30 minutes later after 
two unsuccessful attempts.  The failures were attributed to 
a low approach rate.  The approach rate for the successful 
docking was estimated to be between 0.8 and 1 
foot/second.12  The crew entered the station on flight day 
two.  Two crew members suffered from space adaptation 
syndrome on flight days one, two, and three.   
 Undocking occurred on February 8, 1974.  A fly-
around was performed for inspection and to photograph 
Skylab. 
 The crew later reported that station-keeping and the 
fly-around inspection were easier to perform than was 
expected from training.  Intermittent ground station 
coverage resulted in excessive voice traffic during the 
infrequent ground station passes.  The crew used a 
handheld computer (a Hewlett Packard HP-35 calculator) 
and recommended that the new hand held computers with 
program cards be used for back-up rendezvous burn 
computations in place of the charts.12-13  This was later 
done on Apollo/Soyuz (July 1975), when the CSM crew 
used a Hewlett Packard HP-65 calculator to compute 
back-up rendezvous burn solutions. 
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CHAPTER 6 - APOLLO/SOYUZ TEST PROJECT 
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Table 6.1  Apollo/Soyuz 
APAS = Androgynous Peripheral Assembly System, Coelliptic = Coellptic Flight Profile, CSM = Command/Service Module, DM 
= Docking Module, M = docking on the Mth revolution, Prox Ops = Proximity Operations, SEP = Separation 
Introduction 
 
 Talks were held in 1970 between Soviet and American 
space officials to explore the possibility of a joint space 
flight and development of space rescue techniques.  
Discussions expanded over the next two years and led to 
the Apollo-Soyuz (or Soyuz-Apollo) Test Project (ASTP).  
ASTP became a part of the process of détente.  
Programmatic challenges of ASTP included cultural 
differences, language barriers, use of different 
atmospheres in the spacecraft, and the development of 
androgynous docking hardware that would permit space 
rescue by vehicles of the same or different countries.1, 2, 3 
 In June of 1971, just after the successful docking of 
Soyuz 11 with the Salyut space station, the Soviets 
proposed an Apollo docking with a Salyut space station.  
A Soyuz docking with Skylab was also proposed.  
However, the decision for an Apollo docking with a 
Soyuz was made official in April of 1972 (Figure 6.1).1, 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 The probe and drogue docking mechanisms used by 
Apollo and Soyuz vehicles required different hardware on 
the vehicles to be docked.  An androgynous docking 
system that permitted two vehicles with identical docking 
hardware, called APAS-75, was developed.    
N
A
S
A
 
Figure 6.1  Apollo CSM and Docking Module 
(DM) (left) as seen from Soyuz (left) and Soyuz 
as seen from Apollo (right) (July 1975). 
N
A
S
A
 
 Apollo/Skylab CSM hardware, software and the 
coelliptic rendezvous technique were successfully 
adapted and flown to support rendezvous and docking 
with Soyuz.  Apollo Command Service Module (CSM) 
111, originally built for a lunar mission, was modified for 
ASTP.  In the event of a Soyuz failure the Soyuz crew 
could return in the Apollo CSM with the Apollo crew.  
Additional foot restraints, restraint harnesses, and helmets 
were carried.5, 6 
 Two unmanned Soyuz test flights were flown in 
support of Apollo/Soyuz.  These were Kosmos 638 (April 
1974) and Kosmos 672 (August 1974).  A crewed 
mission, Soyuz 16, was a six day flight flown in 
December of 1974.  The two man crew tested the APAS-
75 docking unit.  The NASA ground tracking network 
also tested American communications equipment installed 
on Soyuz 16.4, 7 
 The launches of both the Soyuz and Apollo vehicles 
were successful.  Docking and joint activities were 
conducted as per the pre-mission nominal timeline.  After 
the final Apollo-Soyuz undocking, challenging piloting in 
close proximity to the Soyuz was successfully performed 
in support of scientific experiments.  All mission 
objectives were met (Table 6.1).1, 6, 8 
 ASTP was the first mission on which a geostationary 
satellite was used to expand communications beyond that 
provided by ground tracking sites.  The NASA ATS-6 
communications satellite was launched on May 30, 1974.  
To support ASTP it was located at 35 degrees east 
longitude over the east coast of Africa.  It expanded 
continuous communications with the CSM up to 
approximately 50 minutes per revolution.5, 6 
 
Rendezvous Target Vehicles 
 
 A number of mission concepts were explored from 
1970 to 1972 that involved different chaser and target 
vehicles.  One scenario involved a Soyuz docking with 
either the primary or backup Skylab (Skylab B).  
However, Skylab mission planning and hardware 
development was too advanced to permit Skylab 
modification to accept a Soyuz vehicle.  In addition          
. 
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launch of the Skylab B was questionable due to budget 
concerns.  Another scenario used the Skylab backup CSM 
to conduct a cooperative docking with a Salyut station, 
followed by a fourth visit to Skylab.  This mission would 
have occurred approximately 18 months after the launch 
of Skylab.9  An Apollo/Salyut mission was planned, but 
the Soviets eventually indicated that it would be too 
costly to modify a Salyut with a second docking port that 
could support Apollo.  An Apollo/Soyuz docking was 
selected in April of 1972 for cost and schedule reasons.1 
 The Soyuz spacecraft was a modified version of the 
7K-T used in the Salyut program (Figure 6.1).  The power 
and life support systems were upgraded to support longer 
autonomous flight.  A VHF communications system was 
added to support voice communications with the CSM 
and VHF ranging by the CSM relative navigation 
function.  The Igla rendezvous system was removed from 
Soyuz.  However, the Soyuz crew was trained to fly a 
manual final approach and docking from a range of 300 
meters.4 
 The Soviets reduced their O2/N2 14 psia cabin 
atmosphere to 10 psia, a pressure level they had never 
flown.  Apollo used the 5 psia O2 atmosphere flown on 
the lunar missions and Skylab.2 
 The CSM was the active vehicle and the Soyuz was 
passive for the initial docking and a final docking on the 
last day of the joint flight.  However, for the final docking 
the Soyuz APAS-75 hardware was in the active role.   
 
Docking Hardware 
 
 Technical discussions concerning rendezvous and 
docking were conducted in Moscow in October of 1970 
during a visit by Bob Gilruth, Caldwell Johnson and 
Glynn Lunney of the Manned Spacecraft Center in 
Houston.1  Johnson gave an overview of his double ring 
and cone or androgynous docking mechanism, which he 
had been working on since May of 1962.  The device had 
been proposed for the Apollo lunar spacecraft, but the 
drogue and probe was selected November of 1963.10  
Johnson also proposed the same concept for the Apollo 
Applications Program in 1967.  NASA recommended a 
peripheral androgynous docking system for future 
missions.  It was peripheral since the docking hardware 
was on the periphery of the docking tunnel.  It was 
androgynous in that both spacecraft had identical docking 
hardware that could function in either an active or passive 
role during docking.  Soviets began working on an 
androgynous docking concept in 1968.1, 4 
 Consideration was given to using the legacy probe and 
cone concept flown on Apollo and Soyuz vehicles, but 
this was discarded in favor of new technology 
development.4  The probe and drogue design used by 
Apollo had to be disassembled to be removed and permit 
crew transfer.  A spacecraft equipped with a probe could 
only dock with a drogue equipped spacecraft.  The 
limitations of the probe and drogue led to the joint             
. 
development of the Androgynous Peripheral Assembly 
System 75, or APAS-75.  Both vehicles would fly with 
identical docking hardware that could function in either 
an active or passive role.  The passive APAS could 
perform a contingency separation from the active APAS.  
The APAS-75 allowed crew transfer without requiring 
removal of the docking hardware by the crew.4 
 The ASTP Soyuz was modified to include an 
androgynous device.  The APAS was too large to be 
placed on the Apollo Command Module and was on the 
Docking Module instead.4  The legacy Apollo probe and 
drogue were used for CSM docking with the DM.   
 
Docking Module 
 
 A Docking Module (DM) was designed as an airlock 
that would enable the crews to safely acclimatize before 
transferring between the vehicles since different 
atmospheres were used (Figure 6.1).  The DM performed 
several other functions as well.  These were 1) Serve as a 
structural adapter between the Apollo legacy probe and 
drogue docking mechanism and new androgynous 
docking mechanism (APAS-75), 2) Carry 
communications gear compatible with Soyuz frequencies, 
and 3) House Earth resources survey equipment for use 
after the joint part of the international mission ended.  
One end of the DM was equipped with a Soyuz 
compatible androgynous docking device (APAS-75), 
while the other had an Apollo compatible drogue.  The 
DM was carried on top of the S-IVB stage of the Saturn 
IB launcher, in the same manner as the LM was carried in 
the Saturn V.  DM also had redundant VHF/FM simplex 
transceivers operating at the Soyuz frequency of 121.75 
MHz.6 
 
Docking Alignment Tools 
 
 A 1971 proposal called for a centerline camera and 
window in the DM hatch to support docking.  One target 
would be in center of Salyut hatch, while another would 
be aligned with the CSM COAS.  This was canceled in 
October of 1972 for technical and budget reasons.  
Docking targets visible to the CSM COAS in the CM 
rendezvous window were judged to be adequate.   
 The Soyuz carried primary and backup docking targets 
to support alignment just before docking.  The primary 
Apollo docking target was erectable and attached to the 
Soyuz docking assembly.  The CSM crew member flying 
the docking sighted on the target using the COAS.  Soyuz 
was also equipped with a fixed backup docking target in 
the event that the primary target failed to deploy.  Soyuz 
was also equipped with two beacons and four orientation 
lights to aid the CSM crew during rendezvous. 
 A Soyuz docking target was placed on the DM for use 
by the Soyuz crew.  It would be observed through the 
Soyuz periscope. 
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On-Board Relative Navigation 
 
 Apollo CSM relative sensors were the same as for 
Skylab.  A sextant provided line-of-sight angle 
measurements.   The Soyuz was equipped with a VHF 
transponder to support VHF ranging.  VHF range rate was 
also available but was not processed in the Apollo 
computer Kalman filter.   
 
On-Board Maneuver Targeting 
 
 The Apollo CSM computer used the same targeting 
and relative navigation algorithms as were used for 
Skylab rendezvous.  However, the paper chart solutions 
were replaced by targeting algorithms on a Hewlett-
Packard HP-65 calculator with a magnetic card reader.  
Back-up targeting could be performed for the coelliptic 
(NSR), Terminal Phase Initiation and Mid-Course 
Correction maneuvers.   
 
Plume Impingement 
 
 Soviet concerns about Apollo CSM plume 
impingement on the Soyuz solar arrays were triggered by 
film of CSM RCS plume impingement effects on the 
Skylab parasol.  The four Apollo SM -X (forward firing) 
RCS jets were inhibited within 2 seconds of contact.  
Only two of the four CSM roll jets were used while 
docked due to loading concerns with the Soyuz solar 
arrays.1, 11 
 
Communications Testing 
 
 Enhanced communications and ground tracking tests 
were conducted through the ATS-6 satellite.  Use of ATS-
6 extended communications from 15 minutes to 49 
minutes per orbit.  This foreshadowed the use during the 
Shuttle Program of the Tracking and Data Relay Satellite 
System (TDRSS).6 
 
Nominal Rendezvous Profile 
 
 The nominal Soyuz rendezvous orbit was 121.5 nm 
circular inclined 51.8 degrees to the equator.  Apollo 
launch opportunities occurred on five consecutive days.  
The first three opportunities provided a docking on the 
29th Apollo revolution (M=29, flight day 3), the fourth 
opportunity on M=14 (flight day 2), and the fifth 
opportunity on M=13 (flight day 2).  The first through the 
fourth Apollo launch opportunities occurred on Soyuz 
daily orbit number 4 while the fifth Apollo launch 
opportunity occurred on Soyuz daily orbit number 3.  
Soyuz daily orbit 1 began when the ascending ground-
track crossed 20 degrees east longitude.  Nominal CSM 
insertion was into an 81 x 90 nm orbit with the nominal 
launch time in the planar window about 3 minutes before 
the minimum yaw steering launch time.  This provided a  
. 
total launch window of 8 minutes while providing 
propellant margin for engine failures by conserving 
Saturn S-IVB propellant allocated for yaw steering.12 
 After orbit insertion the Apollo CSM was to separate 
from the S-IVB and perform a transposition and docking 
maneuver to remove the DM from the S-IVB.  DM 
extraction was followed by a separation burn.    At third 
apogee a burn was performed to circularize the CSM/DM 
orbit at 90 nm.12 
 The CSM/DM flew a nominal coelliptic profile based 
on the Skylab NC1-NC2-NCC-NSR-TPI sequence 
(Figures 6.2 and 6.3).  However, unlike Skylab, which 
performed flight day one dockings, the nominal ASTP 
docking was on flight day 3. Alternate ground targeted 
phase profiles were developed to support different launch 
opportunities (M=14 and M=13 flight day 2 dockings), in 
part due to the high 51.8 degree inclination of the Soyuz 
orbit.12 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 After the circularization burn ground tracking data 
would be acquired and orbit determination results used to 
compute the NC1 burn.  This burn was executed on flight 
day 1.  Since the Soyuz circularization burn was not to be 
executed until after NC1 the desired Soyuz orbit was used 
for NC1 targeting.  If required, a plane change burn 
(NPC) could be executed 90 or 270 degrees after NC1.     
.   
CSM below (km) 
CSM behind (km) 
NC2 
NCC NSR TPI 
-100 
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orbital night 
Figure 6.3  Apollo/Soyuz relative motion for the 
first Apollo launch opportunity. 
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Figure 6.2 Rendezvous profile for the first 
Apollo launch opportunity (July 1975). 
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NC1 would be used to create the common node for the 
NPC.  NPC was the last burn opportunity planned for 
flight day 1.12 
 The Soyuz circularization burn was scheduled for 
execution while the Apollo crew was executing a 
scheduled sleep period.  On flight day 2 an Apollo 
Phasing Correction Maneuver (PCM) opportunity existed 
to permit phasing errors resulting from the NC1 and 
Soyuz circularization burns to be corrected.12 
 The remaining burns (NC2-NCC-NSR-TPI) plus two 
mid-course corrections after TPI were executed on flight 
day 3.  NC2 was a horizontal burn that controlled relative 
altitude to ensure an appropriate range to Soyuz for 
relative measurement acquisition.  NCC controlled 
relative altitude, phasing, and wedge angle at the NSR 
(coelliptic) burn point.  NSR established a nominal 
coelliptic delta-height of 10 nm.  TPI was executed on a 
line-of-sight elevation angle of ~27 degrees, nominally 2 
minutes before orbital midnight.  Two mid-course 
correction burns were planned after TPI.  Zero line-of-
sight rate control began at a range of approximately one 
nautical mile.12 
 After the final undocking the CSM flew a challenging 
relative motion profile (what would become known two 
years later as proximity operations) in support of several 
scientific experiments.12 
 
Contingency S-IVB (Booster) Rendezvous 
 
 Problems with the upper stage of the Saturn IB 
booster, the S-IVB, could have required the CSM to leave 
the vicinity of the S-IVB before the DM could be 
extracted.  This contingency could occur anytime within 
the first hour after orbit insertion, but was most likely to 
occur right after orbit insertion.  Once the ground 
executed procedures to safe the S-IVB (taking from 3 to 6 
hours) the CSM could return for DM extraction.  The low 
altitude at orbit insertion (80 to 90 nautical miles), a flight 
rule limiting CSM perigee altitude to greater than 70         
. 
Figure 6.4  Apollo-Soyuz contingency S-IVB stable orbit rendezvous, not executed (July 1975). 
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nautical miles, and the possibility of S-IVB re-entry as 
soon as 12 hours after insertion prevented use of the 
standard coelliptic rendezvous profile.13 
 The emergency separation procedure involved the 
crew applying a 20 foot/second CSM RCS DV in 
whatever direction the CSM happened to be pointed.  
Separation burn DV was to be voiced to Mission Control, 
or relayed digitally through the ATS-6 communications 
satellite (if available).  A one rev transfer would be 
performed out to a point trailing the S-IVB of 53 nautical 
miles (Figure 6.4).  If required as a part of the safing 
procedure, S-IVB propellant venting would be performed 
just after the NC maneuver.  The venting could impart 
~15 feet/second of DV to the S-IVB, and CSM maneuver 
targeting (NC, SOR1, SOR2) performed by Mission 
Control would be altered if propellant venting was 
performed. NC would initiate phasing to return to the S-
IVB.   
 The only ground update of the CSM state vectors for 
the CSM and S-IVB would be performed after NC.  
Ground tracking at other times during the rendezvous was 
not accurate enough to support rendezvous. Optical 
measurements using the sextant would be taken during all 
daylight periods. VHF ranging was not available for S-
IVB rendezvous, nor was the S-IVB equipped with lights 
to aid optical navigation (as it was on Apollo 7). The lack 
of an atmospheric drag model in the CSM computer 
further complicated relative navigation.  The S-IVB 
attitude was designed to minimize atmospheric drag and 
provide attitude stability, while the CSM attitude was 
defined to maximize atmospheric drag while permitting 
sextant tracking of the S-IVB.  The attitudes of both 
vehicles minimized differential drag effects on relative 
motion. 
 The NC/SOR1 sequence was to place the CSM at a 
point on the V Bar 6 nautical miles behind the S-IVB.  
The SOR2 maneuver executed at this point would 
establish a coellptic orbit (stable orbit rendezvous 
profile).  Later a TPI maneuver with a transfer angle of     
. 
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200 degrees to intercept would be performed.  The TPI 
and both TPM maneuvers were computed by the crew. 
COAS subtended angles were to be used for range 
estimation, and range rate was to be estimated by the 
Entry Monitoring System using an initial value for range 
from the CSM computer. 
 
Contingency Re-rendezvous With Soyuz 
 
 In the event that Apollo attempts to dock with Soyuz 
on the planned day of rendezvous were not successful, an 
alternate plan was developed that would enable more 
attempts to be made on the following flight day (Figure 
6.5).14  Apollo was to separate from Soyuz and phase 
behind it overnight.  A 2 foot/second posigrade separation 
maneuver and differential drag effects would place the 
CSM ~47.6 nautical miles behind Soyuz after 8 
revolutions.  At this point, the re-rendezvous would be 
initiated by a Mission Control computed TPI-1 maneuver 
which placed the CSM on a 290 degree intercept 
trajectory.  The profile was a stable orbit instead of a 
coelliptic.  The TPI-1 maneuver was designed so that at 
the TPI-2 point (a nominally zero DV maneuver), the 
same relative trajectory conditions (delta height, transfer 
angle, elevation angle) would exist as at the TPI 
maneuver on a coelliptic profile.  This profile design also 
provided terminal phase lighting and geometry conditions 
identical with the terminal phase of the coelliptic profile.  
The TPI-2, TPM-1, and TPM-2 maneuvers were 
computed using the CSM computer.   
 
Launch, Rendezvous, and Docking Performance 
(Flight Days 1 through 3) 
 
 After orbital insertion the S-IVB propellant and cold 
gas dumps were successfully accomplished.  The 
separation and stable orbit contingency re-rendezvous 
plan was not needed (Figure 6.4). 
 After separation from the DM/S-IVB, the CSM 
turned around at a range of 80 to 90 feet.  After                   
. 
Figure 6.5  Apollo stable orbit contingency re-rendezvous with Soyuz, not executed (July 1975). 
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transposition, as the CSM approached the DM/S-IVB, the 
COAS reticle was washed out by reflected sunlight from 
the Earth background.  The commander placed his hand 
behind the COAS glass to block the sunlight and 
confirmed that the green reticle was properly illuminated.  
The washout made it difficult to achieve a proper roll 
alignment.  The commander maintained station-keeping 
until the DM/S-IVB approached the horizon and 
proceeded with the docking.  There was some risk with 
delaying docking since orbital night was approaching and 
the S-IVB was not equipped with lighting.  Docking was 
successful.  Separation of the CSM/DM from the S-IVB 
was nominal.8, 15   The NC-1 burn was successfully 
performed. 
 Docking probe removal was delayed until flight day 
2 due to a problem with the probe.  The crew also 
successfully extended and retracted the APAS guide ring 
as a test.15 
 NC-2, the first burn executed on flight day 3, was 
nominal.  VHF ranging acquisition occurred at the 
expected range of approximately 120 nm.  The NCC burn 
was nominal.  The crew observed the Soyuz flashing 
beacon before the NSR burn.  Although sextant tracking 
was not scheduled before NSR, it could have been 
performed.  The crew chose to follow procedure and 
process only VHF marks before NSR.   
 At a range of about 50 nm to 60 nm the crew noticed 
VHF interference from ground stations in the United 
States, Europe, and the Soviet Union.  TPI time of 
ignition slip was approximately three minutes.  The delta-
velocity magnitudes for the two Mid-Course Correction 
burns after TPI were 0.2 feet/second and 0.4 feet/second.  
Line-of-sight rates were null and no inertial motion of the 
Soyuz was observed by the crew at a range of 0.25 nm.  
Some inertial line-of-sight motion occurred at close range 
but it was corrected by the CSM commander.8 
 The Soyuz maintained an LVLH attitude hold with 
the blunt end of the spacecraft pointed in the direction of 
motion.  The CSM flew over the top of the Soyuz to 
achieve the proper position for final approach.  The Soyuz 
. 
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performed a small pitch maneuver, followed by a 60 
degree roll maneuver.  This permitted the CSM to keep 
the high gain antenna pointed at the ATS-6 
communications satellite.   
 At final approach the Soyuz was below the horizon 
as viewed by the Apollo crew.  Reflected sunlight from 
the Earth background washed out the COAS reticle.  
Once the Soyuz reached the appropriate attitude it was 
near the horizon and the COAS reticle pattern was faintly 
visible.  Approach rate at docking was estimated to be 
about 0.4 feet/second.8, 15  The docking was televised live 
using the ATS-6 communications satellite.  Later on flight 
day 3 the crew checked the COAS alignment.  It was 
centered on the Soyuz docking target.  Apollo was able to 
dock with Soyuz on the planned day of rendezvous, and 
the separation and stable orbit re-rendezvous contingency 
plan was not needed (Figure 6.5). 
 
Undocking and Astronomy Experiments on 
Flight Day 5 
 
 The first undocking was performed on flight day 5, 
the final day of the joint flight.  After the Apollo active 
undocking an artificial solar eclipse experiment was 
performed.  The CSM flew a proximity operations profile 
(Figure 6.6) out to a range of approximately 200 meters in 
front of the Soyuz.  At this point the CSM subtended an 
angle of about two solar diameters as seen from the 
Soyuz.  The Soyuz crew then performed solar 
photography.6, 12, 16 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 The delta-velocity count on the EMS appeared to 
drift during the final approach.  The EMS provided the 
only indication, other than visual observation of the 
Soyuz, of the approach rate.  During the approach for the 
second docking the Soyuz was against an Earth 
background as observed from the CSM.  The CSM COAS 
reticle was washed out by sunlight reflected from the 
Earth, as had occurred during transposition and docking 
with the DM (flight day 1) and the docking with Soyuz 
(flight day 3).  This made it difficult to see the COAS       
. 
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Figure 6.6  Apollo motion relative to Soyuz for 
the artificial solar eclipse experiment. 
reticle pattern when the pattern was superimposed on the 
Soyuz or the Earth. Once the stand-off cross docking 
target became visible it provided a good reference for the 
CSM crew.15  The second docking was nominal, but after 
capture a yaw and pitch rotation was noticeable to both 
crews.  The APAS units were able to withstand the large 
structural loads.  The docking was completed 
successfully.   
 After the mission the second docking was 
investigated.  During final approach the Soyuz was in a 
somewhat different attitude than planned.  Additional 
maneuvering by the CSM was required.  Sunlight in the 
field of view of the CSM crew member flying the vehicle 
complicated the approach.  Due to a CSM sideways RCS 
firing after contact the mated stack was rotating.  The 
CSM IMU was approaching gimbal lock and another 
CSM RCS firing was performed to avoid gimbal lock.  
CSM RCS jets were not supposed to be fired during 
docking mechanism operation.4 
 During the second and final undocking the Soyuz 
was active.  The Ultraviolet Absorption (UVA) 
experiment involved three proximity operations profiles, 
two out of plane and one in-plane.6, 16   Ultraviolet light 
was produced by lamps and collimating mirrors on the 
Docking Module.  The light was reflected by an array of 
corner reflectors on the Soyuz.  An instrument on the 
Docking Module collected the reflected ultraviolet light.  
To prevent Doppler effects caused by spacecraft orbital 
velocity from shifting the lamp frequency away from the 
atmospheric absorption frequency the CSM had to be 
maneuvered so that the light beams were perpendicular to 
the orbital velocity.  Three data takes were performed.   
 The first was an out-of-plane orbital south profile out 
to a distance of 150 meters (Figure 6.7).  The second was 
an out-of-plane orbital north profile out to a distance of 
500 meters (Figure 6.8).  The third data take was in-plane 
as the CSM performed the final separation from Soyuz 
(Figure 6.9).  Data was obtained at a range of 1500 meters 
as the CSM passed above the Soyuz.6, 12, 16  The profile 
flown required more accurate CSM pointing than the 
CSM auto-pilot had been designed to provide.8  Data 
could not be obtained on the 150 meter profile.  This 
required changing to the aft Soyuz retro-reflector for the 
500 meter profile and modification of the planned Soyuz 
maneuvering to support the 500 meter profile.  Data was 
successfully obtained during the 500 meter and 1500 
meter profiles.5  VHF ranging data was available to the 
crew during the flight day 5 proximity operations 
activities.  However, range biases made the data 
inaccurate (measured range much smaller than actual 
range) and the crew did not consider it reliable at the data 
take ranges.15 
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CHAPTER 7 - SPACE SHUTTLE – A NEW DIRECTION IN MISSION ACTIVITIES 
 Space Shuttle rendezvous and proximity operations 
represented a significant departure from Gemini and 
Apollo.1 Rendezvous was considered a secondary service, 
while the primary service was payload deployment.  As a 
result rendezvous was not given as high a priority as it 
was in the Gemini and Apollo Programs.   
 There were also important technical differences 
between the shuttle and the previous two programs.  Most 
rendezvous targets would not possess active navigation 
aids (transponders or lights), nor were many of them 
originally designed to support rendezvous, retrieval, and 
on-orbit servicing. Shuttle rendezvous missions also 
involved deploy and retrieval of the same or different 
spacecraft on the same mission, and on some missions 
more than one rendezvous. 
 Relative chaser and target spacecraft size were 
significantly different.  Previous chaser vehicles (Gemini, 
Apollo Command/Service Module and Lunar Module)  
were about the same size as the target spacecraft (Radar 
Evaluation Pod (REP), Titan second stage, Gemini VII, 
Agena, Augmented Target Docking Adapter, LM, Soyuz) 
or smaller (Saturn S-IVB, Skylab).  Until the Mir and 
International Space Station (ISS) missions, the orbiter 
was much larger than its rendezvous targets.  
 Rather than docking at ~1 foot/second, as was done in 
Gemini and Apollo, satellite retrievals involved capture 
and berthing with a robotic arm (the Remote Manipulator 
System, or RMS), with nearly zero relative velocities 
between the two spacecraft.  Robotic arm operations, 
capture and berthing had not been performed on previous 
programs.  RMS design requirements were a function of 
orbiter stopping distance, arm joint loads and the ability 
of the crew to detect and control relative rates. 
  
. 
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Figure 7.1  Gemini and Agena testing before Gemini VI  
(Sept. 1965). 
N
A
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Figure 7.2  Apollo and Docking Module  
testing before Apollo/Soyuz (Jan. 1975). 
 Shuttle docking with Mir and ISS required a contact 
velocity an order of magnitude lower than Gemini and 
Apollo, with tighter piloting tolerances on time of 
docking and contact velocity.  Gemini and Apollo 
docking were axial and along the crew line-of-sight.  The 
Gemini crew had a direct view of the docking hardware at 
contact, while the Apollo CSM and LM crews did not.  
Shuttle grappling and docking required the use of cameras 
to provide adequate crew visibility and cues for final 
control.  Since target spacecraft could possibly already be 
in orbit during mission planning, some grapple equipment 
used by the Shuttle Program was designed from 
documentation of target spacecraft hardware, and was not 
mated on the ground for preflight checks as was done for 
Gemini and Apollo docking hardware (Figures. 7.1 and 
7.2).   
 Development of rendezvous profiles, mission plans, 
and procedures is a complex systems integration problem.  
Rendezvous personnel do not own many of the sub-
systems that are required for rendezvous since they are 
also used to support non-rendezvous activities.  This 
made it more challenging for rendezvous personnel to 
justify and achieve sub-system design changes to 
accommodate new and unique aspects of shuttle 
rendezvous and proximity operations. 
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 In 1969, a study of on-orbit ΔV budgeting was 
conducted for the Advanced Logistics System (ALS), an 
early name for the Space Shuttle.1  A five-maneuver 
coelliptic profile (Figure 8.1) was proposed for a resupply 
mission to a space station in a 200 or 270 n.m. circular 
orbit, with an inclination of 55 degrees.  Apollo and 
Gemini flight techniques, sensor characteristics, and flight 
experience was factored into the propellant budgeting 
estimate.  The ALS terminal phase was the same as that 
used on most Gemini and Apollo missions (Figure 8.2).2,3   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 The phasing, height adjustment, and coelliptic 
maneuvers are normally performed at an apsis crossing, 
resulting in a Hohmann transfer and a theoretically 
optimum ΔV (180 degree transfer).  The study assumed a 
launch directly into the plane of the station, a daily launch 
window, a minimum phasing perigee of 100 n.m., 
rendezvous within 24 hours of launch, and deorbit within 
24 hours of departure from the station.   
  
Figure 8.1   ALS profile for rendezvous (1969). 
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CHAPTER 8 - EARLY SHUTTLE RENDEZVOUS STUDIES 
 Propellant budgeting estimates were important for 
establishing payload capability.  Additional required ΔV, 
beyond the theoretical minimum, had to be estimated due 
to operational considerations, maneuver execution errors, 
targeting dispersions, guidance and navigation dispersions 
during powered ascent and the on-orbit phases, as well as 
worst-case phasing scenarios for both rendezvous and 
landings at a specified runway.  
 The first phasing maneuver (NC) would be executed 
without the benefit of ground tracking of the ALS, or ALS 
tracking of the station.  Subsequent error propagation 
could necessitate additional burns between NC and TPI to 
reduce dispersions.  In addition to an on-orbit ΔV 
estimate, the study concluded ΔV for worst case phasing 
scenarios could be reduced by delaying rendezvous 
beyond 24 hours from launch, delaying launch to take 
advantage of phase angle change per day, or lowering the 
minimum phasing perigee to below 100 n.m. 
 The high inclination and a requirement for rendezvous 
in from three to seventeen orbits placed severe constraints 
on launch window duration and frequency.  The study 
showed that propellant required could be significantly 
reduced if the requirements for every day launch, 
rendezvous duration and minimum perigee were relaxed. 
  Rendezvous with a passive target (radar using skin 
tracking, optical tracking via reflected sunlight) was 
identified as a shuttle requirement by 1969.  Prior to the 
shuttle, target spacecraft (Titan II second stage, Gemini 
VII, Agena and ATDA, Apollo CSM and LM, Skylab, 
Soyuz) possessed active relative navigation aids (Very 
High Frequency or L band transponders, strobes).  Using 
a standard Gemini/Apollo profile, skin-tracking radar 
would have only minutes to acquire and track a target 
before the TPI burn.  Passive relative navigation was seen 
as a major challenge.   Although the coelliptic profile used 
for most Gemini and all Apollo missions was favored for 
use on the shuttle, studies were conducted in 1970 to 
determine if other profiles might provide better geometry 
and tracking arcs for navigationally passive targets.  
 Figure 8.3a depicts a football profile that would 
increase the time available for radar tracking while inside 
a hypothetical 30 nautical mile tracking range of a 
navigationally passive target.  A coelliptic approach with 
a ΔH of 5 nautical miles would provide time for 
acquisition and tracking before the AD1 maneuver.  A 
smaller ΔH might have prevented rendezvous under 
dispersed conditions.  Both the AD1 and AD2 maneuvers 
would place the vehicle at a TPI point with the standard 
geometry used on Gemini/Apollo profiles, and to provide 
additional tracking time prior to TPI. 
 Figure 8.3b illustrates another concept, a stable orbit 
profile.  The AD2 maneuver would initiate shuttle long-
range station keeping behind the target, on the –V Bar.  
Additional tracking would be conducted at this point.        
.  
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However, the post TPI trajectory would not have the 
standardized terminal phase benefits provided by the TPI 
relative geometry of the Gemini/Apollo coelliptic profile. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 8.3   Notional profiles for a navigationally 
passive target (1970). 
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 During the Space Shuttle Phase B studies (1970-1971), 
the following assumptions were made: 1) rendezvous 
techniques and principles were well understood, and the 
flight regime should not contain technical challenges; 2) 
the coelliptic terminal phase from Gemini and Apollo will 
be used; 3) a target mounted navigation transponder will 
allow tracking out to the maximum range achieved during 
the Apollo Program (~300 n.m.); 4) radar skin tracking of 
a passive target out to 10 n.m. was a contingency mode of 
operation; 5) the shuttle will be capable of autonomous 
rendezvous; and 6) on-board computer capacity will be 
significantly greater than Apollo.  
 By 1973, four shuttle reference missions were in use 
for mission planning, vehicle sizing, and subsystem 
requirements definition, and three of them involved 
rendezvous.1  There was also a requirement (later waved) 
for a shuttle to rescue the crew of another shuttle stranded 
in orbit.  Rescue was to occur no later than 96 hours after 
launch of the rescue vehicle.  The rescue shuttle was to be 
able to phase from either above or below the other 
shuttle’s orbit, depending on the initial phasing at launch.  
 
Rendezvous For Reference Missions 1 and 2 
 
 The Mission 1 design involved a shuttle deployed 
space tug returning a geosynchronous satellite to an orbit 
coelliptic (ΔH of 10 n.m) with the shuttle, to facilitate 
retrieval.  The shuttle would then perform a TPI maneuver 
and fly a terminal phase similar to Gemini and Apollo 
(Figure 8.2).  Mission 2 was a servicing mission to an 
orbiting science platform. 
 In April of 1973, the five-maneuver profile used for 
Mission 2 was replaced by a Skylab based profile (Figure 
9.2) that satisfied shuttle operational considerations that 
had been identified up to that time. Those considerations 
were: 1) rendezvous with a navigationally active or 
passive target at orbital altitudes ranging from 150 to 400 
nm; 2) liftoff time selected whenever coplanar launch is 
possible, and will not be constrained by time-of-day; 3) 
minimize onboard relative navigation sensor cost, 
operating range, and accuracy; 4) ground tracking support 
requirements had not been clearly defined; 5) an optical 
sensor was required for inertial platform alignment; and 
6) the phasing portion of the rendezvous was not to be 
unnecessarily large. 
 A change to the Skylab plan involved the insertion of a 
second coelliptic segment before the NCC burn (Figures 
9.1, 9.2, and 9.3).  This second coelliptic phase allowed 
the subsequent maneuver points to be chosen to maximize 
use of reflected sunlight for optical tracking of 
navigationally passive targets.  The additional coelliptic 
segment also ensured the same relative geometry from the 
start of optical tracking through intercept for variations in 
liftoff time and target orbital altitude.  
Figure 9.1  Inertial view of dual co-elliptic  
rendezvous (1973-1983). 
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Figure 9.2   Relative view of dual co-elliptic rendezvous 
(1973-1983).   
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CHAPTER 9 - SHUTTLE DESIGN REFERENCE MISSIONS 
 Relatively constant range at the first optical tracking 
opportunity was also important due to the lower quality of 
optical tracking at this point. The dual coelliptic sequence 
(ΔH of 20 and 10 nm) also provided enough control over 
lighting to minimize lighting considerations for launch 
window determination. A wide variation in liftoff time 
was permitted without resulting in an excessively long 
phasing period.  The profile also permitted flexibility in 
selecting the level of ground tracking required and in the 
selection of on-board relative navigation sensors. 
 The standard terminal phase (Figure 8.2) was also 
used for Mission 2.  One issue, however, was that the 
targets would probably not possess strobes, as other 
targets had in previous programs.  Lighting requirements  
. 
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Figure 9.3 Shuttle Double Coelliptic Profile 
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for the pre-TPI optical tracking pass and the initiation of 
manual piloting (a few thousand feet from the target) at 
sunrise drove TPI to be performed after sunset.  A lack of 
target artificial lighting meant that the backup manual 
procedure of pointing the vehicle thrust axis at the target 
to execute TPI would not be available, as it was on many 
trajectories flown by Gemini and Apollo vehicles.  The 
dual coelliptic (Figure 9.3) would serve as the baseline 
shuttle profile for mission planning until April of 1983. 
 
Rendezvous For Reference Mission 3B 
 
 Mission 3B was a satellite retrieval from a 100 nm. 
circular orbit, with launch and landing occurring at 
Vandenberg Air Force Base.  Mission duration was about 
2 hours.1,2,3  
 The insertion point (Figure 9.4) was chosen to place 
the shuttle at the start of a 73 degree, 18 minute transfer 
to the target.  The relative trajectory at this point was also, 
by design, the same as if the shuttle had initiated a 130 
degree transfer with a TPI burn from a coelliptic orbit 
with a delta-height of  15 nm, and had 73 degrees left to 
travel.  This placed the shuttle on a terminal trajectory 
with characteristics similar to those used on terminal 
approaches flown on Gemini, Apollo, Skylab and Apollo-
Soyuz missions (Figure 8.2). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Insertion point selection also took into account search 
capabilities of the relative sensor, maximum time allotted 
for rendezvous, Reaction Control System (RCS) jet duty 
cycles, and evaluation in off-line and pilot-in-the-loop 
simulations.  Terminal control began with nulling of 
inertial angular rates.  Braking gates were designed so 
that coast periods were long enough to accommodate        
. 
Figure 9.4   Mission 3B approach (July 
1975).  Times are with respect to liftoff.  
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longer burn times due to dispersions or failed RCS jets, 
and to limit any delay in rendezvous to no longer than 
seven minutes. 
 Due to the short timeline (station-keeping at a range of 
100 feet established ~21.6 minutes after orbit insertion), 
no ground tracking of the shuttle was to be performed, nor 
would the shuttle have processed relative sensor 
measurements in a Kalman filter.  No on-board targeted 
maneuvers would have been performed.  Radar data 
(range, range rate, inertial line-of-sight rates) was to have 
been used by the crew to fly an approach along a straight 
line relative to an inertial reference frame and reduce 
closing velocity to appropriate levels. While similar 
profiles had been flown on Gemini XI (Figure 3.19) and 
Apollo lunar missions 14 through 17 (Figure 4.14), the 
Mission 3B profile was much more demanding. Whether 
or not rendezvous, target capture with the RMS, berthing, 
payload bay door closure, and deorbit could have been 
accomplished within the timeline is questionable.   
 Missions 3B and 3A (a similar mission, but with a 
deployment rather than retrieval) were the most 
challenging of the reference missions, and had the most 
impact on shuttle systems design and performance 
requirements.  Planning for both missions ended around 
October of 1975, and neither was flown.* 
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Identification of the Problem 
 
 Gemini and Apollo attitude control systems produced 
little cross coupling, and thrust magnitude, nozzle canting, 
target vehicle size, and appendages did not result in 
significant plume impingement issues.  Lunar Module 
self-impingement did have to be addressed with hardware 
modifications (Figure 10.1).  In the early 1970s, the 
existence of plume impingement was controversial, but 
analysis of Gemini XI film showing tether dynamics in 
response to RCS firings proved that plume impingement 
was real (Figure 10.2).  During the first attempt on Skylab 
2 to deploy a stuck solar array, the CSM was maneuvered 
so that a crewman standing in the hatch could reach the     
. 
Figure 10.3  Two views of the stuck Skylab solar array  
taken during the Skylab 2 CSM fly-around inspection  
(May 1973). 
N
A
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Figure 10.5  Soyuz with solar arrays  
during the Apollo/Soyuz mission  
(July 1975). 
N
A
S
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Figure 10.1  Two of the four LM RCS Quads and  
plume self-impingement shields (Apollo 16,  
April 1972). 
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A
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Figure 10.2  Agena tethered to the Gemini XI  
spacecraft (Sept. 1966). 
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Figure 10.4  Skylab with thermal parasol indicated  
(Feb. 1974). 
array with a deployment tool (Figure 10.3).  Apollo CSM 
thrusting to null the closing velocity triggered Skylab jet 
firings to maintain attitude, which resulted in an opening 
rate between the vehicles.1  Later film of Apollo CSM 
RCS effects on the Skylab thermal control parasol (Figure 
10.4) triggered Russian concerns about plume 
impingement for the Apollo/Soyuz mission.  Four of the 
CSM’s RCS jets were inhibited within 2 seconds of 
contact to avoid plume loading on the Soyuz solar arrays 
(Figure 10.5).2   
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 From March through June of 1973, a total of 491 
human-in-the-loop simulations were conducted at JSC to 
evaluate orbiter docking with a spacecraft (Figure 10.6).  
The objective was to determine if any changes to the 
Preliminary Requirements Review baseline orbiter design 
were required in the areas listed in Table 10.1.  Based on 
the study, many recommendations were made concerning 
crew displays, crew station arrangement, cameras, stand-
off cross targets, sensor data, target vehicle attitude 
control, orbiter flight control modes, RCS jet selection, 
propellant consumption, and cross coupling.  The study 
concluded that more simulations were needed to take into 
account changing orbiter systems configuration so that 
docking requirements could be more precisely and 
realistically defined.  However, the implications of plume 
impingement on RCS system design was not examined. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  By mid 1973, contamination of payloads by shuttle 
RCS jet effluents during the shuttle approach and braking 
phase was a concern to the payload community.  Previous 
analysis focused on potential contamination in the 
payload bay at the launch site and on-orbit.  An approach 
trajectory was proposed that minimized the expulsion of 
combustion by-products at the target, and therefore 
minimized the potential for contamination (Figure 10.7).   
 
Figure 10.6  Orbiter and target configuration used  
in the 1973 docking simulations.   
Figure 10.7   Terminal approach to 
minimize plume impingement on 
target (October 1973). 
1. Braking 
plume 
impingement 
sphere 
2. Transition 
3. Station  
    Keeping 
4. Final Approach 
+R Bar 
+V Bar 
 The trajectory was designed under the assumption 
that the target spacecraft could not be designed with 
features to prevent contamination (such as movable 
sensor covers), or that control of target attitude could not 
prevent contamination.  A target specific minimum range 
at which jets could be fired in the direction of the target 
without a contamination concern was defined.  At this 
point the orbiter would transition from the direct 
approach trajectory to a station-keeping point on the 
target velocity vector.  After preparations for grapple 
with the RMS were complete, the orbiter would initiate 
the final approach to the target.  
 In 1975, work began on rendezvous procedures for 
the Long Duration Exposure Facility (LDEF, Figure 
10.8) retrieval and Solar Maximum Mission satellite 
servicing (Figure 10.9), due to an anticipated deployment 
of LDEF on an early shuttle mission, and the approaching 
launch of Solar Max on a Delta booster.  Issues arising 
out of these efforts were to have a profound impact on 
shuttle operational concepts.  The large size of the shuttle 
primary RCS jets (870 pounds thrust) coupled with the 
small size of LDEF and Solar Max compared to the 
shuttle led to more concerns about RCS plume 
impingement effects.  Plume impingement could induce 
attitude rates on the target or even result in separation of 
the target and shuttle.  Targets with attitude control 
systems may not have been designed to maintain attitude 
in the presence of orbiter plumes.  This was a particular 
concern for payloads that used gravity gradient 
stabilization, such as LDEF.  Shuttle thruster sizing, 
placement, and orientation were designed to provide 
adequate flight control authority throughout the shuttle 
flight envelope, and to avoid self-impingement of aero 
surfaces, but impingement of target spacecraft or the 
RMS was not factored into the design.3  
 By June of 1976, off-line plume impingement 
simulations using simple math models had been 
conducted.  Results indicated that plume impingement 
induced dynamics at RMS release or grapple ranges         
. 
Table 10.1  1973 Docking Study Topics 
• Maneuver rates 
• Required minimum impulse for translation and rotation 
• Flight control requirements 
• Attitude hold requirements 
• Effects of control modes on center of gravity variations 
• Target motion 
• Hand controller location and logic 
• Reduced RCS thrust levels 
• Target displays 
• Range, range rate, and attitude display requirements  
• Station-keeping 
• Docking contact criteria 
• RCS propellant requirements 
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could make LDEF deployment and retrieval difficult and 
perhaps impossible.  A development effort was initiated 
to obtain improved models of shuttle RCS jets and plume 
physics.  New models were required to better 
characterize impingement effects and test trajectories, 
piloting techniques, new software, and identify vehicle 
hardware modifications needed to mitigate impingement 
effects. 
 Human in the loop simulations of approach and 
station-keeping were performed in the Shuttle 
Engineering Simulator (SES) in March, May, and June of 
1976.4  The approach techniques flown used the same 
type of contamination/overpressure sphere defined in 
October of 1973 (Figure 10.7).  The simulations also 
evaluated three types of close-in station-keeping: 1) +V 
Bar using the Crew Optical Alignment Sight (COAS), 2) 
+V Bar using the Closed Circuit Television Camera in 
the payload bay, and 3) +R Bar using the COAS.  SES 
results indicated that the standard Gemini/Apollo inertial 
approach in the current baseline profile did not mitigate 
plume concerns.  The acceptable approach techniques 
were +V Bar and +R Bar approaches.  However, the +V 
Bar approach required a new propulsion system to avoid   
. 
Figure 10.8   LDEF being maneuvered with  
the RMS.  
N
A
S
A
 
Figure 10.9   Attempted retrieval of the Solar  
Max satellite by an astronaut flying a Manned 
Maneuvering Unit on STS-41C (April 1984). 
N
A
S
A
 
PLUME IMPINGEMENT 
plume impingement and the +R Bar approach required 
accurate close-in radar.  
 
Resolving the Plume Impingement and Forward 
RCS Propellant Problems 
 
 By March of 1977 the term “proximity operations” or 
“prox ops” was coined, and proximity operations became 
a distinct discipline within the Shuttle Program.  
Proximity operations occur close to the target (within 
2,000 feet), and are characterized by nearly continuous 
trajectory control, whereas rendezvous control maneuvers 
typically occur at intervals of hours or tens of minutes.4  
 By April of 1977, after a considerable amount of 
lobbying by concerned technical and management 
personnel, potential problems with the ability of the 
Space Shuttle to retrieve satellites such as LDEF and 
Solar Max were receiving visibility at high levels within 
the Shuttle Program and the payloads community 
external to the Program.   
 Some proposed solutions to the plume impingement 
problem, such as alternate recovery techniques using new 
hardware (stand-off berthing using a mast or tether), a 
payload bay mounted cold-gas propulsion system, and 
hardened payloads were not acceptable due to  
complexity and cost.  Operational work-arounds 
consisting of new piloting techniques and shuttle flight 
control system modifications were preferred.  However, 
these options increased propellant usage and increased 
complexity of crew procedures and shuttle software. 
 Both the Gemini and Apollo vehicles carried ample 
propellant margins, but the shuttle was limited in terms of 
forward RCS propellant.  The shuttle could run out of 
forward RCS propellant during the terminal phase 
(Figure 10.7) under dispersed trajectory conditions, and 
in the event of a radar failure.   
 From July to September of 1977, a study of approach 
and station-keeping techniques was conducted in the 
SES.  The PDRS-III runs were the first to incorporate six 
degree-of-freedom RCS jet plume effects in a human-in-
the-loop simulation.  Inertial, +V Bar, +R Bar, and H Bar 
approaches and station-keeping were evaluated (Figure 
10.10).  Targets were LDEF and Skylab.   
 Results confirmed earlier studies, which indicated that 
an Apollo inertial approach and braking technique caused 
the gravity gradient stabilized LDEF to tumble.  Some +R 
Bar approaches worked with the Apollo (inertial) 
approach and technique, due to the natural braking effect 
of orbital mechanics. Other findings were: 1) a +R Bar 
approach can be flown to a gravity gradient stabilized 
spacecraft (LDEF) using +/- X RCS jet firings for 
braking during –Z body axis approaches, 2) rendezvous 
radar is required, 3) a more accurate rendezvous radar 
than the one baselined for the orbiter would ease the 
piloting task, and 4) the payload bay Closed Circuit 
Television Cameras (CCTVs) were very useful for 
sensing small opening or closing rates.4 
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Figure 10.10   Proximity operations approaches. 
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Figure 10.11   Comparison of plumes. 
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Figure 10.12  Proximity operations options as of November 1977 after the PDRS-III simulations.  
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 The one technique that worked for approaches along 
all three Local Vertical Local Horizontal (LVLH) frame 
axes (V Bar, R Bar, H Bar) used the orbiter +/-X body 
axis RCS jets (Figure 10.11) for braking. These jets had a 
small component of thrust along the +Z body axis.   
 A new technique, the lateral or H Bar approach (out-
of-plane) was extensively tested to bring it up to the 
maturity level of the R Bar and V Bar approaches 
(Figures 10.10 and 10.12).4,5,6  A CCTV overlay was 
used as a piloting aid for H Bar approaches.  Advantages 
of the H Bar approach were consistently good lighting 
conditions for piloting and Y LVLH motion that did not 
couple into the LVLH X and Z axes.  Unlike the +R Bar 
approach, the H Bar approach did not have natural 
braking, but had natural acceleration, which necessitated 
frequent thrusting at the target during approach.  Out-of-
plane motion still occurred after relative translational 
rates were nulled.  The H Bar approach was never 
baselined for operational use, due to safety, station-
keeping, propellant consumption, and plume 
impingement concerns. 
 As a result the orbiter flight control system was 
modified to provide a “Low Z” mode.  This provided 
some RCS braking capability while minimizing RCS 
plume impingement (Figure 10.11).  Jets used for this 
mode had a thrust component that was primarily along 
the X body axis.  The serendipitous canting of the aft X 
axis RCS jets was not an original design requirement for 
proximity operations.  The braking contribution provided 
by the scarfed, nose mounted X axis RCS jets is negated 
by RCS firings to control pitch.  Upward firing RCS jets 
were inhibited in Low Z.  However, use of the Low Z 
mode was expensive in terms of propellant use.  The 
ability to perform an attitude hold with respect to the 
LVLH frame was also added to the shuttle flight 
software.4 
 Figure 10.12 illustrates the proximity operations 
approach options that existed as of November 1977.4  
The inertial approach, brake to payload, was the legacy 
approach from the Gemini, Apollo, Skylab, and Apollo-
Soyuz missions.  The contamination sphere, V Bar, R 
Bar, and H Bar approaches were developed in response 
to shuttle plume impingement on the target spacecraft 
concerns.  However, further proximity operations 
technique development would be required before the first 
proximity operations mission (STS-7, June 1983) and the 
first rendezvous mission (STS-41C, April 1984).7,8   
 The shuttle never flew Gemini or Apollo style inertial 
approaches or H Bar approaches.  Most shuttle 
rendezvous missions in the 1980s to mid 1990s flew V 
Bar approaches.  Some low energy inertial approaches 
were flown due to target spacecraft inertial attitude 
requirements.  The first +R Bar approach was flown on 
STS-66 in November of 1994.  +R Bar approaches 
became viable with the addition of proximity operations 
sensors (Trajectory Control Sensor and Hand Held Lidar) 
and the Rendezvous and Proximity Operations Program. 
Summary of the Plume Impingement Issue and 
Resolution 
 
 Plume impingement was a significant technical 
challenge that had to be overcome before the first 
rendezvous and proximity operations missions could be 
planned and flown.  The issue arose from shuttle RCS 
system design, grappling target spacecraft with a robotic 
arm, and the sizes and characteristics of target spacecraft 
attitude control.  Although new simulation capabilities 
and flight control techniques had to be developed, the 
issue was resolved without extensive modification of the 
shuttle or target spacecraft.  However, extensive mission    
specific planning and analysis was required to mitigate 
plume impingement risk to the wide variety of target 
vehicles associated with the Shuttle Program. 
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 Relative Navigation Sensors  
 
 The Space Shuttle presented new technical and 
operational challenges.  The shuttle had a requirement to 
rendezvous with spacecraft that were not modified or 
equipped to support cooperative tracking.  Target 
spacecraft in the Gemini, Apollo, Skylab, and 
Apollo/Soyuz Programs possessed strobes and radio-
frequency transponders to support long-range cooperative 
relative tracking.  Unlike Gemini and Apollo, shuttle 
rendezvous target spacecraft would not necessarily 
possess active navigation aids (transponders or lights), 
nor were many of them originally designed to support 
rendezvous, retrieval, and on-orbit servicing.  The use of 
radar skin tracking and reflected sunlight for star tracking 
led to concerns about detection and tracking of targets 
during shuttle development.   
 The number of ground radar tracking stations would 
be lower than those available during Gemini and Apollo.  
Not all shuttle rendezvous targets were assumed to have 
ground radar compatible transponders.  Later, ground 
tracking uncertainties were deemed too conservative. 
 Optical tracking would be provided by one of two star 
trackers, which were also to be used for aligning the 
Inertial Measurement Units.1  The trackers had field of 
view restrictions based on Earth limb and bright object 
considerations (Sun, Moon).  Availability of optical 
measurements, which used target reflected sunlight to 
facilitate acquisition and tracking, was seen as a major 
challenge before shuttle rendezvous missions were flown.  
Strobes, used on targets in previous programs for optical 
tracking via the human eye, were judged to be 
incompatible with the shuttle star trackers. 
 Original shuttle rendezvous navigation requirements 
called for a radar range of 300 nm, provided that the 
target was equipped with a transponder.  Skin tracking 
(no transponder) of a target with a 1 square meter cross 
section out to a range of 10 nm would also be available.2  
In the mid 1970s radar development costs led to 
examination of deferral of radar operational capability, 
which would have resulted in many early rendezvous 
missions not having radar.  The cost of Ku band radar 
development also motivated the study of alternative 
sensors.  “All optical rendezvous” was studied, but 
simulations indicated that the probability of successful 
dual coelliptic rendezvous (Figure 9.2) under dispersed 
conditions was less than desirable due to increased RCS 
propellant consumption.   
 A proposal to equip shuttle rendezvous targets with 
Tactical Air Navigation (TACAN) transmitters was 
briefly examined in 1976.  This option would take 
advantage of shuttle TACAN receivers and measurement 
processing software already under development to 
support shuttle landings.  However, this would have 
required equipping target spacecraft with TACAN             
. 
transmitters.  Furthermore, this would not have enabled 
the shuttle to meet the passive relative navigation 
requirement. 
 The decision to proceed with Ku radar development 
in the mid 1970s was in part motivated by concerns about 
the proposed Skylab reboost mission that might have 
flown in 1979 or 1980.  The Ku antenna and electronics 
would also be used for communications through the 
Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System (TDRSS). 
 In late 1976 consideration was given to equipping the 
orbiters with two Ku band radars to provide relative 
navigation sensor and burn targeting redundancy.  
However, the cost and weight penalties of two 
rendezvous radars did not justify the additional 
redundancy during rendezvous.  In addition, a proposal to 
move the rendezvous radar from the starboard (right) side 
of the payload bay to the port (left) side (and moving the 
data link only Ku from the port side to the starboard side) 
was not approved due to a consideration of cost versus 
benefit.  If approved radar tracking could have been 
performed in parallel with –Y star tracker tracking. 
 In the spring of 1977 consideration was given to 
modifying the Ku radar to provide proximity operations 
tracking at a minimum range of 35 to 50 feet, rather than 
the specified 30 meters.  This was not pursued due to 
cost. 
 Cost overruns prevented the acquisition of target 
transponders and spare parts for the shuttle radar, and the 
passive skin tracking mode of radar operation was the 
normal operating mode, which in turn limited the range 
of the radar (10 nm specification, ~22 nm maximum 
range).  This was a factor in the inability of the shuttle to 
meet rendezvous autonomy requirements.  A target 
spacecraft that required the transponder never appeared, 
and the Shuttle Program requirement to support 
cooperative rendezvous (radar transponder) was deleted 
in the mid 1980s. 
 Crew Optical Alignment Sight (COAS) line-of-sight 
measurements could be processed in the Kalman filter as 
a backup to the radar and star trackers.  Relative 
navigation sensor measurements from the radar, star 
tracker, and COAS were processed in a Kalman filter that 
built upon the Apollo experience.3-5  Original filter 
requirements called for an optimal filter that updated both 
the shuttle and target state vectors, but the 1976 on-board 
computer requirements scrub resulted in the filtering of 
only one state vector, as was done on Apollo.6  However, 
the shuttle rendezvous navigation sensors and software 
were more capable than the Apollo sensors and software.  
The shuttle relative navigation filter did not require 
modification over the life of the program.  The 
operational envelope of shuttle rendezvous sensor data. 
processed by the Kalman filter is depicted in Figure 11.1. 
. 
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 As a back-up to the radar at close range, the COAS 
could be used to obtain sub-tended angle measurements 
that would be used to obtain a rough estimate of range 
though the use of a chart.  This method required that the 
target be in a known and stable attitude.  The COAS 
would also later see extensive use during proximity 
operations as a piloting aid.7  Tilt angles of the payload 
bay Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) cameras could 
also be used to obtain a rough estimate of range at close 
range during proximity operations.   
 By the mid 1970s, when the rendezvous navigation 
sensors and relative navigation capability was baselined, 
proximity operations culminated with approach and 
grapple of a spacecraft with a robotic arm.  The baselined 
rendezvous radar was adequate to support this, although 
it lacked effective redundancy.  There were concerns 
about the lack of a back-up range and range-rate 
measurement device for the Ku band rendezvous radar, 
particularly during proximity operations and the proposed 
Skylab re-boost mission (canceled in December of 1978).  
A number of potential off-the-shelf solutions were 
examined in the mid and late 1970s, such as hand-held 
police radar and battlefield lasers.  None of the off-the-
shelf options evaluated were satisfactory.   
 A laser rangefinder used for auto-focusing the 
payload bay CCTV cameras was tested during proximity 
operations on STS-41B and STS-41C (1984), but 
limitations in range and range rate accuracy limited its 
usefulness.  A parallax rangefinder and a night vision        
. 
Figure 11.1  Operational use of shuttle rendezvous 
sensors for a typical ISS mission. 
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system were also tested on early missions in the 1980s, 
but performance was not adequate.   
 The baseline proximity operations sensors and 
piloting aids (radar, COAS, CCTV cameras) were 
successfully used to null the final approach velocity to 
zero to support grapple of a spacecraft by the Remote 
Manipulator System (RMS) on rendezvous missions.  
This success made it difficult to obtain sufficient priority 
and resources to address the concern about lack of a 
backup source of range and range rate measurements.   
 However, these sensors and piloting aids had 
operational limitations.  Rendezvous radar tracking for 
even small payloads reached the end of the tracking 
envelope at about 80 feet.  Visual ranging methods using 
COAS subtended angles or two CCTV camera tilt angles 
were imprecise, imposed a heavy crew work-load during 
an already busy phase of flight, and did not provide the 
crew with a direct range-rate measurement.  On-orbit use 
of the CCTVs was frequently limited by extreme orbital 
lighting conditions that caused image blooming.   
 An orbit determination autonomy requirement also 
existed for the shuttle.  Processing of TDRSS one way 
Doppler by the shuttle computers was considered, but not 
pursued due to on-board computer memory limitations.  
During the late 1970s, use of the Global Positioning 
System (GPS) was also examined, but it was not adopted 
due to cost and the immaturity of the technology.8  The 
navigation autonomy requirement could not be met, and 
the shuttle would rely on ground based orbit 
determination using radar, and later in the program, 
measurements from TDRSS tracking.  Single TDRS 
ground navigation was certified in October of 1984.  Two 
TDRS ground navigation was certified after tests during 
STS-29, STS-30, and STS-32. 
  
Burn Targeting 
 
 The ground-targeted phase of rendezvous begins after 
orbit insertion (Table 11.1).  Rendezvous burns are 
computed by Mission Control using orbit determination 
data obtained by processing ground radar and TDRSS 
Doppler measurements.  The length of this phase varies, 
and typically lasts several days.   Although a ground-
targeted phase burn plan is determined before launch, 
some adjustments may be required after launch due to 
shuttle ascent performance dispersions, or shuttle or 
target spacecraft systems problems. 
 The on-board targeted phase begins once shuttle 
sensors (the first is star tracker, Figure 11.1) are able to 
obtain relative measurements.  Shuttle orbit adjustments 
are then computed on-board, while Mission Control 
computations are available as a back-up, in the event of 
an on-board system anomaly.  Unlike the ground-targeted 
phase, activities from the beginning of on-board relative 
navigation to the beginning of proximity operations (at a 
range of ~2,000 feet) may change little from flight to 
flight. 
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Figure 11.2  On-board targeting software evolution in terms of requirements documents.  The final Orbit 
Targeting Specialist Function consisted of Lambert Targeting, Clohessy-Wiltshire Targeting, and Orthogonal 
Braking.  Only Lambert targeting was used on shuttle missions.  See JSC-35053 in the A Note on Sources 
appendix. 
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Regime 
 
I 
 
 
 
 
II 
 
 
 
 
III 
 
 
 
 
IV 
 
 
 
 
V 
Maneuvers or Activities 
 
Phase Adjustment (NC1) 
Plane Change (NPC) 
Height Adjustment (NH) 
Coelliptic (NSR1) 
 
Phase, Height, and Plane Adjustment (NCC) 
Coelliptic (NSR2) 
Terminal Phase Initiation (TPI) 
Terminal Phase Mid-Course (TPM) 
 
Braking 
Station-keeping 
Final Approach 
Terminal Station-keeping 
 
Payload Grapple 
Payload Berthing in Payload Bay 
Payload Un-Berthing  
Payload Deployment 
 
Terminal Station-keeping 
Departure 
Fly-around 
Separation 
Computed By 
 
Mission Control 
 
 
 
 
On-board (primary) 
Mission Control (backup) 
 
 
 
On-board targeting or 
charts & crew procedures  
using radar data & COAS. 
 
 
N/A 
 
 
 
 
On-board targeting or 
charts & crew procedures 
using radar data & COAS. 
State Determination 
 
Mission Control using 
S-Band, C-Band, TDRSS. 
On-board using one-way  
Doppler or GPS. 
 
Mission Control using 
S-Band, C-Band, TDRSS. 
On-board using star  
tracker, radar. 
 
On-board using radar. 
 
 
 
 
N/A 
 
 
 
 
On-board using radar. 
Table 11.1  Rendezvous and Proximity Operations Mission Regimes Circa 1978 
 Definition of on-board rendezvous burn targeting 
concepts for the Space Shuttle was underway by 1972 
(Figure 11.2).  The original intention for shuttle on-board 
targeting was that it would handle all burns from post 
orbit insertion through final approach under nominal 
conditions.  In 1974, a requirement for the shuttle to 
conduct autonomous rendezvous (little or no support 
from Mission Control) existed.  Mission Control burn 
targeting would be available as a backup for cross-checks 
of on-board targeting and for targeting contingency burns 
in the event that off-nominal performance or changes in 
mission plans required changes to the rendezvous profile.  
Astronauts were to compute a nominal series of burns 
and execute them without Mission Control confirmation.  
For off-nominal scenarios, the crew could compute and 
execute a rendezvous plan with inputs from checklists or 
Mission Control.  The on-board computer would not 
recommend actions in response to off-nominal situations.  
Mission Control was still to be able to compute burns, 
particularly in the event of off nominal scenarios.  
 Algorithms to perform this on-board targeting 
(including the baseline dual coelliptic NC1-NH-NSR1-
NCC-NSR2-TPI-TPF profile), called the Orbit Maneuver 
Processor (OMP), were documented in a 1975 JSC 
document (Figure 11.2).    On-board OMP was more 
flexible than its predecessors (Gemini, Apollo, and 
Skylab Docking Initiation, or DKI) and could support 
different combinations of burns without reprogramming.  
It was also capable of targeting all orbital burns from 
insertion through intercept.  However, limited on-board 
computer capacity made the targeting autonomy               
. 
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requirement difficult to meet.  On-board OMP did not 
become actual software requirements due to the 1976 
software scrub led by Apollo 13 astronaut Fred Haise.  
The 1975 on-board OMP algorithms did form the basis of 
a later version of OMP used in Mission Control for 
targeting burns during the Shuttle Program. 
 In April of 1977 a scrubbed version of the 1975 on-
board OMP document was released called the 
Rendezvous Targeting Specialist Function (RTSF, see 
Figure 11.2).   Targeting for burns performed outside of 
relative sensor range (phasing, or NC, and altitude, or 
NH) was to be performed by Mission Control (Table 11.1 
and Figure 11.2).  Only burns performed after on-board 
relative sensor measurement acquisition would be 
targeted on-board (NCC-NSR-TPI-TPM).   These 
algorithms were included in the first orbit targeting 
Functional Subsystem Software Requirements (FSSR) 
document published by Rockwell in March of 1978 
(Figure 11.2).   
 In April of 1977 concerns about Reaction Control 
System (RCS) jet plume impingement during proximity 
operations and forward RCS propellant depletion led the 
Mission Planning and Analysis Division (MPAD) to 
examine the creation of proximity operations targeting 
algorithms based on the Clohessy-Wiltshire equations.  
The proximity operations targeting function was believed 
to be a method for lowering forward RCS propellant 
consumption and permitting final approaches from any 
direction to minimize plume impingement (Figure 10.10).  
This would also provide maximum flexibility during 
mission planning.  It was intended for targeting Mid-        
..  
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Figure 11.3   Approaches using orthogonal 
braking (1978).  Arrows indicate DV. 
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Course Correction (MCC, or Terminal Phase Mid-course, 
or TPM) burns after the TPI burn, long range 
circumnavigation, and proximity operations.  
 However, the RTSF would not fit in the limited 
memory of the shuttle flight computer, nor would both 
RTSF and the new Clohessy-Wiltshire targeting function 
fit in the flight computer.  RTSF was scrubbed from the 
software requirements and replaced with the simple 
addition of the Proximity Operations Specialist Function 
(Figure 11.2).   Studies indicated that the Clohessy-
Wiltshire targeting package might not be able to 
adequately support burns with longer transfer times, such 
as TPI.  Later a decision was made to expand the 
Proximity Operations Specialist Function to include two-
impulse, point-to-point Lambert targeting in order to 
increase the range of operations of the targeting software.   
To reflect the addition of the longer range Lambert 
targeting functionality the Proximity Operations 
Specialist Function was renamed the Orbit Targeting 
Specialist Function (Figure 11.2).  
 RTSF deletion also meant that the on-board targeted 
phase profile was changed from NCC-NSR-TPI-TPM to 
NCC-NCC-TPI-TPM.  A NCC (corrective combination) 
burn was designed to function as a coelliptic (NSR) burn 
since the NSR targeting capability was scrubbed with the 
RTSF.  Lambert performed point-to-point targeting and 
did not retarget the entire burn sequence each time 
targeting was performed, as was done in on-board OMP 
requirements (1975) and RTSF (1977).  Changes to the 
March 1978 FSSR algorithms (RTSF deletion, addition 
of Lambert and Clohessy-Wiltshire targeting) were 
approved in August of 1978 and a new requirements 
documents containing the new Lambert and proximity 
operations targeting algorithms was published in March 
of 1979.  At that time Clohessy-Wiltshire equations were 
preferred for proximity operations over Lambert targeting 
as it was assumed that Lambert targeting would take too 
long on a shuttle flight computer (30 to 60 seconds) 
compared to Clohessy-Wiltshire targeting requiring about 
5 seconds to complete.  However, later experience 
indicated that Lambert targeting typically took less than 
15 seconds to execute. 
 Even with the addition of proximity operations 
targeting based on the Clohessy-Wiltshire equations, 
there was still a need for manual proximity operations 
piloting.  Proximity operations targeting was dependent 
on good radar data and relative navigation using the 
Kalman filter in the flight software.  It was expected that 
the quality of radar measurements with large target 
spacecraft could introduce variation in burn targeting 
solutions.    Manual piloting was still needed as a backup 
for flying transitions to, from, and between the V Bar and 
R Bar axes, approaches along the V Bar and R Bar axes, 
and glideslope approaches.  Manual piloting directly 
controlled range, range rate, and line-of-sight angles 
while Clohessy-Wiltshire targeting performed point-to-
point transfers over a fixed time interval.  Approach and  
. 
separation trajectories needed to be manually flyable to 
preserve the backup option of manual piloting, rather 
than simply bouncing from point-to-point using the 
Clohessy-Wiltshire two point targeting.  The need to have 
manual piloting techniques for backup and direct manual 
control of range, range-rate, and line-of-sight angles as 
opposed to point-to-point targeting over a fixed transfer 
time made Clohessy-Wiltshire targeting less desirable 
than near continuous manual piloting. 
 The Clohessy-Wiltshire based targeting also included 
an orthogonal braking algorithm.  This algorithm solved 
for the transfer time between proximity operations 
braking burns so that the burn was orthogonal to the line-
of-sight to the target spacecraft (Figure 11.3).  The 
orbiter –Z body axis (out of the payload bay) was pointed 
at the target during final approach.  Orthogonal braking 
provided +X body axis RCS jet burns.  This technique 
mitigated risk of plume impingement and avoided use of 
forward RCS propellant.   Aft RCS propellant 
consumption was not as critical.  However, orthogonal 
braking was never used on shuttle missions.  Analysis of 
orthogonal braking during +R Bar approaches indicated 
that performance under nominal trajectory conditions was 
acceptable.   However, under dispersed conditions the 
nominally 5 minute transfer time between two burns 
could decrease by several minutes.  
 Clohessy-Wiltshire targeting, like Lambert targeting, 
was upgraded with a precision predictor outer loop to 
account for atmospheric drag and non-conic gravity.  It 
also had a multi-revolution capability.  However, the 
Clohessy-Wiltshire algorithm was never used in flight as 
it performed essentially the same function as Lambert 
targeting.  The Lambert algorithm was used for all on-
board targeted burns over the life of the Shuttle Program.  
The forward RCS propellant depletion problem that in     
. 
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Vehicle 
 
Gemini 
 
 
 
Apollo  
LM 
 
 
 
 
Apollo  
CSM 
 
 
 
 
Skylab 
CSM 
 
 
Apollo/Soyuz 
CSM 
 
 
Space 
Shuttle 
CSI/NCC A 
 
• Gemini Computer E 
• Mission Control 
 
 
• LM PGNS 
• LM AGS 
• LM Crew Charts 
• CSM PGNCS 
• Mission Control 
 
• LM PGNS 
• LM AGS 
• LM Crew Charts 
• CSM PGNCS 
• Mission Control 
 
• CSM PGNCS 
• CSM Crew Charts 
• Mission Control 
 
• CSM PGNCS 
• Mission Control 
 
 
• Shuttle Computer 
• Mission Control 
CDH/NSR B 
 
• Gemini Computer E 
• Mission Control 
 
 
• LM PGNS 
• LM AGS 
• LM Crew Charts 
• CSM PGNCS 
• Mission Control 
 
• LM PGNS 
• LM AGS 
• LM Crew Charts 
• CSM PGNCS 
• Mission Control 
 
• CSM PGNCS 
• CSM Crew Charts 
• Mission Control 
 
• CSM PGNCS 
• HP-65 Calculator 
• Mission Control 
 
• Shuttle Computer 
• Mission Control 
TPI/Ti C 
 
• Gemini Computer 
• Crew Charts 
• Mission Control 
 
• LM PGNS 
• LM AGS 
• LM Crew Charts 
• CSM PGNCS 
• Mission Control 
 
• LM PGNS 
• LM AGS 
• LM Crew Charts 
• CSM PGNCS 
• Mission Control 
 
• CSM PGNCS 
• CSM Crew Charts 
• Mission Control 
 
• CSM PGNCS 
• HP-65 Calculator 
• Mission Control 
 
• Shuttle Computer 
• Mission Control 
 
 
 
Mid-Course Corrections D 
 
• Gemini Computer 
• Crew Charts 
 
 
• LM PGNS 
• LM AGS 
• LM Crew Charts 
• CSM PGNCS 
 
 
• LM PGNS 
• LM AGS 
• LM Crew Charts 
• CSM PGNCS 
 
 
• CSM PGNCS 
• CSM Crew Charts 
 
 
• CSM PGNCS 
• HP-65 Calculator 
 
 
• Shuttle Computer 
• Mission Control 
 
A Skylab and Apollo-Soyuz and the Space Shuttle performed an NCC maneuver.  CSI was executed on Apollo missions 9, 10, 
11, and 12.  Gemini X, XI, and XII could perform on-board targeting for phasing, height, and out-of-plane corrections. 
B NSR was executed on Gemini, Apollo 7, Skylab, and Apollo Soyuz.  CDH was executed on Apollos 9, 10, 11, and 12. Gemini 
X and XII could perform on-board targeting of NSR. 
C Gemini, Apollo, Skylab, and Apollo/Soyuz performed TPI maneuvers.  The Space Shuttle performed Ti maneuvers. 
D Gemini, Apollo, Skylab, and Apollo/Soyuz performed 2 mid-course corrections after the TPI maneuver.  The Space Shuttle 
performed 4 mid-course corrections after the Ti maneuver. 
E Gemini X executed pre-TPI targeting on-board for comparison with ground as part of a sextant navigation test.  Gemini XI 
targeted two pre-TPI burns on-board as part of the short rendezvous.  It is not clear if the Gemini X pre-TPI on-board solutions 
were executed or if ground targeted solutions were executed.  Gemini XII targeted and executed an on-board NSR. 
AGS – Abort Guidance Section, CDH – Constant Delta Height, CSI – Coelliptic Sequence Initiation, CSM – Command Service 
Module, HP – Hewlett Packard, LM – Lunar Module, NCC – Corrective Combination, NSR – Slow Rate, PGNCS – CSM 
Primary Guidance, Navigation, and Control System, PGNS – Lunar Module Primary Guidance and Navigation Section, Ti – 
Transition Initiation, TPI – Terminal Phase Initiation.  See Appendix H for an explanation of burn names. 
Table 11.2  Maneuver Solution Sources Available During the On-Board Targeted Phase of Rendezvous 
1977 was believed to be solvable with proximity 
operations targeting was eventually solved with the 
adoption of the stable orbit profile in April of 1983.  The 
stable orbit profile lowered the closing rate during final 
approach by an order of magnitude. 
 Unlike Gemini and Apollo, the shuttle crew did not 
use charts or a programmable calculator to compute 
backup burn solutions (Table 11.2).  This was due to the 
increased confidence in the shuttle GNC system design 
and the successful experience with the Apollo GNC 
system and relative sensors.  In addition, shuttle flight 
computer redundancy provided an additional source of 
burn solutions.  For shuttle rendezvous missions before 
Mir two flight computers executed GNC software in 
parallel during rendezvous and proximity operations.  
With the Mir flights the number was increased to three. 
Crew Interface with the Flight Computer 
 
 Advances in computer technology permitted the 
shuttle to have a more advanced crew/flight computer 
interface than Gemini and Apollo.  Systems displays 
provided the crew with item entries to execute commands 
and digital data.  Some of the systems displays used 
during rendezvous and proximity operations are depicted 
in Figure 11.4.  The keyboard is in Figure 11.5.   
  In the mid 1990s an effort began to upgrade the 
shuttle cockpit avionics.  The first phase of the upgrade 
was to replace many of the 1970s era mechanical 
displays with images on flat panel displays.  This was 
known as the glass cockpit and all orbiters in the fleet 
were so modified.  The second phase of the upgrade, the 
Cockpit Avionics Upgrade (CAU) developed new crew   
. 
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Figure 11.4  Shuttle flight computer displays used during rendezvous and proximity operations. 
RESUME CLEAR  PRO
SPEC - 0 +
OPS 7 8 9
EXEC 4 5 6
ITEM 1 2 3
I/0
RESET D E F
GPC/
CRT A B C
FAULT
SUMM
SYS
SUMM
MSG
RESET ACK
crew_interface_E.cvx
Figure 11.5  Shuttle Computer Keyboard 
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displays to replace those developed in the 1970s, such as 
those in Figure 11.4.  The new displays were task 
oriented to reduce the crew workload and supplement 
systems displays.  The Rendezvous Task Display shown 
in Figure 11.6 combined data and commands from four 
legacy displays (Figure 11.4).  The CAU was canceled in 
December of 2004 and the CAU task oriented displays 
later served as the starting point for the Orion displays. 
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on the payload.  An RMS display and control panel, 
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associated television displays are located in the aft flight 
deck flight crew station.  A starboard arm was also 
planned in the 1970s, but was never flown.  In addition to 
deployment and retrieval of satellites and free-flying 
scientific payloads, the RMS is also used as an extension 
ladder for EVA crews (Figure 11.7), for positioning 
modules during ISS assembly and replenishment, and for 
conducting orbiter and ISS inspections using television 
cameras and other sensors.  
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Figure 12.1  The TRS docking with the Skylab radial port. 
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 A final Apollo CSM RCS burn performed by the 
Skylab-4 crew was expected to delay a Skylab re-entry to 
1981 or 1982.*  However, increased solar activity caused 
the Skylab orbit to decay more rapidly than expected.  In 
1977, planning began for a Skylab re-boost mission to be 
flown on an early shuttle mission.  A dual co-elliptic 
rendezvous sequence (Figure 9.2) was adopted to address 
the elliptical Skylab orbit, lighting, and range concerns 
before NCC.  The rendezvous radar and software for on-
board burn targeting were not expected to be available in 
time to support the flight, requiring Mission Control to 
perform all burn targeting with shuttle on-board states 
updated with star tracker data.   
 Rendezvous and proximity operations designers had 
long desired to use orbital mechanics to brake the orbiter 
during the manual phase, and reduce reliance on RCS 
thrusting.  A +R Bar approach for the proposed Skylab 
reboost mission was studied.  However, a +R Bar 
approach required a reliable range rate sensor, and the Ku 
Band radar was not expected to be available.  Even if it 
was, the rendezvous radar did not have sufficient range 
rate accuracy or reliability to support a +R Bar approach.  
In addition, it was assumed that adoption of a +R Bar 
approach would require changes to rendezvous burn 
targeting.   
 Several proximity operations profiles were examined.  
In one, at a range of 500 feet, the orbiter was to transition 
from an inertial approach to a partial fly-around to the +V 
Bar.  The sun was in the crew field of view on the +R 
Bar, and remained in the field of view during the inertial 
rate transition to the +V bar.  While station-keeping, the 
Teleoperator Retrieval System (TRS) was to be deployed 
by the RMS (Figures 12.1 and 12.2).  The orbiter was to 
transition to the –2000 foot point on the –V Bar, from 
which TRS operations (including docking) would be 
controlled (Figure 12.3).  After the reboost, the TRS was 
to undock and be recovered on a later flight.  Due to 
delays in the shuttle schedule, and the rapid orbital decay 
of Skylab, the re-boost mission was canceled in 
December 1978. 
Figure 12.3   Proposed Skylab reboost proximity 
operations (1978).  
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Figure 12.2  The Teleoperator Retrieval System 
* A mission to deorbit Skylab with an Apollo Command/Service 
Module (CSM) was also proposed.  Skylab-5 would have been flown by 
the same two man crew that trained for the never flown Skylab rescue 
mission.  The CSM Service Propulsion System (SPS) would have been 
used to deorbit the combined Skylab Workshop/Skylab-5 CSM stack.  
Skylab 5 would then undock and use the SPS to raise its orbit before it 
reached entry interface.  The proposal was eventually discarded for 
safety reasons. 
CHAPTER 12 - SKYLAB REBOOST 
JSC – 63400 
REVISION 3 
Approved for public release via STI DAA 
24483. See statement on title page. 
This page intentionally left blank. 
94  
Approved for public release via STI DAA 
24483. See statement on title page. 95 
CHAPTER 13 - COELLIPTIC VERSUS STABLE ORBIT RENDEZVOUS 
Early Examination of the Stable Orbit Profile For 
Shuttle 
 
 In 1975 application of the stable orbit profile, first 
flown on Gemini XI, to the Space Shuttle was studied 
(Figure 13.1).  Stable orbit involved the initiation of the 
intercept from a station-keeping point on the –V Bar, 
rather than from a coelliptic orbit.  Stable orbit might 
simplify flight design and operations for missions 
involving deployment of a satellite, followed by retrieval 
of a second satellite.  Contingency retrieval of a deployed 
payload might also be easier to perform with stable orbit.  
A stable orbit profile would desensitize the mission 
timeline from trajectory considerations.  Stable orbit, 
long-range station-keeping (tens of miles) was preferable 
to close range station-keeping (tens or hundreds of feet), 
due to the need for continuous crew monitoring and 
resulting propellant expenditure.  However, like dual 
coelliptic, the availability of sufficient tracking on a 
stable orbit profile for a navigationally passive target was 
in question.  By the mid 1970s, early plans for the shuttle 
Orbital Flight Tests (OFTs) included rendezvous with 
navigationally passive targets (Figure 13.2). 
 
Problems With the Baseline Dual Coelliptic 
Profile 
 
 Although the dual coelliptic (Figure 13.3) had been 
baselined for mission planning purposes in April of 1973, 
doubts about its capability to support Space Shuttle 
rendezvous missions persisted into the early 1980s.  The 
ability to obtain sufficient on-board optical tracking using 
reflected sunlight in the presence of Earth limb and 
celestial bright object constraints on the field of view was 
questionable.  By 1978, forward RCS propellant 
depletion due to the high relative approach velocity 
inherent with coelliptic was a serious concern, as was 
plume impingement on target spacecraft.   
 As a result of simulations conducted from July to 
September of 1977 the Low Z braking mode and LVLH 
attitude hold were added to the flight control software.  
Also in 1977 development was begun on proximity 
operations burn targeting software that would permit 
approach to a target from any direction.   
 In 1979 a modified dual coelliptic profile for the Solar 
Maximum repair mission was proposed to meet lighting 
requirements and reduce forward RCS propellant 
consumption.  The delta-height of the second coelliptic 
segment (TPI delta-height) was decreased from 10 nm to 
5 nm to reduce propellant consumption during the 
terminal phase.  TPI targeted orbiter for a point 1 nm 
below target on the +R Bar. Orthogonal braking, part of 
the new on-board proximity operations burn targeting 
software, was then used to fly an approach up the +R Bar 
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Figure 13.1   Notional stable orbit profiles studied 
in 1975. 
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Figure 13.2   Proposed relative navigation test (1976). 
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Figure 13.3   Relative view of dual co-elliptic rendezvous 
(1973-1983).   
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using aft RCS propellant.  However, by the time the 
transition to +V Bar range of ~200 feet was reached it 
was already orbital noon, resulting in +V Bar arrival near 
sunset with the sun in the eyes of the crew.  TPI TIG slips 
increased from +/- 8 minutes worst case to +/- 15 
minutes.  These slips resulted in unacceptable lighting 
during proximity operations. 
 Introduction of proximity operations targeting, 
including orthogonal braking, did not resolve problems 
due to the conflict between terminal phase lighting 
requirements and forward RCS propellant consumption. 
 
Stable Orbit Profile For Shuttle 
 
 By 1981, mission design for the LDEF deployment 
and Solar Max repair mission (later flown on STS-41C in 
1984) was encountering difficulties.  Mission planners 
began to adapt the stable orbit concept to overcome 
propellant depletion, mission timeline, and on-board 
tracking issues with the dual coelliptic profile (Figure 
13.4). 
 The Solar Max repair mission also involved LDEF 
deployment at a higher orbital altitude than the Solar 
Max orbital altitude.  If the dual coelliptic rendezvous 
profile was to be flown after LDEF deployment, the 
orbiter had to decrease altitude to 20 nm below Solar 
Max and phase 300 nm behind it.  At this point the 
orbiter would start the first coelliptic segment and acquire 
line-of-sight angle measurements with the star tracker. 
 Mission Planning and Analysis Division personnel 
reasoned that rather than phasing ~300 nm behind Solar 
max, ground tracking should be accurate enough for 
Mission Control to target burns to get the orbiter to 
within rendezvous radar range (10 nm tracking 
requirement for a 1 square meter target) on the –V Bar.  
The point on the –V Bar would be close enough to permit 
radar measurement acquisition, but far enough away to     
. 
Figure 13.4   Three of many proposed stable orbit 
rendezvous profiles. 
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permit star tracker operation in the event of a radar 
failure.  A –V Bar station-keeping point of 8 nm was 
selected.  This was within radar range but far enough 
away to avoid potential target size and brightness 
problems with the orbiter star trackers.   
 Station-keeping at the 8 nm stable orbit point would 
be performed until orbital noon, at which point the shuttle 
would initiate an intercept trajectory with an on-board 
targeted burn.  The station-keeping and the timing of the 
transfer would also provide control over lighting in the 
manual piloting phase.   Station-keeping could also be 
extended in the event of orbiter or target systems 
problems.  In the event of a radar failure, optical tracking 
with a star tracker could be performed.  The transfer to 
intercept would require ~4 feet/second of braking, an 
order of magnitude reduction over the dual coelliptic, 
which required ~40 feet/second of braking. 
 
The Tuned Coelliptic Profile 
 
 To address concerns with the dual coelliptic profile, 
coelliptic advocates designed an alternative called the 
tuned coelliptic (Figure 13.5).  It was designed to 
overcome the high approach relative velocity of dual 
coelliptic.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 All day-of-rendezvous burns would be on-board 
targeted, with a maximum star tracker tracking range of 
about 150 nm. The coelliptic segment delta-height was 
much lower than the second dual coelliptic segment 
delta-height (2.5 nm versus 10 nm).  The lower delta-
height permitted radar acquisition of the target before 
TPI, and provided an overlap in radar and star tracker 
tracking for comparison purposes.   
 However, the lower delta-height also increased the 
variability in the time (TPI TIG slip) at which the desired 
TPI relative geometry (elevation angle) was achieved 
(Figure 13.6).  The profile could be tuned during the 
mission to control slips in TPI time and trajectory             
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Figure 13.5   Tuned coelliptic rendezvous with a 
coelliptic  DH of 2.5 nautical miles (1982). 
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dispersions.  Adjusting the placement of early phasing 
maneuvers increased the number of tracking periods prior 
to the coelliptic maneuver, and decreased TPI sensitivity 
to dispersions from earlier burns. 
 Tuned coelliptic was designed to use the on-board 
Lambert targeting software for height (NH) and phasing 
(NC) control burns on the day of rendezvous.  This was 
motivated by a desire to meet a Shuttle Program 
rendezvous autonomy requirement whose meaning had 
been the subject of debate within the Program.  The 
ability to target NH and NC burns on-board had been 
removed from the flight software when the Rendezvous 
Targeting Specialist Function was scrubbed from the 
requirements in the spring of 1978.  The tuned coelliptic 
would enable these burns to be targeted on-board with 
Lambert targeting rather than by Mission Control using 
NC and NH targeting algorithms.   
 TPI placed the orbiter on the +V Bar 1,000 feet ahead 
of the target.  Two mid-course correction burns were 
executed after TPI.  TPI had the same elevation angle as 
Gemini and Apollo (~27.5 degrees) but increasing the 
transfer angle from 130 degrees to 160 degrees lowered 
the amount of braking required during final approach.   
 A delay (equal period football) could be designed into 
the tuned coelliptic in the event of a need to delay the 
rendezvous, but at a higher propellant cost than stable 
orbit. 
 
Selection of a New Baseline Profile 
 
 A lengthy debate ensued between stable orbit 
proponents and tuned coelliptic supporters from the 
summer of 1981 to the spring of 1983.1,2  The debate 
involved some of the same personnel that had been 
involved in the coelliptic versus tangential versus first 
apogee rendezvous debate during mission planning for 
Gemini VI in 1964.3  Coelliptic was a proven technique, 
and some Mission Control personnel, as well as some 
astronauts, were not in favor of adopting a new profile.  
 Mission planners believed stable orbit provided 
several advantages over tuned coelliptic; 1) lower 
propellant consumption, 2) less complex crew and            
. 
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Mission Control procedures, 3) stable station-keeping 
points on the -V Bar in the event of a systems anomaly or 
change in mission planning, and 4) elimination of the 
need to perform optical tracking with star trackers unless 
there was a rendezvous radar failure.  However, pilot-in-
the-loop simulations indicated that stable orbit 
procedures were just as complex as tuned coelliptic.  
 During Gemini, Apollo, Skylab, and Apollo/Soyuz 
rendezvous profiles had initial relative conditions (below 
and far behind) that were more standard than those of 
proposed shuttle deploy/retrieve missions.  Stable orbit 
potentially offered more straightforward trajectory design 
for flights requiring rendezvous from in front or above 
(Figure 13.4c).   
 Station-keeping on the –V Bar at the 8 nm stable orbit 
point was eliminated in favor of performing the intercept 
maneuver, called Transition Initiation (Ti), when the 8 
nm point on the –V Bar was reached.  In the event of a 
systems anomaly, an equal period “football” trajectory 
could be initiated at Ti, called the Ti Delay burn, until it 
was permissible to continue the rendezvous.  Like stable 
orbit, tuned coelliptic could be designed with a delay 
option, but with higher propellant consumption and 
increased procedural complexity. 
 Several variations of stable orbit terminal phase were 
studied.  In one, Ti was targeted to place the orbiter 
several miles in front of the target on the +V Bar, after 
which the orbiter would move in along the +V Bar.  In 
another, Ti targeted the orbiter for a point 5000 feet 
ahead of the target and 1500 feet above it.  From there, 
the orbiter would fly a “glideslope approach” (Figure 
13.7), which avoided RCS firings that could impinge on 
the target.4  However, analysis indicated that a direct 
(inertial) approach could be flown with a transition to the 
+V Bar at a range of about 500 feet.  This approach could 
be flown with acceptable propellant consumption and 
reduced risk of plume impingement.  Neither a lengthy 
+V Bar approach nor glideslope approach was needed for 
stable orbit proximity operations. 
 
•  
Figure 13.7   Proposed 12 degree glide-slope 
approach to 1000 feet (Aug. 1982). 
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 The stable orbit Ti burn delta-velocity vector was not 
along the line-of-sight to the target spacecraft.  This was 
a convenient “point and burn” feature of Gemini and 
Apollo coelliptic rendezvous in the event of a GNC 
systems failure.  However, this was not considered to be 
an issue due to the increased redundancy in the orbiter 
GNC system. 
 Analysis of the stable orbit plan by advocates and 
critics revealed a number of weaknesses, which were 
corrected by changing the profile.   Four Mid-course 
Correction (MC) burns were placed between Ti and 
intercept.  A planar change maneuver (null out-of-plane 
velocity) was placed at the nodal crossing following MC-
1. To reduce the size of the out-of-plane velocity null 
after MC-1, on-board tracking was extended before Ti to 
include one or two star tracker passes, starting at a range 
of 40 nm.  This created an overlap of ground and on-
board tracking for cross checking before committing to 
an intercept trajectory.  An additional on-board targeted 
burn before Ti, NCC, was added to ensure that the Ti 
point would be in the orbital plane of the target.5,6  The Ti 
maneuver point was raised above the –V Bar to make 
trajectory dispersions more manageable when near 
continuous manual piloting was initiated (~2,000 feet 
from the target).  The MC-2 burn was targeted on 
elevation angle as a 130-degree transfer, providing a low 
inertial line-of-sight rate condition at manual takeover 
and facilitating the inertial line-of-sight approach 
technique that was used on the Gemini and Apollo 
terminal profiles.  
 Stable orbit relied more heavily on Mission Control 
orbit determination and burn targeting than tuned 
coelliptic.  This did not address the concern about 
meeting the Shuttle Program autonomy requirement 
raised by tuned coelliptic advocates.  However, meeting 
that requirement would have been difficult due to the 
1976 and 1978 scrubs of the on-board targeting software. 
 Stable orbit was adopted as the shuttle baseline 
rendezvous plan at the first Rendezvous Flight 
Techniques Panel meeting, chaired by Flight Director Jay 
Greene, on April 29, 1983 (Figure 13.8), during planning 
for mission STS-41C.  Factors influencing the decision 
were the inability of the Mission Control software (OMP) 
to support the tuned coelliptic without modification, and 
that the stable orbit concept was promoted by MPAD, the 
JSC organization responsible for trajectory design and 
mission planning.  In the event that a second rendezvous 
with a target was required, stable orbit potentially 
incurred lower propellant expenditure than tuned 
coelliptic.  Another factor was that if a contingency hold 
was required before entering proximity operations range 
(~2000 feet), -V Bar station-keeping was required.  For 
tuned coelliptic, this essentially resulted in a down-mode 
to the stable orbit.  
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  Discussions of tuned coelliptic versus stable orbit 
continued until about the time of STS-51A (November 
1985).  However, coelliptic transfers were not flown 
during the on-board targeted phase of subsequent 
missions.  Coelliptic transfers (NSR burns) were flown 
occasionally during the ground-targeted phase (range > 
40 nm) to ensure that lighting conditions would be met 
during the later on-board targeted phase.   
 Starting with STS-71 (June 1995) NSR burns were no 
longer executed during the ground-targeted phase.  
Horizontal phasing burns (NCs) were performed at points 
off the line of apsides so that lighting requirements would 
be met during the on-board targeted phase.  In addition, 
deletion of NSRs saved crew time and reduced the 
number of OMS engine firings. 
 The STS-134 mission (May 2011) did fly an Orion 
coelliptic profile after undocking from the  International 
Space Station in support of the Orion relative sensor test 
(see Chapter 21, The STORRM DTO). 
Figure 13.8   Stable orbit rendezvous (1983-1997).   
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 After the first flight of the Space Shuttle (STS-1) in 
April of 1981, and successful demonstrations of the RMS 
on subsequent flights, more personnel, computer 
resources, and simulator time became available for 
rendezvous and proximity operations procedure 
development, trajectory analysis, and issue resolution.1   
 
SPAS (STS-7) 
 
 STS-7 (June 1983) performed a proximity operations 
demonstration using the Shuttle Pallet Satellite (SPAS-01, 
Figure 14.1).2,3  Primary objectives were to demonstrate 
and evaluate proximity operations techniques required for 
deployment, separation, station-keeping, final approach 
and RMS capture of a free-flying payload (Figure 14.2).  
No computer based maneuver targeting or relative 
navigation data using computer processed radar 
measurements was available.  Out-the-window cues and 
radar data direct from the sensor were used.  Results 
indicated that plume impingement math models were 
accurate, the rendezvous radar performed better than 
expected, piloting using out-the-window cues and radar 
data was easily accomplished, and that the proximity 
operations tasks could be accomplished with propellant 
consumption falling within one sigma of predicted values.  
The Low Z and LVLH attitude hold flight control options 
were proven effective.  The mission also provided the first 
photographs of a shuttle orbiter taken from another 
spacecraft (Figure 14.3).   
Figure 14.1   STS-7 proximity operations with  
SPAS-01 (June 1983). 
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Figure 14.2  SPAS-01 as Challenger approaches with  
the RMS (left) and (right) partially obscured by a cabin  
window as it is about to be grappled (STS-7, June 
1983). 
Figure 14.3  Challenger as photographed  
by SPAS-01 (STS-7, June 1983). 
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Figure 14.5   First phase of the planned STS-41B rendezvous with the IRT (Feb. 1984).  Profile not 
executed due to IRT balloon failure. 
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 The first rendezvous demonstration was planned for 
STS-41B (February 1984), the tenth shuttle mission 
(Figures 14.4 through 14.8).  However, the rendezvous 
was canceled after the Integrated Rendezvous Target 
(IRT) balloon burst during deployment from the shuttle 
payload bay (Figure 14.8).  A breakout maneuver was 
performed to avoid any shuttle contact with the IRT 
debris.  Rendezvous radar, star tracker and COAS data 
were collected on the IRT debris, and processed in the 
shuttle computer Kalman filter.   
 To support free flight of the astronaut piloted Manned 
Maneuvering Unit (MMU), a proximity operations 
astronaut/MMU rescue procedure had been developed 
pre-flight.  The procedure was validated during retrieval 
of a foot restraint that floated away from the vehicle 
during an EVA. 
 
 
Figure 14.5  Second phase of the planned STS-41B rendezvous with the IRT (Feb. 
1984).  Profile not executed due to IRT balloon failure. 
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STS-41C (Solar Max) 
 
 The Solar Max repair mission (STS-41C, April 1984, 
Figure 14.9) was the first all-up use of the shuttle’s 
integrated rendezvous and proximity operations 
capabilities (Figures 14.10, 14.11, and 14.12).  These 
included pre-flight trajectory design, launch window 
targeting, ground targeting using radar-based orbit 
determination, deployment of the Long Duration 
Exposure Facility (LDEF) during the ground-targeted 
phase, onboard rendezvous navigation with a 
navigationally passive target, onboard rendezvous 
targeting, and three body proximity operations involving 
Challenger, Solar Max, and an astronaut flying the 
Manned Maneuvering Unit.   
  
Figure 14.11   STS-41C first rendezvous, Solar Max  
repair  (April 1984). 
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Figure 14.8   Planned proximity operations after the 
planned STS-41B rendezvous with the IRT (Feb. 1984).  
Profile not executed due to IRT balloon failure. 
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Figure 14.7   Third phase of the planned STS-41B 
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executed due to IRT balloon failure. 
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Figure 14.9  Solar Max under repair in the  
payload bay of Challenger (April 1984). 
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Figure 14.10  Pre-launch Solar Max rendezvous 
profile.  LDEF deploy orbit was coelliptic with Solar 
Max and 10 nm below Solar Max orbital altitude. 
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 A previously developed backup capture procedure 
using the RMS was used to successfully grapple Solar 
Max, and it was placed in the payload bay.  It was later 
repaired and deployed. 
 
Summary 
 
 The successful execution of proximity operations on 
STS-7 and STS-41C and two rendezvous profiles on 
STS-41C validated work performed over a decade to 
create piloting techniques and trajectories that overcame 
shuttle systems limitations, and allowed the shuttle to 
meet mission requirements different from those in the 
Gemini and Apollo programs.  
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 The Long Duration Exposure Facility was deployed 
on Flight Day 2.  On Flight Day 3, the attempt to capture 
Solar Max by an astronaut flying the MMU failed.  The 
failed docking and a “by hand” attempt to stabilize Solar 
Max induced attitude rates, which precluded the 
possibility of a capture attempt with the RMS.  Enough 
propellant margin was available to perform a second 
rendezvous two days later.  A break-out and long range 
station-keeping 40 nm behind Solar Max was performed 
until the second rendezvous was initiated.  For the second 
rendezvous, the arrival on the +V Bar was reduced from 
800 feet to 350 feet to lower forward RCS consumption 
(Figure 14.12). 
Figure 14.12  Approaches to the +V Bar for the first 
and second rendezvous with Solar Max.  The second 
rendezvous arrived on the +V Bar at 350 feet to 
conserve propellant.  Braking gate table does not 
represent all proximity operations procedures, such 
as establish +V Bar and 200 foot station-keeping. 
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 The success of STS-7 and STS-41C did not mean that 
later shuttle rendezvous and proximity operations 
missions were in any way routine.  The unique 
characteristics of the various rendezvous targets, along 
with shuttle system limitations, posed technical 
challenges for every rendezvous mission, and necessitated 
mission unique analysis and procedure development.  
Complexity of and variation in procedures and techniques 
for shuttle rendezvous and proximity operations missions 
was far greater than during Gemini and Apollo. 
 The pace of rendezvous flights between STS-41C 
(April 1984) and the Challenger accident (January 1986) 
had not been seen since the Gemini flights in 1965 and 
1966 (Table 3.2).  The success of these complex missions 
reflected the maturity of shuttle rendezvous and proximity 
operations planning and execution.   The loss of 
Challenger eliminated many potential commercial 
missions involving rendezvous and proximity operations, 
such as Leasecraft and the Industrial Space Facility.  
After the accident, rendezvous missions resumed in 1990.  
Missions executed included retrieval and return to Earth 
of orbiting satellites, deployment and retrieval of 
scientific payloads, and servicing.1 
 Proximity operations and ground targeted phase 
trajectory design varied from flight to flight, and was 
driven by many factors that required extensive analysis 
and contingency procedure (Mission Control and on-
board) development, particularly if the flight involved 
more than one deploy/retrieve payload.  Maneuver 
planning to provide adequate spacecraft separation for 
ground radar tracking, spacecraft to spacecraft 
communication links, and protection against collision 
under dispersed trajectory conditions was particularly 
challenging.  By 1990, the availability of ground based 
processing of TDRSS Doppler measurements and near 
continuous TDRSS communications coverage enhanced 
orbit determination and mission activities. 
 Design of the onboard-targeted phase (for most flights, 
approximately 40 nm behind the target through manual 
takeover at ~2,000 feet) remained relatively stable from 
flight to flight.  A one revolution transfer from the last 
ground targeted burn (a phasing burn, or NC) to Ti was 
used on flights to rendezvous with an already orbiting 
target, due to mission timeline considerations (Figure 
13.8).  For deploy/retrieve missions, a two revolution to 
Ti transfer was used to save propellant.  Radar failure 
procedures were continually improved to maximize 
probability of mission success. 
 Propellant consumption, particularly forward RCS, 
was controlled through limited use of Low Z, avoiding 
long duration approaches, and minimizing station-
keeping, fly-arounds, and attitude trim maneuvers.  
Keeping piloting procedures simple was a challenge.   
CHAPTER 15 - CHALLENGES OF SUBSEQUENT RENDEZVOUS 
AND PROXIMITY OPERATIONS FLIGHTS 
 Flying an in-plane approach, and minimizing six-
degree-of-freedom maneuvers (fly-arounds, alignments), 
flight control system changes, and events requiring exact 
timing helped lower procedural complexity.   
 Solar lighting (sun in the eyes of the crew) and 
adequate artificial lighting of the target were also 
considerations.  These were controlled by the type and 
direction of the approach, and performing station-keeping 
to wait for appropriate solar lighting.  Providing stable 
station-keeping points ensured mission success in the 
event of system anomalies, and permitted re-initiation of 
an approach.  V Bar station-keeping has been preferred 
over R Bar station-keeping due to procedural simplicity 
and lower propellant consumption.  Thermal constraints 
on the vehicles (orbiter and target), attitude and time in 
attitude were taken into account during proximity 
operations design.  Proximity operations trajectory design 
principles and piloting techniques were also applied to 
satellite deployment, emergency breakouts, and nominal 
separations.  
 Proximity operations trajectory design varied from 
flight to flight, and was driven by many factors.  Plume 
impingement concerns were structural loading, target 
attitude stability, and contamination.  Before the Mir and 
ISS flights, attitude stability of small targets was the main 
concern.  Plume impingement was controlled through 
choice of approach direction and duration, and use of the 
Low Z flight control mode (Figure 10.11).    
 Alignment of orbiter and target grapple or capture 
hardware was a major driver in selecting the type of 
approach (Figure 10.10).  Ease of performing 
grapple/capture operations, and target rotation relative to 
the orbiter were of concern.  These were managed 
through choice of approach direction, performing close-in 
fly-arounds, station-keeping, or attitude trim maneuvers; 
and matching the target rotation rate with the orbiter.  For 
targets that maintained a stable attitude in the LVLH 
frame, LVLH approaches (V Bar, R Bar) were used.  
Inertially stabilized targets such as the Hubble Space 
Telescope and EURECA (STS-57) required an inertial 
approach. 
 The LDEF retrieval mission (STS-32) used a minus R 
Bar approach.  LDEF was gravity gradient stabilized, 
with the long body axis of LDEF aligned with the local 
vertical (R Bar).  The roll angle of the RMS grapple 
fixture on LDEF about the R Bar was not controlled.  An 
R Bar approach provided the easiest access to the LDEF 
grapple fixture, and an orbiter fly-around in only one axis.  
However, a long range plus R Bar approach was not 
possible due to the lack of a range and range rate sensor 
with enough precision to support a long range plus R Bar 
approach (the later introduction of TCS and HHL 
provided this capability).  The LDEF proximity                
.. 
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Figure 15.1   STS-49 planned relative motion until 
control box start time (May 1992). 
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operations design involved a standard approach to the 
plus V Bar followed by a close range transition to the 
minus R Bar for a short range minus R Bar approach.  
The existing sensors and piloting techniques could 
support a standard approach to the plus V Bar followed 
by a close-range minus R Bar approach. 
 The SPARTAN spacecraft maintained an inertial 
attitude hold.  However, five SPARTAN retrievals (STS-
51G, STS-56, STS-63, STS-69, and STS-77) flew plus V 
Bar approaches.  The SPARTAN grapple fixture was 
pointed out-of-plane towards orbital north.  The plus V 
Bar approach provided good geometry for both nominal 
grapple and the contingency grapple case for a failure of 
the SPARTAN attitude control system.  On STS-64 the 
orbiter flew an inertial approach to SPARTAN to keep 
the Sun out of the 64 degree field of view of the Lidar In-
space Technology Experiment (LITE) in the payload bay.  
The LITE boresight was along the orbiter minus Z body 
axis. 
 Mission planning for the STS-60 Wake Shield 
Facility-1 (WSF-1) involved plume impingement tests by 
the orbiter on the plus and minus V Bar before the 
retrieval.  After a minus V Bar approach the orbiter was 
to roll 90 degrees to perform the grapple from the Y 
LVLH axis (H Bar).  However, WSF-1 was not deployed; 
therefore the plume impingement test and retrieval were 
not performed. 
 After plus R Bar approaches became standard practice 
on the missions to Mir a number of deploy/retrieve 
missions flew plus R Bar approaches.  These were STS-
72 (OAST-Flyer and SFU), STS-80 (ORFEUS-SPAS 2 
and WSF-3), STS-87 (SPARTAN-201-04), and STS-95 
(SPARTAN-201-05). SPARTAN was an inertially 
stabilized spacecraft.  For STS-87 and STS-95 a 
procedural work-around was developed to permit 
SPARTAN to fly a pseudo-LVLH attitude hold with the 
RMS grapple fixture pointed out-of-plane north.  This 
facilitated testing of the Video Guidance Sensor (VGS) 
during the plus R Bar approach by keeping the VGS 
target on SPARTAN pointed at the VGS on the 
approaching orbiter. 
 The shuttle’s baseline rendezvous navigation 
hardware and software did not required modification to 
place the shuttle at the proximity operations initiation 
point for all rendezvous missions flown, in spite of the 
wide variety of target spacecraft.2,3  Radar failure 
procedures for use during the on-board targeted phase 
(for most flights, approximately 40 nm behind the target 
through manual takeover at ~2,000 feet) were continually 
improved to maximize probability of mission success.  
This was demonstrated during the STS-92 (October 
2000) and STS-131 (April 2010) missions to the ISS, due 
to radar failures before the day of rendezvous.  During 
both missions the rendezvous was performed with star 
tracker data until TCS and HHL data became available 
several thousand feet from the ISS.  STS-92 was the first 
. 
all optical rendezvous flown by NASA since Apollo 7 in 
October of 1968. 
 The ground-targeted phase of two flights (STS-49 in 
1992 and STS-72 in 1996) used a control box rendezvous 
technique (Figure 15.1).4  The target executed a series of 
maneuvers after the shuttle was launched to enter a 
control box in space at a designated time.  This technique 
reduced shuttle propellant consumption.  Once the target 
entered the box, it no longer maneuvered.  A shuttle 
planar change (NPC) burn could also be performed to 
compensate for target planar error introduced by target 
phasing maneuvers. 
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CHAPTER 16 - RENDEZVOUS OR PROXIMITY OPERATIONS  
DEMONSTRATION MISSIONS  
 
 In addition to the previously mentioned STS-7 and STS-41B, three other missions conducted demonstrations of 
rendezvous and proximity operations techniques (Table 16.1).  The shuttle also served as a test platform for relative 
navigation sensors (Table 16.2).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 16.1  The Gamma Ray Observatory after 
release from the RMS (STS-37, April 1991). 
N
A
S
A
 
OEX DAP (STS-51G & -61B) 
 
  The Orbital Experiments Digital Autopilot (OEX 
DAP) was an experimental proximity operations autopilot.  
On STS-51G (June 1985), the OEX DAP performed 
station-keeping with a phantom target.  For STS-61B 
(Nov./Dec. 1985), a crewmember hand deployed a 15 inch 
radar reflector at the end of an EVA.  The orbiter was 
moved to within about 35 feet of the target, with it 
centered in the field of view of the payload-bay and RMS 
end-effector cameras.   Closed loop station-keeping was 
not performed since the Ku-band radar was not installed, 
but other tests were accomplished.  The autopilot was not 
incorporated into the shuttle’s certified avionics system.   
 
Mid-Range Targeted Station-Keeping With GRO 
(STS-37) 
 
 A test of long-range station-keeping techniques for 
STS-39 was originally planned for STS-37.  The target 
was to be a radar corner reflector deployed at the end of 
an EVA.  However, a 1990 manifest change moved STS-
39 ahead of STS-37, and the test was redefined.  The new 
test involved long-range station-keeping using star tracker 
measurements while flying an out-of-plane profile.  This 
technique could be used for future flights with station-
keeping distances constrained by communications 
requirements.   
 The target was later changed from the radar reflector 
to the Compton Gamma Ray Observatory (GRO) 
(deployed on the same flight, Figure 16.1) for the 
following reasons: potential re-contact problem between 
GRO and the reflector, re-contact concerns if hardware 
was jettisoned during an EVA, possible star tracker 
detection difficulties with the reflector, and the possibility 
. 
 
of adding additional orbital debris in a 28.5 degree 
inclination orbit. 
 The profile involved deployment of the GRO, 
followed by separation and phasing to about 125 nm 
behind GRO.  A contingency profile was also designed to 
avoid re-contact if any hardware were jettisoned during an 
EVA later in the flight.  The orbiter performed a 
rendezvous to a point 8 nm miles behind GRO and 
executed a series of out-of-plane profiles.  A phasing burn 
was performed on each orbit to re-target the orbiter to the 
8 nm VBN1 point.  Star tracker relative navigation during 
the test was successful. 
 
Comments 
  
Proximity operations only. 
 
No rendezvous due to IRT balloon failure. 
 
Station-keeping test of proximity operations autopilot. 
 
Station-keeping test of proximity operations autopilot.   
 
 
GRO used as target for optical navigation test. 
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Table 16.1  Rendezvous or Proximity Operations Demonstration Missions 
GRO = Gamma Ray Observatory, IRT = Integrated Rendezvous Target , SPAS = Shuttle Pallet Satellite  
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Relative Sensor Demonstrations 
 
  The Space Shuttle served as a platform for tests of 
relative sensors (Table 16.2).   
 On STS-7 (June 1983) the Improved Crew Optical 
Sight (ICOS) was tested during proximity operations with 
SPAS.  ICOS was proposed as a crew situational 
awareness aid to provide night vision during proximity 
operations.  SPAS was only visible to the crew through 
the ICOS if the SPAS running lights were turned on.  
ICOS was not adopted as a crew proximity operations 
piloting aid. 
 STS-41B (February 1984) was to be the first test of 
the baseline orbiter relative navigation sensors before the 
Solar Max rendezvous and repair mission later flown on 
STS-41C (April 1984).  However, the Integrated 
Rendezvous Target (IRT) balloon ruptured during 
deployment.1  The  orbiter executed a break-out burn to 
ensure there was no contact with the IRT debris.  The re-
rendezvous was canceled.  However, some star tracker 
and rendezvous radar data was obtained during the 
separation.  Star tracker and radar performance was better 
than expected.  The auto-focusing laser on a payload bay 
camera was evaluated as a close-range proximity 
operations sensor.  Range rate measurements were too 
noisy for piloting, pointing the camera at the Manned 
Maneuvering Unit during the EVA was tedious, and use 
of the camera auto-focusing laser was a full time task for 
one crew member.2 
 STS-41C (April 1984) was the first shuttle rendezvous 
and the first full demonstration of the baseline shuttle 
relative navigation sensors.  During the Long Duration 
Exposure Facility (LDEF) deploy, the payload bay 
camera auto-focusing laser was used to track LDEF out 
to a range of 200 feet.  During the star tracker passes on 
the first rendezvous with Solar Max the measurements 
were noisy due to attitude computations using data from 
three different Inertial Measurement Units (IMU).  On all 
subsequent missions only one IMU was used as a source 
of attitude computation data during star tracker passes.2 
 STS-51F (July-August 1985) tested a long hand-held 
parallax rangefinder as a backup to the rendezvous radar.  
Results indicated that there was about a 10% bias in the 
measurements over the tested ranges from 600 to 900 feet 
as compared to the rendezvous radar.  The rangefinder 
was not adopted as a radar backup.  
  STS-39 (April-May 1991) was the first flight of 
Payload Bay (PLBAY), a proximity operations piloting 
situational awareness program.   Camera angles could be 
input into PLBAY by the crew.  On STS-49 (May 1992) 
and STS-56 (April 1993) PLBAY was used to process 
data from two laser rangefinders under evaluation by the 
Shuttle Program.   One unit was manufactured by Laser 
Technology Incorporated (LTI) and the other unit was      
. 
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called the Mini Eyesafe Laser Infrared Observation Set 
(MELIOS).  The LTI unit was chosen to serve as the 
Hand Held Lidar (HHL) to support upcoming missions to 
Mir and the ISS, as well as on other rendezvous missions. 
 STS-51 (September 1993) was the first flight of the 
Trajectory Control Sensor (TCS) and the laptop computer 
hosted Rendezvous and Proximity Operations Program 
(RPOP).  RPOP was based on the earlier PLBAY program 
and was required to process TCS data to provide the crew 
with relative motion cues during proximity operations.  
HHL, TCS, and RPOP were evaluated on several missions 
in 1993, 1994, and 1995 before the first operational use of 
them on the first docking mission with the Mir space 
station (STS-71, June-July 1995). 
 The use of relative Global Positioning System (GPS) 
data to support rendezvous was evaluated on four 
rendezvous missions from 1995 to 1997.3  The first was 
flown on STS-69 (September 1995).  GPS receivers were 
on the orbiter and the Wake Shield Facility (WSF).4-6  The 
STS-80 (November-December 1996) relative GPS 
experiment was flown in support of relative GPS 
development for the European Space Agency (ESA) 
Automated Transfer Vehicle (ATV).7-8  STS-84 (May 
1997) and STS-86 (September-October 1996)  flew the 
Rendezvous Sensor (RVS), Telegoniometer (TGM), and 
relative GPS units for further support of ATV sensor 
development.9-10 
 STS-87 (November-December 1997) and STS-95 
(October-November 1998) flew the Video Guidance 
Sensor (VGS) developed by the NASA Marshall Space 
Flight Center.11-14  The Advanced Video Guidance Sensor 
(AVGS) was developed based on the VGS flight tests on 
the shuttle.15-21.. 
  The DragonEye sensor developed by Space 
Exploration Technologies Corporation (SpaceX) was 
flown on STS-127 (July 2009) and STS-133 (February-
March 2011).  Dragoneye was developed for the 
uncrewed and crewed versions of the SpaceX Dragon 
spacecraft.  The NASA Goddard Space Flight Center 
Relative navigation Sensor (RNS) flew on the last 
servicing mission to the Hubble Space Telescope, STS-
125 (May 2009).22-23  RNS used sensor hardware 
originally procured for the HST Robotic Servicing and 
De-orbit Mission that was canceled in February of 2005.  
The Canadian Space Agency TriDAR flew on STS-128 
(August-September 2009), STS-131 (April 2010), and 
STS-135 (July 2011). 
 The Vision Navigation Sensor (VNS) developed for 
the Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV) 
successfully flew on STS-134 (May 2011).  The VNS 
Sensor Test for Orion Rel Nav Risk Mitigation Detailed 
Test Objective (STORRM DTO) is discussed in Chapter 
21, The STORRM DTO. 
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Comments 
  
Not suitable for night vision during prox ops. 
 
Sensor test in preparation for STS-41C. 
No rendezvous due to IRT balloon failure.  
Laser range rate too noisy to support piloting. 
 
 
 
Laser tracked LDEF out to 200 feet. 
 
 
Not adopted as a radar backup. 
 
 
First PLBAY flight 
 
PLBAY flight. 
 
Last MELIOS flight.  LTI later chosen to 
serve as shuttle HHL.  PLBAY flight. 
 
Last PLBAY flight.  No HHL data collected 
due to crew workload. 
 
First flight of TCS and RPOP. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Relative GPS test. 
 
Relative GPS testing for ATV flights to ISS. 
 
Testing for ATV flights to ISS. 
 
Testing for ATV flights to ISS. 
 
Sensor test with target on SPARTAN for 
AR&C Project. 
 
Longer range proximity-operations test with 
AR&C Project sensor. 
 
Data collection during approach and deploy. 
 
Dragon flash LIDAR sensor development. 
 
Developed by Neptec. 
 
Developed by Neptec. 
 
Dragon flash LIDAR sensor development. 
 
Orion sensor development (STORRM DTO). 
 
Developed by Neptec. 
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HST 
 
SPARTAN-201-02 
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ISS 
 
ISS 
 
ISS 
Sensor 
  
ICOS 
 
CCTV auto- 
focusing laser,  
star tracker, 
rendezvous  
radar  
 
CCTV auto- 
focusing laser  
 
parallax range 
finder 
 
 
 
LTI, MELIOS 
 
LTI, MELIOS  
 
 
HHL (LTI) 
 
 
HHL, TCS  
 
HHL  
 
HHL, TCS  
 
HHL, TCS 
 
RGPS  
 
RGPS  
 
RVS/TGM, RGPS  
 
RVS/TGM, RGPS  
 
VGS  
 
 
VGS  
 
 
RNS  
 
DragonEye  
 
TriDAR  
 
TriDAR 
 
DragonEye  
 
VNS  
 
TriDAR 
Table 16.2  Relative Sensor Demonstration Missions 
AR&C – Automated Rendezvous and Capture, ATV – Automated Transfer Vehicle, CCTV – Closed Circuit Television, CSA – 
Canadian Space Agency, ESA – European Space Agency, HHL – Hand Held Laser, HST – Hubble Space Telescope, HTV – H-II 
Transfer Vehicle, ICOS – Improved Crew Optical Sight, IRT – Integrated Rendezvous Target, ISS – International Space Station, JSC 
– Johnson Space Center, LDEF – Long Duration Exposure Facility, LIDAR – Light Intensification Detection and Ranging, LTI – Laser 
Technology, Incorporated, MELIOS – Mini Eyesafe Laser Infrared Observation Set, PDP – Plasma Diagnostics Package, PLBAY – 
Payload Bay, RGPS – Relative Global Positioning System, RNS – Relative Navigation Sensor, RPOP – Rendezvous and Proximity 
Operations Program, RVS – Rendezvous Sensor, SPAS – Shuttle Pallet Satellite, STORRM DTO – Sensor Test for Orion Rel Nav 
Risk Mitigation Detailed Test Objective, TCS – Trajectory Control Sensor, TGM – Telegoniometer, VGS – Video Guidance Sensor, 
VNS – Vision Navigation Sensor 
Test 
Sponsor 
 
NASA/JSC 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NASA/JSC 
 
 
NASA/JSC 
 
 
NASA/JSC 
 
NASA/JSC 
 
NASA/JSC 
 
 
NASA/JSC 
 
 
NASA/JSC 
 
NASA/JSC 
 
NASA/JSC 
 
NASA/JSC 
 
NASA/JSC 
 
NASA/JSC 
 
ESA 
 
ESA 
 
NASA/Marshall 
 
 
NASA/Marshall 
 
 
NASA/Goddard 
 
SpaceX 
 
CSA 
 
CSA 
 
SpaceX 
 
NASA/JSC 
 
CSA 
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CHAPTER 17 - SATELLITE SERVICING MISSIONS  
 
 Satellite servicing missions flown by the shuttle (Table 17.1) required close coordination and planning between 
rendezvous personnel, proximity operations personnel, Extra Vehicular Activity (EVA) specialists, satellite 
manufacturers, and satellite operators.  EVA preparation and execution occurred simultaneously with rendezvous and 
proximity operations tasks.  The previously mentioned Solar Max repair (STS-41C) was the first servicing mission.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 17.1  Ground rehearsal of flyswatter attachment  
to the RMS (STS-51D, April 1985). 
N
A
S
A
 
RMS End 
Effector 
Fly Swatter 
SYNCOM IV-3 (STS-51D)  
 
 After deployment of the SYNCOM IV-3 satellite by 
Discovery on STS-51D (April 1985), the SYNCOM on-
board sequencer did not initiate antenna deployment, the 
spin-up maneuver or the perigee kick motor firing.  A 
contingency rendezvous and EVA was planned, and the 
flight was extended by two days.  The crew had received 
some rendezvous training nine months before the flight, 
and nominal rendezvous procedures and cue cards were 
sent to crew via the teleprinter.  Based on ground 
instruction, a flyswatter was constructed by the crew, 
which was placed on the RMS during an EVA (Figure 
17.1).  The SYNCOM separation switch was successfully 
snared three times with the flyswatter, but the SYNCOM 
sequencer did not activate. 
Comments 
   
Retrieved with the RMS during the second  
rendezvous.  Solar Max repaired and deployed. 
 
Contingency rendezvous after SYNCOM  
activation failure.  
 
Rendezvous & EVA planned in four months.   
SYNCOM in elliptical orbit. 
 
Hybrid Control Box.  Three rendezvous.   
Lambert targeting problem.  Original capture  
technique failed.  Captured by 3 EVA crew. 
 
Servicing Mission 1 
 
Servicing Mission 2 
 
Servicing Mission 3A 
 
Servicing Mission 3B 
 
Servicing Mission 4 
 
Orbiter 
  
Challenger 
  
 
Discovery 
 
 
Discovery 
 
 
Endeavour 
 
 
 
Endeavour 
 
Discovery 
 
Discovery 
 
Columbia 
 
Atlantis 
Flight 
  
41C 
 
 
51D 
 
 
51I 
 
 
49 
 
 
 
61 
 
82 
 
103 
 
109 
 
125 
Year 
  
1984 
 
 
1985 
 
 
1985 
 
 
1992 
 
 
 
1993 
 
1997 
 
1999 
 
2002 
 
2009
  
Target 
  
Solar Max 
 
 
SYNCOM IV-3 
 
 
SYNCOM IV-3 
 
 
INTELSAT VI (F-3) 
 
 
 
Hubble 
 
Hubble 
 
Hubble 
 
Hubble 
 
Hubble 
Table 17.1  Satellite Servicing Missions  
Prox Ops 
Approach 
  
+V Bar 
 
 
+V Bar 
 
 
+V Bar 
 
 
+V Bar 
 
 
 
Inertial 
 
+R Bar/Inertial 
 
+R Bar/Inertial 
 
+R Bar/Inertial 
 
+R Bar/Inertial 
 
EVA = Extra Vehicular Activity, INTELSAT = International Telecommunications Satellite, RMS = Remote Manipulator System, 
SYNCOM = Synchronous Communication 
Profile  
  
Ground-Up 
 
 
Deploy/ 
Rendezvous 
 
Ground-Up 
 
 
Ground-Up  
 
 
 
Ground-Up 
 
Ground-Up 
 
Ground-Up  
 
Ground-Up 
   
Ground-Up 
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rotation rate.  The INTELSAT would then be grappled 
and maneuvered into the payload bay. 
 This mission also used a hybrid control box 
rendezvous, with the INTELSAT maneuvered after 
Endeavour launch from a 299 nm by 309 nm orbit into a 
control box in a 200 nm by 210 nm, 28.35 degree 
inclination orbit (Figure 17.3, Figure 17.4).  Before the 
rendezvous, the INTELSAT spin rate was reduced from 
about 10.5 to about 0.65 revolutions per minute. 
 The two EVA crewman entered the payload bay 
about 1.5 hours prior to the first capture attempt.  Close 
coordination of complex rendezvous and EVA procedures 
was required throughout the mission.  The Flight Day 4 
capture attempt failed and Endeavour performed a 
breakout and phased away (Figure 17.4).  The Mission 
Management Team approved another rendezvous and 
capture attempt on Flight Day 5, with appropriate 
propellant management to protect for a third rendezvous 
and capture attempt, if it was needed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 INTELSAT performed a maneuver to ensure that it 
stayed ahead of Endeavour.  The Flight Day 5 capture 
attempt also failed, after several tries during two orbital 
daylight periods (Figure 17.5 and 17.6).  During the two 
orbits of proximity operations, several fly-arounds were 
flown to optimize the relative geometry for the capture 
attempts.  However, INTELSAT rotational dynamics 
continued to degrade, with the satellite in a flat spin at the 
last capture attempt. 
 
SYNCOM IV-3 (STS-51I) 
 
 The mission of Discovery on STS-51I (August-
September 1985) was modified to include rendezvous 
with and repair of the SYNCOM IV-3 satellite that 
malfunctioned after deployment on STS-51D.  The time 
available to plan the SYNCOM rendezvous, EVA, and 
repair was four months.  Discovery deployed two 
communications satellites on the first day of the mission, 
and a third on the second day, after which ground targeted 
rendezvous maneuvers began.  The circular orbits 
required for satellite deployment and the elliptical (160 x 
235 nm) orbit of SYNCOM complicated rendezvous 
profile design.  Concerns about the length of the crew 
workday and EVA time drove a decision to have one 
revolution between the final NC and Ti burn.  A close-in 
fly-around of SYNCOM was performed upon arrival.  
Inadvertent pluming of the SYNCOM, which induced 
attitude rates, complicated the retrieval.  The capture, 
repair and redeployment were successful (Figure 17.2). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
INTELSAT VI F-3 (STS-49) 
 
 On March 14, 1990, after launch on a Titan III, the 
INTELSAT-VI (603) communications satellite was 
stranded in low Earth orbit after it failed to separate from 
the Titan second stage.  Ground controllers separated the 
satellite from the second stage at the interface between 
the perigee kick motor and INTELSAT, and used the 
limited propulsion capability of INTELSAT to boost it 
into a slightly higher orbit. 
 The mission of the first flight of Endeavour (May 
1992) was to rendezvous with the stranded INTELSAT, 
so that a new perigee kick motor could be installed, and 
the satellite boosted to a suitable orbit.  INTELSAT was 
not designed to support retrieval by the shuttle.  A capture 
bar was designed to enable an astronaut on the end of the 
RMS to capture the satellite and stop it’s                           
.        . 
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Figure 17.2  Grapple bar on a SYNCOM IV-3 mock-up  
in preparation for the STS-51I mission (1985). 
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Figure 17.3   STS-49 shuttle relative motion profile  
(May 1992). 
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Figure 17.4  Sketch of proximity operations for  
the first STS-49 rendezvous on Flight Day 4. 
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 For the next rendezvous and capture attempt on Flight 
Day 7, a new capture procedure was developed, using 
three EVA crew, rather than two, to capture the satellite 
by hand, without using the capture bar.  Appropriate grab 
areas on the INTELSAT were located and safety issues 
were identified and addressed.  Simulations were 
conducted to verify the new procedure in the Weightless 
Environment Training Facility at NASA Johnson, and 
analysis of shuttle plume impingement on INTELSAT 
dynamics was also studied. 
 After the NCC burn on Flight Day 7, several on-board 
Ti burn targeting attempts failed to converge on a 
solution.1  An attempt to clear up the problem by 
reloading the computer software failed, and a Ti delay 
maneuver was performed (the first and so far only Ti 
delay to be conducted).  Propellant use eliminated the        
. 
Figure 17.5   EVA crewman on the RMS 
attempts to capture INTELSAT (right).  The 
COAS is on the left (STS-49, May 1992). 
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1. Delay Capture Attempts  
    Until Sunrise 
2. Initial Capture Attempts 
3. Delay Further Attempts  
    Until Sunrise 
4. Capture Attempts 
5. Decision to Break-out 
6. First Separation Maneuver 
7. Second Separation Maneuver 
+ R Bar 
+ V Bar 
•  6 
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Figure 17.6  Sketch of proximity operations for the 
second STS-49 rendezvous on Flight Day 5 (May 
1992). 
1. Delay Capture Attempts  
    Until Sunrise 
2. Roll Endeavour to  
    Achieve Capture Attitude 
3. INTELSAT Captured by  
    EVA Crew + R Bar 
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•  
1 •  
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Figure 17.7  Sketch of proximity operations for the 
third STS-49 rendezvous on Flight Day 7 (May 1992). 
Figure 17.8  Three person EVA finally captures  
INTELSAT VI (STS-49, May 1992). 
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SATELLITE SERVICING MISSIONS 
possibility of a fourth rendezvous, if the Flight Day 7 
capture attempt failed.  Targeting failures continued to 
occur.  Navigation data from the shuttle flight computers 
was used by Mission Control to compute the Ti and Mid-
Course maneuvers, and the burn solutions were voiced to 
the crew.  Before the capture attempt, Endeavour was 
maneuvered so that the INTELSAT spin axis was into the 
payload bay.  The capture was successful (Figure 17.7 and 
17.8), and the perigee kick motor was attached.  After 
INTELSAT deploy, due to limited propellant remaining, 
Endeavour performed a retrograde separation maneuver 
to place the perigee in the correct hemisphere and 
minimize propellant required for deorbit.  The 
INTELSAT perigee kick motor was fired when 
Endeavour was below and about 300 n.m. in front of it, 
and INTELSAT eventually reached an operational orbit. 
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 Situational awareness and propellant preservation 
during proximity operations was enhanced through the 
use of a new Hand Held Laser (HHL) rangefinder and a 
new laptop computer program called Payload Bay.  The 
new capability was especially useful during orbital night, 
as the INTELSAT was intrinsically dark, and depth 
perception degraded at night.  STS-49 set a new shuttle 
record for the number of rendezvous profiles flown 
(three) and the total amount to proximity operations time 
(~8 hours). 
  
 
Hubble Space Telescope (STS-61, -82, -103, -109, 
& -125) 
 
 Between 1993 and 2009 five missions were flown to 
successfully service the Hubble Space Telescope (HST).  
These complex servicing missions enhanced and ensured 
the ability of HST to provide significant scientific data 
and breathtaking photography (Figures 17.9 to Figure 
17.14).2  The first HST servicing mission flew an inertial 
approach (Figure 10.10).  Later HST flights used a +R 
Bar LVLH approach, and the orbiter went into an inertial 
attitude hold shortly before grapple to achieve alignment 
at the appropriate time.  Chapter 24 provides more detail 
on the Hubble servicing missions. 
Figure 17.9   Story Musgrave about to be 
elevated to the top of the HST (STS-61, 
Dec. 1993). 
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Figure 17.11  Hoffman with the original 
Wide Field/Planetary Camera that was 
replaced on STS-61 (Dec. 1993). 
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Figure 17.12  HST after deployment from  
Endeavour (STS-61, Dec. 1993). 
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Figure 17.10 HST after RMS grapple, before 
berthing in Columbia's payload bay (STS-
109, March 2002). 
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Figure 17.14  Illustration created by STS-82 
rendezvous instructor Alan Fox.  Ken “Sox” 
Bowersox was pilot of STS-61 and 
commander of STS-82.  Source: STS-82 Flight 
Specific Briefing, August 26, 1996. 
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CHAPTER 18 - DEPLOYMENT AND RETRIEVAL OF SCIENTIFIC PAYLOADS  
 
 Sixteen missions were flown involving the deployment and retrieval of from one to two science packages (Table 
18.1).  The eight types of deploy/retrieve payloads flown concerned astronomy, space physics, atmospheric physics, and 
missile defense research.  Parallel execution of deploy/retrieve profiles, satellite deployments, EVAs, and multiple 
research tasks coordinated with multiple ground facilities made these the most complex of the shuttle missions to plan 
and execute.  Dual shift, 24-hour crew operations on some missions further complicated planning and real-time 
operations.  
 
Comments 
  
Incorrect SPARTAN attitude at retrieval. 
 
On-board Lambert targeted proximity operations.  
 
Most complex deploy/retrieve profile flown. 
 
Laser range and range rate sensor test. 
 
Long range, in-front and behind station-keeping. 
 
WSF-1 problems prevented deployment. 
 
First successful test of Trajectory Control Sensor (TCS) laser. 
 
Football for data collection.  +R Bar Mir approach corridor test. 
 
Deploy the day after Mir rndz.  Trajectory designed to avoid Mir. 
 
1. Incorrect SPARTAN attitude at retrieval. 
2. Long range, in-front station-keeping. 
 
Gas venting by an experiment complicated ground tracking. 
 
1. Inflatable Antenna Experiment (IAE) 
2. Three rendezvous and station-keeping (650 meters) periods. 
 
1. Relative GPS test for ISS ESA Automated Transfer Vehicle. 
2. Long range, in-front station-keeping.  
 
Tested ISS TORVA and +V Bar corridor approach using 
payload bay keel camera. 
 
SPARTAN activation failure, EVA retrieval. VGS test.  
 
VGS test. 
Flight
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87 
 
95 
Year
  
1985 
 
1985 
 
1991 
 
1993 
 
1993 
 
1994 
 
1994 
 
1994 
 
1995 
 
1995 
 
 
1996 
 
1996 
 
 
1996 
 
 
1997 
 
 
1997 
 
1998 
Target 
 
SPARTAN-101 
 
PDP 
 
IBSS-SPAS II 
 
SPARTAN-201-01 
 
ORFEUS-SPAS 1 
 
WSF-1 
 
SPARTAN-201-02 
 
CRISTA-SPAS 1 
 
SPARTAN-204 
 
1. SPARTAN-201-03 
2. WSF-2 
 
OAST-Flyer 
 
1. SPARTAN-207-IAE 
2. PAMS-STU* 
 
1. ORFEUS-SPAS 2 
2. WSF-3 
 
CRISTA-SPAS 2 
 
 
SPARTAN-201-04 
 
SPARTAN-201-05 
Table 18.1  Deployment and Retrieval of Scientific Payloads 
Orbiter  
  
Discovery 
 
Challenger 
 
Discovery  
 
Discovery 
 
Discovery  
 
Discovery 
 
Discovery 
 
Atlantis 
 
Discovery 
 
Endeavour 
 
 
Endeavour 
 
Endeavour 
 
 
Columbia 
 
 
Discovery 
 
 
Columbia 
 
Discovery 
* Deploy/rendezvous or “proxy-vous.”  No retrieval. 
CRISTA = Cryogenic Infrared Spectrometers and Telescopes for the Atmospheric, ESA = European Space Agency, EVA = Extra-
Vehicular Activity, GPS = Global Positioning System, IBSS = Infrared Background Signature Survey, ISS = International Space Station, 
OAST = Office of Aeronautics and Space Technology , ORFEUS = Orbiting and Retrievable Far and Extreme Ultraviolet Spectrometer, 
PAMS-STU = Passive Aerodynamically Stabilized Magnetically Damped Satellite-Satellite Test Unit,  PDP = Plasma Diagnostics 
Package, SK = Station-Keeping, SPARTAN = Shuttle Pointed Autonomous Tool For Astronomy, SPAS = Shuttle Pallet Satellite, 
TORVA = Twice Orbital Rate V Bar Approach, VGS = Video Guidance Sensor, WSF = Wake Shield Facility 
Prox Ops 
Approach 
 
+V Bar 
 
+V Bar 
 
+V Bar 
 
+V Bar 
 
+V Bar 
 
-V Bar 
 
Inertial 
 
+R Bar 
 
+V Bar 
 
1. +V Bar 
2. +V Bar 
 
+R Bar 
 
1. +V Bar 
2. –V Bar SK 
 
1. +R Bar 
2. +R Bar 
 
TORVA/+V Bar 
 
 
+R Bar 
 
+R Bar 
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Plasma Diagnostics Package (STS-51F)  
 
 During STS-51F (July/Aug. 1985) the Plasma 
Diagnostics Package (PDP) experiment (Figure 18.1, 
18.2) explored the plasma environment around 
Challenger.1  The mission required the development of 
complex nominal and contingency (such as radar fail and 
delayed deploy) procedures, and close coordination with 
scientific investigators.  Precise proximity operations burn 
targeting was performed using the shuttle computer’s 
Lambert targeting algorithm.  An abort-to-orbit due to the 
shutdown of a main engine during ascent resulted in a 
lower orbital altitude, forcing a redesign of on-board 
Lambert targeting data by Mission Control.  The 
challenging trajectory was successfully flown (Figure 
18.3), but the third orbit of Challenger about the PDP was 
canceled due to increased propellant consumption during 
ascent. 
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Figure 18.3   STS-51F station keeping with PDP (July/ 
Aug. 1985). 
N
A
S
A
 
Figure 18.1  PDP on the end of the RMS 
(STS-51F, July/Aug. 1985) 
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Figure 18.2  PDP after release from the RMS  
(STS-51F, July/Aug. 1985). 
SPARTAN (STS-51G, -56, -64, -63, -69, -72, -77, -
87, & -95) 
 
  The Shuttle Pointed Autonomous Tool For 
Astronomy (SPARTAN) was a free-flying astronomical 
observatory that flew on nine shuttle missions.2  
  After deployment on it’s first mission, STS-51G, 
(June 1985) radar and star tracker data were obtained by 
Discovery.  When Discovery approached SPARTAN-101 
two days later, the crew noted that the RMS grapple 
fixture was not pointed in the expected direction (Figure 
18.4).  Rather than yaw Discovery to facilitate retrieval, 
the RMS procedures were modified to adjust for the 
unexpected SPARTAN-101 attitude. 
 After deployment from Discovery on STS-56 (April 
1993), SPARTAN-201-01 conducted two days of data 
collection concerning solar wind and the sun's corona.  
The trajectory design was not constrained by a 
SPARTAN-201-01 communication constraint during 
approximately two days of detached operations.  
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 Discovery (STS-63, February 1995) deployed 
SPARTAN-204 the day after the rendezvous and +V Bar 
approach to Mir.  An orbit adjust maneuver was 
conducted following the separation from Mir to ensure 
that Discovery and SPARTAN-204 maintained a safe 
distance from Mir during SPARTAN-204 operations.  
SPARTAN-204 was retrieved after two days of free 
flight. 
 SPARTAN-201-03 (STS-69, September 1995) 
conducted two days of detached operations after 
deployment from Endeavour (Figure 18.6).  During the 
rendezvous, the NCC burn used more propellant than 
expected due to a flight software algorithm performance 
issue.  As a result, Endeavour missed the desired Ti point 
by 0.96 nm.*  SPARTAN-201-03 was not in the nominal 
retrieval attitude, and a fly-around was required to 
position Endeavour and the RMS for capture. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 The day after the STS-72 retrieval of the Space Flyer 
Unit in January of 1996, Endeavour deployed the Office 
of Aeronautics and Space Technology Flyer (OAST-
Flyer, SPARTAN-206) for two days of detached 
operations (Figure 18.7).  Significant trajectory 
dispersions were induced by an OAST-Flyer experiment 
that performed a vent previously advertised as non-
propulsive.  The retrieval was successful. 
 
121 
2. NC1 
Figure 18.4   STS-51G SPARTAN deploy and  
retrieval profile (June 1985). 
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Figure 18.6  SPARTAN before capture 
(STS-69, Sept. 1995). 
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Figure 18.5  SPARTAN before  
deployment (STS-64, Sept. 1994). 
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Figure 18.7  SPARTAN-206 (OAST-
Flyer) seen from an aft flight deck 
window (Jan. 1996).   
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 The shuttle borne Lidar In Space Technology 
Experiment (LITE) on STS-64 (Discovery, September 
1994) required a low eccentricity orbit during data takes, 
which constrained design of Discovery’s trajectory 
profile during detached operations of SPARTAN-201-02 
(Figure 18.5).  Data takes were scheduled during two 
crew sleep periods and a crew day between deploy and 
retrieval.  Difficulty establishing radar tracking after the 
deploy (50 minutes of failed attempts, acquisition finally 
obtained at a range of 2760 feet) resulted in moving the 
last ground targeting phasing maneuver (NC) of the 
rendezvous from 40 n.m. trailing to 34 n.m. trailing to 
provide more time for evaluation of radar data.  On the 
day of rendezvous initial acquisition was about 30 
minutes before the second star tracker pass and the radar 
performed well.  The Trajectory Control Sensor (TCS) 
lidar was also successfully tested during the approach to 
SPARTAN-201-02, with radar and TCS data showing 
excellent agreement.  An inertial approach to SPARTAN-
201-02 was used to protect the LITE sensor from 
sunlight. 
  
* See John L. Goodman, Lessons Learned From Seven Space 
Shuttle Missions, NASA Contractor Report NASA/CR-2007-
213697, NASA Johnson Space Center, January 2007.   
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  STS-95 was a re-flight of the SPARTAN payload 
from STS-87, and VGS data during SPARTAN retrieval 
was obtained (Figure 18.11).3  An improved version of 
VGS, called the Advanced Video Guidance Sensor, was 
later developed for the Demonstration of Autonomous 
Rendezvous Technology (DART) and Orbital Express 
programs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IBSS (STS-39) 
 
 Discovery flew a dedicated Department of Defense 
mission in late April and early May of 1991.  The Shuttle 
Pallet Satellite-II (SPAS-II), carrying the Infrared 
Background Signature Survey (IBSS) experiment, was 
deployed, flew for almost two days and was then 
retrieved (Figure 18.12).  The 38 hour deploy/retrieve 
profile was the most complex flown by the Space Shuttle, 
and involved numerous on-board and ground-targeted 
maneuvers (Figure 18.13).  Mission planning, dual shift 
crew operations and observations by ground stations were 
coordinated.    
 The mission plan for Discovery, after IBSS 
deployment, involved phasing out to the far-field (10 
kilometers, 5.4 n.m.) point on the –V Bar and conduct 
three OMS burns and one translational RCS burn to be 
observed by the IBSS experiment.  Ideally, to meet an 
IBSS observation requirement for minimal relative line-
of-sight rates, the orbiter would perform station-keeping 
on the –V Bar before each plume observation maneuver.   
However, since Discovery could not be placed on the       
. 
 STS-77 (Endeavour, May 1996) set a Shuttle Program 
record for most rendezvous profiles flown (four) and 
longest total proximity operations time (21 hours).  After 
the SPARTAN-207 deploy on flight day two, the orbiter 
performed minus R bar station-keeping to observe the 
Inflatable Antenna Experiment (IAE) (Figure 18.8).  The 
IAE was then jettisoned from the SPARTAN.  
SPARTAN-207 was retrieved on flight day three.  Three 
additional rendezvous profiles were flown for the PAMS-
STU experiment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 After the SPARTAN-201 deploy by Columbia (Figure 
18.9) on STS-87 (Nov./Dec. 1997), the SPARTAN 
attitude control system failed to activate.  Attitude rates 
prevented capture by the RMS soon after the deploy.  The 
activation failure prevented the accomplishment of 
science objectives.  Later in the mission, a rendezvous 
was performed and SPARTAN was manually captured by 
two astronauts during an EVA previously planned to 
demonstrate ISS assembly techniques (Figure 18.10).  
Video Guidance Sensor (VGS, an experimental proximity 
operations sensor) data was obtained while the 
SPARTAN was attached to the RMS, but not during the 
retrieval due to the SPARTAN activation failure.3 
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Figure 18.8 Inflatable Antenna Experiment  
and SPARTAN-207 (STS-77, May 1996). 
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Figure 18.9  SPARTAN before release 
(STS-87, Nov./Dec. 1997) 
  
N
A
S
A
 
Figure 18.10  Two EVA crew about to 
catch SPARTAN (STS-87, Nov./Dec. 
1997). 
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Figure 18.11  SPARTAN and the RMS 
(STS-95, Oct./Nov. 1998) 
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maneuvers had been planned prior to the mission for just 
such a situation. 
 Insufficient knowledge of IBSS and orbiter vents, and 
SPAS-II attitude and drag characteristics complicated 
activities during the SPAS-II detached operations phase.  
On-board targeting worked well, but predicting long-term 
relative motion to support ground-targeted maneuvers was 
challenging (Figure 18.14 and Figure 18.15).  While all 
objectives during the SPAS-II detached operations phase 
were met, overall relative motion differed from the pre-
mission plan. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ORFEUS-SPAS (STS-51 & -80)  
 
 ORFEUS-SPAS (Orbiting and Retrievable Far and 
Extreme UV Spectrometer) was another free-flying 
astronomical payload.4  
 For STS-51 (Discovery, September 1993), SPAS was 
deployed on flight day 2.  Discovery transitioned from 
long-range, in front to behind station-keeping on flight 
day 6.  Maximum station-keeping range was constrained 
to meet communications constraints.  On flight day 8, 
ORFEUS-SPAS drag uncertainties resulted in the start of  
.  
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–V Bar with perfect accuracy, a maneuver was executed 
to place it in a trajectory coelliptic with the SPAS-II, 
which controlled the relative line-of-sight rates.  The 
plume observation maneuvers were out-of-plane, and 
were followed by a “fast flip” attitude maneuver and 
another burn targeted to place Discovery back on the -V 
Bar.  Another coelliptic maneuver was planned to set-up 
for the next plume observation maneuver. 
 Discovery then transitioned to the near-field plume 
observation point, 2.25 kilometers (1.2 n.m.) behind the 
SPAS-II, where two plume observation maneuvers were 
conducted in the same manner as the far-field maneuvers.  
After the near field activities were completed, Discovery 
phased out to the normal 8 nm Ti range and conducted a 
rendezvous with IBSS for the retrieval. 
 Two Chemical Release Observation (CRO B and C) 
sub-satellites were deployed during the IBSS detached 
operations, and a third (CRO A) was deployed after 
SPAS-II was retrieved.  The sub-satellites were not 
tracked by the shuttle’s relative navigation sensors, but 
were tracked by ground radar until there was no longer a 
possibility of re-contact with Discovery. After IBSS 
retrieval, CRO-B could not be located by ground radar 
tracking, and Discovery executed two additional 
maneuvers to protect against re-contact.  These                  
. 
Figure 18.12  SPAS-II/IBSS after 
release from the RMS (STS-39, 
April/May 1991). 
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Figure 18.14   Planned STS-39 IBSS profile (April/May  
1991). 
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Figure 18.13  STS-39 planned profile for IBSS detached  
activities with maneuvers indicated (April/May 1991). 
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the rendezvous occurring 40 nm behind SPAS, rather 
than the pre-mission planned range of 30 nm.  Before the 
grapple with the RMS (Figure 18.16), attitude rates 
induced by shuttle RCS jet firings (plume impingement) 
were detected by the SPAS attitude control system, but it 
was able to maintain SPAS attitude. 
 On STS-80 (November-December 1996), SPAS was 
deployed 8.25 hours after the launch of Columbia.  Wake 
Shield Facility 03 (WSF-03) was deployed about 3 days 
and 5.7 hours after launch, and retrieved 3 days later.  
SPAS was retrieved about 14 days and 12.5 hours after 
launch.  Extended three body operations during the flight 
presented a challenge to mission planning, but was 
successful.  SPAS trajectory dispersions were most likely 
due to translational accelerations from the SPAS attitude 
control thrusters. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CRISTA-SPAS (STS-66 & STS-85) 
 
 The Cryogenic Infrared Spectrometers and 
Telescopes for the Atmospheric Shuttle Pallet Satellite 
(CRISTA-SPAS) flew on STS-66 (Atlantis, November 
1994) and STS-85 (Discovery, August 1997) (Figure 
18.17).  The STS-66 separation profile was designed to 
provide 5 hours of continuous communications between 
the SPAS and the shuttle.  To avoid contamination of the 
CRISTA-SPAS during science periods, the orbiter had to 
maintain at least an 11 n.m. separation.  CRISTA-SPAS 
instrument field of view constraints mandated in-front 
station-keeping.  Atlantis phased out to 67 n.m. in front of 
CRISTA-SPAS, but the range had to be reduced to 
improve space-to-space communications.  Maneuver 
planning was complicated by variable CRISTA-SPAS 
drag, which may have been due to cryostat vent self 
impingement.  During the rendezvous, a one-orbit             
. 
football trajectory was initiated at the Ti point to allow 
the Middle Atmosphere High Resolution Spectrograph 
Investigation (MAHRSI) instrument on CRISTA-SPAS 
to observe the orbiter.  The +R bar approach designed for 
the subsequent (November 1995) STS-74 mission to Mir 
was flown during the approach to CRISTA-SPAS.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 For STS-85 (August 1997), profile design constraints 
were similar, but a football was not flown during the 
rendezvous.  Orbiter attitude maneuvers were limited to 
reduce trajectory dispersions.  During the approach to 
CRISTA-SPAS (Figure 18.18), a Twice Orbital Rate +V 
Bar Approach (TORVA) and a plus V Bar approach 
corridor were flown to test proximity operations 
procedures for missions to the ISS.  
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Figure 18.16  ORFEUS/SPAS after capture by the 
RMS (STS-51, Sept. 1993). 
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Figure 18.17 CRISTA-SPAS after 
being grappled by the RMS (STS-
66, Nov. 1994). 
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Figure 18.18   CRISTA-SPAS before 
retrieval with the RMS (STS-85, Aug. 
1997). 
N
A
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Wake Shield Facility (STS-60, -69, & -80) 
 
 An example of mission-specific trajectory design 
were the Wake Shield Facility (WSF) flights (Figures 
18.19 and Figure 18.20).  The WSF structure created an 
enhanced vacuum on the downwind side of the vehicle to 
support thin film epitaxial growth and materials 
purification.  Long-range station-keeping was performed 
ahead of the WSF, rather than behind, to avoid WSF 
contamination by shuttle RCS firings and water dumps 
(Figure 18.20).  There was also a requirement for the 
payload bay to be visible to the WSF for communications 
purposes.  Extended station-keeping with the orbiter 
windows and radiators pointed opposite the velocity 
vector (toward the WSF) was also desirable to minimize 
orbital debris impacts on those surfaces.  
N
A
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Figure 18.19  Wake Shield on the 
RMS (STS-60, Feb. 1994).  
Figure 18.20   STS-80 deploy/retrieve profile for the  
Wake Shield Facility (Nov./Dec. 1996). 
9. MC1 
-10 
11. MC2 
12. MC3 
13. MC4 
8. Ti 
2. NC7 
4. NC12 
7. NCC 
R
 B
a
r 
(n
. 
m
.)
 
+1 
6. NH 
3. Orbiter 
    Station  
    Keeping 
    NC8-NC11 
V Bar  
(n. m.) 
Star Tracker 
5. Start 
    Radar 
•  
•  
•  
•  
•  •  
•  
•  
•  
•  •  • • 
•  
•  
10. Out-of- 
      Plane 
      Null 
  1. Deploy 
14. Retrieval 
-2 
+10 
-2500 -1000 +500 
+500 Desired Station  
Keeping Box 
Required Station  
Keeping Box 
•  MC-4 
V Bar Null 
•  
•  
Sep Burn 
V Bar (ft.) 
R
 B
a
r 
(f
t.
) 
Figure 18.22   STS-77 station-keeping (proxy-vous) 
with PAMS-STU (May 1996). 
Figure 18.21  PAMS-STU after deployment  
from Endeavour (May 1996). 
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PAMS-STU (STS-77) 
 
 On flight day four, the Passive Aerodynamic-
Magnetically Stabilized Satellite Test Unit (PAMS-STU) 
was deployed (Figure 18.21).  Station-keeping and 
rendezvous profiles were flown for data collection on 
flight days four, seven and eight.  The PAMS-STU 
rendezvous and station-keeping profiles (also called 
“proxy-vous”) were specifically designed and flown to 
collect data for the experiment.  New on-board targeting 
procedures were developed to ensure that the orbiter 
intercepted the –V Bar station-keeping box (Figure 
18.22).  New piloting procedures were also developed to 
lower propellant consumption (particularly forward RCS) 
during the extended station-keeping periods.  PAMS-
STU was not retrieved. 
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Relative GPS Demonstrations 
 
 Several deploy/retrieve missions were used to evaluate 
relative GPS technology for application to future 
rendezvous vehicles.  During STS-69 (Sept. 1995), 
Endeavour carried a Collins 3M receiver and the Wake 
Shield Facility a Osbourne/Jet Propulsion Laboratory 
TurboRogue receiver.5-7  On STS-80 (1996), Columbia 
carried a TANS Quadrex receiver and the ORFEUS-SPAS 
II a Laben Tensor receiver in support of the European 
Space Agency (ESA) Automated Transfer Vehicle (ATV) 
program.8  
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CHAPTER 19 - RETRIEVAL AND RETURN TO EARTH OF A SATELLITE 
 
 Five satellites were retrieved by the Space Shuttle and returned to Earth.  Two of them, Palapa-B2 and Westar-VI, 
were not originally designed for retrieval by the shuttle.  The others were designed to support shuttle retrieval. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 19.1  Retrieval and Return to Earth of a Satellite* 
* All were ground-up rendezvous. 
LDEF = Long Duration Exposure Facility, EURECA = European Retrievable Carrier, EVA = Extra Vehicular Activity, MMU = 
Manned Maneuvering Unit, SFU = Space Flyer Unit 
Figure 19.1  Dale Gardner about to dock with 
Westar-VI (STS-51A, Nov. 1984). 
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Palapa-B2 and Westar-VI (STS-51A) 
 
 The Palapa-B2 and Westar-VI communications 
satellites were deployed by Challenger on STS-41B 
(February 1984) but both were stranded in low orbit due 
to failures of the Payload Assist Modules (PAM) on both 
satellites.  Discovery on STS-51A (November 1984) 
deployed the Anik D-2 and SYNCOM (LEASAT) IV-1 
satellites on Flight Days 2 and 3, and then performed a 
rendezvous with Palapa on Flight Day 5.  An astronaut 
flying an MMU inserted a stinger device into the apogee 
motor nozzle and captured Palapa.  The same procedure 
was performed on Flight Day 7 for Westar-VI (Figure 
19.1).1 
  
 Plume impingement on Westar and Palapa did not 
cause problems, but motion of thermal protection material 
on the satellites could be observed when orbiter RCS jets 
were fired.  Prior to the mission, studies were conducted 
to determine the appropriate inertial attitude for the 
satellites, which was a trade-off between visibility to the 
star tracker, the rendezvous radar, and the human eye.  
Both satellites were visible to the crew, using the COAS 
as a cue, at a range of over 100 n.m.  A total of 44 orbital 
change maneuvers were executed, and the heavy 
workload of rendezvous and EVA activities extended the 
crew days well into the scheduled sleep periods. 
 The retrieval and return to Earth of the Palapa-B2 and 
Westar-VI satellites demonstrated the ability of the 
Shuttle Program to rapidly respond to new requirements 
involving vehicles not designed to support shuttle 
activities.   Planning for the dual rendezvous mission was 
further complicated by the deployment of two other 
communications satellites prior to the rendezvous and 
servicing phase, and the combination of proximity 
operations with free-flying (MMU) EVA crew capturing 
and maneuvering the satellites for grapple using the RMS.  
Detailed mission preparation and real-time re-planning 
enabled the rendezvous with, retrieval and return to Earth 
of the satellites within a tight propellant budget.  Both 
Palapa-B2 and Westar-VI maneuvered to meet 
downrange and planar offset conditions before the launch 
of Discovery. 
 
Long Duration Exposure Facility (STS-32) 
 
 LDEF (Figure 19.2), deployed on STS-41C (April 
1984), was supposed to have been retrieved in early 1985 
(STS-51D), then in September of 1986 (STS-61I, 
canceled due to the loss of Challenger), and finally the 
summer of 1989 (STS-32, Columbia).  Columbia was       
.  
Comments 
  
Both maneuvered to meet downrange and planar constraints  
and were retrieved by an astronaut flying the MMU. 
 
Hot final approach due to radar procedure issue. 
 
Solar array latch failure, corrected during EVA. 
 
Hybrid control box.  Solar array retraction failure & jettison. 
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 Endeavour established communication with EURECA 
at a range of 44 nm.  Between the shuttle MC-1 and MC-2 
burns, the EURECA batteries were at full charge and the 
solar arrays were retracted and latched.  Antenna 
retraction was performed via ground command when the 
Endeavour reached 200 feet, but they failed to latch.  
EURECA was grappled with the RMS, but not berthed 
until it was confirmed that berthing could be safely done 
with the antennas unlatched.  They were later manually 
stowed during a previously scheduled EVA. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Space Flyer Unit (STS-72) 
 
 STS-72 (January 1996) retrieved the Japanese Space 
Flyer Unit (SFU, Figure 19.4), which had been launched 
from the Tanegashima Space Center by an H-2 booster on 
March 18, 1995.  A hybrid control box rendezvous was 
performed.  A 4 ft./sec. posigrade maneuver was executed 
~22 hours after launch to ensure a safe separation distance 
from an orbiting object.  The burn was designed to have 
minimal impact on the rendezvous.  The two SFU solar 
arrays were jettisoned before retrieval when sensors 
indicated improper latching after array retraction. 
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finally launched in January of 1990.  LDEF orbital decay 
due to the solar maximum, Columbia launch delays and 
the SYNCOM IV-5 deploy two days before LDEF 
rendezvous complicated mission planning.  Orbit 
prediction of the LDEF had a high degree of uncertainty, 
and experience with Skylab in 1978 and 1979 heightened 
concerns that LDEF could reenter the atmosphere before 
retrieval. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 During the rendezvous, poor quality radar data at long 
range resulted in a dispersed trajectory, and a faster final 
approach that required additional braking.2,3  The gravity 
gradient stabilized LDEF was in the expected attitude, 
and the retrieval and return to Earth was successful, with 
only a few weeks of LDEF orbital lifetime left.  After the 
mission, radar data incorporation procedures were 
changed based on the rediscovery of a radar hardware 
limitation. 
 
 
EURECA (STS-57) 
 
 The European Retrievable Carrier (EURECA) was 
deployed on STS-46 (Atlantis, July-August 1992), and 
retrieved on STS-57 (Endeavour, June-July 1993, Figure 
19.3).  Before and during the flight, close coordination on 
mission planning and procedures was required between 
Mission Control in Houston and the European Space 
Operations Center (ESOC) in Darmstadt, Germany.   
EURECA completed an orbit adjustment program in 
preparation for the rendezvous seven days prior to the 
launch of Endeavour.  However, a control box 
rendezvous was not performed.  A phase repeating orbit 
was used to establish periodic launch windows and ease 
mission planning.  In the event of an off-nominal shuttle 
orbit insertion; plans were developed for EURECA to 
lower its orbital altitude to facilitate a rendezvous and 
retrieval.4 
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Figure 19.2  LDEF after capture by the RMS 
(STS-32, Jan. 1990). 
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Figure 19.3  EURECA above KSC after deployment  
from Atlantis (STS-46, July/Aug. 1992). 
N
A
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Figure 19.4  SFU about to be berthed in the 
payload  bay of Endeavour.  OAST-Flyer is 
below SFU (STS-72, Jan. 1996) 
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CHAPTER 20 - MIR AND THE INTERNATIONAL SPACE STATION 
 
 Docking of the Space Shuttle with notional space stations was studied in the early 1970s, as well as docking in 
support of space rescue motivated by the Apollo/Soyuz Test Project.  Much of the work done to prepare the shuttle to 
support Space Station Freedom was applied to the Mir and ISS missions (Tables 20.1 and 20.2). 
Table 20.1  Space Shuttle Flights to Mir* 
* All were ground-up rendezvous.  ATV = Automated Transfer Vehicle, ESA = European Space Agency,  GPS = Global 
Positioning System, ORBT = Optimized R-Bar Targeted Rendezvous  
Orbiter  
  
Discovery 
 
Atlantis 
 
Atlantis 
 
Atlantis 
 
Atlantis 
 
Atlantis 
 
Atlantis 
 
Atlantis 
 
Endeavour 
 
Discovery 
Comments 
  
+V Bar approach to 37 feet.  No docking planned.  Leaking RCS jet problem. 
 
Docked to Buran port on Kristall Module.  Crew exchange. 
 
Installed Shuttle Docking Module on Kristall. 
 
Resupply & U.S. crew delivery. 
 
Resupply & U.S. crew exchange. 
 
Resupply & U.S. crew exchange. 
 
Resupply & U.S. crew exchange. GPS & laser test for ESA ATV. 
 
Resupply & U.S. crew exchange. GPS test for ESA ATV.  First ORBT flight. 
 
Resupply & U.S. crew exchange. 
 
Resupply & U.S. crew return. 
Flight
  
63 
 
71 
 
74 
 
76 
 
79 
 
81 
 
84 
 
86 
 
89 
 
91 
Year
  
1995 
 
1995 
 
1995 
 
1996 
 
1996 
 
1997 
 
1997 
 
1997 
 
1998 
 
1998 
Prox Ops 
Approach 
 
+V Bar 
 
+R Bar 
 
+R Bar 
 
+R Bar 
 
+R Bar 
 
+R Bar 
 
+R Bar 
 
+R Bar 
 
+R Bar 
 
+R Bar 
Docking Hardware 
 
 The Androgynous Peripheral Docking Assembly 
(APAS) unit (Figure 20.1) is a descendent of the APAS-
75 unit jointly developed by the Soviet Union and the 
U.S. for the Apollo/Soyuz Test Project.  The later 
generation APAS was originally intended for use on a 
Soyuz class vehicle and the Buran shuttle.  Soyuz TM-16 
(January-February 1993) docked with one of the two 
Kristall Mir module ports equipped with the APAS.  For 
the U.S. shuttle, the APAS is mounted on the Orbiter 
Docking System (ODS) in the payload bay.  APAS was 
used for dockings to both Mir and ISS.  A centerline 
camera mounted in the ODS with a bore sight through the 
ODS hatch window provides the shuttle crew with a view 
of a docking target mounted on the Mir and ISS hatches.1 
Figure 20.1  APAS on the Orbiter Docking System 
in the payload bay.  The RMS is on the right. 
N
A
S
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 For the first shuttle docking with Mir (Atlantis, STS-
71, June 1995), the Kristall module was moved from a 
longitudinal port to an axial port to provide enough 
clearance between Atlantis and Mir solar arrays.  After 
the departure of Atlantis, Kristall was moved back to the 
original position to support Soyuz and Progress dockings.  
A Russian built docking module was attached to the 
Kristall axial docking port during STS-74 (November 
1995) to allow Kristall to remain attached to the Mir axial 
port while providing enough clearance for the shuttle.2  
The ISS is equipped with two APAS units, mounted on 
two Pressurized Mating Adapters (PMA). 
 
New Sensor Development and New Challenges 
 
 In the mid 1970s, when the rendezvous navigation 
sensors and relative navigation capability was baselined, 
proximity operations culminated with approach and 
grapple of a spacecraft with a robotic arm.  The baselined 
rendezvous radar was adequate to support this, although 
it lacked effective redundancy. 
 The lack of a backup range and range rate sensor 
providing better data and ease of operation than COAS 
subtended angles and Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) 
tilt angles had been a source of concern since the late 
1970s.  Attempts to obtain a new source of range and rate 
data were limited to off-the-shelf options (stadimetric 
binoculars, a parallax rangefinder, laser range finders in    
. 
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Orbiter 
  
Endeavour 
 
Discovery 
 
Atlantis 
 
Atlantis 
 
Discovery 
 
Endeavour 
 
Atlantis 
 
Discovery 
 
Endeavour 
 
Atlantis 
 
Discovery 
 
Endeavour 
 
Atlantis 
 
Endeavour 
 
Atlantis 
 
Endeavour 
 
Discovery 
 
Discovery 
 
Atlantis 
 
Discovery 
 
Atlantis 
 
Endeavour 
 
Discovery 
 
Atlantis 
 
Endeavour 
 
Discovery 
 
Endeavour 
 
Discovery 
 
Endeavour 
 
Discovery 
 
Atlantis 
 
Endeavour 
 
Discovery 
 
Atlantis 
 
Discovery 
 
Endeavour 
 
Atlantis 
Comments 
  
Captured Zarya with RMS, attached Unity Node with PMA 1 & 2. 
 
First docking with ISS.  ISS resupply and outfitting. 
 
ISS resupply and outfitting. 
 
ISS resupply and outfitting. 
 
Radar failure.  Z1 Truss, PMA 3, Ku comm,  & CMGs installed. 
 
Delivered P6 truss (with solar arrays & radiators). 
 
Delivered Destiny lab.   
 
MPLM resupply. Crew exchange.  Tail forward approach. 
 
Installed robotic arm. MPLM resupply.  Tail forward approach. 
  
Delivered Quest Airlock (installed with ISS robotic arm). 
 
MPLM resupply. Crew exchange. 
 
MPLM resupply. Crew exchange. 
 
Delivered S0 truss and Mobile Transporter. 
 
MPLM resupply. Mobile base installation.  Crew exchange. 
 
Delivered S1 truss, radiators & CETA cart A. 
 
Delivered P1 truss, radiators & CETA cart B.  Crew exchange. 
 
MPLM Resupply.  CMG replacement.  First RPM. 
 
MPLM Resupply.  ISS repairs via EVA.  Add third ISS crewmember. 
 
Install P3/P4 truss. 
 
P5 Truss, SPACEHAB 
 
S3/S4 Truss  
 
S5 Truss  
 
U.S. Node 2, first flight of Lambert guidance upgrade. 
 
Columbus Laboratory  
 
Kibo Logistics Module, Dextre Robotics System  
 
Kibo Pressurized Module, Japanese Remote Manipulator System  
 
MPLM 
 
S6 truss segment  
 
Kibo JEM EF, Kibo Japanese ELM-ES 
 
Leonardo MPLM, LMPESSC, Vernier RCS failure.  
 
ELC1, ELC2 
 
Tranquility Node 3, Cupola.  TCS failure during approach. 
 
Leonardo MPLM, radar fail. 
 
ICC, MRM1, COAS bulb replacement. 
 
ELC4, PMM 
 
ELC3, AMS-2, STORRM DTO 
 
Raffaello MPLM, LMC, return to Earth of failed ammonia pump. ISS 
yaw maneuver after orbiter undocking to facilitate engineering photos 
during orbiter half-lap fly-around. 
 
Flight 
  
88 (2A) 
 
96 (2A.1) 
 
101 (2A.2a) 
 
106 (2A.2b) 
 
92 (3A) 
 
97 (4A) 
 
98 (5A) 
 
102 (5A.1) 
 
100 (6A) 
 
104 (7A) 
 
105 (7A.1) 
 
108 (UF-1) 
 
110 (8A) 
 
111 (UF-2) 
 
112 (9A) 
 
113 (11A) 
 
114 (LF-1) 
 
121 (ULF‐1.1) 
 
115 (12A) 
 
116 (12A.1) 
 
117 (13A) 
 
118 (13A.1) 
 
120 (10A) 
 
122 (1E) 
 
123 (1J/A) 
 
124 (1J) 
 
126 (ULF2) 
 
119 (15A) 
 
127 92J/A) 
 
128 (17A) 
 
129 (ULF3) 
 
STS-130 (20A) 
 
STS-131 (19A) 
 
STS-132 (ULF4) 
 
STS-133 (ULF5) 
 
STS-134 (ULF6) 
 
STS-135 (ULF7) 
 
Year 
 
1998 
 
1999 
 
2000 
 
2000 
 
2000 
 
2000 
 
2001 
 
2001 
 
2001 
 
2001 
 
2001 
 
2001 
 
2002 
 
2002 
 
2002 
 
2002 
 
2005 
 
2006 
 
2006 
 
2006 
 
2007 
 
2007 
 
2007 
 
2008 
 
2008 
 
2008 
 
2008 
 
2009 
 
2009 
 
2009 
 
2009 
 
2010 
 
2010 
 
2010 
 
2011 
 
2011 
 
2011 
Table 20.2  ISS Assembly and Replenishment Missions* 
Prox Ops 
Approach 
 
TORRA/-R Bar 
 
TORRA/-R Bar 
 
TORRA/-R Bar 
 
TORRA/-R Bar 
 
TORRA/-R Bar 
 
+R Bar 
 
+R Bar 
 
TORVA/+V Bar 
 
TORVA/+V Bar 
 
TORVA/+V Bar 
 
TORVA/+V Bar 
 
TORVA/+V Bar 
 
TORVA/+V Bar 
 
TORVA/+V Bar 
 
TORVA/+V Bar 
 
TORVA/+V Bar 
 
TORVA/+V Bar  
 
TORVA/+V Bar  
 
TORVA/+V Bar 
 
TORVA/+V Bar 
 
TORVA/+V Bar 
 
TORVA/+V Bar 
 
TORVA/+V Bar 
 
TORVA/+V Bar 
 
TORVA/+V Bar 
 
TORVA/+V Bar 
 
TORVA/+V Bar 
 
TORVA/+V Bar  
 
TORVA/+V Bar  
 
TORVA/+V Bar 
 
TORVA/+V Bar 
 
TORVA/+V Bar 
 
TORVA/+V Bar 
 
TORVA/+V Bar  
 
TORVA/+V Bar  
 
TORVA/+V Bar 
 
TORVA/+V Bar 
* All were ground-up rendezvous.  A = Assembly, AMS = Alpha Magnetic Spectrometer, ATV = Automated Transfer Vehicle, CETA = Crew and Equipment 
Translation Aid, CMG = Control Moment Gyro, DTO = Detailed Test Objective, ELC = EXPRESS Logistics Carrier, ELM-ES = Experiment Logistics Module 
- Exposed Section, EVA = Extra Vehicular Activity, ICC = Integrated Cargo Carrier, JEM EF = Japanese Experiment Module Exposed Facility, LF = 
Logistics Flight, LMC = Lightweight Multi-purpose Carrier, LMPESSC = Lightweight Multi-Purpose Experiment Support Structure Carrier, MPLM = Multi-
Purpose Logistics Module, MRM = Mini Research Module, ORBT = Optimized R-Bar Targeted Rendezvous, PMA = Pressurized Mating Adapter, PMM = 
Permanent Multi-Purpose Module, Rndz = Rendezvous, RPM = R Bar Pitch Maneuver, STORRM = Sensor Test for Orion RelNav Risk Mitigation, TORRA 
= Twice Orbital Rate R Bar Approach, TORVA = Twice Orbital Rate V Bar Approach, UF = Utilization Flight, ULF = Utilization & Logistics Flight  
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Figure 20.3  Operational use of shuttle proximity 
operations sensors for a typical ISS mission. 
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use by the military, or auto focusing lasers on the payload 
bay camera system) due to budget restrictions.  None of 
the off-the-shelf options evaluated were satisfactory.  
Once shuttle rendezvous and proximity operations 
missions began, their success made it difficult to obtain 
sufficient priority and resources to address the concern.  
 The baseline sensors (radar, COAS, CCTV) were 
successfully used to null the final approach velocity to 
zero to support grapple of a spacecraft by the RMS on 
rendezvous missions.  However, these sensors and 
piloting aids had operational limitations.  Rendezvous 
radar tracking for even small payloads reached the end of 
the tracking envelope at about 80 feet.  Visual ranging 
methods using COAS subtended angles or two CCTV 
camera tilt angles were imprecise, imposed a heavy crew 
work-load during an already busy phase of flight, and did 
not provide the crew with a direct range-rate 
measurement.  On-orbit use of the CCTVs was frequently 
limited by extreme orbital lighting conditions that caused 
image blooming.  There was no orbiter sensor capability 
that would permit the crew to achieve a specific non-zero 
approach velocity with precision.  Such a capability 
would be required for docking the shuttle to a space 
station.  
 In 1987, studies of shuttle docking with Space Station 
Freedom indicated that a better proximity operations 
sensor than the Ku Band radar was needed.  This provided 
the justification needed to begin development of custom 
built sensors and procurement of off-the-shelf sensors that 
were more advanced than sensors evaluated in the late 
1970s and early 1980s (Figures 20.2 and 20.3).3 
 Hand Held Lidar (HHL) first flew on STS-49 (May 
1992). The Trajectory Control Sensor (TCS) lidar flew as 
a Detailed Test Objective (DTO) on STS-51, STS-63 and 
STS-64.  The first official flight as a payload was on STS-
71 (June-July 1995) for rendezvous and docking with the 
Mir Space Station.  TCS and HHL provided the precise 
range and range rate measurements needed to meet Mir 
and ISS docking conditions. 
 Though raw data was adequate to meet docking 
requirements, HHL, TCS, and legacy sensor data (radar, 
centerline camera, CCTV cameras) were processed in a 
laptop computer using a software package known as the 
Rendezvous and Proximity Operations Program (RPOP).  
RPOP provided a relative motion display and proximity 
operations piloting cues not available in the legacy shuttle 
avionics system (Figures 20.2 through 20.4).3-5  TCS, 
HHL, and RPOP became known as “rendezvous tools.” 
HHL, TCS, and RPOP data were not provided to the GNC 
flight computer.  Even though HHL data could be 
acquired before MC-3 and TCS data before MC-4, these 
burns were Lambert targeted independently of RPOP data 
(Figure 20.2).   
 In addition to TCS and HHL measurements, RPOP 
also could processes centerline camera vertical angles and 
CCTV tilt angles.  The one foot CCTV range ruler marks 
could be processed if the crew pressed a key each time a     
. 
Figure 20.2  Simplified GNC and rendezvous tools 
architecture.  RPOP, TCS, HHL, and cameras provide 
piloting cues after the last Lambert targeted burn, 
MC-4. 
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landmark on the ISS crossed a one foot mark on the ruler. 
However, normally only the centerline camera vertical 
angles were processed in conjunction with HHL range as 
a backup to TCS. 
 The operational envelope of proximity operations 
sensors is illustrated in Figure 20.3 for a typical mission 
to the ISS.  In the event of a radar failure (such as on 
STS-92 and STS-131), TCS, HHL, and COAS subtended 
angle (Figure 20.5) are used earlier in the profile than on 
a nominal mission.  A ranging ruler overlay on an aft 
cockpit monitor provides ranging during the last 15 feet 
(Figure 20.6). 
 To save money, the new rendezvous tools were not 
certified to the same criticality level as the baseline 1970s 
era rendezvous GNC capability.  Crews were expected 
and trained to fly proximity operations, docking, and 
undocking without the use of rendezvous tools. 
 While the Space Shuttle effectively flew missions to 
the Mir and ISS, the staggered integration of rendezvous 
(mid 1970s) and proximity operations (early 1990s) 
relative navigation algorithms and sensors resulted in a 
high crew work load with most crew members 
participating in proximity operations (Figure 20.7).  
 The rendezvous radar was usable with small targets 
down to ranges of between 80 to 100 feet. However, the 
size of Mir and the ISS resulted in beam wandering, 
which degraded measurement quality out to ranges of a 
few thousand feet depending on the size of the target.  
For ISS missions rendezvous radar measurements 
typically were not processed by the Kalman filter after     
. 
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Figure 20.4  Recreation of Mission Control RPOP display showing the STS-126 +V Bar arrival and 
final approach to docking (Nov. 17, 2008). 
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Figure 20.6  Space Shuttle camera  
ranging ruler overlay for use  
during docking with the ISS. 
Figure 20.5  ISS viewed through 
the COAS on STS-126. 
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Figure 20.7  Wendy Lawrence using an HHL during 
STS-114 (July/Aug. 2005). 
Figure 20.8  View from Discovery of Valeriy V. 
Polyakov looking out a Mir window during +V 
Bar approach (STS-63, Feb. 6, 1995). 
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the +R Bar Pitch Maneuver (RPM). However, the radar 
data was often still available to the crew up to the time the 
orbiter arrived on the +V Bar as the radar range rate 
proved to be accurate at close ranges and was monitored 
by the crew.  At some point during proximity operations 
the Ku band antenna was transitioned from radar mode to 
communications mode to transmit video to Mission 
Control through TDRSS.  TCS and HHL exhibited better 
performance during proximity operations than the Ku 
radar.  The availability of TCS and HHL measurements 
was essential to ensure safe and successful approaches to 
Mir and the ISS (Figures 20.5 and 20.8). 
 It was also recognized that Mir and ISS brightness and 
size issues could complicate or prevent use of daytime 
star tracker measurements for relative navigation after the 
Ti maneuver, in the event of a radar failure (Figure 11.1).  
Night star tracker data was obtained between the MC-1 
and MC-3 burns during the STS-64 rendezvous with 
SPARTAN.  Analysis techniques verified with the 
collected flight data were applied to data collected during 
the STS-63, STS-71, and STS-74 missions to Mir.  
 Analysis of these missions indicated that the 18 lights 
of varying intensity and character (flashing and non-
flashing) distributed across Mir provided a suitable target 
for the shuttle star tracker.  Post Ti contingency night star 
tracker navigation procedures were first flown on STS-79 
(September 1996).  A tracking light was added to the ISS 
Zvezda (“Star”) Service Module to enable contingency 
star tracking during orbital night for ISS missions.  Night 
star tracker navigation was performed during STS-92 
(October 2000) and STS-131 (April 2010) due to the 
radar failures. 
 Although shuttle orbiters were equipped with GPS 
receivers for use on-orbit and during entry, and the ISS 
was equipped with GPS as well, GPS was not used for 
shuttle rendezvous or proximity operations with the ISS 
until the STORRM DTO flown on STS-134 (see Chapter 
21).6 
 
Flight Control and Plume Challenges 
 
 All missions to Mir and ISS required extensive flight 
control and plume impingement analysis of the various 
configurations during approach, mated flight, assembly, 
and separation.7-12  For example STS-88, the first ISS 
assembly flight, involved the attachment of the U.S. built 
Unity node to the previously launched, Russian 
manufactured Zarya (FGB) module (Figure 20.9).  Unity 
was docked to the ODS using the RMS before the 
rendezvous with Zarya.  Shuttle flight control analysis 
was required to ensure that execution of rendezvous 
maneuvers would not violate structural loading 
constraints on Unity and the ODS.  Zarya was later 
grappled with the RMS, and docked to Unity (Figure 
20.10).  At 42,000 pounds, Zarya was the largest object 
ever manipulated with the RMS.  Analysis was also 
performed to ensure that ISS orbit raising with shuttle 
RCS jets could be successfully performed.10 
N
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Figure 20.9  Zarya in the distance as  
Endeavour approaches with Unity  
in the foreground (Dec. 1998). 
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Figure 20.10  Zarya and Unity after deployment  
from Endeavour (Dec. 1998). 
New Profile Development 
 
 The stable orbit rendezvous profile was designed for 
mainly inertial and +V Bar approaches (a transition to the 
–R Bar could be performed upon arrival at the +V Bar).  
A difficulty with the stable orbit approach was the 
increased amount of propellant required for braking in 
Low Z mode (Figure 10.11) and greater sensitivity to 
plume impingement loads of Mir and ISS.  Reducing 
plume concerns (static, dynamic, thermal, contamination) 
was critical, particularly for solar arrays. 
  Planning for Mir and ISS rendezvous missions 
prompted renewed study of the direct +R Bar approach in 
1993 (Figure 10.10).  Use of orbital mechanics to reduce 
the needed braking, rather than using RCS jet firings, 
would lower plume impingement and provide propellant 
savings.  An additional benefit was that a +R Bar 
separation could also take advantage of orbital mechanics, 
requiring fewer jet firings.  Studies indicated that the new 
approach could be performed without changing on-board 
computer targeting constants for the stable orbit profile.  
The availability of laser sensors (TCS, HHL) provided 
range and range rate measurement redundancy which was 
not available when the direct +R Bar approach was 
considered for the Skylab reboost mission in the late 
1970s.   
 After extensive analysis, procedure development, and 
efforts to overcome programmatic resistance, the direct 
+R Bar approach was approved by the Shuttle Program in 
April of 1994.  It was first flown in November of that year 
during the STS-66 retrieval of CRISTA-SPAS.  Direct +R 
Bar approaches were flown on all docking missions to 
Mir.4,13,14  The Mir missions (Figure 20.11) validated 
shuttle proximity operations and docking analysis 
originally performed for Space Station Freedom. 
 Further analysis led rendezvous designers to 
investigate changes to the rendezvous profile itself, before 
the proximity operations phase, to further reduce 
propellant consumption and increase shuttle payload 
capability.  The stable orbit profile, like its’ predecessor 
the coelliptic profile, was a “high energy” profile              
. 
designed to support a terminal phase inertial approach and 
direct intercept.  Additional propellant and procedures 
were required for R Bar or V Bar activities.  A new 
profile was designed which was optimized for the +R Bar 
approach. 
 Optimized R-Bar Targeted Rendezvous (ORBT) 
differed from stable orbit in several ways (Figure 20.12).  
ORBT was designed to optimally set up initial conditions 
for a low energy coast up the +R Bar (Figures 20.13, 
20.14, and 20.15).  By targeting the Ti, and first three 
mid-course maneuvers for the manual takeover point at 
2,000 feet, rather than for intercept, manual phase 
trajectory dispersions were reduced and propellant 
consumption was lowered.  The Ti point for ORBT was 
below the V Bar so that the subsequent MC-4 ΔV vector 
would be primarily in the +X body axis direction (Figure 
10.11), saving propellant.  The MC-4 maneuver targeted 
the orbiter for a point 600 feet below the target, on the +R 
Bar.  ORBT did not require as many +R Bar stabilization 
.. 
Figure 20.11  Atlantis docked to Mir during 
STS-71, as seen from Soyuz TM-21 (June 
1995). 
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Figure 20.13   Approaches to ISS.   
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Figure 20.14  ISS viewed from Endeavour on  
the +R Bar during STS-113 (Nov./Dec. 2002). 
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burns or as many braking burns as were needed with the 
stable orbit profile.  The first ORBT flight was STS-86 to 
Mir (September-October 1997). 
 
Proximity Operations and Docking 
 
 Final approach to the Mir (+R Bar) and ISS (+V Bar, 
+R Bar, or -R Bar, depending on the ISS configuration, 
Figure 20.13) involved flying a precise range and range 
rate profile.14  An 8-degree, followed by a 5-degree, 
approach corridor centered on the Mir or ISS docking 
hatch target was flown (Figure 20.15).  An angular fly-out 
could be performed at a range of 30 feet to achieve the 
required alignment for docking.  Station-keeping points 
existed during the approach to allow delays to ensure 
proper lighting, gain time to work systems issues, or 
obtain visibility to ground communication stations.  
 Rather than performing orbital rate inertial fly-arounds 
to transition between the R Bar and V Bar axes, twice 
orbital rate fly-arounds were conducted.  This technique 
was originally developed for the WSF fly-around on STS-
60, but was not flown due to the unsuccessful WSF 
deployment.  Twice orbital rate fly-arounds permitted 
faster transfers with lower propellant consumption and 
plume impingement, and was also used for post-
undocking fly-arounds of Mir and ISS.  The faster rate 
compared with inertial transitions prevented the sun from 
continuously staying in the field of view of the crew.  
Post-undocking fly-arounds were used to obtain 
photography of the Mir and ISS, if sufficient propellant 
was available. 
 The ability of the shuttle to perform station-keeping 
during proximity operations with Mir and early ISS 
missions (through STS-92) was required so that the           
. 
docking would occur within the visibility of a Russian 
ground communications station.  Mir attitude control was 
transitioned to free drift at docking by the Mir crew.  
Ground commanding by Russian flight controllers served 
as a backup to the crew.  The shuttle crew flew timed 
proximity operations approaches to ensure that final 
approach and docking occurred during a Russian 
communications window. 
 The attitude of the shuttle relative to the Mir or ISS 
while docked was defined by the clocking angle.  
Determination of the clocking angle depended on several 
considerations.  These were: 1) Ability of the station solar 
arrays to generate solar power in a given attitude, 2) 
Thermal control capabilities of the shuttle and station, 3) 
Station and shuttle communications while docked (i.e. 
antenna visibility), 4) Adequate clearance of station and 
shuttle hardware to avoid undesirable contact, 5) Shuttle 
RCS jet plume impingement on the station, and 6) How 
well the mated stack could be controlled by the station or 
shuttle flight control systems.  The Mir or ISS attitude 
during the approach was determined through a trade study 
comparing station solar power generation and thermal 
control capabilities for a given attitude with the shuttle 
flight control system margin (controllability).  
 At a range of 30 feet on all Mir and ISS missions 
station-keeping could be performed (if required) to 
perform an angular attitude alignment correction to ensure 
that the shuttle and Mir (or ISS) docking hardware was 
properly aligned.  Station-keeping at 30 feet could also 
include waiting for appropriate orbital lighting for the 
shuttle crew to read the docking target on Mir (or ISS) to 
determine the relative misalignment.  In addition, for 
flights that required docking with communications 
through a Russian ground station, the 30 foot station-        
. 
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Figure 20.18  Plus R Bar approach to Mir from 
ORBT profile, tail forward docking, STS-86 
(Sept./Oct. 1997) & STS-91 (June 1998).   
+
 R
 B
a
r 
(f
e
e
t)
 
-1000 -500 
1000 
1500 
2000 
+V Bar  
(feet) 
2) Manual Takeover 
    (MC-4+2 min.) 
4) +R Bar Arrival 
7) 30 Foot station-keeping  
    for angular alignment    
    correction.* 
8) Docking 
* If Required 
1) MC-4 Targets  
    for +R Bar 
6) 170 foot station- 
     keeping for  
     Russian    
     ground station  
     coverage. 
3) Range Rate Gates 
5) 180 Degree Yaw  
     Maneuver 
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Figure 20.23  RPM and plus V Bar approaches 
to ISS, STS-114 (July/Aug. 2005) to end of 
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Figure 20.22  Plus V Bar approaches to ISS, STS-102 
(March 2001) to STS-113 (Nov./Dec. 2002).   
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Figure 20.21  Plus R Bar approaches to ISS, 
STS-97 (Nov./Dec. 2000) & STS-98 (Feb. 2001).   
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keeping could be used to absorb time of arrival 
dispersions. 
 For the first docking mission to Mir (STS-71, June 
1995) station-keeping was performed at a range of 270 
feet on the plus R Bar (Figure 20.16) if Mir was not in the 
docking attitude.  If Mir was in the docking attitude 
station-keeping was performed at a range of 170 feet.  For 
beta angles higher than 30 degrees docking would be 
performed in a nose out-of-plane attitude.  This was 
driven by orienting the Mir solar arrays out-of-plane.  The 
actual beta angle was driven by the launch date.  A delay 
in the STS-71 launch resulted in a lower beta angle, and 
the docking was performed with the shuttle nose in plane 
(nose forward).  For STS-74 (Nov. 1995) docking was 
performed nose forward (Figure 20.16) and station-
keeping was performed at a range of 170 feet. 
 Missions STS-76, STS-79, STS-81, and STS-84 
(Figure 20.17) flew tail forward dockings to improve Mir 
communications with the ground.  STS-86 and STS-91 
also flew a tail forward dockings (Figure 20.18).  STS-86 
(Sept./Oct. 1997) was the first flight of the Optimized R 
Bar Targeted (ORBT) rendezvous.  STS-89 (Jan. 1998) 
flew a nose forward docking (Figure 20.19) to test the 
new single minus X RCS jet firing procedure.  This 
procedure was required for future ISS missions to reduce 
shuttle RCS plume impingement on the ISS.  The 
procedure had not yet been analyzed to determine if it 
could provide adequate flight control for the tail forward 
approach.  Tail forward dockings were highly desirable 
but not mandatory.  
 STS-88 (Dec. 1998), STS-96 (May/June 1999), STS-
101 (May 2000), STS-106 (Sept. 2000), and STS-92 (Oct. 
2000) all flew minus R Bar approaches (Figure 20.20) to 
avoid orbiter obscuration of Russian communications 
antennas on ISS.  These missions also required nose out-
of-plane grapple (STS-88) or dockings for beta angles 
greater than 45 degrees due to pointing ISS solar arrays 
out-of-plane.  However, these missions were launched 
when the beta angle was low and the shuttle nose out-of-
plane attitude was not required.  All dockings (96, 101, 
106, and 92) and the STS-88 grapple using the RMS were 
performed with the nose in-plane.  
 The STS-88 mission to the ISS required Russian 
ground station coverage during grapple for Russian 
commanding of the ISS attitude control system to free 
drift.  There was no backup method of transitioning to 
free drift.  For STS-96, STS-101, STS-106, and STS-92 
the primary means of moding to free drift was automatic, 
with Russian ground commanding as the backup.  
 STS-97 (Nov./Dec. 2000) and STS-98 (Feb. 2001) 
flew plus R Bar approaches (Figure 20.21) with tail 
forward dockings.  Tail forward was the only attitude that 
allowed a PMA-3 docking for these flights.   PMA-3 
dockings were required for installation of the P6 truss and 
the Destiny laboratory.  For these flights the Russian 
ground station communications requirement was changed 
to highly desirable as long as some form of air-to-air         
. 
communication existed between the Mir and shuttle 
crews.  The primary means of moding to free drift was 
automatic, with ISS crew commanding as the second 
method.  The third method was Russian ground 
commanding.  Station-keeping could still be performed if 
Russian ground communications became a requirement.  
In this event the shuttle crew would have flown a timed 
approach.  
 STS-102 (March 2001) was the first flight to fly the 
plus V Bar approach (Figure 20.22) that would be flown 
on all missions to the ISS through the end of the Shuttle 
Program.  Also beginning with STS-102 Russian ground 
station communications coverage was neither required nor 
highly desirable.  Commanding of the ISS attitude control 
system to free drift at docking was performed 
automatically, with ISS crew commanding and Mission 
Control Houston commanding as the backup methods.  
Timed final approach procedures were no longer carried 
on the shuttle.  The ORBT rendezvous profile placed the 
orbiter on the plus R Bar at a range of 600 feet.  A twice 
orbital rate fly-around from the plus R Bar to the plus V 
Bar was performed, followed by the plus V Bar approach 
and docking.  
 In the wake of the Columbia tragedy, options for 
inspecting the thermal protection system on the bottom of 
the orbiters were examined.  For flights to the ISS, one 
option entailed visual and photographic inspection from 
the ISS as the orbiter approached for docking, or during 
the post-undocking fly-around.  The post-undocking 
survey was eventually discarded due to propellant costs, 
procedural complexity for both nominal and off nominal 
(i.e. systems anomalies) scenarios, limited consumables 
remaining to support any required post-redocking EVAs 
for repairs, and the limited time available to assess the 
photographic survey before a decision to re-dock was 
required.  The ISS crew photographed the orbiter through 
windows in the Zvezda Service Module. 
 A 360-degree pitch maneuver after arrival at the 600 
foot point (before docking) on the +R Bar was selected 
(Figures 20.13, 20.23, 20.24).5,15,16  After maneuver 
initiation, the flight control system is placed in free drift 
(no RCS firings) to avoid ISS window contamination and 
plume impingement.  A minimal closing rate at maneuver 
initiation, coupled with +R Bar braking effects protects     
. 
Figure 20.24  Discovery photographed 
from the ISS during the RPM on STS-114 
(July/Aug. 2005). 
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  against an undesirable closing trajectory while the ISS is 
out-of-view of the shuttle crew and relative navigation 
sensors.  A rotation rate of 0.75 degree/second was 
chosen to allow sufficient time for photography, 
minimize propellant usage, and limit trajectory 
dispersions while in free drift.  After maneuver 
completion, a normal twice orbital rate transition from the 
+R Bar to the +V Bar is performed, followed by the 
standard +V Bar approach and docking. 
 The +R Bar tile inspection maneuver was attractive 
since it could be flown with existing hardware, software 
and crew capabilities, and could be certified for 
operational use to support the earliest return to flight.  
Development and certification of the procedure also 
involved consideration of RCS plume loads on the ISS, 
propellant consumption, stability of the orbiter pitch 
rotation in the presence of dispersed attitude, rates, and 
mass properties (pitch is unstable because it is about an 
intermediate axis of inertia), use of ISS windows, ability 
of cameras to provide imagery of sufficient quality, 
orbital lighting, breakout procedures, and procedures for 
handling system anomalies (such as sensor or RCS jet 
failures). 
 A new requirement to perform shuttle thermal 
protection repair at the ISS also drove extensive 
proximity operations analysis and procedure 
development.  The shuttle RMS grapples a fixture on the 
ISS and the shuttle is rotated to an appropriate position 
relative to the ISS for repair.  An ISS attitude was defined 
that would facilitate a safe separation (no undesirable 
contact with or pluming of ISS and Soyuz structure) and 
re-docking in the event a RMS or other failure resulted in 
a contingency separation from the ISS.17 
 In the event an orbiter docked to the ISS had suffered 
thermal protection system damage that could not be 
repaired, an unmanned undocking procedure was 
developed so that the docking port could be cleared for 
another shuttle to pickup the damaged shuttle’s crew and 
bring them home.  The damaged shuttle would be 
deorbited for a South Pacific destructive entry.18 
 
Launch Windows and Mission Planning 
 
 All ground-up rendezvous missions flown by the 
shuttle before the Mir flights were to an orbital 
inclination of ~28.5 degrees.  This provided long launch 
windows since the Earth fixed launch site was near the 
desired orbital plane for several hours.  For example, 
launch windows for HST servicing missions were 
approximately one hour long.  However, the 51.6 degree 
orbital inclination of the Mir station resulted in launch 
windows of 10 to 12 minutes duration.   For steep 
inclinations the launch site approached, passed through, 
and departed the desired orbital plane in a few minutes. 
Launching inside such short windows was considered a 
challenge.  For the initial Mir missions launch was 
targeted to occur at the beginning of the launch window 
to maximize the probability that the shuttle could launch   
. 
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on a given day, even though this required propellant for 
yaw steering during ascent.  
 Shuttle missions to Mir were successfully launched on 
time and confidence in the ability of the shuttles and 
associated ground support systems to support short launch 
windows grew.  Starting with STS-86 (September 1997) 
the practice of targeting launch for the beginning of the 
launch window was changed to targeting launch when the 
targeted orbital plane crossed the launch site, even though 
this decreased the time available in the launch window.  
Launch at this time, called the in-plane time, required 
little or no yaw steering and increased ascent 
performance margin through propellant savings.  Most 
Mir and ISS launches were successfully performed at the 
in-plane launch time.  However, there were exceptions to 
this practice due to other mission planning considerations 
and an unplanned launch hold for STS-110 (April 2002). 
 Mission planning for ISS missions was a complex 
process, with many factors such as ISS logistics, ISS 
hardware maintenance, ISS orbit maintenance, shuttle 
ascent abort, rendezvous and proximity operations 
considerations, and visits of other vehicles (Soyuz, 
Progress, ATV, HTV) to the ISS that must be 
considered.19-20  Ascent propulsion problems (such as an 
early main engine shutdown) could limit the ability of the 
shuttle to fly the planned rendezvous profile (Figure 
20.25).21-22  In coordination with the Russians, 
contingency plans existed for the ISS to lower its orbit. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 The Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) 
recommended that the Shuttle Program obtain 
photography of the orbiter TPS and ET and downlink the 
imagery during the mission to facilitate detection of foam 
shedding and determination of associated risk.  In 
addition to on-orbit inspection with the OBSS and during 
the RPM, this resulted in photography of the shuttle 
during ascent (using ground based cameras and cameras 
mounted on NASA WB-57F aircraft flying at ~60,000 
feet) and External Tank (ET) photography after 
separation.  This in turn led to daylight launch and 
acceptable ET lighting requirements that placed 
constraints on launch windows. 
 Before the Columbia accident lighting constraints 
were not placed on ground-up rendezvous launch 
windows since such constraints would too severely            
. 
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Figure 20.25   Typical ISS Flight Day 3 rendezvous  
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constrain the launch windows.  Crews were trained to fly 
ascent abort and nominal end of mission landings at 
night, if they were required. 
 Motion picture and still cameras had been carried in 
the ET umbilical wells for ET photography well before 
the return to flight, STS-114 (July-August 2005).  For 
STS-114 and subsequent flights the right umbilical well 
film camera was replaced by a digital camera with image 
downlink capability (Figure 20.26).  ET photography was 
also performed after ET separation by a 16 mm motion 
picture camera mounted in the left ET umbilical well of   
. 
Figure 20.26  STS-131 External Tank photo 
taken from the right External Tank umbilical 
well camera (April 2010).   
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the orbiter.  The crew performed ET photography through 
the aft cockpit overhead windows.  The orbiter performed 
+X RCS translation to initiate relative motion that 
ensured a good ET hand-held photo opportunity. 
 SRB cameras that had been carried on some previous 
shuttle missions were reinstated on the SRBs.  A small 
video camera was added to the ET.  It provided 
supplemental imagery to that obtained by the OBSS.  In 
addition, a camera mounted on the ET liquid oxygen 
feedline faring provided real-time video of the underside 
of the orbiter, wing leading edges, and part of the ET.       
This camera system had first flown as a technology 
demonstration on STS-112 (October 2002). 
 The availability of time periods (launch seasons) with 
acceptable launch and post-ET separation lighting 
conditions for photography, as well as on-orbit solar beta 
angle was summarized in a chart (Figure 20.27).*  For 
most missions the absolute value of the solar beta angle 
was restricted to less than 60 degrees for thermal control 
considerations.  For STS-115 and STS-116 the limit was 
50 degrees due to the unique configuration of the ISS        
. 
* This management friendly launch date summary was first 
created by Cindy Oliver at the request of Charles K. Knarr, 
United Space Alliance Vice President of Flight Operations. 
GMT LAUNCH DATES 2006-2007 
LAUNCH DATE SUMMARY 
FOR ISS MISSIONS 
May 4, 2006 C. Oliver/USH-483L 
P. Gentry/USH-483L 
N. Wortham/USH-483L 
Hand-Held Photo 
Composite 8 
(# consecutive days) 
Hand-Held  
ET Photo 6,7 
Umbilical Photo 
Composite 8 
(# consecutive days) 
Umbilical  
ET Photo 6,7 
Daylight 
Launch 3 
|β| < 60  
For Mated Ops4 
|β| < 50  
For Mated Ops5 
1. Inplane launch times based on the March 2006 ISS reference trajectory. 
2. For GMT dates with two launch opportunities 23.5 hours apart, only the second 
launch opportunity is considered (i.e. 6/21/06, 8/19/06, 4/11/07). 
3. Daylight launch protects full 10 minute planar window from sunrise plus 3 
     minutes to sunset minus 3 minutes. 
4. |β| < 60  and |β| < 45  for 9 days of mated ops references the STS-121 FRRR3 
     design.  |β| < 45  protects ISS for inadvertent jet firings. 
5. |β| < 50  for 8 days of mated ops references the STS-1115 OCFR2 A/E design 
(12A and 12A.1 constraint).   
6. Inplane Orbiter and ET ephemerides for image analysis of ET are 
     documented in STF# ADFD-06-020 (Pitch-up at MPS dump + 0 seconds). 
7. ET photo launch date predictions based on lighting analysis from SF/  
    Graphical Research and Analysis Facility (GRAF) lab and KX/ Image  
    Science and Analysis Group which meet requirement set forth by ET  
    project Office per STS-121 FRD version 16 sect. 3.1.a, and 3.1.m.   
    Lighting is only one factor to ensure “good” ET photos. 
8. Composite launch date periods protect daylight launch, |β| < 60  for 
    mated ops, and either Hand-Held ET Photo or Umbilical ET Photo. 
|β| < 45  
For Mated Ops4 
OCT NOV DEC JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP JUN JUL 
7/05 7/23 9/05 9/18 
43 164 45 42 
3/02 3/12 4/27 5/13 6/25 7/10 
40 42 54 55 45 41 
7/05 8/02 9/05 9/26 11/07 11/21 1/05 1/17 3/02 3/20 4/27 5/24 6/25 7/20 
7/01 7/19 8/29 9/13 10/26 10/29 12/23 12/25 
4 3 
2/19 3/05 4/20 5/08 6/19 7/06 
7/01 7/19 9/13 8/29 10/26 11/07 12/23 1/03 2/19 3/05 4/20 5/08 6/19 7/06 
19 14 11 17 16 
19 16 15 19 18 
6/21 7/23 8/19 9/18 10/20 11/15 12/18 1/11 2/13 3/12 4/11 5/13 6/08 7/10 
6/22 8/02 8/18 10/29 11/16 12/25 1/13 5/21 6/09 7/19 
6/24 7/31 8/20 10/27 11/19 12/23 1/15 2/22 3/11 3/25 4/11 5/20 6/11 7/17 
6/25 7/29 8/21 9/01 9/17 10/25 11/20 12/21 1/16 2/20 3/13 3/22 4/13 5/18 6/12 7/15 
Figure 20.27  Lighting chart for launch dates from June 2006 through July 2007. 
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during those missions.  For some missions the limit was 
raised to 65 degrees to gain extra days of launch 
capability.  Raising the limit required special thermal 
analysis for each flight.  This chart was generated every 
three months and provided a summary of launch 
conditions over a 12 month period.  Only the ISS planar 
launch windows which met these lighting conditions were 
acceptable.  This severely restricted launch dates 
available for ISS missions, creating launch seasons.21  
 Missions STS-114 (July-August 2005), STS-121 (July 
2006), and STS-115 (September 2006) required lighted 
launch, ascent, and ET separation that supported 
photography.  Starting with STS-116 (December 2006) 
ET photography lighting no longer drove launch date 
selection but umbilical well and crew hand held 
photography was performed if post ET separation lighting 
conditions permitted.  STS-116 was also the last flight 
that was photographed by the NASA WB-57F during 
ascent.  Starting with STS-123 (March 2008) flash units  
were mounted in the ET left umbilical well of each 
orbiter to ensure that ET photographs could be obtained 
in darkness using the umbilical well cameras.  These 
changes provided the Shuttle Program with more 
flexibility in choosing launch dates and permitted night 
launches.  The first night launch after the STS-114 return 
to flight was STS-116 (8:47 pm EST, December 9, 2006).  
If data such as in Figure 20.27 indicated that lighting 
would not support hand-held photography the crew would 
not perform the procedure.   
 
Rendezvous Systems Failures 
 
 While all shuttle missions with rendezvous and 
proximity operations objectives have successfully 
accomplished these objectives, four missions to the ISS 
encountered failures in systems used during rendezvous 
and proximity operations. Backup procedures and well-
trained crews and Mission Control personnel enabled 
mission success in spite of the failures.  
 
STS-92 Radar Fail 
 
 The STS-92 (October 2000) mission to the ISS 
successfully installed the Zenith Z1 Truss and Pressurized 
Mating Adapter (PMA-3).  PMA-3 was used as the 
docking port for subsequent shuttle missions.  On flight 
day 2 the Ku communications system failed.  This also 
resulted in a failure to acquire and track the ISS with the 
Ku radar during the rendezvous on flight day 3.   
 The pre-Ti burn day light star tracker pass was 
successfully executed.  Post-Ti day and night star tracker 
passes were then performed as a part of the radar fail 
procedure.  The night star tracker pass was ended shortly 
before MC-2 and no star tracker data was taken after MC-
2.   
 The MC-2 burn time-of-ignition slip was large enough 
that MC-2 was burned at the 7 minute late time rather      
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than on elevation angle.  This indicated a short trajectory 
and such a large MC-2 time-of-ignition slip was not 
unusual. 
  At MC-3 plus two minutes the crew checked the 
position of the ISS in the COAS as part of the radar fail 
trajectory correction burn procedure.  Since the shuttle 
orbiter and ISS navigation state vectors are used to point 
the –Z body axis at the ISS the position of the ISS in the 
COAS is an indication of navigation error.  The radar fail 
correction burn was then executed based on ISS position 
in the COAS.  ISS was 6 degrees high in the COAS 
which indicated a short trajectory.  The crew performed 
12 +X Translational Hand Controller pulses that provided 
a delta-velocity of 1.2 feet/second.   
 TCS tracking began near 1700 ft, a lower range than 
normal due to the short trajectory and the geometry of the 
TCS retro-reflectors on the ISS at that time.  TCS data 
indicated that the orbiter was closer to the ISS and closing 
at a higher rate than the crew and MCC previously 
realized.  TCS also confirmed a shorter trajectory than 
expected, requiring extra firings to reach the R-bar, 
including extra Low Z braking while setting up for the 
Twice Orbital Rate R-Bar Approach (TORRA).  The 
minus R Bar approach was nominal. 
 While the rendezvous and docking was successful 
propellant consumption was higher than that expected for 
a radar fail case.  Post-flight analysis indicated that it 
would have been preferable to keep the ISS higher in the 
COAS.  Procedures for controlling ISS motion in the 
COAS were revised and training for misleading sensor 
data cases was improved.  RPOP HHL data incorporation 
was updated to eliminate dependency on radar or TCS 
angles.  
 
STS-128 Vernier RCS Jet Failure 
  
 The mission of STS-128 (August-September 2009) 
was to deliver the Leonardo Multi-Purpose Logistics 
Module and the Lightweight Multi-Purpose Experiment 
Support Structure Carrier to the ISS.  Early on flight day 
one vernier (VERN) RCS jet F5R failed due to a 
propellant leak.  The manifold was isolated and VERN 
jets were considered failed for the rest of the mission.  
This did not impact mission objectives and resulted in the 
first VERN fail rendezvous and docking in the Shuttle 
Program.   
  Propellant margins supported the per-procedure use 
of the Alternate Digital Auto-Pilot (ALT DAP) primary 
RCS jet configuration during the rendezvous until just 
after the MC-4 burn when the orbiter arrived on the +R 
Bar.  The primary DAP RCS jet configuration was used 
for proximity operations and approach, which was 
successful.  A relative attitude fly-out at a 30 foot range 
before docking was not required.  The rendezvous and 
docking were successful with a slight increase in 
propellant consumption over a nominal rendezvous and 
docking using VERN jets.  
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 Normally mated stack attitude control was performed 
with the VERN jets.  However, after docking ISS Russian 
segment thrusters were used to maneuver the mated stack 
to the Torque Equilibrium Attitude but with high 
propellant consumption.  During the mission extensive 
analysis was performed to determine if the ALT DAP 
could be used to maneuver the mated stack to the 
undocking and collision avoidance burn attitudes.  A new 
procedure was developed to maneuver to a retrograde 
collision avoidance burn attitude, if it were required.   
 The ALT DAP was used to maneuver the mated stack 
to the undocking attitude.  ALT DAP was also used for 
undocking and the separation along the +V Bar.  The 
crew transitioned to the primary RCS jet configuration 
once the fly-around range was reached.  The rest of the 
fly-around and separation was flown using this 
configuration. 
 
STS-130 Partial TCS Failure 
 
 The February 2010 mission of STS-130 delivered the 
Tranquility node and its cupola to the ISS.  After the MC-
4 burn the crew noted that TCS range rate measurements 
were noisy.  Normally TCS transitioned from pulse laser 
to continuous wave (CW) laser tracking before arriving 
on the +R Bar.  However, TCS remained mostly in pulse 
mode with only occasional periods of CW tracking.  
Noisy measurements were edited by the TCS filter and 
the resulting range and range rate values were as 
expected.   
 During the TORVA, between the RPM and +V Bar 
arrival, some continuous CW tracking occurred.   It was 
clear that the CW laser was not functioning properly and 
there were jumps in range and range rate.  At a range of 
250 feet on the +V Bar the crew forced the TCS to track 
in CW rather than pulse mode.  Further troubleshooting 
attempts were called off so that the crew and Mission 
Control personnel could focus on completing the 
approach and docking.   
  The HHL was used as the primary source of range 
data for RPOP during the final approach along with 
centerline camera vertical angle measurements until a 
range of 12 feet.  Occasional instances of TCS data 
agreed with HHL data.  It was obvious to the crew and 
ground personnel when CW measurements were bad.  An 
auto-angular fly-out to correct relative attitude miss-
alignment was not required.  At 12 feet the crew 
transitioned to the ranging ruler overlay on a closed 
circuit television screen.  The docking was successful. 
 After docking an investigation determined that an 
electronic tone board in the CW laser was emitting a bad 
bit that resulted in range measurement spikes.  Undocking 
and separation procedures were modified to reflect the 
CW laser failure.  The pulse laser was to be used even 
though it was less accurate and noisier than the CW laser.  
However, HHL had always been the primary sensor 
during fly-arounds since the ISS retro-reflectors do not     
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provide complete coverage of a fly-around.  The 
undocking, fly-around, and separation were successful.  
STS-130 was the first partial TCS fail rendezvous, 
docking, and separation in the Shuttle Program. 
 
STS-131 Radar Failure 
 
 The mission of STS-131 (April 2010) was to deliver 
science equipment and cargo to the ISS using the 
Leonardo Multi-Purpose Logistics Module.  On flight day 
one the Ku system failed in the communications mode 
(TDRSS).  This resulted in the loss of all downlinked 
video, periods of ratty communications over S-Band, and 
loss of shuttle Orbital Communications Adapter 
capability until ISS communications assets were available 
after docking.  Both the crew and Mission Control 
personnel reviewed the radar fail procedures during flight 
day two.   
 On flight day three the Ku radar self-test failed and 
the radar failed to acquire the ISS after the NCC burn.  
Per the radar fail procedure the post-Ti burn day and 
night star tracker passes were performed.  At MC-3 plus 
two minutes the crew checked the position of the ISS in 
the COAS as part of the correction burn procedure. The 
shuttle orbiter and ISS state vectors maintained by shuttle 
on-board relative navigation are used to point the –Z 
body axis at the ISS.  ISS position in the COAS is an 
indication of navigation error.    The crew reported that 
the ISS was dead center in the COAS and exhibited a 
variation of +/-0.5 degrees, presumably due to shuttle 
attitude dead-banding. This indicated that the star tracker 
relative navigation was of high quality, therefore the 
correction burn was not required. The docking was 
nominal and no relative attitude fly-out correction 
maneuver was required at 30 feet.  After docking the 
crew hand transferred to the ISS a hard disk containing 
the flight day two thermal protection system inspection 
imagery.  It was then transmitted to Mission Control 
using the ISS communications system.  STS-131 was the 
second radar fail rendezvous in the Shuttle Program. 
 
STS-132 Procedural Work-Arounds 
 
 On STS-132 (May 2010) Atlantis delivered an 
Integrated Cargo Carrier and the Russian-built Mini 
Research Module to the ISS.  At the beginning of Flight 
Day 3 the crew noted that the Crew Optical Alignment 
Sight (COAS) bulb was burned out.  It was replaced. 
 During the docked phase of the mission the crew 
noted that the primary laptop (RPOP1) used to run the 
Rendezvous and Proximity Operations Program (RPOP) 
had a cracked screen but did not produce debris.  The 
damage was limited to the screen.  The backup laptop 
(RPOP2) was used as the primary RPOP laptop for 
undocking and fly-around.   
 During the docking the Orbiter Docking System 
(ODS) vestibule lights worked properly.  However,           
. 
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before undocking the crew noted that the ODS vestibule 
lights did not turn on, preventing the crew from verifying 
the configuration of the centerline camera by observing 
the docking target on the ISS docking hatch.  The 
vestibule lights could not have been accessed for in-flight 
maintenance unless the docking tunnel was re-pressurized 
and the shuttle docking hatch opened.  This option was 
not desirable from a crew timeline perspective.  The crew 
mounted a LED headlamp on the centerline camera so 
that the camera configuration could be verified.  The 
headlamp was normally used by the crew in the cockpit.  
Later the headlamp was removed part way through the 
fly-around since it partially obscured the camera field of 
view. 
 
STS-135 GPC3 Fail to Synch 
 
 Early on Flight Day 3 the crew was to increase the 
number of flight computers running Guidance, 
Navigation, and Control (GNC) software from one to 
three.  Rendezvous and docking with Mir and ISS was 
normally flown with three GNC flight computers in a 
redundant set.   
 The mode of the GPC was controlled by a three 
position switch whose positions were HALT, STBY 
(stand-by), and RUN.  In the HALT position, the GPC is 
not running software.  In RUN, the GPC is running 
software.  The STBY position act as a go- between and 
either initializes the GPC, or shuts down the GPC 
depending on what the previous mode was (HALT or 
RUN).   
 Before the set expansion General Purpose Computer 1 
(GPC1) was running on-orbit GNC software and GPC4 
was running Systems Management software 
(communications, life support, etc.).  GPC1 and GPC4 
made up what was called the common set.  GPC2 and 
GPC3 were loaded with on-orbit GNC software but were 
in HALT (application software not executing) mode.  
GPC5 contained Backup Flight System (BFS) software in 
HALT mode.  BFS supported ascent, orbit insertion, 
deorbit, entry, and landing.  
 The set expansion involved moding GPC2 and GPC3 
to RUN and joining them to the common set of GPC1 and 
GPC4.  As the crew took GPC3 from HALT to STBY 
there was a moment between the switch positions where 
none of the three discrete from the switch were set.  
When the hardware saw no discrete set it set one of the 
modes.  In this case GPC3 was set to RUN and it began to 
join the common set.  Then the switch reached the STBY 
position and GPC3 saw a transition from RUN to STBY 
and shut down.  GPCs 1, 2, and 4 saw GPC3 momentarily 
join the common set, then saw it leave.  The failure of 
GPC3 to synchronize with the common set resulted in a 
GPC3 fault message.  Since neither the crew nor Mission 
Control had insight to the switch discretes, all they saw 
was the GPC3 fault message, the fact that GPC3 was not 
in the common set, and the GPC3 mode talkback was       
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barberpole (indicating it was not running).  Mission 
Control opted to safe GPC3 and not attempt to recover it. 
 The Mission Control Data Processing System (DPS) 
officer wanted to dump the contents of GPC1 to confirm 
the cause of the GPC3 problem.  However, DPS did not 
want to wait until after docking.  The 2.5 minute dump 
was performed after the NH burn and before the NC-4 
burn. 
 Since a re-Initial Program Load (re-IPL) of a GPC 
could take 20 to 25 minutes, the Flight Director decided 
to execute the rendezvous with two GPCs running GNC 
software, rather than the normal three.  The amount of 
time required to re-IPL GPC3 would negatively impact 
the crew timeline for rendezvous.  If there was a problem 
with one of the two GNC GPCs during the rendezvous 
GPC3 could be re-IPLed.  Due to post-docking robotics 
activity the Flight Activities officer (FAO) preferred that 
the GPC be recovered on the morning of Flight Day 4.  
The GPC3 memory was dumped and re-IPLed on the 
morning of Flight Day 4 and then freeze dried with 
primary deorbit and entry software per normal 
procedures.  Analysis of the dumps and reconstruction of 
the scenario showed that the cause of the issue was the 
switch timing from HALT to STBY which was a known 
and documented condition. 
 The rendezvous and docking with ISS was 
successfully accomplished with only two GPCs executing 
on-orbit GNC software. 
 
STS-135 TRIDAR Relative Sensor Test 
 
 STS-135 was the third flight of the TRIDAR relative 
navigation sensor.  On Flight Day 3 after the NCC burn 
the crew was not able to activate the TRIDAR due to a 
laptop computer communications problem.  The problem 
was isolated to a laptop computer port and Ethernet cable.  
The crew taped the cable and nominal TRIDAR 
activation occurred.  TRIDAR performance during the 
Flight Day 3 rendezvous and docking and the Flight Day 
12 undocking, fly-around, and separation was nominal. 
 
STS-135 Fly-Around and HHL Sensor  
Transfer to the ISS 
 
 The shuttle normally performed a fly-around of the 
ISS after undocking to obtain photography of the ISS for 
engineering purposes.  On STS-135, to obtain 
photographs of parts of the ISS that had not been 
photographed before, the ISS was to perform a 27 minute, 
90 degree yaw maneuver.  The orbiter was to perform 
station-keeping at a range on the +V Bar between 600 
and 700 feet during the start of the ISS attitude maneuver.  
After completion of the yaw maneuver, on Mission 
Control command, the orbiter was to begin a 23 minute 
twice orbital rate half lap fly-around, up through the -R 
Bar and down to the -V Bar.  Nominal undocking was to 
be performed 32 minutes before sunrise to ensure good    
. 
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lighting during station-keeping and for photography 
during the fly-around. 
 The fly-around would be ended by the SEP-1 burn of 
1.5 feet/second radial down executed on the -V Bar.  At 
SEP-1 the ISS was to maneuver back to the standard 
Torque Equilibrium Attitude (TEA).  A 10 foot/second 
SEP-2 burn was to be executed one hour and 50 minutes 
after undocking at a range greater than 6,000 feet, when 
the orbiter was below and in front of the ISS.  STS-135 
was the first time the shuttle performed a fly-around of 
the ISS during an ISS attitude maneuver.  Furthermore, 
the shuttle had never performed station-keeping while the 
ISS was executing an attitude maneuver. 
 Two months before the flight of STS-135 NASA/JSC 
personnel supporting commercial cargo vehicles for the 
ISS suggested that the backup Hand Held Lidar (HHL), 
Night Vision Scope (NVS), and a HHL to Payload 
General Support Computer (PGSC) data cable carried on 
STS-135 be left on the ISS.  This would provide future 
ISS crew members with a sensor for monitoring 
automated or crewed commercial vehicles approaching or 
departing the ISS.  The data cable would enable the HHL 
to send data to situational awareness software used by the 
crew to monitor Visiting Vehicle relative motion.  
Previous HHL transfers had been conducted on STS-127 
(the unit was returned to Earth on STS-131) and STS-
133. 
 Analysis was conducted after STS-135 docking by 
Mission Operations personnel to determine the impacts of 
flying the undocking and half fly-around with only the 
primary HHL.  Normally HHL was the primary sensor     
. 
  
during a fly-around due to gaps in TCS reflector 
coverage.  However, TCS coverage was expected to be 
good after the first 30 degrees of the fly-around.  There 
could be occasional TCS data dropouts of no more that 2 
minutes due to blockage by ISS solar arrays and radiators 
that could cause temporary loss of data or reflector 
swaps, particularly at the beginning and the end of the 
half-lap fly-around. 
 A flight rule governing shuttle sensor requirements 
during proximity operations with the ISS stated that a 
functioning HHL was required to begin a fly-around.  If 
the last functioning HHL failed during a fly-around the 
fly-around was to be aborted and a break-out burn 
performed to take the orbiter safely away from the ISS.  
However, for STS-135 the HHL part of the flight rule 
was waved.  If the sole remaining HHL on-board failed 
during station-keeping or the fly-around, the crew could 
use TCS as the primary sensor.  The TCS in conjunction 
with the rendezvous radar, COAS, centerline camera, and 
payload bay cameras could also be used to maintain a 
range of greater than 600 feet to mitigate shuttle RCS 
plume impact on the ISS. 
 Both the primary and backup HHL units and the NVS 
were checked out during the Flight Day 2 rendezvous 
tools checkout.  Primary HHL performance during the 
Flight Day 3 rendezvous and docking was nominal. 
 Primary HHL performance during the undocking and 
separation on Flight Day 12 was nominal.  TCS 
performance during the fly-around was better than 
expected.   
HISTORY OF SPACE SHUTTLE RENDEZVOUS 
Approved for public release via STI DAA 
24483. See statement on title page. 147  
References 
 
1. Sampaio, C. E., “A Lighting and Visibility 
Evaluation of the Shuttle/Mir Docking Target,” 
Proceedings of the 39th Human Factors and 
Ergonomics Society Annual Meeting, Human Factors 
and Ergonomics Society, Santa Monica, CA, 1995, 
pp. 45-49. 
 
2. Portree, D. S. F., Mir Hardware Heritage, NASA 
Reference Publication 1357, NASA Johnson Space 
Center, March 1995.  
 
3. Clark, F., P. Spehar, H. Hinkel, and J. Brazzel, 
“Laser-Based Relative Navigation and Guidance for 
Space Shuttle Proximity Operations,” Guidance and 
Control 2003, Advances in the Astronautical 
Sciences, Vol. 113, Univelt, San Diego, CA, 2003. 
 
4. Zimpfer, D., and P. Spehar, “STS-71 Shuttle/Mir 
GNC Mission Overview,” Spaceflight Mechanics 
1996, Advances In The Astronautical Sciences, Vol. 
93, Part I, Univelt, San Diego, CA, 1996, pp. 441-
460. 
 
5. Brazzel, J., F. Clark, and P. Spehar, “RPOP 
Enhancements to Support the Space Shuttle R-Bar 
Pitch Maneuver for Tile Inspection,” AIAA 
Guidance, Navigation, and Control Conference, 
AIAA, Reston, VA, 2005. 
 
6. Goodman, J. L., GPS Lessons Learned From The 
ISS, Space Shuttle and X-38, NASA Contractor 
Report NASA/CR-2005-213693, NASA Johnson 
Space Center, November 2005.  See the NASA JSC 
Technical Reports server at 
http://ston.jsc.nasa.gov/collections/TRS/  
 
7. Dagen, J. D., “Structural Integration of the Space 
Shuttle and the Mir Space Station,” Spaceflight 
Mechanics 1996, Advances in the Astronautical 
Sciences, Vol. 93, Part I, Univelt, San Diego, CA, 
1996, pp. 461-471. 
 
 
8. Jackson, M., D. Zimpfer, and J. Lepanto, 
“Identification of Shuttle/Mir Structural Dynamics 
For Notch Filter Tuning,” Spaceflight Mechanics 
1996, Advances in the Astronautical Sciences, Vol. 
93, Part I, Univelt, San Diego, CA, 1996, pp. 493-
509. 
 
9. Zimpfer, D., et al., “Shuttle Stability and Control for 
the STS-71 Shuttle/Mir Mated Configuration,” 
Spaceflight Mechanics 1996, Advances in the 
Astronautical Sciences, Vol. 93, Part I, Univelt, San 
Diego, CA, 1996, pp. 473-492. 
 
  
10. Hall, R., et al., “Flight Control Overview Of STS-88, 
The First Space Station Assembly Flight,” 
Astrodynamics 1999, Advances in the Astronautical 
Sciences, Vol. 103, Part II, Univelt, San Diego, CA, 
1999, pp. 1063-1081. 
 
11. Rochelle, W. C., E. A. Reid, T. L. Carl, R. N. Smith, 
and F. E. Lumpkin III, “Thermal Analysis For 
Orbiter And ISS Plume Impingement On 
International Space Station,” 35th AIAA 
Thermophysics Conference, AIAA, Reston, VA, 
2001. 
 
12. Ghofranian, S., M. S. Schmidt, J. McManamen, J. 
Schliesing, and T. Briscoe, “Space Shuttle Docking 
to Mir Mission-1,” Proceedings of the 
AIAA/ASME/ASCE/AHS/ASC Structures, Structural 
Dynamics and Materials Conference, New Orleans, 
LA, pp. 333-339.  
 
13. Gibson, R. L., and C. J. Precourt, “The First Space 
Shuttle to Mir Docking Mission,” Proceedings of the 
39th Symposium of the Society of Experimental Test 
Pilots, Society of Experimental Test Pilots, 
Lancaster, CA, 1995, pp. 386-419. 
 
14. Gibson, Robert L. “Hoot”, “Pilot Report - How to 
Fly a Space Shuttle Rendezvous and Docking,” 
Aviation Week and Space Technology, Volume 172, 
No. 44, December 6, 2010, pages 66-67. 
 
15. Walker, S., J. LoPresti, M. Schrock, and R. Hall, 
“Space Shuttle Rbar Pitch Maneuver for Thermal 
Protection System Inspection Overview,” AIAA 
Guidance, Navigation, and Control Conference, 
AIAA, Reston, VA, 2005. 
 
16. Jenkins, D. R., and J. R. Frank, Return to Flight: 
Space Shuttle Discovery Photo Scrapbook, Specialty 
Press, North Branch, MN, 2006. 
 
17. Machula, M., “Orbiter Repair Maneuver 
Contingency Separation Methods and Analysis,” 
AIAA Guidance, Navigation, and Control 
Conference, AIAA, Reston, VA, 2005. 
 
18. Bigonesse, R., and W. R. Summa, “Unmanned 
Orbiter Undocking: Method for Disposal of a 
Damaged Space Shuttle Orbiter,” Spaceflight 
Mechanics 2006, Advances In The Astronautical 
Sciences, Univelt, Inc., San Diego, CA. 
 
19. Hale, N. W., and B. A. Conte, “Considerations in 
Rendezvous Launch Window Management,” 53rd 
International Astronautical Congress, International 
Astronautical Federation, Paris, France, 2002. 
 
MIR AND THE INTERNATIONAL SPACE STATION 
Approved for public release via STI DAA 
24483. See statement on title page. 
20. Jones, R., “Architecture In Mission Integration, 
Choreographing Constraints,” 30th International 
Conference on Environmental Systems, Society of 
Automotive Engineers, Warrendale, PA, 2000. 
 
21. Adamo, D. R., “ISS Rendezvous Phasing 
Considerations Pertaining to Optimal STS-114/LF1 
Launch Opportunities,” AIAA Guidance, Navigation, 
and Control Conference, AIAA, Reston, VA, 2005. 
 
148 
22. Adamo, D. R., “Contingency ISS Rendezvous 
Recovery Planning By Houston And Moscow 
Control Centers,” Astrodynamics 1999, Advances in 
the Astronautical Sciences, Vol. 103, Part III, 
Univelt, San Diego, CA, 1999. 
HISTORY OF SPACE SHUTTLE RENDEZVOUS 
Approved for public release via STI DAA 
24483. See statement on title page. 149 
CHAPTER 21 – THE STORRM DTO 
Introduction 
 
 The Orion (also called the Multi-Purpose Crew 
Vehicle, or MPCV) spacecraft required a different 
approach to relative navigation than the shuttle.1-12  Cost, 
available power, and available spacecraft volume 
prevented the use of a rendezvous radar like the shuttle.  
An automated rendezvous and proximity operations 
requirement, coupled with a single crew member piloting 
requirement, called for a more integrated approach to 
relative navigation and proximity operations than the 
shuttle.  Automated docking required measurement of 
relative attitude, a function not performed by the shuttle 
TCS or HHL sensors.  An HHL must be held so that its 
bore-sight is orthogonal to the window pane.  This could 
be done in the shuttle aft cockpit, but the placement and 
design of the Orion crew windows did not permit the use 
of a shuttle type of HHL lidar.   
 After the August 31, 2006 award of the Orion contract 
to the Lockheed Martin team the contractor team 
members and NASA personnel began development of the 
Vision Navigation Sensor, or VNS.  The VNS flash lidar 
was designed to provide range and line-of-sight angle 
measurements to the Orion relative navigation software.  
The nominal range for first measurement incorporation 
was 5 km (16,500 feet).  The VNS also was to provide 
relative attitude  measurements from 15 meters (50 feet) 
through docking.  VNS measurements were to support 
both automated and manually piloted proximity 
operations and docking. 
 
The STORRM DTO 
 
 NASA Johnson Space Center personnel studied the 
lessons learned and experiences of several flight 
programs with relative navigation sensors. Experience 
had shown that it was difficult for a ground test facility to 
duplicate all aspects of the space environment that impact 
relative sensor performance. On-orbit testing may be 
required in addition to ground testing, to subject new 
hardware and software to a wider range of flight 
conditions (particularly on-orbit lighting) than can be 
created in a ground laboratory.   
 To mitigate risk during Orion development NASA 
flew a test of the Orion VNS flash lidar and docking 
camera on the STS-134 Space Shuttle mission (May 
2011) to the ISS.  This test was called the Sensor Test for 
Orion RelNav Risk Mitigation Detailed Test Objective, or 
STORRM DTO.  The objective was to collect data from 
the sensors in the vicinity of the ISS during shuttle 
approach, separation from the ISS, and part of an Orion 
proximity operations approach profile.  Shuttle relative 
navigation data was also collected to serve as a source of 
truth data.13,14 
DTO Hardware 
 
 The prototype VNS and docking camera were 
mounted on the Orbiter Docking System truss next to the 
TCS in the shuttle payload bay.  Commanding and data 
handling was performed using a Payload General Support 
Computer (PGSC) in the shuttle crew cabin that was 
dedicated to the DTO.  The PGSC was networked so that 
it received orbiter flight computer and TCS data.  The 
PGSC display was downlinked to Mission Control via still 
sequential video.  STORRM DTO data was also recorded 
on-board in an avionics package mounted on the payload 
bay side wall and later downlinked to Mission Control.  
The data was analyzed post-flight to assess the 
performance of the VNS and docking camera. 
 
DTO Hardware Testing and installation 
 
 During STS-130 proximity operations (February 
2010) the STORRM DTO team performed a test of the 
DTO laptop computer software in Mission Control.  
Shuttle TCS and orbiter GNC data was provide to DTO 
software on a laptop using the RPOP Windecom data 
cables.  The test was successful. 
 The DTO required that five VNS compatible retro-
reflectors be placed on the ISS docking target used by the 
shuttle.  The VNS retro-reflectors were opaque to the 
shuttle TCS lidar so that the VNS flash lidar would not 
interfere with shuttle relative navigation.  The retro-
reflectors would be visible to the VNS during the +V Bar 
approach and docking on Flight Day 3, and during the 
undocking and +V Bar back-away later in the mission.  
The retro-reflectors would not be visible to the VNS 
during the re-rendezvous after undocking.   
 The STORRM DTO reflective elements kit was taken 
into orbit aboard the shuttle Discovery on mission STS-
131 in April of 2010.  The DTO retro-reflectors were 
installed by Expedition 23 Flight Engineer Soichi 
Noguchi approximately 3.5 hours after docking.  
 
DTO Activities and Rendezvous Profile 
 
 This section provides an overview of the nominal 
STORRM DTO activities and re-rendezvous relative 
motion profile as defined during mission planning. 
 The VNS, docking camera, and associated DTO 
PGSC hardware and software was to be checked out 
during the rendezvous tools checkout on Flight Day 2.  
The rendezvous radar, TCS, HHL, and APAS docking 
ring were also to be checked out at this time.  During the 
shuttle ORBT rendezvous and proximity operations 
approach to the ISS on Flight Day 3 data would be 
collected from the VNS and docking camera.  The crew 
would monitor the DTO PGSC and perform procedures to 
enable the VNS to acquire the ISS by a range of 5 km.   
JSC – 63400 
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Figure 21.1  STORRM DTO relative motion profile.  The 
pre-SEP1 ISS fly-around is not shown.   
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 The remaining STORRM DTO profile consisted of 
six multi-axis RCS burns.  The SEP2 burn was a ground 
targeted NC (phasing) burn targeted for the NSR down-
range value.  NH2 was a ground targeted burn that 
targeted the orbiter for the relative altitude at the NSR 
point.  MC5 was on-board Lambert targeted to correct 
for any trajectory dispersions and ensure that the orbiter 
arrived at the desired relative position for NSR.  The 
MC5 delta-velocity was nominally zero and above the 
minus V Bar for a non-dispersed trajectory.   In a radar 
fail scenario star tracker data would be taken between 
NH2 and NSR. 
 The on-board Lambert targeted burn, NSR, set up a 
coelliptic trajectory and  targeted the vehicle for the TPI 
point.  Since the on-board Lambert software did not have 
a true NSR targeting capability the relative position 
offset targets and transfer time were computed to provide 
a coelliptic transfer.  However, in the presence of   
trajectory dispersions, the NSR to TPI transfer trajectory 
could be non-coelliptic.    Consideration was given to 
using the Mission Control Orbital Maneuver Processor 
(OMP) to target the burn.  OMP had a true coelliptic 
targeting capability.  However, since the previous MC5 
and subsequent MC6 and TPI burns were on-board 
targeted, it was decided to compute NSR on-board to 
maintain consistency in the crew and ground procedures. 
 After NSR, at a range of 6 km, VNS sensor 
acquisition would be initiated.  The Sun was not to be in 
the VNS field of view from 6 km through TPI.  An on-
board Lambert targeted MC6 burn ensured that the 
orbiter arrived at the desired TPI relative position.  TPI 
was on-board targeted using the Lambert elevation angle 
option for the TDA point 330 feet behind and 1,000 feet 
below the ISS.  The TPI elevation angle was 42 degrees 
with no TIG slip limits.  TPI was nominally 3.3 
feet/second, mostly posigrade and with a small radial up 
component. 
 During the DTO the ISS was not to maneuver to the 
docking attitude, nor was it to feather solar arrays.  No 
burn was executed at the TDA point since the orbiter was  
 There were callouts for STORRM DTO procedures in 
the rendezvous Flight Data File (crew procedures).  The 
STORRM crew procedures were approximately 65 pages 
long.  However, the DTO was to be conducted on a non-
interference basis and rendezvous activities would not be 
changed to accommodate resolution of DTO issues.  
STORRM DTO procedure calls from Mission Control  to 
the crew were to be handled through the Assembly and 
Checkout (ACO) officer in Mission Control.  The 
Rendezvous Guidance and Procures Officer (RGPO) and 
associated backroom support would not handle 
STORRM DTO procedures, in accordance with the non-
interference policy.  The VNS and docking camera were 
powered off about 10 minutes after docking.   
 Before removal of the stand-off cross and hatch 
opening the crew would obtain photogrammetry of the 
docking target by photographing it.  DTO data recorded 
on-board during the rendezvous would be transmitted to 
Mission Control for analysis to determine if any DTO 
software parameters needed to be changed to support the 
DTO after orbiter separation from the ISS and the 
subsequent execution of the re-rendezvous profile.   
 On the day before undocking the crew would perform 
STORRM DTO tools checkout at the same time as the 
rendezvous tools checkout.  The crew would again 
perform  photogrammetry of the docking target before 
and after re-installation of the stand-off cross. 
 The VNS, docking camera, and PGSC software were 
powered up by the crew about 30 minutes before 
undocking.  Undocking time was determined by fly-
around and STORRM DTO lighting requirements.  
Undocking was to occur at orbital midnight.    
 Data was to be collected during the fly-around.  
However, the fly-around was only to be conducted if 
enough propellant was available.  SEP1 at the end of the 
fly-around on the +V Bar was the same 1.5 foot/second 
radial up burn executed on ISS missions.  At a range of 
1,000 feet the orbiter would maneuver to a minus Z body 
axis target track attitude to facilitate sensor measurement 
acquisition.    
 Radar data was to be taken from the minus V Bar 
crossing during the fly-around through the SEP3 burn 
plus 20 minutes.  In the event of a rendezvous radar 
failure state vector uplinks were to be performed to 
ensure sufficient relative navigation accuracy so that the 
orbiter minus Z body axis could be accurately pointed at 
the ISS ensuring that the ISS would be in the VNS field 
of view.   
 The post-separation DTO profile was designed to 
match the Orion rendezvous and proximity operations 
profile for ISS missions within 20,000 feet of the ISS 
(Figure 21.1).13  The approach profile flown within 
20,000 feet of the ISS was the current Orion baseline  
profile as of 2010.  The DTO was independent of the 
execution of a post-undocking ISS fly-around by the 
orbiter. 
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not to proceed inside of 600 feet.  Range rate gates were 
included in the crew procedures to ensure that the orbiter 
did not approach inside of 600 feet.  At 15 minutes after 
the TDA point a SEP3 burn would be executed to ensure 
safe relative motion away from the vicinity of the ISS.  
The DTO hardware was to be powered off once a range 
of 6 km was reached during the final departure from the 
ISS. 
 
Contingency Procedures 
 
 Several contingency procedures were developed to 
ensure that the DTO could be conducted in the event of a 
late undocking or a rendezvous radar failure.  
Contingency procedures were verified in mini-
simulations using rendezvous personnel, an RPOP 
laptop, and a shuttle proximity operations simulator on a 
work-station.  These mini-sims were instrumental in 
verifying crew and Mission Control procedures before 
STORRM DTO integrated simulations were held in 
Mission Control. 
 
Late Undocking 
 
 For beta angles from -15 to +15 degrees the DTO 
profile was designed to keep direct sunlight out of the 11 
degree field-of-view of the VNS.  However, the 
possibility of a late undocking could result in violating 
the Sun out of the VNS field-of-view requirement later in 
the DTO profile.  Contingency procedures were devised 
to permit DTO execution with the required lighting 
condition within a range of 6 km of the ISS in the event 
of a delayed undocking.  There was to be no adjustment 
of the on-board Lambert targeted burn (MC5, NSR, 
MC6, TPI) data to accommodate an undocking time slip. 
 If the undocking time slipped by 10 minutes or less 
the delta-velocity of the SEP2 burn would be adjusted to 
keep the TPI TIG at the nominal time and meet the 
lighting requirement.  The SEP2 DV adjustment was a 
continuous curve of increasing SEP2 DV to reduce the 
transfer time between SEP2 and NH2.  The 15 minutes 
gained by adjusting the SEP2 DV was added to the 14 
minute TPI lighting window.  The 10 minute point was 
chosen since the SEP2 DV adjustment after that point 
rapidly increased. 
 After a 10 minute slip the TPI TIG could be slipped 
up to 14 minutes and still preserve appropriate lighting 
for VNS.  A 14 minute TPI burn execution window 
existed that provided appropriate lighting.  The 14 
minute TPI lighting window allowed DTO objectives to 
be met within a range of 6 km of the ISS.  This applied to 
the approach to the ISS as well as after the final SEP3 
burn.  
 If the undocking time slipped beyond 24 minutes 
there was a 5 minute window available in which the 
SEP2 burn delta-velocity could be adjusted to meet the 
lighting requirement.   
 For a slip beyond 29 minutes TPI would be delayed 
one revolution by delaying the time of NH2 burn 
execution.  The post-undocking fly-around could also be 
canceled in the event of a late undocking in order to meet 
the lighting requirement. 
 
Radar Fail 
 
 Procedures were developed so that the DTO could be 
flown in the event of a shuttle rendezvous radar failure.  
In the event of a radar failure TCS and HHL could not 
support shuttle relative navigation required to support on-
board Lambert targeted burns.   Neither TCS nor HHL 
data were processed by the shuttle flight computer 
relative navigation function that provided state vectors to 
Lambert burn targeting.  Furthermore, the short ranges of 
TCS and HHL could not support relative navigation over 
most of the DTO re-rendezvous profile (Figure 21.1). 
 The SEP1 burn delta-velocity was determined pre-
mission and was part of the crew procedures.  State 
vectors improved by filtering TCS measurements would 
be used by Mission Control to target the SEP2 burn.  
However, the short range of TCS meant that it could not 
support targeting of the MC5, MSR, MC6, and TPI 
burns.  Mission Control based orbit determination using 
ground C-band radar and TDRSS data could not be used 
since it took the orbit determination process too long to 
converge on a solution. 
 Outside of TCS range an alternate method was 
needed to provide the shuttle flight computer with state 
vectors accurate enough to support Mission Control burn 
targeting and on-board Lambert burn targeting.  Shuttle 
personnel developed a new navigation technique that 
used shuttle and ISS GPS receiver data to provide orbiter 
and ISS state vectors for shuttle relative navigation 
initialization.  The shuttle was not equipped to perform 
relative GPS navigation with the ISS.15,16  Neither the 
ISS or shuttle orbiter GPS receivers were equipped with 
the necessary filtering algorithms to perform precision 
orbit determination.  However, the Mission Control 
based Spacecraft Position Optimal Tracking (SPOT) 
filter was to be used to improve the shuttle and ISS 
orbital estimates by filtering the on-board shuttle and ISS 
GPS receiver position vectors.  SPOT was certified for 
both shuttle and ISS use in 2008.  SPOT state vectors 
computed in Mission Control would be used to target the 
NH2 burn, or ground targeting of any other burns in a 
contingency, such as a NH Delay or TPI.  The TCS and 
SPOT methods were successfully tested in Mission 
Control during shuttle separations from the ISS on STS-
131 (April 2010), STS-132 (May 2010), and STS-133 
(February-March 2011).   
 Use of star tracker in the event of a radar failure was 
complicated by the close range to the ISS, ISS size and 
brightness that limited star tracker to night passes, and 
the presence of the Earth behind the ISS during potential 
day star tracker passes.  A night star tracker pass could     
. 
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be executed between the NH2 and NSR burns in the 
event of a radar failure (Figure 21.1).  A light on an ISS 
truss would be turned on by the ISS crew to support the 
night star tracker pass.  The Service Module tracking 
light normally available during rendezvous would not be 
visible to the shuttle orbiter during the re-rendezvous.  
However, the crew could be told not to perform the star 
tracker pass if Mission Control had confidence in the 
SPOT data.  If Mission Control did not have confidence 
in either the SPOT vectors or the on-board relative 
navigation state vectors, the TPI burn would not be 
executed.  The coelliptic trajectory would ensure that the 
shuttle would pass below the ISS at a safe distance 
without risk of collision. 
 
Delay Burns 
  
 If undocking were delayed or the fly-around were 
deleted an NH2 delay burn could be computed by 
Mission Control.  An NH2 delay results in the orbiter 
continuing to phase away from the ISS while above the 
minus V Bar.  However, a NH2 Delay could result in 
orbital lighting impacts for the VNS.   
 If shuttle, STORRM DTO, or ISS systems 
performance problems prevented execution of the DTO 
profile, an NSR delay burn would be computed by 
Mission Control and executed by the crew.  An NSR 
delay would result in a relative motion football similar to 
a Ti Delay football.   
 NH2 and NSR delay burns would provide safe 
relative motion from which the DTO profile could be 
resumed when appropriate.  
 
Vernier RCS Jet Failure 
 
 In the event of a Vernier RCS jet failure the crew 
would use the ALT DAP mode of the primary RCS jets. 
 
Orbiter Boom Sensor System 
 
 Shuttle missions after the loss of Columbia performed 
a Flight Day 2 inspection of the Thermal Protection 
System (TPS) to check for TPS damage that occurred 
during ascent.  On ISS missions after undocking and 
separation were complete a late inspection was 
performed to check for TPS damage due to micro-
meteoroid impacts.  Both inspections used the Orbiter 
Boom Sensor System (OBSS) that was grappled and 
maneuvered using the Remote Manipulator System 
(RMS).  Since STS-134 was the next to the last shuttle 
mission the nominal plan was to leave the OBSS on the 
ISS rather than return it to Earth.  There was a possibility 
that the OBSS could not be left on the ISS and could not 
be put in the stowed (Earth return) position in the 
payload bay before undocking.  In this case the orbiter 
would undock with the OBSS in the standard undock       
. 
position, on the RMS and lying across the width of the 
payload bay. 
 However, analysis indicated that this position could 
subject the OBSS to undesirable structural loads while 
the crew executed a burn component in the Z body axis 
direction.  An alternate OBSS and RMS position was 
defined that would protect the OBSS from structural 
loads during the re-rendezvous burns.  This alternate plan 
involved positioning the OBSS vertically above the 
payload bay. 
 
Flight Results 
 
 STS-134 launched on time on Monday, May 16, 
2011, at 7:56 am Central Daylight Time.  This section 
provides highlights of the mission. 
 
Rendezvous and Docking 
 
 On Flight Day 1 the Ku Band antenna was 
successfully deployed and placed in operation for 
TDRSS communications.  The Flight Day 2 centerline 
camera installation and alignment, docking ring 
extension, and rendezvous tools checkout (TCS and 
HHL) were successful.  A successful checkout of the 
STORRM DTO PGSC, VNS, and docking camera was 
also performed.  Docking camera images and raw VNS 
data were obtained. 
 During the on-board targeted phase of rendezvous 
relative navigation (star tracker, radar) and Lambert burn 
targeting performance were nominal.  TCS acquisition 
occurred at a range of 5903 feet.  At a range of 3920 feet 
the crew reported that the TCS and HHL range 
measurements matched.  The TCS transition from pulse 
to Continuous Wave (CW) tracking mode nominally 
occurs at a range of about 950 feet, before the RPM.  
However, the transition did not occur.  Pulse mode loss 
of tracking events occurred at ranges of 1020 feet and 
895 feet.  The crew forced a transition to CW tracking at 
a range of 648.29 feet, after the RPM.  No loss of 
tracking events occurred between this point and docking. 
 On past missions loss of tracking events were 
associated with direct or indirect sunlight on the TCS 
receiver.  However, TCS performance just before loss of 
tracking did not support that scenario.  The loss of 
tracking incidents and difficulty transitioning from pulse 
to CW mode could not be explained.  STS-134 was the 
last flight of the particular unit flown (it last flew on 
STS-126).  The anomalies were judged not to be a 
constraint on use of the TCS as the primary proximity 
operations sensor during the subsequent undocking and 
plus V Bar back-out on STS-134.  HHL was the primary 
sensor during fly-around.  Nor were the STS-134 TCS 
tracking problems judged to impact use of TCS on the 
future STS-135 mission. 
 STORRM DTO performance was outstanding.  The 
VNS automatically detected the ISS at a range of 5.4 km.  
. 
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The docking camera obtained images of the ISS starting 
at a range of 60 km through docking.  A total of 340 
Giga-Bytes of data were collected and later downlinked 
for analysis. 
 
Docked Phase 
 
 On Flight Day 5 the ISS American GPS (SIGI) unit 2 
experienced an unrecoverable hardware failure.  GPS 1 
continued to provide GPS state vector data.  This reduced 
the level of ISS GPS redundancy to support the shuttle 
radar fail procedure during the STORRM DTO on the 
day of undocking.  During the re-rendezvous the Mission 
Control shuttle ground navigator would run SPOT to 
filter shuttle GPS position vectors, while the ISS 
Trajectory Operations Officer (TOPO) would filter ISS 
GPS position data with SPOT. 
 During the docked phase of the mission a STORRM 
checkout procedure revealed a card failure in Data 
Recording Unit 3 (DRU3).  This DRU was used to record 
docking camera data and process commands sent to the 
docking camera.  A high DRU3 temperature and higher 
than expected read/write activity were noted during the 
later part of the Flight Day 3 rendezvous.  This could 
have been an initial indication of the problem but the 
docking camera performed well during the entire 
rendezvous.  The VNS and associated DRU1 performed 
well during the rendezvous and the STORRM checkouts 
during the docked phase.  New procedures were 
developed and sent up to the crew to accommodate the 
DRU3 failure.  The plan was for the crew to power on 
DRU3 about 30 minutes before undocking on Flight Day 
15.  If DRU3 did not recover it and the STORRM 
docking camera would be powered off for the remainder 
of the undock and re-rendezvous. 
 On Flight Day 14 the shuttle rendezvous tools 
checkout was successfully performed.  A STORRM tools 
checkout was not performed out of concern that cycling 
the hardware could damage it.  The hatches between the 
ISS and the orbiter were closed. 
 
Undocking and Re-rendezvous 
 
 On Flight Day 15 the change of shift briefing (Orbit 3 
to Orbit 1) was held for the on-coming flight controllers 
that would oversee the undocking and re-rendezvous.  
The Flight Dynamics Officer (FDO) stated that the 
STORRM DTO burns (SEP-2, NH-2, NSR, TPI, SEP-3) 
had been cleared and there were no potential 
conjunctions with orbiting debris or other spacecraft.  
The Rendezvous Guidance and Procedures Officer 
(RGPO) reported that the undock messages and event 
summaries were sent to the crew on the previous flight 
day by the Orbit 2 shift and the crew had no questions 
after reviewing the transmitted material.  In response to a 
question from the Flight Director the RGPO stated that if 
the rendezvous radar failed and the backup SPOT             
. 
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process did not work as planned, he would ask the ISS 
Communication and Tracking Officer (CATO) to turn on 
the ISS lights so a night star tracker pass could be 
performed between NH-2 and NSR.  The Assembly 
Checkout Officer (ACO) reported that a STORRM 
procedures update was uplinked to crew.  STORRM 
photogrammetric photos were taken by the crew and 
downlinked during the hatch closing yesterday.  From an 
ACO perspective all was go.  The off-going Orbit 3 
Flight Director stated that the Orbit 3 shift was the calm 
before the STORRM. 
 Before undocking the Guidance, Navigation, and 
Control hardware (GNC) officer reported that a good 
IMU alignment had been performed.  The Propellant 
(PROP) officer reported that propellant margins were 
sufficient to support the fly-around.  TCS activation was 
completed, along with undocking mechanism power-up 
and undocking preparation.  When the crew performed 
the STORRM hardware checkout DRU3 failed again.  
Both DRU3 and the STORRM docking camera were 
powered off.  The crew was given a go for undocking.   
 After physical separation flight controllers reported 
that TCS was tracking the ISS and the shuttle was in 
attitude control.  STORRM DTO personnel stated that 
VNS was functioning as expected.  During the backout 
VNS successfully transitioned through the range bins as 
expected.  At a range of 115 feet the crew reported that 
the HHL range and the TCS range measurements 
matched.  Docking mechanism power-down was 
completed on schedule before the fly-around started. 
 As expected the crew performed the plus V Bar 
separation at a slightly higher opening rate than the 
reference profile.  The fly-around was started 2.5 minutes 
ahead of the reference time, but well within the +/-5 
minute limits set to bound trajectory and lighting 
dispersions.  After the minus V Bar crossing the Ku-band 
antenna system was taken from communications mode to 
radar mode and locked on immediately.  The crew 
commanded the processing of rendezvous radar data by 
the orbiter relative navigation Kalman filter.  After the 
plus R Bar crossing a Kalman filter covariance re-
initialization was performed since elevation angle 
measurements were being rejected.  This is expected 
behavior that occurs due to radar wandering over the 
surface of the ISS.  STORRM DTO personnel reported 
that the VNS data recording looked good.  
 The SEP-1 burn was completed.  The covariance was 
re-initialized again due to rejected elevation angle 
measurements.  The FDO reported that the final SEP-2 
burn solution that targeted for the down-track position at 
the NSR burn time was +1.5, 0.0, and 0.0 feet/second 
LVLH.  SEP-2 was successfully performed.  During the 
separation VNS continued to successfully transition 
through the range bins, as expected.  
 One of the periodic fuel cell self-tests failed.  
However, the Electrical Generation and Illumination 
(EGIL) officer reported that all other fuel cell parameters 
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solid performance.  The Mission Control version of the 
Rendezvous and Proximity Operations Program (RPOP) 
that attempts to mimic the onboard version using Orbiter 
and TCS telemetry did not initially accept TCS data.  The 
problem cleared after a few minutes and worked fine 
after that. The onboard RPOP did not experience the 
same problem. 
 Trajectory performance was about as close to the 
nominal mission plan as possible.  The crew did not have 
to execute any braking gates to ensure that the orbiter did 
not approach closer than 600 feet to the ISS.  The crew 
left the flight controller power off.  Based on Mission 
Control RPOP data the closest approach after TPI was 
955 feet. 
 The GNC officer reported that the TCS was running 
hot and may have to be shut down earlier than planned 
during the separation.  Later the GNC officer reported 
that the TCS temperature had dropped a degree and the 
crew needed to take no action.  The temperature trend 
appeared to be leveling off.  STORRM DTO personnel 
reported that the VNS was successfully transitioning 
through the range bins. 
 The ISS maneuvered back to the nominal attitude.  
The SEP-3 burn of -1.0, 0.0, 0.0 feet/second LVLH was 
successfully performed.  This resulted in the orbiter 
phasing away from the ISS at a rate of 9 nm per 
revolution of the Earth.  After SEP-3 the GNC officer 
had the crew deactivate TCS to prevent a possible auto-
shutdown.   
 
Summary 
 
 Separation and re-rendezvous trajectory performance 
was very good with the actual trajectory virtually on top 
of the reference trajectory.  The on-board targeting and 
burns, including the on-board targeted coelliptic burn 
(NSR) and the TPI burn (elevation constraint), all 
worked as planned.  Propellant consumption was at the 
expected values.  The VNS, DRU1, and STORRM 
software performed flawlessly throughout undock, re-
rendezvous and final separation.  The VNS successfully 
transitioned through all range bins.    
 The STORRM DTO team was very happy with VNS 
performance throughout the rendezvous, docking, 
undocking, fly-around, separation, and re-rendezvous.  A 
total of 260 giga-bytes of VNS data were collected 
during the undock and re-rendezvous.  On Flight Day 3 a 
total of 108 giga-bytes of VNS and 230 giga-bytes of 
docking camera data were recorded.  Preliminary 
analysis indicated that the 5 km acquisition range 
requirement for the VNS was achieved on Flight Days 3 
and 15.  In addition, VNS tracked to within 6 feet of the 
ISS.  STS-134 crew member Drew Feustel had 
complimentary words for the STORRM DTO team. 
 Endeavour landed on the first opportunity at the 
Kennedy Space Center on Wednesday, June 1, 2011. 
 
were nominal and a subsequent self-test passed.  EGIL 
reported that personnel were continuing to watch the fuel 
cell.  Radar was performing well and it was reported that 
the MC-5 burn would occur at a range of about 29,000 
feet.  The FDO reported that the final NH-2 burn solution 
was -1.8, 0.0, and 0.0 feet/second LVLH.  NH-2 was 
successfully performed. 
 The Mission Evaluation Room (MER) reported that 
the fuel cell issue was similar to an STS-130 issue with 
the same set of fuel cell hardware.  Paper work had been 
written on the STS-130 anomaly and there was no need 
to bring in people to examine the issue this evening.  A 
total of four fuel cell self-test failures had been seen 
today.  A data take was scheduled for the next day per a 
fuel cell flight rule. 
 The final on-board Lambert targeted MC-5 burn 
solution was 0.1, 0.0, and 0.5 feet/second LVLH.  The 
crew was given a go to burn the final on-board solution.  
MC-5 was successfully performed. 
 The TARGET position reported that the preliminary 
on-board Lambert targeted NSR burn solution looked 
good at -2.5, 0.1, and -0.3 feet/second LVLH.  It was also 
reported that if a NSR delay burn was needed it was a 
no-burn.  In other words, the post MC-5 relative 
trajectory provided the required relative motion for a 
NSR delay.  The crew had entered the STORRM re-
rendezvous phase re-initialization procedure.  VNS had 
transitioned to the furthest range bin and was in stand-by 
mode (at a range of ~30,000 feet).  The ISS had 
maneuvered to the STORRM DTO LVLH attitude of -
3.0, 0.0, and 0.0 degrees pitch/yaw/roll. 
 The final on-board Lambert targeted NSR burn 
solution -2.5, 0.1, 0.0 feet/second LVLH.  The crew was 
given a go to burn the on-board solution.  The NSR burn 
was successfully performed.  The final MC-6 burn 
solution was 0.0, 0.0, and 0.0 feet/second LVLH.  It was 
declared a no burn, indicating excellent trajectory 
performance.  
 STORRM personnel reported that data was being 
recorded at the nominal 15 MB/second rate.  VNS was 
believed to have acquired the ISS at a range of ~16,500 
feet. 
 Mission Control gave the crew a go to perform the 
TPI burn. The crew was advised that during the burn 
TDRSS communications quality between the orbiter and 
Mission Control could be substandard, but TDRSS 
communications quality between ISS and Mission 
Control that also carried orbiter to Mission Control 
communications (called “The Big Loop”) should be 
acceptable.  The final on-board Lambert targeted TPI 
burn solution (targeted on elevation angle) was 0.3, 0.1, 
and -3.4 feet/second LVLH.  The preliminary, 
intermediate, and final TPI burn solutions all had TIG 
slips of 33 seconds early.  TPI was successfully 
performed. 
 TCS acquired at a range of 5,300 feet.  After an initial 
period of ratty data TCS soon locked on and exhibited     
. 
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 Shuttle rendezvous and proximity operations 
technique development was able to respond to new 
program requirements, but the development process was 
not always straight forward.  The success of the Space 
Shuttle in fulfilling new, challenging, and unforeseen 
requirements was due to extensive analysis conducted by 
integrated, interdisciplinary teams; and continuous 
development of new nominal and contingency procedures 
for a vehicle and ground support system that possessed a 
high degree of flexibility.   
 However, the success of shuttle rendezvous and 
proximity operations came at the expense of some of the 
original objectives and goals of the Shuttle Program.  
These included simplified and standardized mission 
planning and training, lower number of mission support 
personnel, high flight rates, elimination of extensive 
flight-to-flight analysis, no computation of flight specific  
. 
trajectory data, and no generation of customized onboard 
charts for each mission.  Successful adaptation of proven 
rendezvous principles to meet new and emerging 
operational and programmatic constraints was in part due 
to the carry over of experienced personnel from the 
shorter duration Gemini and Apollo programs.  Later 
generations of engineers that joined the Shuttle Program 
successfully applied knowledge learned from these 
experienced personnel and their own shuttle experience to 
solving the complex systems integration challenges 
associated with satellite repair missions, Mir docking 
missions, and ISS construction and re-supply missions.  
These personnel possessed extensive experience in the 
development and analysis of vehicle and subsystem 
performance specifications, requirements, and operations 
concepts. 
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CHAPTER 23 - STS-39, THE MOST COMPLEX DEPLOY/RETRIEVE MISSION 
Introduction 
 
 The Space Shuttle flew 16 missions with deployment 
and retrieval mission objectives.  The April/May 1991 
flight of STS-39 was the most complex deploy/retrieve 
mission flown with approximately 38 hours of relative 
motion, rendezvous, and proximity operations.  One 
payload, the SPAS-II satellite (Figure 23.1), was 
deployed and retrieved while three smaller payloads were 
deployed.  Rendezvous, proximity operations, deployed 
satellite commanding by the crew, and numerous 
experiments using the primary and secondary payloads 
required dual shift, 24 hour crew scheduling.  This 
chapter reviews the STS-39 mission objectives, relative 
motion design, mission events, and lessons learned.   
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Another April 1991 mission, STS-37, tested an out-of-
plane star tracker pass technique that was part of the STS-
39 radar fail procedure.  The evolution of the STS-37 
Mid-Range Station-Keeping Detailed Test Objective 
mission plan is covered along with mission performance.   
 
The Mission 
 
 The April/May 1991 flight of STS-39 was the eighth 
dedicated Department of Defense (DOD) mission and the 
first shuttle DOD mission to be flown unclassified.  The 
orbiter Discovery was launched from launch pad 39A into 
a 57 degree inclination, 140 nm circular orbit.  A direct 
insertion was performed (no Orbital Maneuvering System 
1 (OMS-1) burn, just OMS-2).  The primary mission 
objective was to collect visible light, infrared, X-Ray, and 
ultraviolet data on orbiter OMS and primary Reaction 
Control System (RCS) plumes.  In addition, observations  
.  
Figure 23.1  SPAS-II with the IBSS payload. 
of aurora, Earth limb, airglow, chemical and gas releases, 
the orbiter environment, and celestial objects (such as 
galaxies, nebula, and stars) were performed.  Data from 
these observations were used for development of sensors 
and other systems for the Strategic Defense Initiative 
Organization (SDIO).  The two primary payloads were 
the Infrared Background Signature Survey (IBSS) and Air 
Force Program (AFP) 675.  Attached cargo operations 
were performed with the AFP-675 in the payload bay.  
AFP-675 activities included aurora viewing.1  
 Two of the three elements of IBSS were deployable, 
the SPAS-II satellite and the three Chemical Release 
Observation (CRO) sub-satellites.  The third, the Critical 
Ionization Velocity (CIV) experiment, was mounted in 
the payload bay.  Some CRO observation hardware was 
also mounted in the payload bay of Discovery.1 
 The SPAS-II (Figure 23.1) was deployed and later 
retrieved by Discovery.  It was an improved version of 
the SPAS-I flown on STS-7 (Challenger, June 1983) and 
STS-41B (Challenger, February 1984).  SPAS-II could be 
commanded by either the crew or ground.  It carried two 
visible light television cameras, an ultraviolet 
multispectral sensor, and a cryogenically cooled infrared 
sensor.  A large dewar on SPAS-II contained liquid 
Helium used to cool the IBSS infrared sensor.  Precision 
attitude control by SPAS-II was required to support 
experiment observations.  In addition, SPAS-II/IBSS 
activities were conducted with the spacecraft attached to 
and maneuvered by the shuttle Remote Manipulator 
System (RMS) robotic arm.  SPAS-II commanding was 
performed by both the crew and ground personnel.1 
 The CRO experiments were developed to collect 
infrared, visible light, and ultraviolet data of chemicals 
that could be released by spacecraft for obscuration 
purposes.  In addition, the observations were useful for 
characterizing signatures of propellants escaping from 
damaged boosters. Three CRO sub-satellites were 
deployed from the orbiter.  The CRO sub-satellites were 
deployed one at a time to accommodate Vandenberg Air 
Force Base commanded chemical release and viewing 
opportunities.  Two chemical releases were viewed by the 
SPAS-II IBSS payload while it was deployed and the 
third while SPAS-II was on the RMS.  In addition to the 
SPAS-II sensors, observations of the chemical releases 
were also made from Vandenberg Air Force Base and 
from aircraft.1 
 Each CRO sub-satellite was equipped with a chemical 
tank, antennas, an optical beacon, solar cells, and a radar 
reflector mounted on a 5 foot boom.  The CRO sub-
satellites were not equipped with attitude control systems.  
CRO-C was loaded with 15 pounds of nitrogen tetroxide 
(N2O4), CRO-B contained 52 pounds of unsymmetrical 
dimethyl hydrazine (UDMH), and CRO-A had 60 pounds 
of monomethyl hydrazine (MMH).1 
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* If required. 
AFP-675 – Air Force Program 675, CLOUDS-1A – Cloud Logic to Optimize Use of Defense Systems 1A, EV – Extra-Vehicular 
Activity, IBSS – Infrared Background Signature Survey, IVA – Intra-Vehicular Activity, MPEC – Multi-Purpose Experiment 
Canister, MS – Mission Specialist, N/A – Not Applicable, RME – Radiation Monitoring Equipment, RMS – Remote Manipulator 
System, STP-1 – Space Test Payload 1  
Crew Member 
 
Michael L. Coats 
 
Blaine Hammond 
Gregory J. Harbaugh 
Donald R. McMonagle 
Guion S. Bluford 
Charles L. Veach 
Richard J. Hieb 
Role 
 
Commander 
 
Pilot 
MS-1, EV-1* 
MS-2, EV-2* 
MS-3, IVA* 
MS-4 
MS-5 
Team 
 
N/A 
 
Red 
Blue 
Blue 
Blue 
Red 
Red 
Table 23.1  STS-39 Crew 
Responsibilities 
 
Mission decisions, deploy, separation, rendezvous,  
orbiter systems, and detailed test objectives. 
Piloting tasks and orbiter systems. 
IBSS, RMS 
Orbiter systems, piloting tasks, and RME-III. 
AFP-675, STP-1, and MPEC. 
AFP-675 and CLOUDS-1A. 
IBSS and RMS. 
 Space Test Payload-1 (STP-1) and the classified 
Multi-Purpose Experiment Canister (MPEC) were 
secondary payloads.  MPEC was deployed from 
Discovery late in the mission.  It was housed in a Get-
Away Special (GAS) canister in the payload bay. 
 STS-39 was the debut mission of the new IBM AP-
101S General Purpose Computers (GPCs).  These 
computers replaced the original AP-101B GPCs.  The 
AP-101S possessed 2.5 times as much memory and 
provided an up to three times improvement in processing 
speed.  STS-39 was the second flight of primary flight 
software Operational Increment 8F (OI-8F).1 
 
The Crew and Mission Control 
 
 Six of the seven STS-39 crew members were assigned 
to a red team or a blue team.  Each team member worked 
12 hour shifts with 12 hours off duty.  The commander 
was not assigned to a team and was free to adjust his 
work hours as required.  Crew assignments are listed in 
Table 23.1.  Table 23.2 lists the planned major activities 
for each team by flight day.  Figure 23.2 is the Mission 
Control shift schedule for the nominal April 23, 1991 
launch date.  The shift schedule for the actual April 28 
launch was similar.  Figures 23.3, 23.4, and 23.5 are the 
overview timelines illustrating red and blue team 
activities by flight day during the mission.  Note that both 
teams were to be awake for SPAS-II deployment, the 
plume burns, and SPAS-II retrieval.   
 
Flight Plan and Relative Motion Profile 
 
 This section provides an overview of the pre-flight 
mission plan for STS-39, with emphasis on deployed 
payloads (SPAS-II, CRO sub-satellites, and MPEC).  
Topics covered include the launch window, SPAS-II 
detached phase relative motion, the rendezvous radar fail 
. 
profile and procedures, CRO sub-satellite deployments 
and observations, MPEC deploy, and nominal end of 
mission.  Attached payload operations are not covered.   
 
Launch Window 
 
 The launch window open time was driven by a 
daylight Kennedy Space Center (KSC) launch 
requirement (sunrise + 15 minutes).  Launch window 
close was driven by daylight CRO-B observation on orbit 
56 (Flight Day 4) over Vandenberg AFB.  All aborts 
(Return to Launch Site (RTLS), Trans-oceanic Abort 
Landing (TAL), and Abort Once Around (AOA)) were in 
daylight.  The launch window also protected for all 
daylight end of mission descending orbit opportunities for 
the nominal end of mission day and two additional days.  
The launch window provided for a minimum of three 
aurora viewing opportunities on Flight Day 1.  It also 
provided for a minimum of 30 minutes of umbra per orbit 
from orbit 15 through orbit 120.2 
 
SPAS-II Detached Phase Mission Plan 
 
 SPAS-II was to be deployed using the RMS on orbit 
31 (flight day 3) and retrieved with the RMS on orbit 56 
(flight day 4).  The overall planned relative motion profile 
is shown in Figures 23.6 and 23.7.  Table 23.3 contains 
acronym definitions of burns and other planned mission 
events.3 
 The SPAS-II IBSS payload was to observe orbiter 
OMS out-of-plane and RCS plume burns at ranges of 10 
km (5.4 nm, the far field) and 2.25 km (1.2 nm, the near 
field) while the orbiter was trailing SPAS-II on the minus 
V Bar.  The customer requested one plume observation 
several hours before the rest of the plume observations.  
The SPAS-II detached phase was planned to last 
approximately 36 hours.3 
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Flight Day 
 
Flight Day 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Flight Day 2 
 
 
 
Flight Day 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Flight Day 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Flight Day 5 
 
 
Flight Day 6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Flight Day 7 
 
 
Flight Day 8 
 
 
 
 
Flight Day 9 
Red Team 
 
• Ascent  
• Orbit insertion 
• Ku-Band antennae deploy 
• Group B powerdown 
• RMS powerup and checkout 
• Aft controller checkout 
• STP-1 activation 
• AFP-675 init and checkout 
• RME-III activation 
• IBSS checkout 
 
• AFP-675 operations 
 
 
 
• SPAS-II/IBSS release, attitude  
  control checkout 
• Separation to far field (10 km) 
• OMS plume sequence 1 
• Far field station-keeping 
• IBSS operations (Earth scan,  
  Earth limb, CO2 Earth sweep) 
 
 
• Orbiter systems redundant  
  component checkout 
• IBSS experiment operations 
• CIV operations 
• Phase out to rendezvous  
  initiation range 
• CRO-C observation 
• CRO-B deploy 
• SPAS-II/IBSS rendezvous 
• CRO-B observation 
• SPAS-II/IBSS capture 
 
• AFP-675 
 
 
• AFP-675 
• SPAS-II/IBSS checkout 
• SPAS-II/IBSS attached  
  operations 
• CRO-A observation 
• STP-1 operations 
 
• SPAS-II/IBSS in-bay operations 
• AFP-675 
 
• Flight control system checkout 
• AFP-675 operations 
• STP-1 dedicated operations 
 
 
• Payload deactivation 
• Deorbit preparation 
• Entry and landing 
Blue Team 
 
• Ascent  
• Orbit insertion 
• AFP-675 operations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• AFP-675 operations 
• SPAS-II/IBSS predeploy checkout 
• SPAS-II/IBSS grapple, unberth 
 
• Far field OMS plume sequences  
  2 and 3 
• Far field RCS plume sequence 
• IBSS experiment operations 
• CRO-C deploy 
• Transition to near field (2 km) 
• Near field OMS plume sequences  
  4 and 5 
 
• SPAS-II/IBSS berth 
• Orbit adjust for CRO-C avoidance 
• STP-1 operations 
• AFP-675 operations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• AFP-675 
• CRO-A deploy 
 
• SPAS-II/IBSS attached operations 
• CIV operations 
• Orbiter environment 
• SPAS-II/IBSS berth 
 
 
 
• AFP-675 
 
 
• STP-1 dedicated operations 
• AFP-675 deactivation 
• MPEC deploy 
• Cabin stow 
 
• Payload deactivation 
• Deorbit preparation 
• Entry and landing 
Table 23.2  Planned STS-39 Activities By Flight Day 
AFP – Air Force Program, CIV – Critical Ionization Velocity, CRO – Chemical Release Observation, CO2 – Carbon Dioxide, IBSS – 
Infrared Background Signature Survey, km – kilometer, MPEC – Multi-Purpose Experiment Canister, OMS – Orbital Maneuvering 
System, RCS – Reaction Control System, RME – Radiation Monitoring Equipment, SPAS – Shuttle Pallet Satellite, STP – Space Test 
Payload    
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POST LIFTOFF SUPPORT IS AS FOLLOWS (CALL 483-1077 FOR UPDATES): 
STS-39 FLIGHT CONTROL TEAM SCHEDULE 
PRELAUNCH SUPPORT IS AS FOLLOWS (BASED ON APRIL 23 LAUNCH): 
L-2 DAYS (SUNDAY, 4/21/91) 
        1900 CDT              ~L-35 hrs 
 
L-1 DAY (MONDAY, 4/22/91) 
         0430 CDT 
 
 
         0500 CDT 
 
 
         0545 
         (ASAP After SYS Brfg) 
 
         1700 CDT             ~L-13 hrs 
 
L-0 DAY (TUESDAY, 4/23/91) 
         0100 CDT             ~L-5 hrs 
COMM ACTIVATION 
 
 
PRE-BRIEFING 
TEAM TAG UP 
 
L-1 DAY SYSTEMS 
BRIEFING 
 
L-1 DAY WEATHER 
BRIEFING 
 
MCC MANNING 
 
COUNT/LAUNCH 
ORBIT 3 TEAM 
(FD/INCO/GC) 
 
ASCENT TEAM 
 
 
ASCENT TEAM 
 
 
ASCENT TEAM 
 
 
ORBIT 3 TEAM 
 
ASCENT TEAM 
FLIGHT 
DAY 
 
1 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
4 
 
 
 
5 
 
 
 
6 
 
 
 
7 
 
 
 
8 
 
 
 
9 
TEAM 
 
 
ASCENT 
ORBIT 2 
ORBIT 3 
 
ORBIT 1 
ORBIT 2 
ORBIT 3 
 
ORBIT 1 
ORBIT 2 
ORBIT 3 
 
ORBIT 1 
ORBIT 2 
ORBIT 3 
 
ORBIT 1 
ORBIT 2 
ORBIT 3 
 
ORBIT 1 
ORBIT 2 
ORBIT 3 
 
ORBIT 1 
ORBIT 2 
ORBIT 3 
 
ORBIT 1* 
ORBIT 2 
ORBIT 3 
 
ENTRY 
HOURS 
 
 
    8.0 
    8.0 
    9.0 
 
    9.0 
    9.0 
    9.0 
 
  10.0 
  11.0 
  10.5 
 
    8.5 
  10.0 
    9.0 
 
    9.0 
    9.0 
    9.0 
 
    9.0 
    9.0 
    9.0 
 
    9.0 
    9.0 
    9.0 
 
    9.5 
    8.5 
  10.0 
 
MET ON 
 
 
L--5 
0/02:00 
0/09:00 
 
0/17:00 
1/01:00 
1/09:00 
 
1/17:00 
2/02:00 
2/12:00 
 
2/21:30 
3/05:00 
3/14:00 
 
3/22:00 
4/06:00 
4/14:00 
 
4/22:00 
5/06:00 
5/14:00 
 
5/22:00 
6/06:00 
6/14:00 
 
6/22:00 
7/06:30 
7/14:00 
 
7/23:00 
MET OFF 
 
 
0/03:00 
0/10:00 
0/18:00 
 
1/02:00 
1/10:00 
1/18:00 
 
2/03:00 
2/13:00 
2/22:30 
 
3/06:00 
3/15:00 
3/23:00 
 
4/07:00 
4/15:00 
4/23:00 
 
5/07:00 
5/15:00 
5/23:00 
 
6/07:00 
6/15:00 
6/23:00 
 
7/07:30 
7/15:00 
8/00:00 
DAY 
 
 
TU/23 
 
 
 
WE/24 
 
 
 
TH/25 
 
 
 
FR/26 
 
 
 
SA/27 
 
 
 
SU/28 
 
 
 
MO/29 
 
 
 
TU/30 
 
 
 
WE/1 
CDT ON 
 
 
23/0100 
23/0800 
23/1500 
 
23/2300 
24/0700 
24/1500 
 
24/2300 
25/0800 
25/1800 
 
26/0330 
26/1100 
26/2000 
 
27/0400 
27/1200 
27/2000 
 
28/0400 
28/1200 
28/2000 
 
29/0400 
29/1200 
29/2000 
 
30/0400 
30/1230 
30/2000 
 
01/0500 
CDT OFF 
 
 
23/0900 
23/1600 
24/0000 
 
24/0800 
24/1600 
25/0000 
 
25/0900 
25/1900 
26/0430 
 
26/1200 
26/2100 
27/0500 
 
27/1300 
27/2100 
28/0500 
 
28/1300 
28/2100 
29/0500 
 
29/1300 
29/2100 
30/0500 
 
30/1330 
30/2100 
01/0600 
*ENTRY TEAM SUPPORT WILL BE IDENTIFIED BY THE ENTRY FLIGHT DIRECTOR 
Figure 23.2  Mission Control shift schedule for the April 23, 1991 launch date.  Launch actually 
occurred on April 28. 
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Figure 23.3  Original pre-mission overview timeline for flight days 1 through 4.   
A flight day began when the crew woke up.   
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Figure 23.4  Original pre-mission overview timeline for flight days 4 through 7.   
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Figure 23.7  IBSS deploy and separation proximity operations.   
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Figure 23.6  Relative motion during IBSS detached operations and after IBSS retrieval.   
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Event 
 
Launch 
OMS-2 
SEP 
MC1FF 
MC2FF 
NFF0 
TFF1 
MCCF1 
NFF1 
NCSK1 
NCSK2 
TFF2 
MCFF2 
NFF2 
OP1 
NOP1 
MCP1 
VNP1 
OP3 
NOP3 
MCP3 
VNP3 
OP2 
NOP2 
MCP2 
VNP2 
RCSP 
NRCS 
CRO-C 
NCSK3 
NHSK4 
NCCNF 
TNF 
Description 
 
 
Orbit Insertion 
Separation from SPAS 
Mid-Course Correction 1 to Far Field 
Mid-Course Correction 2 to Far Field 
Null at Far Field 0 
Transition to Far Field 1 
Mid-Course Correction to Far Field 1 
Null at Far Field 1 
Phasing/Station-Keeping 1 
Phasing/Station-Keeping 2 
Transition to Far Field 2 
Mid-Course Correction to Far Field 2 
Null at Far Field 2 
OMS Plume Observation 1 
Out-of-Plane Null From Plume 1 
Out-of-Plane Mid-Course From Plume 1 
V Bar Null From Plume 1 
OMS Plume Observation 3 
Out-of-Plane Null From Plume 3 
Out-of-Plane Mid-Course From Plume 3 
V Bar Null From Plume 3 
OMS Plume Observation 2 
Out-of-Plane Null From Plume 2 
Out-of-Plane Mid-Course From Plume 2 
V Bar Null From Plume 2 
RCS Plume Observation 
Null RCS Plume Observation 
Deploy CRO-C 
Phasing/Station-Keeping 3 
Height/Station-Keeping 4 
Corrective Combination for Near Field 
Transition to Near Field 
Event 
 
MC1NF 
MC2NF 
MC3NF 
NNF 
OP4 
NOP4 
MCP4 
VNP4 
OP5 
NOP5 
MCP5 
NSR5 
OPC/NC 
NCSK5 
NOPC 
CRO-B 
NCC 
Ti 
MC1 
MC2 
MC3 
MC4 
Grapple 
HA1 
CIRC1 
CRO-A 
HA2 
CIRC2 
AIS 
UVPI 
MPEC 
SEP 
Deorbit 
Landing 
Description 
 
Mid-Course Correction 1 to Near Field 
Mid-Course Correction 2 to Near Field 
Mid-Course Correction 3 to Near Field 
Null Near Field 
OMS Plume Observation 4 
Out-of-Plane Null From Plume 4 
Out-of-Plane Mid-Course From Plume 4 
V Bar Null From Plume 4 
OMS Plume Observation 5 
Out-of-Plane Null From Plume 5 
Out-of-Plane Mid-Course From Plume 5 
Coelliptic (Slow Rate) 5 
Out-of-Plane and Phasing Correction 
Phasing/Station-Keeping 5 
Null Out-of-Plane 
Deploy CRO-B 
Corrective Combination 
Transition Initiation 
Mid-course Correction 1 
Mid-course Correction 2 
Mid-course Correction 3 
Mid-course Correction 4 
Grapple SPAS 
Height Adjust 1 
Circularization 1 
CRO-A Deploy 
Height Adjust 2 
Circularization 2 
Out-of-Plane Burn 
Orbit Raising 
MPEC Depoy Burn 
Separation from MPEC 
Deorbit burn for KSC Landing 
KSC Landing 
Table 23.3  STS-39 Event Descriptions 
CRO – Extra-Vehicular Activity, KSC – Intra-Vehicular Activity, MPEC – Multi-Purpose Experiment Canister, OMS – Orbital 
Maneuvering System, RCS – Reaction Control System, SPAS – Shuttle Pallet Satellite 
 Rendezvous radar tracking was to be maintained 
throughout the SPAS-II/IBSS detached operations phase 
except during IBSS boresight and radiometric 
calibrations.  The relative motion profile was designed to 
ensure a 20 km (10.8 nm) Payload Interrogator (PI) 
communications range link margin.   
 Figure 23.7 shows orbiter relative motion after SPAS-
II deploy and during separation.  One separation burn was 
planned, a 2.2 foot/second posigrade burn. On-board 
relative navigation and rendezvous radar tracking was to 
be commenced soon after the separation burn.  Figure 
23.8 is a pre-mission plot of planned relative motion from 
separation through arrival at the far field.  Two on-board 
Lambert targeted Mid-course Correction burns (MC1FF 
and MC2FF) were to ensure arrival at the far field with 
low trajectory dispersions.  Once at the far field the           
. 
on-board targeted NFF0 burn was planned to set-up a 
relative motion football.  Ground targeted NCSK1 and 
NCSK2 burns were planned to adjust phasing (or down-
track, Figure 23.9).  The subsequent TFF1 and MCFF1 
burns were to transfer the orbiter from the relative motion 
football back to the far field point for the first OMS 
plume sequence.  NFF1 was a coelliptic (NSR) burn to 
lower orbiter line-of-sight rates as viewed from SPAS for 
the first plume sequence. 
 At the far field three OMS single engine out-of-plane 
plume burns and one RCS plume burn were to be 
conducted for IBSS observation.  The first plume 
sequence (Figure 23.10) consisted of the ground targeted 
OMS plume burn (OP1), followed by the on-board 
targeted out-of-plane null burn (NOP1) designed to return 
the orbiter to the minus V Bar.    
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Figure 23.9  Far field coarse station-keeping, LVC coordinate frame.   
NCSK1 NCSK2 
 Between the OP1 and NOP1 burns the orbiter 
performed a fast flip attitude maneuver of approximately 
180 degrees to achieve the NOP2 burn attitude.  The 
combination of out-of-plane motion and the 
approximately 180 degree attitude maneuver was known 
as the Malarkey Milkshake (see also Figure 23.11).  It 
was named for the developer, STS-39 lead Rendezvous 
Guidance and Procedures Officer John Malarkey. 
 An on-board targeted mid-course correction burn 
(MCP1) was planned to tweak the arrival point on the 
minus V Bar.  VNP1 was an on-board targeted football 
burn executed upon arrival at the minus V Bar.   
 A TFF2-MCFF2-NFF2 burn sequence was then           
. 
planned to set up for the second plume sequence.  These 
three burns performed the same function as the earlier 
TFF1-MCFF1-NFF1 burn sequence.  Execution of the 
second (OP2-NOP2-MCP2-VNP2) and third (OP3-
NOP3-MCP3-VNP3) OMS plume burn sequences 
followed.  An RCS plume burn was planned after the 
third OMS plume burn.  Figure 23.11 illustrates far field 
planned relative motion for the second and third OMS 
plume burns and the RCS plume burn.3 
 Coarse station-keeping was then to be performed at 
the far field with the ground targeted NCSK3 (phasing) 
and NHSK4 (altitude) burns.  Sub-satellite CRO-C 
(N2O4) was to be deployed as well.  Figure 23.12 depicts     
. 
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Figure 23.8  Separation to far field, Local Vertical Curvilinear (LVC) coordinate frame.   
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Figure 23.10  First OMS burn at far field, LVC coordinate frame.   
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Figure 23.11  Second and third OMS burns and RCS plume at Far Field, LVC coordinate frame.   
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far field station-keeping after the far field plume 
observations. 
 The orbiter was then to transition to the 2.25 km (1.2 
nm) near field point for more IBSS observation activities.  
Figure 23.12 depicts the transfer from the far field to the 
near field.  The Transition to Near Field (TNF) burn was 
followed by three mid-course correction burns (MC1NF, 
MC2NF, and MC3NF) to ensure arrival at the near field 
point with small trajectory dispersions.  Upon arrival at    
. 
the near field the on-board targeted NNF burn was 
planned to establish a coelliptic orbit with SPAS-II to 
lower line-of-sight rates for the fourth OMS plume 
sequence (OP4-NOP4-MCP4-VNP4).  A fifth OMS 
plume sequence was also planned (OP5-NOP5-MCP5-
VNP5).  Figure 23.13 depicts planned near field relative 
motion for the fourth and fifth plume sequences.  The 
fifth plume sequence ended with an on-board targeted 
NSR5 to establish a coelliptic trajectory (Figure 23.14).. 
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Figure 23.12  Far field station-keeping and transition to near field, LVC coordinate frame.   
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Figure 23.13  Near field OMS burns, LVC coordinate frame.   
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Figure 23.14  Transition from near field to 14.8 km (8 nm) Ti point followed by rendezvous 
with IBSS, LVC coordinate frame.   
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Figure 23.15  Out-of-plane motion during phasing from near field to Ti point, LVC coordinate 
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 The orbiter was then to phase away from the near 
field to the standard shuttle stable orbit rendezvous 
profile Transition Initiation (Ti) burn point at 8 nm (14.8 
km) on the minus V Bar.  The OPC/NC, NCSK5, and 
NOPC burns were planned to ensure correct phasing and 
out-of-plane relative motion to support the CRO-C 
observation and arrive at the Ti burn point (Figure 23.14).  
Figure 23.15 illustrates planned out-of-plane motion 
during the transfer from the near field to the 8 nm Ti 
point.  The out-of-plane burn component was designed to 
.  
place the orbiter 12 degrees out-of-plane in 1.25 
revolutions to support the CRO-C observation.  The 
CRO-C (N2O4) chemical release was to be observed on 
orbit 51.  Before arriving at the Ti point (8 nm behind 
SPAS-II) the CRO-B (UDMH) sub-satellite was to be 
deployed. 
 The rendezvous with SPAS-II was initiated from the 
Ti burn point.  Nominally Ti was executed 8 nm behind 
the target spacecraft and 1,200 feet above the minus V 
Bar. 
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 A standard set of four Mid-course Correction (MC1, 
MC2, MC3, and MC4) burns followed Ti (Figure 23.14).   
The proximity operations phase for SPAS-II retrieval 
used standard manual piloting techniques and a plus  V 
Bar approach (Figure 23.16) culminating in a grapple of 
SPAS-II by the RMS on orbit 56.  The CRO-B (UDMH) 
sub-satellite chemical release was also to be observed on 
this orbit while the orbiter conducted proximity 
operations leading to SPAS-II retrieval.   
 For CIV activities no dedicated station-keeping burns 
were planned but a slow relative motion opening rate was 
established to support the experiment. 
 
Rendezvous Radar Fail Profile 
 
 A mission plan and crew and ground procedures were 
developed for the rendezvous radar fail case.  It was 
determined that shuttle star tracker angle measurements 
could support relative navigation during the SPAS-II 
deployed phase.  The out-of-plane star tracker technique 
was proven on the earlier STS-37 mission of Atlantis 
(April 1991) using the Gamma Ray Observatory (GRO) 
as a target spacecraft.3, 4, 5 
 The entire radar fail profile could be supported by 
ground tracking.  Expected trajectory dispersions were 
within acceptable limits and the radar fail profile was       
. 
within the SPAS-II PI communications link margin of 20 
km (10.8 nm).3 
 Radar Fail Before SPAS-II Deploy – If the 
rendezvous radar failed before SPAS-II deploy the crew 
would proceed with the SPAS-II deploy and orbiter 
separation to the far field (Figure 23.17).  A 15 
foot/second out-of-plane component would be added to 
the NFF0 burn.  After NFF0 execution a star tracker pass 
would be performed that took advantage of the out-of-
plane relative motion set up by NFF0.  Ten minutes after 
the end of the star tracker pass and before the V Bar 
crossing a Mission Control targeted trajectory correction 
burn would be performed.  This would be followed by the 
on-board targeted TFF1 and MCFF1 burns that were 
designed to return the orbiter to the V Bar.5 
 The NFF1 burn at V Bar arrival would null the out-of-
plane motion.  A plume burn (OP1) would then be 
performed.  However, the NOP1 burn and fast flip 
attitude maneuver (the Malarkey Milkshake) would not 
be performed.  NOP1 was to be followed by a star tracker 
pass.  Half a revolution after OP1 a Mission Control 
targeted phasing burn would be executed to place the 
orbiter at the 8 nm Ti burn point in one revolution.   
Mission Control coarse station-keeping burns would be 
executed as required.3,5 
 If on-board relative navigation performance with only 
. 
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Figure 23.16  IBSS retrieval proximity operations from MC4 + 2 minutes to arrival at grapple range.   
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Event sequence is for an on-time April 23, 1991 launch at 
11:05:00.0 GMT. 
 
1) MET 3/10:31:30.0 – CRO-B (UDMH) beacon on. 
 
2) MET 3/10:38:00.0 – CRO-B fine pointing completed. 
 
3) MET 3/10:39:10.0 – V BAR arrival and CRO-B observation. 
 
4) MET 3/10:41:30.0 – CRO-B beacon off. 
 
5) Switch to Low Z DAP Mode. 
 
6) Switch to NORM Z DAP Mode for final braking. 
 
7) MET 3/11:04:00.0 – Arrive at IBSS grapple range. 
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Figure 23.18  CRO-C relative motion during IBSS 
detached phase.   
star tracker data was good enough the orbiter could phase 
to the 5.4 nm (10 km) far field point and perform the OP2 
and OP3 plume observation burns.  Additional far field 
plume burns could be performed in place of the near field 
plume burns.  At the appropriate time the orbiter would 
phase to the 8 nm Ti burn point to initiate the rendezvous 
with SPAS-II.5 
 Radar Fail During the Far or Near Field – If the 
rendezvous radar failed at the near or far field points a 15 
foot/second out-of-plane burn would be performed.  
Mission Control targeted phasing burns would be 
executed to place the orbiter at the 8 nm Ti burn point.  
Out-of-plane star tracker passes would be performed.5 
 Radar Fail After Initiation of the Transfer to the Near 
Field – If radar fail occurred after the MC1NF and 
MC2NF burns had been successfully targeted and 
executed the orbiter would proceed to the V Bar at the 
near field.  The OP4 plume observation burn would be 
performed.  Ten minutes after OP4 a 2 foot/second           
posigrade phasing burn would be performed to phase the 
orbiter to the 8 nm Ti burn point.  No near field null burns 
or fast flip attitude maneuvers would be performed.  If 
radar fail occurred before MC1NF or a good MC2NF 
burn could not be targeted the crew would perform a 5 
foot/second out-of-plane burn no later than ten minutes 
after the scheduled MC2NF burn time.  Five minutes later 
a 5 foot/second posigrade burn would be performed.  The 
orbiter would phase to the 8 nm Ti burn point.5 
 Radar Fail Before or During the Rendezvous – Radar 
fail procedures for the rendezvous were the same as for a 
standard shuttle radar fail rendezvous.  Star tracker 
measurements would be taken from after Ti until orbital 
sunset between the MC1 and MC2 burns.  The MC3 and 
MC4 burns would not be performed.  The crew would 
perform trajectory control using the target position in the 
Crew Optical Alignment Sight (COAS) and a chart to 
determine range rate corrections.4 
 
. 
CRO Deployments and Observations 
 
 The CRO sub-satellites were to be deployed one at a 
time to meet chemical release viewing and commanding 
requirements by assets located at Vandenberg Air Force 
Base, California.  The CRO-C and CRO-B observations 
were to be performed during the SPAS-II detached phase.  
The CRO-A observation was to be performed after 
SPAS-II retrieval.   
  
Orbit 56 CRO-B 
Observation Orbit  
56 Not to Scale 
Figure 23.19  CRO-B relative motion during IBSS 
detached phase.   
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Figure 23.17  Relative motion during IBSS detached operations for the rendezvous 
radar fail before SPAS-II deploy case.     
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Figure 23.20  Planned MPEC deploy relative motion in 
an orbiter centered LVLH frame over 5 minutes.   
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MPEC retrograde 2.66 
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Figure 23.21  Planned MPEC relative motion over 24 
hours, orbiter centered LVLH frame.   
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 Nominal CRO sub-satellite deploys were scheduled 
on revolution 42 for CRO-C, revolution 53 for CRO-B,    
and revolution 79 for CRO-A.  Nominal observations 
were planned for revolution 51 for CRO-C, revolution 56 
for CRO-B, and revolution 88 for CRO-A.  Figure 23.18 
depicts planned CRO-C relative motion and Figure 23.19 
depicts planned CRO-B relative motion during the SPAS-
II deployed phase. 
 A SPAS-II pointing plan was developed for each 
chemical release observation.  For CRO-B (UDMH) a 
television camera on SPAS-II was used to perform fine 
pointing.  The television signal link margin was weak and 
uncertain when Discovery was near 180 degrees from the 
SPAS-II/IBSS sensor pointing direction.  The exact CRO-
B observation time during the final approach of 
Discovery to SPAS-II (Figure 23.16) was a function of 
orbital lighting during retrieval and the MC-2 Time of 
Ignition (TIG) slip.  The nominal retrieval time could be 
shifted by 10 minutes to accommodate the CRO-B 
observation.  An earlier manual phase shifted the CRO-B 
observation time closer to the +V Bar.  A later manual 
phase shifted the CRO-B observation time in the direction 
of MC-4 (Figure 23.16).  SPAS-II could be rotated by 180 
degrees if Discovery was to be above the +V Bar during 
fine pointing.  The observation was to be attempted even 
if fine pointing could not be performed.  Adequate 
television link margin was assumed to exist between MC-
4 and the +V Bar.   
 CRO sub-satellites required ground tracking until it 
was determined that they no longer presented a re-contact 
hazard for Discovery.  Two burns were planned to avoid 
contact with the empty CRO sub-satellites and to meet 
AFP-675 requirements.  These were a height adjustment 
burn (HA-1) on orbit 57 and a 140 nm circularization 
(CIRC-1) burn on orbit 58. 
 
MPEC Deploy 
 
 MPEC was to be deployed retrograde on orbit 127, 
near the end of the mission.  Deployment was scheduled 
for flight day 8 but could have been deployed earlier in 
the flight due to a contingency.  MPEC was to be ejected  
. 
from the GAS canister with an estimated velocity of 2.7 
feet/second.  Planned MPEC deploy relative motion is 
illustrated in Figure 23.20.  Figure 23.21 depicts MPEC 
relative motion with respect to Discovery over 24 hours. 
 
Nominal End of Mission 
 
 Nominal end of mission was for a descending daylight 
landing at Edwards Air Force Base, California, on orbit 
134.  Mission duration was planned for 8 days, 7 hours, 
and 24 minutes. 
 
Creative Use of Lambert Targeting 
 
 The SPAS-II detached phase involved more on-board 
Lambert targeted burns than any other shuttle rendezvous 
mission.  Table 23.4 lists the Lambert targeting inputs for 
the far field, while Table 23.5 contains the Lambert 
targeting inputs for the near field burns and the 
rendezvous.  A normal rendezvous had only six Lambert 
targeted burns, the six at the bottom of Table 23.5.  For 
STS-39 there were a total of 37 Lambert targeted burns.  
Not all burns performed during the SPAS-II detached 
phase are listed in Tables 23.4 and 23.5 since some were 
targeted by Mission Control.5 
 The first column lists the acronym of the burn name.  
BASETIME was a reference time entered by the crew on 
the ORBIT TGT display (Figure 23.22).  The reference 
time was used by the targeting software with the times in 
the T1 column to compute the Time of Ignition (TIG) for 
each burn.  This provided the ability to easily shift the 
rendezvous sequence in time if mission activities had to 
be re-scheduled.  The crew would simply enter a new 
BASETIME provided by Mission Control into the ORBIT 
TGT display.   
 LVLH X, Y, Z TARGET SET OFFSETS were the 
desired relative position components at the end of the 
transfer expressed in a target spacecraft centered LVLH 
curvilinear (or Local Vertical Curvilinear, or LVC) 
coordinate frame.  This relative aimpoint was converted 
into inertial coordinates by the targeting software since 
the Lambert algorithm computed the required velocity in 
an inertial frame.  TRANSFER TIME was the time in       
. 
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BURN 
 
BASETIME = 1/22:30:00 
SEP 
MC1FF 
MC2FF 
 
BASETIME = 1/22:03:00 
NFF0 (FOOTBALL) 
 
BASETIME = 2/00:55:00 
TFF1 
MCFF1 
NFF1 (NSR) 
 
BASETIME = 2/01:02:00 
OP1 
NOP1 
MCP1 
VNP1 (FOOTBALL) 
 
BASETIME = 2/09:59:00 
TFF2 
MCFF2 
NFF2 (NSR) 
 
BASETIME = 2/10:06:00 
OP2 
NOP2 
MCP2 
VNP2 (NSR) 
 
BASETIME = 2/10:40:00 
OP3 
NOP3 
MCP3 
VNP3 (NSR) 
RCSP 
NRCS (FOOTBALL) 
TARGET 
SET 
 
 
 
20 
21 
 
 
27 
 
 
20 
21 
22 
 
 
 
23 
24 
27 
 
 
20 
21 
22 
 
 
 
23 
24 
25 
 
 
 
23 
24 
25 
 
26 
LVLH X, Y, Z  
TARGET 
OFFSETS (FT) 
 
 
 
-32808, 0, 0 
-32808, 0, 0 
 
 
-32808, 0, 0 
 
 
-32808, 0, 0 
-32808, 0, 0 
-32808, 0, 0 
 
 
 
-32808, 0, 0 
-32808, 0, 0 
-32808, 0, 0 
 
 
-32808, 0, 0 
-32808, 0, 0 
-32808, 0, 0 
 
 
 
-32808, 0, 0 
-32808, 0, 0 
-32808, 0, 0 
 
 
 
-32808, 0, 0 
-32808, 0, 0 
-32808, 0, 0 
 
-32808, 0, 0 
T1 
(MINUTES) 
 
 
 
-60.0 
-20.0 
 
 
+27.0 
 
 
-60.0 
-20.0 
0.0 
 
 
 
+5.0 
+17.0 
+27.0 
 
 
-60.0 
-20.0 
0.0 
 
 
 
+5.0 
+17.0 
+27.0 
 
 
 
+5.0 
+17.0 
+27.0 
 
+34.0 
TRANSFER 
TIME 
MINUTES 
 
 
 
60.0 
20.0 
 
 
22.4 
 
 
60.0 
20.0 
19.0 
 
 
 
22.4 
10.4 
22.4 
 
 
60.0 
20.0 
19.0 
 
 
 
22.4 
10.4 
19.0 
 
 
 
22.4 
10.4 
19.0 
 
22.4 
TIG 
(MET) 
 
 
1/21:00:00 
1/21:30:00 
1/22:10:00 
 
 
1/22:30:00 
 
 
1/23:55:00 
2/00:35:00 
2/00:55:00 
 
 
2/01:02:00 
2/01:07:00 
2/01:19:00 
2/01:29:00 
 
 
2/08:59:00 
2/09:39:00 
2/09:59:00 
 
 
2/10:06:00 
2/10:11:00 
2/10:23:00 
2/10:33:00 
 
 
2/10:40:00 
2/10:45:00 
2/10:57:00 
2/11:07:00 
2/11:14:00 
2/11:14:30 
DV TOTAL 
(FT/SEC) 
 
 
2.2 
0.4 
0.0 
 
 
2.0 
 
 
3.0 
0.0 
2.6 
 
 
16.8 
15.8 
0.0 
5.8 
 
 
0.6 
0.0 
1.2 
 
 
16.8 
15.8 
0.0 
5.7 
 
 
16.8 
15.6 
0.0 
5.8 
3.0 
3.1 
Table 23.4  Targeting Data for Far Field On-Board Targeted Lambert Burns 
minutes from TIG to the arrival at the desired relative 
position.  Finally, each set of Lambert targeting inputs for 
a burn was identified by a TARGET SET number.  This 
number was input by the crew into the ORBIT TGT 
display to designate which burn was to be targeted.6  The 
TIGs and delta-velocity magnitudes listed were based on 
the nominal pre-flight mission design.   
 Observation of orbiter plume burns by the IBSS 
payload on SPAS-II required minimizing the orbiter 
relative motion with respect to SPAS-II.  Ideally the 
orbiter would execute a burn to completely null relative 
motion on the minus V Bar, then perform a plume burn.  
However, due to navigation errors and cross coupling of   
. 
rotational RCS jet firings into translation the orbiter could 
not arrive exactly on the minus V Bar (Figure 23.23).  To 
minimize relative motion in the presence of small altitude 
dispersions rendezvous designers chose to execute either 
a coelliptic (NSR, or Slow Rate) or a football burn before 
each plume burn (Figure 23.24).  In Tables 23.4 and 23.5 
the NSR and football burns are indicated in the BURN 
name column.  Table 23.6 lists the burns designed to 
minimize line-of-sight rates and the corresponding plume 
burns.  This list is based on the actual sequence of the 
burns during the flight. 
 The on-board coelliptic (NSR) burn targeting 
capability was deleted from the shuttle on-board software  
. 
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BURN 
 
BASETIME = 2/19:04:00 
NCCNF 
TNF 
MC1NF 
MC2NF 
MC3NF 
NNF (NSR) 
 
BASETIME = 2/20:31:00 
OP4 
NOP4 
MCP4 
VNP4 (NSR) 
 
BASETIME = 2/21:05:00 
OP5 
NOP5 
MCP5 
NSR5 (NSR) 
 
BASETIME = 3/09:07:04 
NCC 
Ti 
MC1 
MC2 
MC3 
MC4 
TARGET 
SET 
 
 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
 
 
 
35 
36 
37 
 
 
 
38 
39 
40 
 
 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
LVLH X, Y, Z  
TARGET 
OFFSETS (FT) 
 
 
-32808, 0, 0 
-7382, 0, 0 
-7382, 0, 0 
-7382, 0, 0 
-7382, 0, 0 
-7382, 0, 0 
 
 
 
-7382, 0, 0 
-7382, 0, 0 
-7382, 0, 0 
 
 
 
-6562, 0, -400 
-6562, 0, -400 
-6562, 0, -400 
 
 
-48600, 0, -1200 
0, 0, 0 
0, 0, 0 
0, 0, 0 
0, 0, 0 
0, 0, 0 
 
T1 
(MINUTES) 
 
 
56.0 
80.0 
55.0 
30.0 
15.0 
19.0 
 
 
 
22.4 
10.4 
19.0 
 
 
 
22.4 
10.4 
19.0 
 
 
-55.9 
0.0 
19.3 
47.1 
10.0 
20.0 
TRANSFER 
TIME 
MINUTES 
 
 
56.0 
80.0 
55.0 
30.0 
15.0 
19.0 
 
 
 
22.4 
10.4 
19.0 
 
 
 
22.4 
10.4 
19.0 
 
 
55.9 
79.6 
60.3 
32.5 
22.5 
12.5 
TIG 
(MET) 
 
 
2/18:08:00 
2/19:04:00 
2/19:29:00 
2/19:54:00 
2/20:09:00 
2/20:24:00 
 
 
2/20:31:00 
2/20:36:00 
2/20:48:00 
2/20:58:00 
 
 
2/21:05:00 
2/21:10:00 
2/21:22:00 
2/21:32:00 
 
 
3/08:11:10 
3/09:07:04 
3/09:26:22 
3/09:54:10 
3/10:04:10 
3/10:14:10 
DV TOTAL 
(FT/SEC) 
 
 
0.2 
3.2 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
1.7 
 
 
16.8 
15.8 
0.0 
5.7 
 
 
16.8 
15.7 
0.0 
6.1 
 
 
0.9 
3.8 
0.0 
0.1 
0.0 
0.0 
Table 23.5  Targeting Data for Near Field On-Board Targeted Lambert Burns 
requirements in the spring of 1978.7  The on-board 
targeted phase stable orbit profile adopted in April of 
1983 did not use NSR burns, but NSRs were computed by 
Mission Control and executed during the ground targeted 
phase.  For STS-39 there was a desire to compute NSRs 
on-board to provide the crew with more autonomy, less 
reliance on communications with Mission Control, and 
permit timely burn targeting using on-board relative 
navigation state vectors during a phase of flight with a 
complex crew timeline. 
 To avoid modifying the on-board software to target a 
NSR burn a procedure was developed to use the 
Clohessy-Wiltshire equations to modify the trajectory 
constraints input to the Lambert targeting algorithm.  
These modified constraints resulted in a delta-velocity 
that provided a coelliptic transfer.  However, this did not 
involve use of the onboard Clohessy-Wiltshire burn 
targeting algorithm, which was never used during a 
shuttle mission.8 
 The initial and final conditions for the coelliptic 
transfer in the LVLH reference frame are given below 
(see also Figure 23.24).  To simplify the crew procedure 
for modifying the Lambert targeting constraints the final   
. 
down-track position xt was set to the initial down-track 
position x0 plus twice the initial LVLH altitude z0.
8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 The Clohessy-Wiltshire equation for altitude rate (z 
dot) was used to solve for the desired down-track velocity 
(x0 dot) at the start of the transfer.
9 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 An additional expression for the final down-track 
position xf was needed to solve for the transfer time.  This 
was obtained using the Clohessy-Wiltshire equation for 
down-track.9 
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Null Burn 
 
NFF2 
VNP1 
VNP3 
VNP2 
NNF 
VNP4 
Plume Burn 
 
OP1 
OP3 
OP2 
RCSP 
OP4 
OP5 
Table 23.6  Null Burns and Corresponding  
Plume Burns 
Burn Type 
 
NSR 
football 
NSR 
NSR 
NSR 
NSR 
STS-39, THE MOST COMPLEX DEPLOY/RETRIEVE MISSION  
+R Bar 
+V Bar 
Figure 23.24  Since nulling relative motion on the 
minus V Bar before plume burns was not practical, 
coelliptic transfers were targeted on-board to 
minimize relative motion.  The predicted miss distance 
z0 was used to modify Lambert targeting constraints 
and obtain a coelliptic burn delta-velocity. 
zt = z0 
zt = z0 
Dx = 2z0 
Dx = 2z0 
coelliptic 
transfer 
Desired point for 
plume burn. 
+R Bar 
+V Bar 
Figure 23.23  The desired position for performing 
plume burns was on the minus V Bar where relative 
motion could be completely nulled and long-term 
station-keeping established.  However, slight 
trajectory dispersions would prevent nulling relative 
motion for any length of time. 
Dispersed 
position. 
Dispersed 
position. 
Figure 23.22  Results of preliminary NFF2 burn Lambert targeting. 
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 The resulting expression and the pre-defined equation 
for final down-track position were then equated to solve 
for the transfer time.9 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 The value for the transfer time t was ILOADed into 
the Lambert burn target sets for the V Bar Null (VBNx) 
burns.  The crew performed an initial burn computation to 
obtain the predicted values of relative down-track 
position x and altitude z at the burn time (items 7 and 9 in 
Figure 23.22).  These values were then used by the crew 
to modify the LVLH down-track and altitude targets input 
to Lambert targeting (items 18 and 20 in Figure 23.25).  
The resulting delta-velocity from Lambert targeting 
resulted in a coelliptic transfer.  The equations used by     
. 
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the crew in terms of the Orbit Targeting (ORBIT TGT) 
display parameters are shown below.  The slashes do not 
represent division but are part of the parameter names on 
the display (Figures 23.22 and 23.25).4 
 
 
 
 
 
 The Lambert targeting software also did not have the 
ability to target burns that established football (matched 
period) relative motion.  A technique similar in concept to 
the NSR modification of the Lambert position targets was 
used by the crew.  An initial targeting was performed to 
obtain the predicted LVLH altitude z (item 9) of the burn.  
The down-track (V Bar) position target x (item 18) was 
then modified by twice the value of the predicted altitude 
at TIG (Figure 23.26).  Note that the x values at the far 
field and near field were negative, while the altitude 
values could be positive or negative.  The transfer time 
was one quarter of a revolution.  The slashes in the below 
equation used by  the crew do not represent division but 
are part of the parameter names on the display (Figures 
23.22 and 23.25).  The altitude target x was not adjusted.4 
 
 
HZDNRNGXX DDDD /2/
HISTORY OF SPACE SHUTTLE RENDEZVOUS 
Figure 23.25  Results of final NFF2 burn Lambert targeting with adjusted aim point targets 
(items 18 and 20). 
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Plume Sequence and On-Board Burn Targeting 
Example 
 
 Figures 23.22, 23.25, and 23.27 through 23.31 are 
crew displays depicting key events during a simulation of 
the far field OMS Plume 2 (OP2) burn sequence.  The 
displays were generated during Rockwell Space 
Operations Company Level 8 Flight Software testing for 
STS-39.10  Figure 23.22 contains the results of the initial 
computation of the Null Far Field 2 (NFF2) burn.  The 
trajectory was targeted to place the orbiter at the far field 
point on the minus V Bar.  However, results of the             
. 
NFF2  computation indicated an altitude miss of -690 feet 
at the NFF2 burn time (see item 9 on the display).  Figure 
23.25 presents results of the final NFF2 computation 
using X (item 18) and Z (item 20) Lambert targeting 
constraints modified based on the predicted altitude miss 
displayed in Figure 23.22.  This burn was then executed 
to establish a coelliptic trajectory and minimize relative 
motion. 
 Figure 23.27 is the Maneuver Execute (MNVR 
EXEC) display for the next burn, OMS Plume 
Observation 2 (OP2).  This burn was not Lambert 
targeted but used a pre-defined delta-velocity of minus 
16.8 feet/second out of plane (item 20 in the figure).  
MNVR EXEC was used by the crew for all OMS and 
translational primary RCS burns but only the MNVR 
EXEC display for the OP2 burn is shown.  
 Figure 23.28 is the final Lambert targeting 
computation for the next burn, Null OMS Plume 
Observation 2 (NOP2).  This burn targeted the orbiter to 
return to the far field point on the minus V Bar.    Figure 
23.29 presents Lambert burn targeting results for the Out-
of-Plane Mid-Course From Plume 2 (MCP2) burn.  This 
burn served as a mid-course correction to fine tune the 
orbiter arrival at the desired far field minus V Bar point.  
 Figures 23.30 and 23.31 present preliminary and final 
Lambert targeting results for the V Bar Null 2 (VBN2) 
burn.  VBN2 served the same purpose as NFF2, set-up a 
coelliptic trajectory to minimize relative motion.  As with 
NFF2 the predicted altitude at the VBN2 point (item 9 in  
. 
 
STS-39, THE MOST COMPLEX DEPLOY/RETRIEVE MISSION  
Figure 23.26  The crew modified the LVLH x1 (V Bar) 
component of the Lambert aimpoint using the 
predicted altitude z0 and downtrack x0 position of the 
burn (TIG) from an initial burn targeting.  This 
modified aimpoint along with a one quarter revolution 
transfer time resulted in a football relative trajectory. 
+R Bar 
+V Bar 
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x1 = x0 + 2z0 
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Figure 23.27  Maneuver Execute display 4 seconds before the OP2 burn.  Note 16.8 
foot/second out-of-plane delta-velocity. 
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Figure 23.28  Results of final NOP2 burn Lambert targeting. 
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Figure 23.29  Results of final MCP2 burn Lambert targeting. 
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Figure 23.30  Results of preliminary VNP2 burn Lambert targeting. 
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Figure 23.31  Results of final VNP2 burn Lambert targeting with adjusted aim point targets 
(items 18 and 20). 
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Figure 23.30) represents a trajectory dispersion and was 
used to adjust the down-track and altitude Lambert 
targeting constraints in Figure 23.31 (items 18 and 20).  
Once the delta-velocity vector in Figure 23.31 was 
executed a coelliptic trajectory was established. 
 
The Flight 
 
 STS-39 had a very ambitious flight plan.  Some 
unexpected problems occurred, but all mission objectives 
during the SPAS-II deployed phase were accomplished.  
Tables 23.7 and 23.8 provide details for mission events.  
Figure 23.32 is the actual relative motion of the orbiter 
with respect to SPAS-II over an approximately 38 hour 
period. 
 
Launch 
 
 The April 23, 1991 launch was scrubbed due to the 
failure of a transducer in Space Shuttle Main Engine 
(SSME) #3.  Discovery launched from pad 39A on April 
28 at 6:33:14 am CDT.  The launch was delayed by 32 
minutes 14 seconds due to a concern with the OPS-2 data 
recorder.  Ascent and orbit insertion performance were 
nominal.11  
 
Replanning of the SPAS-II Detached Phase 
 
 STS-39 mission activities were planned with exact 
times of execution to meet various experiment, SPAS-II, 
and shuttle orbiter requirements.  The slip in launch time 
required examination of all activities to determine what 
changes needed to be made to the mission timeline. 
 The launch delay resulted in celestial observation 
times that were 2 minutes different than the times 
determined during pre-mission planning.  This was 
judged to be a minor impact.   The IBSS payload had a 
requirement that all plume observation burns occur on a 
whole GMT minute.  However, liftoff did not occur on a 
whole GMT minute.  The Mission Elapsed Time of all 
plume burns was moved 14 seconds early to meet the 
GMT whole minute requirement.12 
 The slip in launch time also impacted the Ti burn 
time.  The time of the Ti burn ensured appropriate orbital 
lighting during proximity operations and grapple of 
SPAS-II.  In addition, ground assets at Vandenberg Air 
Force Base required visibility of both the shuttle and 
CRO-B to support the CRO-B sub-satellite chemical 
release observation.  This event occurred during 
proximity operations before SPAS-II grapple and 
retrieval.  It was desired for the Vandenberg crossing time 
to occur before the orbiter reached the plus V Bar (Figure 
23.16).  This enabled a good communications link 
between the orbiter and SPAS-II to support SPAS-II fine 
pointing for CRO-B observation.  The Ti burn time was 
recomputed to be one hour and 29 minutes before the       
. 
Vandenberg crossing.  This constraint would be applied 
to any subsequent re-planning of Ti, if it were required.12 
 On flight day 2 rendezvous flight controllers were 
informed that the CIRRIS payload was running out of 
cryogen.  A proposal was made to delay SPAS-II 
deployment to provide more time for the CIRRIS activity 
to be completed before the cryogen was depleted.  A 
three hour slip in SPAS-II deploy was judged to be of 
little impact.  However, any slip in the deploy time 
greater than three hours necessitated a 24 hour delay in 
SPAS-II deploy.  The 24 hour slip was agreed to by the 
payload customer.  In addition, attitude and pointing 
personnel recommended that the deployment slip 9 
minutes early (a slightly less than 24 hour slip) to keep 
the celestial target observation times close to the times in 
the current mission plan.12 
 New times for all burns in the rendezvous book were 
re-published that took into account the 24 hour 
deployment delay, an additional 9 minute early slip in 
deployment time, and the 14 second early slip in plume 
burn times.  Orbit designers also re-created the sun angle 
constraint plots for the plume observations.  Rendezvous 
personnel found the entire re-planning task to be 
straightforward.12 
 
SPAS-II Deploy, Separation and Far Field Arrival 
 
 SPAS-II release was on time and the checkout of the 
SPAS-II attitude control system was successful.  At the 
time of release the orbiter was in a 137 by 134 nm orbit.  
The separation burn occurred on time at a MET of 
2/20:51 with a Mission Control confirmed delta-velocity 
magnitude of 2.21 feet/second.  The orbiter maintained an 
inertial attitude hold for 10 minutes and then transitioned 
to a target track attitude.12 
 The MC1FF and MC2FF mid-course correction burns 
were small, indicating good trajectory performance.  
Arrival relative position errors at the NFF0 burn point, 
designed to occur at the desired far field point on the 
minus V Bar, were 40 feet in X LVLH and 60 feet in Z 
LVLH.  The TFF1 burn was executed one hour and 25 
minutes later to transfer the orbiter back to the far field 
point.  The MCFF1 burn was not executed to conserve 
propellant.   
 After the NFF0 burn the SPAS-II attitude reference 
was not accurate enough to support IBSS sensor 
requirements.  The first plume sequence was delayed to 
provide time to resolve the pointing problem.  The NFF1 
burn was ground targeted and executed by the crew.  
NFF1 was designed to return the orbiter to the far field 
point in one orbital revolution to protect for a possible 
one revolution delay in execution of the first plume 
sequence.  Execution of the first plume sequence was 
delayed nine hours due to the time required to resolve the 
SPAS-II attitude pointing problem.  Rendezvous 
personnel in Mission Control replanned the three far field 
. 
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Event 
 
Launch 
 
OMS-2 
SEP 
MC1FF 
MC2FF 
NFF0 
TFF1 
MCCF1 
NFF1 
NCSK1 
NCSK2 
TFF2 
MCFF2 
NFF2 
OP1 
NOP1 
MCP1 
VNP1 
OP3 
NOP3 
MCP3 
VNP3 
OP2 
NOP2 
MCP2 
VNP2 
RCSP 
NRCS 
CRO-C 
NCSK3 
NHSK4 
NCCNF 
TNF 
MC1NF 
PN1 
MC2NF 
MC3NF 
NNF 
OP4 
NOP4 
MCP4 
VNP4 
OP5 
NOP5 
MCP5 
NSR5 
Actual 
Time 
 
118/11:33:14 
 
0/00:36:07 
2/20:51:00 
2/21:21:00 
2/22:01:00 
2/22:21:00 
2/23:45:46 
3/00:25:46 
3/00:45:46 
3/05:00:00 
3/07:20:00 
3/08:49:46 
3/09:31:45 
3/09:49:46 
3/09:56:46 
3/10:01:46 
3/10:13:46 
3/10:23:46 
3/10:30:46 
3/10:35:46 
3/10:47:46 
3/10:57:46 
3/11:04:46 
3/11:09:46 
3/11:21:46 
3/11:31:46 
3/11:38:46 
3/11:39:46 
3/13:55:20 
3/14:29:00 
3/16:45:00 
3/17:58:46 
3/18:54:46 
3/19:19:46 
--- 
3/19:44:46 
3/19:59:46 
3/20:14:46 
3/20:21:46 
3/20:26:46 
3/20:38:46 
3/20:48:46 
3/20:55:46 
3/21:00:46 
3/21:12:46 
3/21:22:46 
Planned 
Time 
 
118/11:05 
 
0/00/38:00 
1/21:00:00 
1/21:30:00 
1/22:10:00 
1/22:30:00 
1/23:55:00 
2/00:35:00 
2/00:55:00 
2/03:45:00 
2/06:25:00 
2/08:59:00 
2/09:39:00 
2/09:59:00 
2/01:02:00 
2/01:07:00 
2/01:19:00 
2/01:29:00 
2/10:40:00 
2/10:45:00 
2/10:57:00 
2/11:07:00 
2/10:06:00 
2/10:11:00 
2/10:23:00 
2/10:33:00 
2/11:14:00 
2/11:14:30 
2/13:57:00 
2/14:19:00 
2/15:04:00 
2/18:08:00 
2/19:04:00 
2/19:29:00 
2/19:40:00 
2/19:54:00 
2/20:09:00 
2/20:24:00 
2/20:31:00 
2/20:36:00 
2/20:48:00 
2/20:58:00 
2/21:05:00 
2/21:10:00 
2/21:22:00 
2/21:32:00 
Actual 
DV 
 
--- 
 
209.5 
2.2 
0.2 
0.7 
2.0 
0.8 
--- 
0.4 
2.6 
3.0 
2.5 
7.5 
--- 
--- 
--- 
0.6 
8.1 
17.0 
15.7 
0.6 
5.9 
17.1 
16.5 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
~4.0 
0.8 
--- 
1.9 
3.2 
1.0 
--- 
1.4 
2.4 
5.1 
17.1 
16.3 
0.4 
5.9 
17.1 
16.6 
0.2 
5.9 
Planned 
DV 
 
--- 
 
209.6 
2.2 
0.2 
0.5 
2.0 
0.9 
2.3 
0.6 
2.6 
3.0 
2.6 
7.5 
3.1 
16.8 
15.9 
0.5 
7.7 
17.0 
16.1 
0.5 
6.1 
17.0 
16.2 
0.1 
6.1 
3.0 
3.0 
3.7 
0.8 
0.3 
1.4 
3.2 
1.1 
--- 
1.5 
2.1 
4.7 
17.0 
16.3 
0.4 
5.9 
17.0 
16.3 
0.4 
6.0 
Remarks 
 
Slipped 32 min 14 sec for OPS recorder  
malfunction 
Ha=139.0, Hp = 137.2 
Delayed 24 hours for CIRRIS OPS 
Executed; w/o MC2FF DV = 2.5 
 
 
 
Not executed.  OP1 delayed. 
Football continued for SPAS pointing error. 
Biased for energy growth. 
Biased for energy growth. 
 
2 min late, large radial component. 
ZOE, not confirmed. 
ZOE, not confirmed. 
ZOE, not confirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Not required, DV < 0.2. 
ZOE, not confirmed. 
ZOE, not confirmed. 
ZOE, not confirmed. 
Deploy spring DVs, tumbled. 
Biased for energy growth. 
Not executed. 
 
 
Large radial component. 
 
Large radial component. 
Large radial component. 
Large radial component. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 23.7  STS-39 Events  
CIRRIS – Cryogenic Infrared Radiance Instrument for Shuttle, CRO – Chemical Release Observation, Ha– Height of apogee, Hp – 
Height of perigee, min – minute, OPS – Operations, sec – seconds, SPAS – Shuttle Pallet Satellite, w/o – without, ZOE – Zone of 
Exclusion, no communication with Mission Control, DV – Delta Velocity 
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Remarks 
 
1.7 ft/sec retrograde. 
Unscheduled pre-mission, posigrade. 
1.0 ft/sec posigrade. 
Deploy spring DV‟s, tumbled. 
2.4 ft/sec retrograde. 
1 hour 29 min before CRO-B observation. 
Not executed. 
27 second late TIG slip. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Executed for loss of CRO-B tracking. 
Executed for loss of CRO-B tracking. 
Deploy spring DV‟s, tumbled. 
Executed per pre-mission design. 
Executed per pre-mission design. 
Not planned pre-mission, burned OOP. 
Not planned pre-mission, orbit raising. 
Posigrade deploy DV. 
Retrograde SEP 
KSC selected, EDW no-go for winds. 
Runway KSC15 
Event 
 
OPC/NC 
NCSK5 
NOPC 
CRO-B 
NCC 
Ti 
MC1 
PN2 
MC2 
MC3 
MC4 
Manual Phase 
V Bar Approach 
Grapple Range 
Grapple 
HA1 
CIRC1 
CRO-A 
HA2 
CIRC2 
AIS 
UVPI 
MPEC 
SEP 
Deorbit 
Landing 
 
Actual 
Time 
 
4/01:32:46 
4/02:10:00 
4/03:46:56 
4/06:30:15 
4/08:03:52 
4/08:59:46 
4/09:19:04 
--- 
4/09:47:19 
4/09:57:19 
4/10:07:19 
--- 
--- 
--- 
4/10:52:00 
4/23:05:35 
4/23:54:20 
5/00:36:46 
5/11:40:00 
5/12:24:52 
7/04:20:00 
7/10:53:29 
7/20:45:00 
7/21:21:21 
8/06:20:20 
8/07:22:22  
(KSC) 
Planned 
Time 
 
3/01:42:00 
 
3/03:56:00 
3/06:46:00 
3/08:11:10 
3/09:07:04 
3/09:26:22 
3/09:42:00 
3/09:54:10 
3/10:04:10 
3/10:14:10 
3/10:16:10 
3/10:39:00 
3/11:04:00 
3/11:11:00 
3/12:30:00 
3/13:15:00 
4/21:15:00 
5/11:30:00 
5/12:15:00 
--- 
--- 
--- 
7/21:10:00 
8/06:24 
8/07:24  
(EDW) 
Actual 
DV 
 
8.2 
1.6 
8.4 
~3.7 
2.5 
3.0 
--- 
--- 
2.1 
--- 
0.3 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
9.2 
9.2 
 
6.2 
6.1 
3.6 
1.2 
--- 
2.9 
257.8 
--- 
Planned 
DV 
 
8.2 
1.5 
8.1 
3.5 
2.3 
2.9 
0.0 
--- 
2.1 
0.0 
0.3 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
9.0 
9.0 
3.3 
6.0 
6.0 
3.6 
1.3 
2.49 
3.0 
257.8 
--- 
Table 23.8  STS-39 Events (continued) 
CRO – Chemical Release Observation, EDW – Edwards Air Force Base, ft/sec – feet/second, KSC – Kennedy Space Center, OOP – 
Out Of Plane, SEP – Separation,  TIG – Time of Ignition, DV – delta velocity,  
OMS plume sequences and supplied the crew with new 
timeline pages. 
 
Far Field Station-Keeping Challenges 
 
 NCSK burns were designed to be small primary RCS 
burns to control orbiter down-track (phasing) position 
relative to SPAS-II.  The NCSK1 burn was delayed one 
revolution to support SPAS-II commanding to regain the 
attitude reference.  The Mission Control targeting of the 
NCSK1 burn was designed to place the orbiter at a point 
10 km (5.4 nm) behind SPAS-II on the minus V Bar for 
the TFF2 burn after a 3 hour 42 minute transfer.  Before 
NCSK1 about half a revolution of ground tracking with 
radars was performed.  Mission Control orbit 
determination indicated a significant increase in orbital 
energy of the shuttle.  As a result the vent value used by 
Mission Control to account for un-modeled accelerations 
in the Mission Control software was increased.  The 
computed NCSK1 burn solution was computed with 
ephemeris data that included the new vent value.  In          
. 
addition, the burn delta-velocity in-plane component was 
biased to account for translational effects from the 
maneuver to and from the NCSK1 burn attitude. 13,14 
 After NCSK1 was performed the predicted trajectory 
was good and it was believed that a subsequent NCSK2 
burn would not be required.  However, later trajectory 
predictions using the latest on-board orbiter and SPAS-II 
state vectors by Mission Control indicated that the orbiter 
would approach to within half a nautical mile of SPAS-II.  
It was also predicted that the TFF2 burn would occur at a 
range of 3.5 nm behind SPAS-II rather than the desired 
5.4 nm.  A burn to correct the trajectory dispersion was 
required before the orbiter reached relative perigee since 
a posigrade burn could result in an even closer approach 
to SPAS-II.     
 The NCSK2 burn was performed 2 hours and 20 
minutes after NCSK1 to correct for the trajectory 
dispersion and to place the orbiter at the desired 10 km 
(5.4 nm) point.  NCSK2 reversed the overall orbiter 
closing rate on SPAS-II.  However, since it was 
performed approximately 1.2 nm below the V Bar it          
. 
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Figure 23.32  Sketch of actual STS-39 relative motion with some burns labeled. 
Near Field  
(1.2 nm) 
Far Field  
(5.4 nm) 
resulted in a large looping trajectory.  The orbiter 
approached to within one nautical mile of SPAS-II, then 
reached a relative apogee about 1.9 nm above the minus 
V Bar (Figure 23.32).  The trajectory then took the orbiter 
to a minus V Bar crossing at about 9.1 nm.  The 
subsequent on-board Lambert targeted TFF2 burn took 
out the opening rate created by NCSK2 and re-established 
the pre-NCSK2 closing rate.12  After the TFF2 burn the 
vent in the Mission Control ephemeris was changed back 
to the original lower value.14  
 After the mission three possible causes of the 
trajectory dispersion were investigated.  The biases added 
to NCSK1 and NCSK2 to account for translational effects 
from the maneuvers to and from the burn attitude were 
found to be accurate.  SPAS-II attitude maneuvers did 
change the atmospheric drag of SPAS-II but the drag was 
relatively high after NCSK1.   SPAS-II orbital energy did 
not grow during this time.  Post flight analysis indicated 
that the increased orbiter vent force value used in the 
Mission Control ephemeris only applied to a short portion 
of the trajectory.  The original lower value of the vent 
force more accurately represented un-modeled 
accelerations before and after that short period.  Use of 
the higher vent force value when the actual vent force 
was lower was found to account for the trajectory  
dispersion after NCSK1.    The granularity of ground 
tracking data made it difficult to determine vent forces 
over short periods of time.14, 15 
 
Far Field Plume Burns 
 
 A problem with SPAS-II pointing delayed the first 
plume sequence at the far field.  The NFF1 burn was 
targeted by Mission Control as a football to place the 
orbiter at the 10 km point in 2.5 hours.  The OP1 plume 
sequence was delayed until the next set of plume 
sequences.16 
 Shortly after TFF2 the radar broke lock on SPAS-II 
and then re-acquired it.  The crew inhibited radar 
measurements and Mission Control monitored the radar 
data.  The data was good and measurement processing by 
relative navigation was resumed.  However, noisy radar 
angle residuals were noted during the maneuver to the 
next plume burn attitude.  The noisy angle measurements 
did not negatively impact the quality of the relative 
navigation solution.12 
 Before the intermediate on-board Lambert targeting 
solution for MCFF2, the radar broke lock on SPAS-II.  
The crew inhibited radar measurement processing.  The 
radar then went through several loss of tracking and re-
acquisition cycles.  Measurement data during tracking 
looked good and the intermediate on-board MCFF2 burn 
solution compared favorably with the Mission Control 
Flight Dynamics Officer solution based on ground 
tracking.  This gave rendezvous personnel confidence in 
the on-board relative navigation solution in spite of the 
radar break tracks.  The radar also passed a self test.  The 
.  
STS-39, THE MOST COMPLEX DEPLOY/RETRIEVE MISSION  
Approved for public release via STI DAA 
24483. See statement on title page. 188  
Instrumentation and Communications Officer (INCO) 
noted that the radar range switch was in the minimum or 
low power position.  This could have explained the break 
locks around the time of the TFF2 burn.  The rendezvous 
radar was switched to AUTO and immediately re-
acquired SPAS-II. 12 
 Due to the large size of the MCFF2 delta-velocity and 
since radar measurements had not been processed for a 
while the crew was asked to delay the MCFF2 burn and 
take additional radar data.  During the maneuver to the 
burn attitude radar angle measurements were intentionally 
not processed.  However, the radar broke lock again; 
indicating that the previous minimum power setting did 
not cause the previous loss of tracking incidents.12 
 Due to the busy crew timeline Mission Control told 
the crew to burn the intermediate MCFF2 burn solution 
and not compute a final burn solution.  Normally on-
board Lambert targeted burns were executed using 
Lambert cyclic guidance that closed the loop on the 
trajectory.  However, after the intermediate burn targeting 
the crew selected the OMS engine on the MNVR EXEC 
display due to the large size of the burn.  This action 
changed the burn to external delta velocity guidance, per 
software requirements.  Since the crew had been 
instructed not to perform the final Lambert targeting to 
save time, MCFF2 was performed open loop with respect 
to the trajectory.  Performing the final Lambert targeting 
would have reset the burn guidance to closed loop 
Lambert.12 
 At the end of the post MCFF2 transfer the error in the 
arrival point was -2,500 feet in X LVLH and -2,000 feet 
in Z LVLH.  Factors that caused this position error were 
1) executing the burn two minutes late with open-loop 
(with respect to the trajectory) external delta velocity 
guidance, 2) a burn attitude error of 8 degrees, and 3) the 
intermediate on-board burn solution could not have taken 
into account translational delta-velocity imparted by the 
subsequent maneuver to burn attitude (performing the 
final targeting would have accounted for the maneuver to 
burn attitude).  Although both external delta velocity and 
Lambert cyclic guidance account for sensed IMU delta-
velocity during the burn, use of Lambert cyclic guidance 
(closed loop with respect to the trajectory) would have 
improved relative trajectory performance under these 
conditions. 12 
 The NFF2, OP1, and NOP1 burns were performed 
without communication with Mission Control due to gaps 
in communications coverage.  The crew reported that the 
OP1 and NOP1 burns were successful, including SPAS-II 
pointing and data collection.  In addition, a playback of 
telemetry data at this time showed that the previous 
minimum power setting of the radar had been selected 
after the radar loss of tracking incidents.  This proved that 
the low power setting was not the cause of the 
intermittent loss of tracking.  The OP3 plume sequence 
was also successful.  The OP2 plume sequence trajectory  
. 
performance was good enough that the MCP2 trajectory 
correction burn was not performed.12  The plume 
sequences went well and the crew reported that SPAS-II 
data collection during the plume burns was successful.  
The primary RCS (PRCS) plume burn and associated null 
burn (NRCS) were performed during a time when 
Mission Control was not in communication with the 
orbiter due to a gap in communications coverage. 
 CRO-C was successfully deployed after the far field 
plume sequences were complete. 
 In preparation for the orbiter transition to the near 
field the rendezvous team, Mission Control flight 
directors, and Mission Operations Directorate 
management met to review far field relative trajectory 
performance.  The on-board Lambert targeted burns 
(transfer times less than one revolution) provided better 
trajectory control than ground targeted station-keeping 
burns designed to control relative motion over several 
revolutions.  If the trend in predicted relative motion 
became undesirable a burn could be executed to correct 
the trend.  The Mission Control team and the crew did not 
have to commit to the transfer to the near field until TNF 
burn execution.  If trajectory control after TNF became an 
issue a breakout procedure could be executed by the 
crew. 
 The NCSK3 burn (phasing adjustment) was ground 
targeted and designed to place the orbiter at the far field 
point for the TNF burn.  Subsequent far field station-
keeping trajectory performance was good enough that the 
NHSK4 burn (altitude adjustment) was not performed.   
 SPAS-II was visible to the crew typically between 
orbital noon and orbital sunset.  The attitude of SPAS-II 
was difficult to determine with binoculars at a range of 5 
nm (the far field).   
 
Transition to the Near Field 
 
 The NCCNF and TNF burns were performed to 
initiate the transfer to the near field point (Figure 23.12).  
The mid-course corrections burns had increasing radial 
(plus Z LVLH) delta-velocity components, indicating a 
force pushing the orbiter trajectory up and away from 
SPAS-II.  The orbiter arrived close to the near field aim-
point, 110 feet short in X LVLH and 310 feet high in Z 
LVLH. 12 
 
Near Field Plume Sequences 
 
 The OP4 and OP5 OMS plume sequences went 
smoothly with good trajectory performance.   After the 
fifth plume observation sequence (at the near field) was 
complete the NSR5 burn was executed to start football 
(matched period) relative motion.  However, due to 
orbital energy growth the football trajectory was 
transformed into a trajectory with an opening rate.  
Down-range displacement from SPAS-II increased with   
. 
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each revolution.  During this period the rendezvous radar 
went through several loss of lock and re-acquisition 
cycles.   
 The crew subsequently maneuvered to the CIV 
observation attitude.  The orbiter was phasing away from 
SPAS-II and the observations were performed at ranges 
of between 12,000 feet and 15,000 feet.  Orbiter range to 
SPAS-II was greater than desired for the CIV experiment 
but the payload customer did not want orbiter propellant 
expended to change the relative motion.12 
 
Transition to Rendezvous and the CRO-B Deploy 
 
 The OPC/NC burn was executed at a range from 
SPAS-II of approximately 5 nm.  The burn was targeted 
by the Mission Control Flight Dynamics Officer so that 
the orbiter would reach the 8 nm Ti burn point in 5 
revolutions.  In addition, the out-of-plane burn component 
was designed to place the orbiter 12 degrees out-of-plane 
in 1.25 revolutions to support the CRO-C observation.  At 
the end of the burn there was a large -0.7 foot/second 
delta-velocity residual in the orbiter Z body axis.  The 
residual was not trimmed to avoid waking sleeping crew 
members with forward primary RCS jet firings.   
 Post OPC/NC trajectory predictions indicated a 
closing rate with SPAS-II and a potential intercept in 2 
revolutions.  To avoid an intercept trajectory the 
unscheduled NCSK5 burn was targeted by Mission 
Control and executed by the crew.  The unplanned 
NCSK5 burn was executed 40 minutes after OPC/NC to 
correct the trajectory and establish a relative motion 
football.  The resulting relative motion was as desired.  
NOPC was executed one revolution later to null out-of-
plane velocity and ensure a 3.5 revolution transfer to the 8 
nm Ti point.15  Mission Control asked the crew to trim the 
delta-velocity residuals on this burn to ensure good 
trajectory performance.12 
 Post flight analysis indicated that a -0.43 foot/second 
OPC/NC over-burn contributed to the undesired closing 
rate.  However, this did not completely account for the all 
of the undesired relative motion.  Post flight analysis also 
indicated a need for better target spacecraft attitude 
timeline knowledge and more insight into the exact nature 
of the SPAS-II helium vent.  Another possible factor 
included uncertainty in orbiter vent force modeling.15, 17 
 CRO-B was scheduled for deployment approximately 
two hours after NOPC.  The radar experienced several 
break locks and the orbiter relative navigation software 
Kalman filter rejected 6 range measurements before the 
deploy.  Just before the CRO-B deploy the radar was 
unable to track SPAS-II.  After CRO-B deploy the radar 
tracked CRO-B for short periods and lost lock.   
 
Rendezvous With SPAS-II 
 
 Due to poor radar performance the Mission Control 
rendezvous team changed the relative sensor plan for the  
. 
rendezvous with SPAS-II.  The radar mode was changed 
from GPC Acquisition to GPC Designate which was not 
dependent on radar angle tracking.  This mode of radar 
operation was used for most of the retrieval.  However, 
use of GPC Designate resulted in no radar angle data 
being made available to the relative navigation filter.  Star 
tracker angle measurements would be processed in 
parallel with radar range and range rate when orbital 
lighting permitted a star tracker pass.  Before the NCC 
burn the radar was able to track SPAS-II in the GPC 
Designate mode.  The NCC burn was successfully 
performed.12 
 After NCC Mission Control supplied the crew with a 
procedure to fix a problem with the payload bay camera 
angle digital data.  This data would be used to support a 
back-up ranging technique during proximity operations in 
the event of a rendezvous radar failure.  The 
recommended fix was to power cycle the cameras.12 
 After the Ti burn was completed to initiate the 
rendezvous with SPAS-II a star tracker pass was 
performed.  The star tracker shutter remained closed since 
the Earth horizon was within 16 degrees of the star 
tracker bright object sensor (which was mounted on the 
star tracker light shade and pointed along the star tracker 
bore sight).  The shutter later opened just before Mission 
Control was to ask the crew to open the shutter manually.  
Relative navigation performance during the star tracker 
pass was good.  Small navigation errors at Ti and the 
processing of star tracker line-of-sight angle data instead 
of radar angles after Ti led to a small MC1 burn solution 
that was not executed.18  This indicated good trajectory 
performance.  The star tracker pass ended before orbital 
sunset and the radar lost lock and then re-acquired SPAS-
II.  The MC-3 and MC-4 burn solutions were small, but 
they were executed by the crew.12 
 
Final Approach and Grapple of SPAS-II  
 
 Although the radar experienced periods of loss of 
tracking and there were periods of noisy state vectors 
during the SPAS-II detached phase there was confidence 
in radar quality during the rendezvous (Figures 23.14 and 
23.16).  Crew plotting of mid-course correction burn 
locations and relative motion during proximity operations 
on polar graph paper indicated a nominal approach 
trajectory. 
 During the rendezvous sub-tended angle ranging 
charts provided accurate backup range estimates (Figure 
23.33).  However, these range estimates were not 
continuously performed due to the nominal rendezvous 
trajectory.  Ranging ruler overlays on the Closed Circuit 
Television (CCTV) camera screen were not useful during 
proximity operations (Figure 23.16) due to CCTV camera 
blooming caused by sunlight reflected by SPAS-II.  Both 
automatic and manual control of the camera iris did not 
improve the image.    Within a range of 200 feet image 
blooming was not a problem.  This was likely due to the   
. 
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SPAS-II being backlit by the sun at this point, rather than 
reflecting sunlight directly into the orbiter CCTV 
cameras.  By a range of 200 feet out-the-window 
observations of the SPAS-II above the payload bay 
provided better situational awareness than the CCTV 
cameras.  However, the proximity operations phase would 
have been very challenging had a rendezvous radar 
failure occurred along with the loss of backup ranging 
rulers due to CCTV camera blooming.*   
 The laptop computer Payload Bay (PLBAY) program 
was used occasionally during proximity operations to 
estimate range using crew entered CCTV payload bay 
camera angle data.  PLBAY was a precursor of the later 
RPOP program.  However, range estimates were not 
accurate outside of 250 feet, most likely due to 
inaccuracy in the camera angle encoders.  Heavy crew 
workload inside a range of 250 feet prevented continual 
range determination using the PLBAY program.12 
 As the orbiter approached the manual phase (post 
MC-4, proximity operations) the radar frequently lost 
lock on SPAS-II.  The crew changed the radar modes 
between GPC and AUTO TRACK several times in 
attempts to track SPAS-II.  During tracking the range and 
range rate measurements were becoming increasingly 
noisy.  However, trajectory performance during the 
manual piloting phase was excellent.12 
 During the manual phase the crew acquired the CRO-
B beacon with the camera on SPAS-II.  SPAS-II pointing 
was accomplished and the CRO-B chemical release 
observation was successful.  The orbiter arrived on the 
plus V Bar at approximately the 200 foot point.  The crew 
. 
did not place the flight control system in the LOW Z         
(minimum plume impingement) mode since the 
propellant remaining was below the LOW Z red line.   
The radar broke lock inside of 200 feet and the crew 
transitioned the antenna to the communications mode.  
This permitted Mission Control to observe video of the 
final approach and grapple of SPAS-II by the RMS.12   
 During final approach the RMS grapple fixture on 
SPAS-II was visible by a range of 200 feet.  SPAS-II was 
successfully grappled two minutes before orbital sunset.  
Had grapple been delayed the payload bay floodlights 
would have provided sufficient lighting for grapple 
during orbital night.  The plus V Bar approach and 
grapple phase lasted about 15 minutes.  SPAS-II was 
grappled with the RMS after approximately 38 hours of 
free flight. 12 
 
Post Grapple Activities 
 
 Difficulty in tracking the CRO-B and CRO-C sub-
satellites after the chemical releases resulted in 
uncertainty about their orbits.  While SPAS-II was 
berthed in the payload bay an orbital altitude adjust burn 
and a circularization burn was computed by Mission 
Control and performed by the crew to avoid potential 
contact with the empty CRO sub-satellites.  The 
posigrade MPEC deployment was successful.  
 
Return to Earth 
 
 Discovery landed on KSC runway 15 on May 6, 1991, 
after a flight of 8 days, 7 hours, 23 minutes, and 17 
seconds.11 
 
STS-39 Flight Experience Summary 
 
 This section provides a summary of the STS-39 
SPAS-II detached phase. 
  
* The later introduction of the Rendezvous and Proximity 
Operations Program (RPOP), Hand Held Lidar (HHL), and 
Trajectory Control Sensor (TCS, another lidar) improved crew 
situational awareness during proximity operations and provided 
better sensor redundancy. 
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 SPAS-II deployed activities began with SPAS-II 
deploy on flight day 4 at a Mission Elapsed Time (MET) 
of 2/20:51 (days, hours, minutes, seconds) and ended with 
SPAS-II grapple on flight day 5 at MET 4/10:52.  The 
three far field and two near field plume observation 
sequences were successfully completed.  A total of 16 
OMS burns and 41 RCS translational burns were 
performed.  The OMS-2 (orbit insertion) and deorbit 
burns used both OMS engines.  The remaining 14 were 
seven right OMS burns and seven left OMS burns.  RMS 
performance throughout the flight was nominal.11, 12, 13 
 Requirements – Relative motion and rendezvous 
design was driven by constraints not normally associated 
with relative motion trajectories.  These included dual 
shift crew operation, ground site visibility to deployed 
payloads, on-orbit lighting for experiments, ensuring an 
adequate communications link between the orbiter and 
SPAS-II, and other attached payload requirements. 
 Replanning of the SPAS-II Detached Phase – High 
cryogenic use by the CIRRIS payload resulted in a delay 
of SPAS-II deployment by 24 hours.  This enabled 
completion of CIRRIS activities before cryogen 
depletion.  This also delayed the first OMS plume 
sequence until after the first crew sleep period following 
SPAS-II deployment.  The delay had no impact on the 
relative motion trajectories.11  Re-planning of burn times 
was also required to accommodate the slip in the launch 
time.  Resolution of a SPAS-II attitude pointing problem 
resulted in a delay of the first far field plume sequence of 
nine hours.  This necessitated replanning of all three far 
field OMS plume sequences.   
 Station-Keeping Challenges – Trajectory dispersions 
during the Mission Control targeted coarse station-
keeping phase were higher than expected.  This was 
attributed to inaccuracies in long-term state vector 
prediction due to uncertainties in orbiter and SPAS-II 
unmodeled accelerations.19  The poor performance of 
ground targeted station-keeping burns raised a concern 
about the ability of the Shuttle Program to perform close-
range station-keeping at the relatively low orbital altitude 
of approximately 140 nm.12 
 Propellant Consumption – Forward RCS propellant 
consumption predictions were close to actual 
consumption.  Aft RCS propellant consumption 
predictions were over 1,000 pounds low.  However, 
mission planners considered the propellant budget to be 
good even with the unexpected relative trajectory control 
difficulties.16 
 Lambert Targeting – On-board Lambert burn 
targeting compared well with Mission Control burn 
targeting that was performed in parallel.  In addition, on-
board targeting of coelliptic and football (matched period) 
burns using crew modification of Lambert targeting 
trajectory constraints worked well.  However, computing 
these burns required more crew training and more crew 
time during the flight.20  These null burns at the far             
. 
Figure 23.34  Orbiter line-of-sight rates after null 
burns as seen from SPAS-II.   
RELATIVE LINE-OF-SIGHT ANGLES 
(SPAS-TO-ORBITER) 
CURVES BEGIN AT END OF INDICATED 
BURNS & MARKED EVERY 3 MIN. 
RATES ARE SPECIFIED NEAR 
BURN NAMES IN DEG/MIN 
AZIMUTH (DEG) 
(POSITIVE NORTH) 
E
L
E
V
A
T
IO
N
 (
D
E
G
) 
(P
O
S
IT
IV
E
 U
P
) 
-0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 
-1.0 
0.0 
1.0 
2.0 
3.0 
4.0 
NFF2 
0.02 
NFF 
0.22 
VNP4 
0.09 
VNP1 
0.06 
VNP3 
0.05 
VNP2 
0.02 
and near fields successfully minimized relative motion 
and met requirements of the IBSS payload on SPAS-II.  
Line-of-sight control was better than expected (Figure 
23.34).  Re-pointing of SPAS-II to facilitate plume 
observation was not required.16  Energy growth observed 
during the SPAS-II deployed phase had little impact on 
trajectory performance when on-board targeted burns 
were executed.  This was believed to be due to short 
transfer times and the use of on-board targeted mid-
course correction burns.20 
 Rendezvous Radar – Rendezvous radar performance 
during the far and near field plume sequences was good.  
Occasional radar data drop outs introduced noise into the 
orbiter state vector.  However, the relative navigation 
filter mitigated the noise impact over time and few burns 
were targeted with noisy state vectors.  The frequency of 
loss of tracking incidences increased during the final 
approach to SPAS-II grapple.  Occurrences of rendezvous 
radar loss of tracking during the manual piloting phase 
complicated the piloting task.  During periods of loss of 
lock and reacquisition range rate data became noisy.  
However, a nominal approach trajectory mitigated the 
impact of poor radar performance.  Some of the 
occurrences of radar tracking loss were believed to be due 
to SPAS-II attitude maneuvers and weak returned signal 
strength. 18, 20 
 CRO and MPEC Deployments – All three CRO sub-
satellite deployments and chemical release observations 
were successful.  Each of the CRO sub-satellites tumbled 
after deployment.  CRO-C and CRO-B chemical releases 
occurred approximately 94.6 nm down-range and 43 nm 
down-range respectively from SPAS-II.  The CRO-A 
chemical release occurred approximately 69 nm down-
range from the orbiter.  Delta-velocities from CRO-C and 
. 
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CRO-A chemical releases were higher than predicted.   
Uncertainty in CRO sub-satellite orbit estimates drove the 
execution of two burns to ensure the sub-satellites would 
not come near the orbiter.  The MPEC deployment was 
also successful. 
 
STS-39 Lessons Learned 
 
 Successful execution of the STS-39 flight plan was 
due in part to extensive pre-mission planning and analysis 
by experienced personnel.   
 The STS-39 mission stressed the difficulty and 
importance of determining vent force values to account 
for un-modeled accelerations that cause trajectory 
perturbations.  Not all sources of orbital acceleration can 
be mathematically modeled in a straightforward manner, 
such as gravity can be.  Hardware design and operation of 
vents on spacecraft must be investigated and understood.  
Sources of chaser and target spacecraft un-modeled 
accelerations that can cause orbital energy growth 
include, but are not limited to, cross coupling of rotational 
jet firings into translation, and vents.  Long attitude holds 
during ground tracking can be useful for determining 
accurate vent force values through precision orbit 
determination.  However, vent force value determination 
requires long periods of attitude hold without rotational 
and translational burns.   
 Accurate knowledge of target spacecraft attitude with 
respect to time (also known as an attitude timeline) as 
well as vent forces is useful for accurate target orbit 
determination and trajectory prediction.  Accurate 
understanding of attitude maneuver cross coupling into 
translation and resulting trajectory dispersions is 
necessary.15 
 During long-range station-keeping while within 
relative sensor range the use of on-board targeted burns 
and short transfer times (less than 60 minutes) proved 
useful for mitigating trajectory dispersions resulting from 
vent and atmospheric drag (spacecraft attitude) 
uncertainties.15 
 At that time (April/May 1991) relative motion was 
hand plotted on polar graph paper and transmitted to a 
large screen in Mission Control using closed circuit 
television.  Plotters, also called “Mr. Hand” (their hands 
frequently showed up on the closed circuit television 
image), provided valuable situational awareness for 
Mission Control personnel during the SPAS-II deployed 
phase.  However, more rapid relative motion graphics 
using computer displays were highly desirable.  The later 
introduction of the Rendezvous and Proximity Operations 
Program (RPOP) into Mission Control provided this 
capability.  RPOP was originally intended for use on-
board the shuttle during proximity operations but was 
used on the ground as well. 
 Additional Mission Control personnel supporting orbit 
determination and trajectory planning during the SPAS-II 
deployed phase was found to be beneficial.  
  
 The ability to change the target spacecraft 
atmospheric drag in the on-board navigation software 
would have improved on-board relative navigation 
performance.  Such a capability (known as a KFACTOR) 
existed for the orbiter state vector and was eventually 
added for the target state vector. 
 The communication link between the orbiter and 
SPAS-II was never lost, even though the antenna lines-of-
sight were close to 90 degrees apart.  Personnel believed 
that the communication range and line-of-sight angle 
estimates imposed an unrealistic constraint on mission 
planning, leading to over-design of the SPAS-II detached 
phase. 
 
STS-37 Mid-Range Station-Keeping Test 
 
 The primary purpose of STS-37 was to deploy the 
Gamma Ray Observatory (GRO).  After the deploy 
Detailed Test Objective (DTO) 822, Mid-Range Station-
Keeping, was originally intended to test the long-range 
station-keeping technique planned for use on STS-39.  
The DTO involved deployment of a Radar Corner 
Reflector (RCR) by an Extra Vehicular Activity (EVA) 
crew member at the end of an EVA.  The orbiter was to 
phase away overnight.  The next day station-keeping was 
to be performed on the minus V Bar at ranges of 8 nm 
(14.8 km), 1.2 nm (2.2 km), and 5.4 nm (10 km) from the 
RCR (Figure 23.35).21 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Changes to the DTO 
 
 By September of 1990 changes in the Shuttle Program 
flight manifest moved the STS-37 launch date to after 
STS-39.†   The DTO could no longer support STS-39 but 
several station-keeping techniques were examined for 
evaluation at a range of 8 nm on the minus V Bar.  The 
motivation for the new DTO was to permit the orbiter to 
remain at or near the 8 nm point to meet a payload             
. 
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Figure 23.35  Planned relative motion profile for Mid-
Range Targeted Station-Keeping DTO before 
November 1990.   
† STS-37 ended up flying about 3 and a half weeks before STS-
39, in April of 1991. 
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Figure 23.36  Relative motion profile for Mid-Range 
Targeted Station-Keeping DTO using the Radar Corner 
Reflector, November 1990.   
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requirement or provide a delay before a rendezvous was 
resumed.   
 A problem on the orbiter or the target spacecraft could 
prevent completion of a rendezvous.  One option would 
be for the orbiter to execute a break-out at the Ti point 
and phase away overnight.  The rendezvous could be 
resumed once the problem was resolved.  However, this 
would have a significant impact on the mission timeline, 
cost additional propellant, and would require repeating 
much of the rendezvous profile later in the mission.  The 
mid-range station-keeping option, if orbiter systems 
health permitted it, would permit the orbiter to remain in 
the vicinity of the 8 nm Ti point until the problem was 
resolved and the rendezvous could be resumed.  In 
addition, the range might also permit the orbiter to remain 
within communications range of the target spacecraft.  
This option would conserve propellant and have less of an 
impact on the mission timeline.  Proving that mid-range 
station-keeping could be performed with star tracker 
navigation would make the technique an option for the 
radar fail case.21, 22 
 DTO options considered were 1) holding at the Ti 
position, 2) phasing away to a range of 16 nm, 3) flying 
football relative motion, 4) use of only ground tracking, 
orbit determination, and burn targeting to support station-
keeping, and 5) an out-of-plane station-keeping profile.  
In October of 1990 Shuttle Program Manager Tommy 
Holloway approved an out-of-plane station-keeping 
profile using star tracker measurements for relative 
navigation.  Out-of-plane relative motion would enable 
the orbiter to stay within communications range of 
another spacecraft.  It could also be executed for any 
number of integral revolutions or half revolutions.21 
 
DTO Profile Details 
 
 The new DTO plan involved the same deployment of 
the RCR at the end of an EVA followed by over-night 
phasing away from the RCR.  The next crew day the 
orbiter would perform star tracker relative navigation and 
on-board burn targeting to reach the V Bar Null (VBN1) 
burn point at 8 nm (Figure 23.36).  An out-of-plane           
. 
(OOP) delta-velocity would be combined with VBN1 to 
set-up the out-of-plane motion.  Star tracker passes would 
be performed each revolution to maintain an accurate 
relative navigation state vector for the orbiter.  Ten 
minutes after the end of each pass a Mission Control 
targeted phasing burn would be executed to re-target the 
orbiter for the 8 nm point on the minus V Bar.  Ten 
minutes was considered to be enough time for the 
Mission Control Flight Dynamics Officer to compute the 
phasing burn using the on-board orbiter state vector and 
for a partial burn pad to be voiced up to the crew and 
entered into the MNVR EXEC display.21 
 Based on Monte Carlo analysis of trajectory 
dispersions an out-of-plane velocity of minus 5 
feet/second was chosen over minus 15 feet/second for the 
VBN1/OOP burn.  The smaller value permitted the out-
of-plane motion to degrade quicker, providing a test of 
how long the out-of-plane station-keeping technique 
could be used.  The larger delta-velocity resulted in more 
stable out-of-plane motion.  The smaller value also 
consumed less propellant.  An additional consideration 
was performing the star tracker passes on either side of 
the minus V Bar, or having the pass cross the minus V 
Bar to provide more geometry change and higher line-of-
sight angular rates.  Monte Carlo results showed that 
there was no benefit to permitting the star tracker pass to 
cross the minus V Bar.21 
 Design of the DTO profile was complete by February 
of 1991.  The orbiter would phase away from the RCR 
overnight.  The NC1 phasing burn would be performed at 
orbital noon to set-up for the appropriate lighting at 
VBN1/OOP to permit the orbiter to reach the 20 nm point 
in three revolutions.  NC2 targeted the orbiter for the 8 
nm VBN1/OOP point in one revolution.21 
 
Addressing Late Issues 
 
 Several issues were identified that resulted in a re-
design of the DTO profile (Figure 23.37).  These were 1) 
a potential contact hazard between the GRO and the 
RCR, 2) a potential contact hazard between the GRO and 
any EVA hardware that could be jettisoned, 3) placing      
. 
+R Bar 
+V Bar 
Figure 23.37  Relative motion profile for Mid-Range 
Targeted Station-Keeping DTO using GRO as the 
target, February 1991.   
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orbital debris (the RCR) in the 28.5 inclination orbit, and 
4) uncertainty about the orbiter star tracker detecting and 
tracking the RCR using reflected sunlight.21 
 Only the jettisoned EVA hardware re-contact hazard 
was not resolved.  Changes to the DTO included 1) use of 
the GRO as the DTO target instead of the RCR, 2) no 
planning for an EVA hardware jettison, 3) scheduling 
only one burn after the EVA to deconflict the crew 
timeline.  These changes were required to have minimal 
impact to planning due to the rapidly approaching launch 
date.21 
 The GRO separation sequence was not changed.  The 
orbiter was to separate overnight and during the EVA.  A 
NH0 placeholder burn was added to the burn plan in case 
it was required to counteract orbital energy growth 
(caused by cross-coupling of rotational RCS jet firings 
into translation).  NC0 would be executed at orbital noon 
to set-up a phasing rate toward the VBN1/OOP point and 
establish the appropriate orbital lighting at VBN1/OOP.  
A NH burn was included to control the height at 
VBN1/OOP.  This was intended to keep the on-board 
Lambert targeted NCC burn less than 4 feet/second so 
that it could be executed as a multi-axis primary RCS 
burn.  Such a burn eliminated the need to perform a 
maneuver to burn attitude that could cause a trajectory 
dispersion due to rotational jet firings cross coupling into 
translation.  NC1 was targeted for the 20 nm point in two 
revolutions.  The NC2 burn at 20 nm targeted the orbiter 
for the 8 nm VBN1/OOP point.  The out-of-plane 
component of the VBN1/OOP burn was changed from 
minus 5 to plus 5 feet/second due to orbiter attitude.21 
 A contingency profile was designed to protect for the 
possibility of an EVA hardware jettison.  If EVA 
hardware were jettisoned the orbit would be lowered by 3 
nm using two orbital adjustment burns separated by half a 
revolution.  The NC0 burn would be used as a hardware 
separation burn as well as a phasing burn.  It would be 
executed at orbital midnight to set up the proper orbital 
lighting at VBN1/OOP for the star tracker passes.  
However, a minimum separation of 11 nm was to be 
maintained between GRO and the orbiter once the orbiter 
returned to the GRO orbital altitude.21 
 
Mission Execution 
 
 Atlantis launched on April 5, 1991 into a post OMS-2 
burn orbit of 242 x 244 nm with an inclination of 28 
degrees.  On flight days 1 and 2 the crew performed on-
orbit checkout of GRO and the RMS.  GRO was deployed 
using the RMS on flight day 3, and two crew members 
performed a contingency EVA to free a stuck GRO high 
gain antenna boom.  On flight day 4 the scheduled EVA 
was performed.  The Mid-Range Station-Keeping DTO 
was performed on flight day 5, along with the flight 
control system (OPS 8) checkout and the RCS hot fire test  
to prepare for landing.   
 
 A back-away deploy was performed after GRO 
release from the RMS on flight day 3.  A 0.55 foot/second 
Low Z primary RCS SEP 1 burn was performed.  The 
LVLH attitude (122 degrees pitch, 17 degrees yaw, and 
180 degrees roll) resulted in SEP 1 burn components of -
0.4 X (retrograde), 0.0 Y, and +0.4 Z (radial down) 
feet/second in the LVLH frame.  The shuttle rendezvous 
radar and relative navigation was begun at a range of 155 
feet.  This was performed to confirm desired relative 
motion throughout the separation sequence.  22 minutes 
after SEP 1 the SEP 2 burn was performed with LVLH 
delta-velocity components of -0.2 X, +2.0 Y, and 0.0 Z 
feet/second.  GRO RCS commanding for attitude control 
was enabled once the orbiter reached a range of 1,500 
feet, a range based on GRO thruster overpressure data.  
The SEP 3 burn was executed 37 minutes after SEP 2 
with LVLH delta-velocity components of +2.9 X, +0.2 Y, 
and +0.1 Z feet/second.  The orbiter was in a –Z body 
axis target track to facilitate Payload Interrogator 
communication with GRO.  The rendezvous radar was 
taken to communications mode 51 minutes after GRO 
release.23 
 Several changes were made to the DTO plan during 
the flight.  One revolution of the DTO was deleted due to 
the late deployment of GRO and an increase in crew tasks 
due to the two EVAs.  All DTO activities after the NC0 
burn were delayed and one revolution of station-keeping 
data was lost.21 
 NC0 was targeted for 24 nm rather than 20 nm since 
24 nm represented the mid-point of a two revolution 
transfer from 40 nm (the last ground targeted phasing 
burn) to 8 nm (the Ti point) on a nominal rendezvous 
profile.  This change was made to set-up star tracker pass 
geometry consistent with a standard stable orbit 
rendezvous profile.  The rationale behind the original 20 
nm point for NC2 was to facilitate rendezvous radar 
acquisition (22 nm maximum range for radar acquisition).  
The change to 24 nm did not pose a problem for later use 
of the rendezvous radar.  NC1 was deleted and NH was 
delayed until half a revolution before NC2 to lower the 
crew work load.  These changes resulted in a NC2 range 
of 28 nm rather than the desired 24 nm.21 
 Three phasing burns were planned during the out-of-
plane station-keeping.  NC3 was targeted but not 
executed, NC4 was executed with a delta-velocity of 0.4 
feet/second, and NC5 was deleted due to the late GRO 
deploy. 
 The down-track position of the orbiter during the out-
of-plane station-keeping from VBN1/OOP to the 
separation burn ranged from -43,000 feet to -49,500 feet.  
Mission planning predicted dispersions ranged from         
-39,900 feet to -57,300 feet.  Trajectory dispersions and  
relative navigation performance indicated that out-of-
plane (or mid-range) station-keeping using star tracker 
data was a viable technique in a radar fail case.21 
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 The flight day 6 landing was waived off due to 
weather.  Landing at Edwards Air Force Base was on 
flight day 7. 
 
Summary 
 
 STS-39 represented the most complex deploy/retrieve 
flown by the Shuttle Program.  Integration of primary and 
secondary payloads on the shuttle orbiter and 
development of mission plans, crew procedures, and 
ground procedures required extensive coordination by 
experienced personnel at multiple NASA centers, 
government contractors, and Department of Defense 
organizations.  Both the STS-39 and STS-37 missions 
illustrated the complexity of planning and flying missions 
with relative motion and rendezvous objectives. 
 
References 
 
 References with an asterisk at the end may be found 
in the following compilation document.  See the A Note 
on Sources chapter. 
 
Goodman, John L. (editor), Space Shuttle Rendezvous 
and Proximity Operations Overview and Experience 
Papers, Volume 2 of 2 (1986-2009), JSC-35050. 
 
1. STS-39 Press Information, Office of Media 
Relations, Space Systems Division, Rockwell 
International, April 1991. 
 
2. STS-39 Flight Requirements Document, Level A 
Groundrules and Constraints, Appendix A, NSTS-
17462A-39, Close to Launch Cycle, Launch Date 
April 23, 1991, Revision A, NASA/JSC Flight 
Design and Dynamics Division, April 1991. 
 
3. Sawin, Dan, “STS-39 Rendezvous Analysis & 
Operations,” Holloway Briefing, Flight Design and 
Dynamics Department, Rockwell Space Operations 
Company, January 17, 1991.* 
 
4. Malarkey, John M., STS-39, Infrared Background 
Signature Survey (IBSS), Rendezvous Flight Data 
File, JSC-48072-39, Final, January 18, 1991. 
 
5. Sawin, Dan, “STS-39 Information Pack,” Flight 
Design and Dynamics Department, Rockwell Space 
Operations Company, April 15, 1991.  This contains 
minutes of the January 22, 1991 STS-39 Flight 
Techniques Splinter Meeting on Radar Failed 
Operations.* 
 
6. Goodman, John L., Introduction to Space Shuttle 
Rendezvous Guidance, Navigation, and Control, 
Fourth Edition, JSC-49686, NASA JSC Flight 
Design and Dynamics Division, November 2009. 
 
7. Goodman, John L., (editor), Space Shuttle 
Rendezvous Maneuver Targeting Papers, JSC-35053, 
Flight Dynamics Division, Mission Operations 
Directorate, NASA Johnson Space Center, July 2011. 
 
8. Malarkey, John M., “Targeting Schemes For 
Onboard Computed Matched Period and Coelliptic 
Maneuver Capabilities,” Orbit Flight Techniques 
Panel Presentation, Rendezvous Guidance and 
Procedures Office, Flight Design and Dynamics 
Division, NASA/JSC Mission Operations 
Directorate, September 15, 1989.* 
 
9. Goodman, John, “STS-37/39 NSR Burns,” informal 
memo to Larry Bryan of Rockwell International 
Space Systems Division (Downey, CA), Level 8 
Guidance, Navigation, and Control Flight Software 
Testing Group, Reconfiguration Products 
Department, Rockwell Space Operations Company, 
May 24, 1990.* 
 
10. Rahman, Shireen, IBSS Detached Operations Test 
Report, Nominal Rendezvous, ONOM2, Level 8 Test 
Report, Flight Cycle, STSOC-RT-001287-0015, 
Reconfiguration Products Department, Rockwell 
Space Operations Company, Houston, TX, January 
28, 1991. 
 
11. Fricke, Robert W., STS-39 Space Shuttle Mission 
Report, JSC-08250, NSTS-08250, NASA/JSC, June 
1991. 
 
12. Malarkey, John M., “STS-39 Rendezvous Post Flight 
Report,” Rendezvous Guidance and Procedures 
Office, Flight Design and Dynamics Division, 
NASA/JSC Mission Operations Directorate, May 10, 
1991.* 
 
13. Britz, William R., “STS-39 Post Flight Review,” 
Orbit Flight Dynamics Group, Flight Design and 
Dynamics Division, NASA/JSC Mission Operations 
Directorate, May 17, 1991.* 
 
14. Britz, William R., “Resolution of the Station Keeping 
Problems During STS-39,” Orbit Flight Dynamics 
Group, Flight Design and Dynamics Division, 
NASA/JSC Mission Operations Directorate, 
November 7, 1991.* 
 
15. Burley, P. J., “STS-39 Lessons Learned Ground 
Targeted Stationkeeping CRO Trajectory 
Operations,” Orbit Flight Dynamics Group, Flight 
Design and Dynamics Division, NASA/JSC Mission 
Operations Directorate, August 14, 1991.* 
 
STS-39, THE MOST COMPLEX DEPLOY/RETRIEVE MISSION  
Approved for public release via STI DAA 
24483. See statement on title page. 196  
16. Sawin, Dan, “STS-39 Lessons Learned,” 
Presentation to the Orbit Flight Techniques Meeting 
of the NASA/JSC Mission Operations Directorate, 
Flight Design and Dynamics Department, Rockwell 
Space Operations Company, August 14, 1991.* 
 
17. Malarkey, John  M.,  “STS-39 Actual Rendezvous 
Profile Overview,” Rendezvous Guidance and 
Procedures Office, Flight Design and Dynamics 
Division, NASA/JSC Mission Operations 
Directorate, June 18, 1991.* 
 
18. Michels, T. R., “STS-39 Radar Anomaly Study,” 
660-NAV-640-92-024, Flight Design and Dynamics 
Department, Rockwell Space Operations Company, 
April 22, 1992.* 
 
19. Simpson, Roger, “Minutes of Post STS-39 Trench 
Tag Up,” Flight Design and Dynamics Division, 
NASA/JSC Mission Operations Directorate, May 10, 
1991.* 
 
20. Malarkey, John M., “STS-39 Post Flight Lessons 
Learned Onboard Targeting and Radar Navigation,” 
Orbit Flight Techniques Panel Presentation, 
Rendezvous Guidance and Procedures Office, Flight 
Design and Dynamics Division, NASA/JSC Mission 
Operations Directorate, August 14, 1991.* 
HISTORY OF SPACE SHUTTLE RENDEZVOUS 
21. Gabriel, Dawn M., “STS-37/DTO 822 Post-Flight 
Summary,” SSDD-440-91-059, Flight Design and 
Dynamics Department, Rockwell Space Operations 
Company, June 18, 1991.* 
 
22. Goodman, John, “DTO 822 Out-of-Plane Star 
Tracker,” STS-37 Level 8 Software Testing 
Performance Test Review Presentation, Level 8 
Guidance, Navigation, and Control Flight Software 
Testing Group, Reconfiguration Products 
Department, Rockwell Space Operations Company, 
March 7, 1991.* 
 
23. Meyer, Christian K., “STS-37 Post Flight Support,” 
SSDD-F0-730-91-146, Flight Design and Dynamics 
Department, Rockwell Space Operations Company, 
July 25, 1991.* 
Approved for public release via STI DAA 
24483. See statement on title page. 197  
CHAPTER 24 - A CLOSER LOOK AT THE HUBBLE SERVICING MISSIONS 
 
This is an expanded version of a paper originally titled, “Hubble Servicing Challenges Drive Innovation of Shuttle 
Rendezvous Techniques” by John L. Goodman and Stephen R. Walker.  It was presented at the 32nd Annual AAS 
Guidance and Control Conference in Breckenridge, Colorado, on Saturday, January 31, 2009.  This chapter contains 
seven pages not included in the conference paper. 
Introduction 
 
 Hubble Space Telescope (HST) servicing performed 
by Space Shuttle crews contributed to what is arguably 
one of the most successful astronomy missions ever 
flown.1-3  On-orbit servicing performed by five Space 
Shuttle servicing missions between 1993 and 2009 
increased the science return and extended the life of the 
telescope by correcting performance problems, replacing 
malfunctioning hardware, and equipping it with more 
advanced astronomy sensors.4  Servicing missions 
involved extensive coordination between specialists in 
multiple disciplines in both the Shuttle and HST 
Programs to develop new or adapt existing techniques for 
HST servicing.  These disciplines included trajectory 
design, robotics, flight control, thermal control, power 
generation, structures, orbital debris, and Extra-Vehicular 
Activity (EVA).5 
 HST servicing missions have provided NASA with 
opportunities to gain insight into servicing mission design 
and to develop nominal and contingency procedures.  
HST performance issues have driven new and 
unanticipated servicing and proximity operations 
techniques development. Both nominal and contingency 
procedures and mission plans for rendezvous, proximity 
operations, jettison, deployment, and tool capture have 
evolved since HST was deployed on STS-31 in 1990.  
Although Space Shuttle missions to HST involve human-
in-the-loop rendezvous, capture, and servicing, the HST 
servicing experiences and lessons learned are also 
applicable to current and future robotic flight programs 
that involve on-orbit servicing and rendezvous.6-11  The 
highly successful Orbital Express robotic servicing 
demonstration mission illustrated the importance of pre-
mission development of contingency procedures to 
address postulated anomalies, as well as real-time 
development of contingency procedures in response to 
unanticipated anomalies.12  Although HST EVA and 
robotic activities are outside the scope of this paper, those 
disciplines have likewise developed and evolved 
extensive nominal and contingency procedures. 
 Servicing missions succeeded in part due to the efforts 
of experienced HST and Shuttle Program personnel 
(NASA and contractor) from multiple disciplines that had 
extensive experience planning and flying servicing and 
assembly missions to a variety of spacecraft.  This 
facilitated application of best practices and lessons 
learned.  These personnel were responsive to 
unanticipated satellite performance issues that drove late   
. 
and significant changes in servicing mission plans.  These 
events drove changes to existing proximity operations, 
robotic operation, and servicing procedures or required 
the creation of new procedures and mission plans.  HST 
and Shuttle Program personnel continually learned about 
emerging HST and shuttle orbiter constraints.  
Unforeseen constraints and performance limitations drove 
development of new or changes to existing nominal and 
contingency plans and procedures.  Rendezvous, 
proximity operations, and other mission techniques from 
other Space Shuttle missions were successfully applied to 
mitigate risk to HST servicing mission success. 
 This chapter provides an overview of HST servicing 
missions.  This is followed by a description of HST 
design and operations that are pertinent to Space Shuttle 
rendezvous and proximity operations.  Next, relative 
navigation and shuttle plume impingement challenges are 
discussed.  For the deploy mission and the servicing 
missions an overview is given of the rendezvous, 
proximity operations, and deploy procedures that were 
flown, along with mission results.  In addition, 
contingency procedures to address the HST aperture door 
failed closed or failed open cases are described.  Other 
contingency proximity operations and hardware jettison 
procedures are then outlined.  Table 24.1 is an overview 
of HST servicing mission objectives.  Table 24.2 is a list 
of nominal and contingency procedures for each mission 
that address relative motion.  The table lists procedures 
for rendezvous, proximity operations (approach and 
grapple), jettison, and deploy and separation. 
 A rescue mission had been planned if a thermal 
protection system problem prevented the safe return of 
the STS-125 crew during the last HST servicing mission 
in 2009.  Since the rescue mission was different in many 
respects from the HST deployment and servicing 
missions, nominal and contingency procedures are 
discussed in a separate section at the end of the chapter. 
 
Early Servicing Concepts 
 
 From the beginning of space telescope concept 
development in the early 1970s, both on-orbit servicing 
by Space Shuttle EVA crew and ground servicing was 
included in requirements and operations concepts.  On-
orbit servicing by Space Shuttle astronauts was to be 
performed every 2.5 years, and hardware lifetime and 
reliability requirements were based on this assumption.  
Every 5 years the shuttle was to return the telescope to      
. 
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Mission 
 
 
STS-61J 
 
 
 
 
 
STS-31 
 
 
 
 
 
STS-42 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
STS-57 
 
 
 
 
 
 
STS-61 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
STS-82 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
STS-103 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
STS-109 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
STS-125 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
STS-400 
 
Crew 
 
 
John Young  
Charles Bolden 
Steven Hawley   
Bruce McCandless  
Kathryn Sullivan 
 
Loren Shriver 
Charles Bolden 
Steven Hawley 
Bruce McCandless 
Kathryn Sullivan 
 
Ronald Grabe  
Stephen Oswald  
Norman Thagard  
David Hilmers  
William Readdy 
Roberta Bondar 
Ulf Merbold  
 
Ronald Grabe 
Brian Duffy 
David Low 
Nancy Sherlock 
Peter Wisoff 
Janice Voss 
 
Richard Covey 
Kenneth Bowersox 
Kathryn Thornton 
Claude Nicollier 
Jeffrey Hoffman 
Story Musgrave 
Thomas Akers 
 
Kenneth Bowersox 
Scott Horowitz 
Joseph Tanner 
Steven Hawley 
Gregory Harbaugh 
Mark Lee 
Steven Smith 
 
Curtis Brown  
Scott Kelly  
Steven Smith  
Michael Foale  
John Grunsfield  
Claude Nicollier  
Jean-Francois Clervoy 
 
Scott Altman  
Duane Carey  
John Grunsfeld  
Nancy Currie  
James Newman  
Richard Linnehan  
Michael Massimino 
 
Scott Altman 
Gregory C. Johnson 
Michael Massimino  
Michael Good  
Megan McArthur  
John Grunsfeld  
Andrew Feustel 
 
Chris Ferguson 
Eric Boe  
Stephen Bowen  
Robert Kimbrough 
Orbiter 
 
 
Atlantis 
OV-104 
 
 
 
 
Discovery 
OV-103 
 
 
 
 
Discovery 
OV-104  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Endeavour 
OV-105 
 
 
 
 
 
Endeavour 
OV-105 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Discovery 
OV-103 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Discovery 
OV-103 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Columbia 
OV-102 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Atlantis 
OV-104 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Endeavour 
OV-105 
HST Mission  
Objectives 
 
Deploy HST 
 
 
 
 
 
Deploy HST 
 
 
 
 
 
Proposed HST 
photo inspection. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EVA tests of  
STS-61 HST  
servicing  
procedures. 
 
 
 
Servicing  
Mission 1  
(SM1) 
 
 
 
 
 
Servicing  
Mission 2  
(SM2) 
 
 
 
 
 
Servicing  
Mission 3A  
(SM3A) 
 
 
 
 
 
Servicing  
Mission 3B  
(SM3B) 
 
 
 
 
 
Servicing  
Mission 4  
(SM4) 
 
 
 
 
 
Rescue 125  
crew if  
required. 
Launch Date, Pad 
Landing Date, Runway 
 
Mission planned for  
August, 1986. 
 
 
 
 
4/24/90, 39B 
 
4/29/90, EDW 22 
 
 
 
1/22/92, 39A 
 
1/30/92, EDW 22  
 
 
 
 
 
6/21/93, 39B 
 
7/01/93, KSC 33 
 
 
 
 
12/02/93, 39B 
 
12/13/93, KSC 33 
 
 
 
 
 
2/11/97, 39A 
 
2/21/97, KSC 15 
 
 
 
 
 
12/19/99, 39B 
 
12/27/99, KSC 33 
 
 
 
 
 
3/01/02, 39A 
 
3/12/02, KSC 33 
 
 
 
 
 
5/11/09, 39A 
 
5/24/09,  EDW 22 
 
 
 
 
 
Mission not required.   
Would have been  
launched from pad 39B. 
 
Remarks 
 
 
Canceled after Challenger accident. 
 
 
 
 
 
HST successfully deployed.  Contingency  
rendezvous with HST planned but not  
required. 
 
 
 
Proposed inspection was to document solar 
array tip deflections that could lead to array 
failure and negatively impact astronomy.  
Inspection proposal rejected in August 1991.  
 
Primary mission objective International  
Microgravity Laboratory-1. 
 
EVA successful.  No rendezvous or prox ops  
conducted in support of HST. 
 
Primary mission objectives EURECA 
retrieval and SPACEHAB. 
 
 
Installation of corrective optics.  Solar arrays 
replaced and one old array jettisoned by EVA 
crew.  
 
 
 
 
 
MECO under-speed.  During rendezvous star 
tracker broke lock on HST, then tracked a star 
and orbital debris.  SEP2 maneuver under-
burn.  Re-planning and crew procedures 
executed in response to these issues ensured 
successful rendezvous and separation. 
 
 
Flown in response to HST gyro failures.  HST 
in Hardware Sun Point safe mode at the time 
of rendezvous due to fourth gyro failure.  
Discovery yaw maneuver due to off nominal 
HST attitude at the time of grapple. 
 
 
 
Rendezvous altitude decayed below insertion 
altitude, forcing one rendezvous maneuver to 
be retrograde. 
 
 
 
 
 
Mount passive LIDS docking hardware and 
laser retro-reflectors on HST for possible 
missions by future human or robotic 
spacecraft.  
 
 
 
 
Rescue orbiter grapples Atlantis with RMS.  
EVA transfer of Atlantis crew to rescue orbiter.  
TCS retro-reflector mounted in Atlantis payload  
bay for use by rescue orbiter TCS. 
 
Table 24.1  Space Shuttle Missions Concerning The Hubble Space Telescope 
EDW – Edwards Air Force Base 
EURECA – European Retrievable Carrier  
EVA – Extra Vehicular Activity 
MECO –  Main Engine Cut-Off 
OV – Orbiter Vehicle 
RMS – Remote Manipulator System 
SM – Servicing Mission 
STS – Space Transportation System 
TCS – Trajectory Control Sensor 
HST – Hubble Space Telescope 
KSC – Kennedy Space Center 
LIDS – Low Impact Docking System 
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EVA – Extra Vehicular Activity 
FRCS – Forward Reaction Control System 
GF – Grapple Fixture 
HST – Hubble Space Telescope 
ORBT – Optimized R Bar Targeted Rendezvous 
Mission 
 
STS-31 
 
Nominal 
 
Contingency 
 
 
 
 
STS-61 
 
Nominal 
 
Contingency 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
STS-82 
 
Nominal 
  
Contingency 
 
 
 
 
 
 
STS-103 
 
Nominal 
 
Contingency 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
STS-109 
 
Nominal 
 
Contingency 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
STS-125 
 
Nominal 
 
Contingency 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
STS-40x 
 
Nominal 
 
Contingency 
Rendezvous 
 
 
 
 
 
• Stable Orbit (2 rev) 
• Radar Fail  
• Rndz Breakout  
• Ti Delay  
 
 
 
• Stable Orbit (2 rev) 
 
• Radar Fail  
• Rndz Breakout  
• Ti Delay  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• Stable Orbit (2 rev) 
 
• Radar Fail  
• Rndz Breakout  
• Ti Delay  
 
 
 
 
 
 
• ORBT (2 rev) 
 
• Stable Orbit (2 rev) 
• Radar Fail  
• Rndz Breakout  
• Ti Delay  
 
 
 
 
 
 
• ORBT (1 rev) 
 
• Stable Orbit (1 rev) 
• Radar Fail  
• Rndz Breakout  
• Ti Delay  
 
 
 
 
 
 
• ORBT (1 rev) 
 
• Stable Orbit (1 rev) 
• Radar Fail  
• Rndz Breakout  
• Ti Delay  
 
 
 
 
 
 
• ORBT (1 rev) 
 
• Radar Fail  
• Rndz Breakout  
• Ti Delay  
 
Proximity Operations  
 
 
 
 
 
• Inertial Approach  
• Fast Flyaround  
• STS Roll to Align  
 
 
 
 
• Inertial Approach 
 
• Manual Inertial Flyaround  
  Alignment Trim  
• AUTO Inertial Flyaround  
• Prox Ops Backoff  
• Prox Ops Breakout  
 
 
 
 
 
• +R Bar Approach/Inertial Grapple 
 
• Inertial Approach  
• RBAR Yaw Alignment  
• Manual Inertial Flyaround  
  Alignment Trim  
• AUTO Inertial Flyaround  
• Prox Ops Backoff  
 
 
 
• +R Bar Approach/Inertial Grapple 
 
• Inertial Approach  
• RBAR Yaw Alignment  
• Manual Inertial Flyaround  
  Alignment Trim  
• AUTO Inertial Flyaround  
• Prox Ops Backoff  
• HST R Bar Breakout  
  
 
 
• +R Bar Approach/Inertial Grapple 
 
• Inertial Approach  
• RBAR Yaw Alignment  
• Manual Inertial Flyaround  
  Alignment Trim  
• AUTO Inertial Flyaround  
• Prox Ops Backoff  
• HST R Bar Breakout  
 
 
 
• +R Bar Approach/Inertial Grapple 
 
• Inertial Approach  
• RBAR Yaw Alignment  
• Manual Inertial Flyaround  
  Alignment Trim  
• AUTO Inertial Flyaround  
• Prox Ops Backoff  
• HST R Bar Breakout  
 
 
 
• +R Bar Approach 
 
 
Jettison 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• HST Jettison  
• SAC Jettison  
• ORUC Jettison  
• SA Jettison Using Jettison  
  Handle (performed) 
• SA Jettison Using  
  Portable GF  
 
 
 
 
 
• HST Jettison 
• EVA Hardware Jettison  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• HST Jettison for  
  Rapid Safing  
• ORUC Jettison  
• EVA Hardware Jettison  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• HST Solar Array Jettison  
• HST Jettison for Rapid  
  Safing  
• SAC Jettison  
• RAC Jettison 
• EVA Hardware/Solar  
  Array Jettison 
 
 
 
 
 
• HST Jettison for Rapid  
  Safing  
• SLIC Jettison  
• ORUC Jettison  
• EVA Hardware Jettison  
 
Deploy/Separation 
 
 
 
• Deploy with RMS 
 
• Emergency RMS  
  Deploy  
• No RMS Backaway  
  Deploy 
 
 
 
• Deploy with RMS 
 
• RMS Quick Deploy 
• No RMS Backaway  
  Deploy  
• Low Propellant Sep 
  (performed)  
 
 
 
 
 
• Deploy with RMS 
 
• RMS Quick Deploy 
• No RMS Backaway  
  Deploy  
• No FRCS Sep  
 
 
 
 
 
• Deploy with RMS 
 
• RMS Quick Deploy 
• No RMS Backaway  
  Deploy  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• Deploy with RMS 
 
• RMS Quick Deploy 
• No RMS Backaway  
  Deploy  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• Deploy with RMS 
 
• RMS Quick Deploy 
• No RMS Backaway  
  Deploy  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• Separation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• Prox Ops Breakout  
• EVA Rescue  
• Loss of VRCS  
 
  
 
 
 
 
• Tool chasing  
• EVA Rescue  
• Loss of VRCS  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• Prox Ops Breakout  
• Loss of Low Z Braking  
• Loss of Low Z Breakout  
• Loss of VRCS  
• Tool chasing   
• EVA Rescue  
 
  
 
 
 
• HST Flyaround/Loss of  
  LOW Z Breakout  
• Loss of VRCS  
• Loss of Low Z Braking  
• Tool Chasing   
• EVA Rescue   
 
  
 
 
 
 
• HST Flyaround/Loss of  
  LOW Z Breakout  
• Loss of VRCS  
• Loss of Low Z Braking  
• Tool Chasing   
• EVA Rescue   
 
 
 
 
 
 
• HST Flyaround/Loss of  
  Low Z Breakout  
• Loss of VRCS  
• Loss of Low Z Braking  
• Tool Chasing   
• EVA Rescue  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 24.2  Nominal And Contingency Procedures For HST Servicing Missions 
ORUC – Orbital Replacement Unit Carrier 
RAC – Rigid Array Carrier 
RMS – Remote Manipulator System 
Rndz – Rendezvous 
SA – Solar Array 
SAC – Solar Array Carrier 
SLIC – Super Lightweight Interchangeable Carrier  
STS – Space Transportation System 
Ti – Transition Initiation 
VRCS – Vernier Reaction Control System 
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* Flight day one began with crew wakeup at the Kennedy Space 
Center on the day of launch.  Subsequent flight days on-orbit 
began when the crew wakes up. 
solar array orientation must be carefully managed to 
ensure that sufficient power is available to recharge HST 
batteries.  In addition, the HST solar arrays, solar array 
support structure, and rotational mechanisms are sensitive 
to shuttle RCS jet plume contamination and over-
pressure.  Significant analysis is required to develop 
nominal and contingency proximity operations 
procedures (approach, grapple, deploy) that do not violate 
HST plume constraints.  Furthermore, HST attitude 
during shuttle proximity operations must be carefully 
managed to ensure that the HST solar arrays can generate 
sufficient power, even in the presence of degraded HST 
attitude control system performance.  HST optics are 
sensitive to plume contamination as well.  However, the 
optics are protected by closing the aperture door during 
the approach by the shuttle. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 HST relies on four Reaction Wheel Assemblies 
(RWAs) for attitude control, rather than using RCS jets.  
Six Rate Gyro Assemblies (RGAs) provide redundant 
measurements for attitude control.  However, only three 
RGAs are required for attitude control.  The Retrieval 
Mode Gyro Assembly (RMGA) is a non-redundant set of 
back-up gyros that are independent of the RGAs.  The 
RMGA can provide course attitude data for limited 
periods to support shuttle proximity operations and 
grapple. 
 In the event of performance anomalies HST has two 
attitude control safe modes to maintain HST in a power 
positive configuration.  A HST systems anomaly that 
forces use of one of the safe modes has implications for 
proximity operations and shuttle robotics procedures.  
The Hardware Sunpoint (HWSP) safe mode uses RMGA 
data and points the +V3 axis to the Sun, maintains an 
inertial attitude hold, aligns the solar arrays with the V1 
axis, and closes the aperture door.  The Zero Gyro Sun 
Point (ZGSP) safe mode points the +V3 axis in the 
general direction of the Sun, maintains a slow spin about 
the V3 axis, aligns the solar arrays with the V1 axis, and   
. 
to Earth for a more intensive refurbishment.  The shuttle 
would then return the telescope to Earth orbit.  However, 
by the late 1970s, concerns about contamination and 
structural loads that the telescope could be subjected to 
during ascent and entry led NASA to limit servicing to 
on-orbit.  It was determined that on-orbit servicing would 
be adequate to maintain HST during the 15 year design 
life.   
 
Overview of HST Servicing Missions 
 
 Planning for all HST missions involved trade studies, 
simulations, and extensive technical discussions covering 
both nominal and contingency mission plans and 
procedures.  Mission preparation included timeline and 
crew activity planning, procedure development, and 
trajectory design covering all aspects of the mission.  This 
included ascent, launch aborts, rendezvous, proximity 
operations, entry and landing, EVA, robotics, etc.  
Contingency procedures were also developed or adapted 
to addresses systems anomalies that may occur in the 
rendezvous, proximity operations, servicing, and deploy 
phases. 
 Shuttle rendezvous with HST and grapple, by the 
Remote Manipulator System (RMS) robotic arm, was 
normally scheduled for flight day three.  On the morning 
of flight day three, the shuttle relative navigation sensors 
(radar and star tracker) obtained relative measurements 
that were used to improve the estimate of the relative 
navigation state in the shuttle flight computers.  
Rendezvous maneuvers were also computed by the 
shuttle flight computers. 
 Once the orbiter was within approximately 2000 feet 
of HST (post MC-4) the proximity operations phase 
began.  The relative motion trajectory was designed to 
accommodate orbiter and HST constraints such as orbiter 
Reaction Control System (RCS) jet plume impingent, 
power generation, and thermal control.  The crew 
grappled HST with the RMS and berthed it in the shuttle 
payload bay.  After several days of servicing by EVA 
crew members, HST was deployed and eventually 
resumed the astronomy mission.  Deploy procedures were 
designed to ensure safe separation of the orbiter from 
HST while also concurrently protecting HST from plume 
impingement.  Deploy procedures also had to meet 
additional constraints for thermal, lighting, and 
communications.   
 
The Hubble Space Telescope  
 
 Figure 24.1 is an illustration of the HST as it appears 
on-orbit while conducting the astronomy mission.  Two 
solar arrays provide electrical power.  HST attitude and    
. 
Figure 24.1  Hubble Space Telescope 
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closes the aperture door.  Coarse rate and Sun position 
data is obtained from the Coarse Sun Sensor.  No RGA 
data is used by the ZGSP safe mode. 
 Before the shuttle begins the final approach to grapple 
HST with the RMS, the HST is placed in a proper 
systems configuration and attitude.  The –V3 High Gain 
Antenna (HGA) (Figure 24.1) is stowed and latched, and 
the solar arrays rotated to be parallel with the V1 axis.  
HST performs a roll maneuver to place the RMS grapple 
fixture on the north side of the orbital plane. HST 
continues to maintain an inertial attitude hold during 
rendezvous and final approach. Two RMS grapple 
fixtures are mounted on the HST along the  –V3 axis 
(Figure 24.1).  The fixtures can be removed and installed 
by EVA crew, if required.  The nominal grapple attitude 
of HST is not optimal for power generation by the solar 
arrays.  When the roll maneuver completes, a 180 minute 
Sun pointing timer is started.  If HST is not grappled by 
the orbiter after 180 minutes, HST performs a low rate 
attitude maneuver to a power optimal attitude.  However, 
this maneuver was not required on the servicing missions 
flown.   
 
Challenges of HST Servicing Missions 
 
 The Space Shuttle was designed in the early 1970s 
after NASA had successfully demonstrated rendezvous 
techniques in the Gemini and Apollo Programs.  
However, technical and mission design challenges 
emerged from servicing missions to HST, as well as 
shuttle missions involving other target spacecraft, that 
were not faced during Gemini and Apollo.13  This section 
highlights some of those challenges. 
 
Propulsion, Attitude Control, and Plume 
Impingement Challenges 
 
 The early operational concepts for HST defined in the 
1970s included on-orbit servicing by astronauts.  HST 
hardware and systems layout was designed to support 
servicing.  However, the design of both the HST and the 
Space Shuttle was completed before the potential of HST 
contamination or structural damage, resulting from over-
pressure by shuttle RCS jet plume impingement, was 
fully understood.  As a result, proximity operations 
design for servicing missions has evolved as insight into 
plume effects on HST has improved.  To minimize risk of 
plume contamination and over-pressure the shuttle Low Z 
flight control mode is used for HST and other proximity 
operations missions, such as Mir and ISS, rather than 
normal Z-axis firings (Figure 24.2).  The Low Z mode 
provides some RCS braking capability while minimizing 
RCS plume impingement.  The Low Z mode uses X body 
axis jets that have a small thrust component along the Z-
axis, rather than Z-axis jets that direct plumes at the target 
spacecraft.  The X-axis thrust components of the forward 
and aft-firing jets sum to near-zero, leaving a small Z-axis 
.  
component that can be used for braking. Propellant 
consumption for braking is increased dramatically in the 
Low Z mode.  The Z-axis thrust component of the X-axis 
jets was not an original Space Shuttle design requirement 
for proximity operations.  The Low Z mode was 
developed in the 1977-1978 time period, after the shuttle 
design was finalized and hardware was already under 
construction.5,13  Use of the Low Z mode increases 
propellant consumption on missions that are already 
propellant limited as the HST orbital altitude is much 
higher than the orbital altitude of other shuttle missions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 HST does not have a propulsion system for orbit 
maintenance or attitude control.  Consequently it is 
dependent on the shuttle for orbit raising maneuvers to 
counteract orbital decay due to atmospheric drag.  While 
the HST is in the shuttle payload bay the shuttle may 
perform a re-boost maneuver to increase the HST orbital 
altitude.  Since years separate servicing missions, HST is 
placed and maintained at as high an altitude as can be 
reached by the shuttle.  The orbital altitude coupled with 
the previously mentioned extensive use of the Low Z 
flight control mode reduces available propellant margins.   
 
Relative Navigation 
 
 At the time of the HST design in the mid 1970s 
shuttle rendezvous sensors were defined as radar without 
a transponder on the target spacecraft and a star tracker 
that tracked sunlight reflected by the target.13  While HST 
was equipped with a Tracking and Data Relay Satellite 
System (TDRSS) transponder to allow ground tracking 
using Doppler and range measurements, HST was not 
equipped with relative navigation aids.  Unlike smaller 
shuttle rendezvous targets, such as SPARTAN, some 
rendezvous beam wandering was observed while tracking 
HST.  However, the beam wandering was less than is        
. 
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Figure 24.2  Normal and Low Z  
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experienced on International Space Station (ISS) 
missions.  By 1995 the shuttle was flying the Trajectory 
Control Sensor (TCS) lidar and the Hand Held Lidar 
(HHL) to provide measurements to the laptop computer 
Rendezvous and Proximity Operations Program (RPOP).  
HHL measurements and RPOP data based on TCS and 
HHL improved crew situational awareness beyond what 
could be provided by the legacy shuttle computer relative 
navigation filter and sensors.  This led to lower propellant 
consumption during proximity operations.  Proposals to 
add retro-reflectors to HST to support TCS had not been 
approved for cost reasons; consequently TCS is not used 
on servicing missions.  Although there was a European 
Space Agency retro-reflector on the back end of HST, it 
was not designed to work with TCS.  The curved surface 
of HST makes it a poor target for HHL and causes shuttle 
payload bay camera blooming, complicating proximity 
operations piloting.  Experience has shown that the RMS 
grapple fixtures on HST are good targets for the HHL. 
 
Remote Manipulator System 
 
 The RMS was used to grapple, maneuver, berth, and 
deploy the HST.  It is an approximately 50 ft long, 6-
degree-of-freedom robotic arm equipped with six joints 
(shoulder yaw, shoulder pitch, elbow pitch, wrist pitch, 
wrist yaw, and wrist roll).  It is located on the port side of 
the payload bay, and is capable of handling payloads up 
to 65,000 lb. The RMS end effector on the end of the arm 
grapples a fixture installed on the payload.  An RMS 
display and control panel, rotational and translational 
hand controllers, and associated television displays are 
located in the aft flight deck flight crew station.  The 
RMS is also used as an extension ladder for EVA crews, 
and for conducting inspections using end effector 
television camera.  
 There are two types of RMS end effector techniques 
used for grappling another spacecraft.  The preferred 
technique, called orthogonal, aligns end effector motion 
along orbiter +Y body axis, in the direction of the 
starboard wing.  End effector orientation aligns the up, 
down, left, and right directions observed by the crew with 
the end effector camera with the orbiter body X and Z 
axes.  This provides the crew with good motion cues.  
The second technique, non-orthogonal, retains the closing 
rate cues of the orthogonal technique, but end effector 
lateral motion (up, down, left, right) is not aligned with 
the body X and Z axes.  Two RMS grapple fixtures are 
mounted on the HST along the –V3 axis.  The fixtures 
can be removed and installed by EVA crew if required. 
 
Ground Tracking Limitation During Ascent 
 
 A Mission Control ground tracking solution is 
available for comparison with the on-board navigation 
state after Main Engine Cut-Off (MECO).  Ensuring an 
accurate on-board state vector is important since the         
. 
Orbital Maneuvering System 2 (OMS-2) burn helps 
control orbiter phasing and orbital plane control for 
rendezvous.  In the event that on-board navigation state 
error in the out-of-plane direction is excessive after 
MECO, one of two state vectors could be uplinked by 
Mission Control to the shuttle flight computers.  The first 
is the ground tracking state vector.  The second is the 
GPS state vector downlinked from the orbiter GPS 
receiver.  A new state vector uplink would ensure that the 
OMS-2 orbit insertion burn will correct for out-of-plane 
trajectory dispersions.  Correcting for such dispersions 
later in the flight increases propellant consumption. 
 For 51.6 degree inclination flights to the International 
Space Station, ground radar tracking is available 
throughout powered ascent.  The elimination of the 
Bermuda tracking station in 1998 reduced ground 
tracking coverage during powered ascent for the 28.5 
degree inclination HST missions.  In the absence of an 
accurate ground tracking solution, the on-board GPS 
receiver state vector was used by Mission Control to 
assess the health of the on-board navigation state on 
flights STS-103, STS-109, and STS-125.  If required, a 
GPS state vector could have been uplinked to the vehicle 
before the OMS-2 burn.  Mission Control would assess 
the performance of the GPS receiver before using the 
GPS receiver as a vector source.  However, a GPS update 
was not required for STS-103, STS-109, or STS-125.  
This procedure would have also been available for the 
STS-400 (Endeavour) rescue mission of the Atlantis 
crew, if a rescue had been required.  GPS state vectors 
are normally only used during entry to update the orbiter 
navigation state.14 
 
 
STS-31 – HST DEPLOY 
 
 After a four year delay due to the loss of the Space 
Shuttle Challenger, HST was deployed from the orbiter 
Discovery on April 25, 1990 (flight day two), during the 
STS-31 mission (Table 24.1).   
 
STS-31 Deploy  
 
 After HST was unberthed from the payload bay with 
the RMS, solar array #2 did not unfurl.  Concurrent with 
crew and ground troubleshooting, preparations began for 
an unscheduled EVA in the event that a manual unfurl 
was required.  Two EVA crewmembers conducted the in-
suit pre-breath activity (required to flush nitrogen from 
the bloodstream before being exposed to the reduced 
pressure environment of a spacewalk), and then entered 
the shuttle airlock.  The airlock was then depressurized to 
5 psi.  However, another pre-planned contingency 
procedure successfully unfurled the array on the third 
attempt and the EVA was not required.  Solar array #1 
and the two HGAs were deployed without incident before 
HST was released by the RMS on rev. 20 (Figure 24.3). 
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 The shuttle rendezvous radar tracked HST from a 
range of 96 feet to 38,000 feet, when the Ku antenna was 
taken to the communications mode.  Rendezvous radar 
data was incorporated into on-board navigation during the 
separation to improve crew and Mission Control 
knowledge of relative motion (Figure 24.4).  Use of the 
rendezvous radar provided a more accurate relative state 
solution than could have been obtained with ground radar 
and TDRSS tracking. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 The Separation 1 (SEP1) maneuver was performed 
with the RCS in the Low Z mode to minimize HST 
contamination by RCS plumes.  Separation maneuvers 
performed by Discovery were required to prevent 
recontact with HST and ensure that the safe separation 
continued during the crew sleep period following HST 
deployment (Figure 24.5).  The HST inertial deployment 
was designed to ensure that HST sun sensors would lock 
onto the Sun after release from the RMS.  The time 
required for HST to acquire and track the Sun to 
minimize battery discharge and recovery time was also 
considered. 
 Continuous communications with Discovery was 
required for pre-defined periods before and after 
deployment.  Once HST was released and Discovery         
. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
separated to a safe distance, HST mission responsibility 
was transferred to the HST Director of Orbit Verification 
at the Space Telescope Operations Control Center 
(STOCC) at the Goddard Space Flight Center.  After HST 
deploy, Discovery separated overnight and conducted 
long-range station-keeping in the general vicinity of a 
position 40 nm behind HST on the –V Bar (Figure 24.5).  
The Shuttle Program was required to maintain a 
capability to rendezvous with HST for up to 45 hours or 
until the STOCC verified that the aperture door was open.  
Long range station-keeping was conducted until HST 
activation was complete and the aperture door 
successfully opened by the STOCC.  At approximately 1 
day and 19 hours after deployment Discovery was 
released from HST operations.  A contingency 
rendezvous was not required.  Discovery left the long-
range station-keeping trajectory using an orbit coelliptic 
to HST to ensure safe separation (Figure 24.5). 
 
STS-31 Contingency Deploy Planning 
 
 A significant amount of planning was performed to 
ensure that HST could be successfully placed in orbit on 
STS-31 in the presence of various shuttle anomalies.   
Although the nominal deploy was on flight day 2, HST 
could have been deployed on any flight day and orbit if 
the crew timeline and HST power and thermal constraints 
permitted it.  A flight day 1 contingency deployment 
could have been performed through the completion of 
solar array deployment in the event of the following HST 
failures: 1) Total loss of orbiter power to the HST, and 2) 
failure to apply orbiter power to HST during HST 
systems activation on flight day 1.  Components within 
the HST Optical Telescope Assembly (OTA) had a 
limited life without power from Discovery or the HST 
solar arrays.  Extended lack of power could degrade OTA 
performance and introduce safety risks for returning HST 
to Earth.  A contingency EVA could also have been 
performed on flight day 2 to make power available to 
HST from the solar arrays or the orbiter after umbilical 
disconnect.  An EVA would not have been performed on 
Flight Day 1. 
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Figure 24.4  STS-31 HST Deploy Profile 
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Figure 24.3  STS-31 HST Deployment 
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 Degraded orbiter systems performance or a 
component failure might prevent the planned mission 
duration from being flown, but not require a return to 
Earth at the next opportunity.  In this case a Minimum 
Duration Flight (MDF) may be declared.  The objective 
of a MDF is to allow high priority mission objectives to 
be accomplished while minimizing exposure to 
subsequent failures that could threaten crew safety.  The 
nominal length of a MDF is 72 hours.  If a MDF were to 
be declared before HST deploy, the deployment could 
have occurred on flight day 2.  Entry preparation would 
occur on flight day 3, with landing on flight day 4.  HST 
could also have been deployed on flight day 3.  For a 
flight day 2 deploy the crew could perform a contingency 
EVA if required to support the HST deployment.  A 
contingency EVA would not have been performed for a 
flight day 3 deploy since the entry would be on flight day 
4.  EVAs for mission success are not performed the day 
before entry or on entry day.  If a landing at the next 
available Primary Landing Site was required the HST did 
not have to be deployed for the orbiter and crew to return 
safely to Earth.  A RMS or backaway deploy would be 
considered in this case if there was sufficient time 
remaining before the deorbit burn. 
 An EVA to deploy HST manually using the crew 
members gloved hands would not have been performed 
since the size of HST would have prevented EVA crew 
members from observing each other.  Close coordination 
is required to avoid undesirable re-contact during a by-
hand payload deployment.  Unscheduled EVAs could 
also be performed no earlier than flight day 3 to address 
the following: 1) RMS failures, 2) reattach thermal 
blankets, 3) umbilical disconnect, 4) HGA deploy, 5) 
aperture door latch release, and 6) grapple fixture release. 
 
STS-31 Contingency Rendezvous and Inertial 
Approach 
 
 While rendezvous was part of the nominal mission 
plan for future servicing missions, it was a contingency 
procedure for STS-31.  The only driver, for a contingency 
rendezvous following deploy, was to open a failed closed 
HST aperture door (Figure 24.1).  The contingency 
rendezvous timeline was written for a flight day 5 
rendezvous and EVA by the crew to open the door, with 
an additional flight day added to the mission (Figure 
24.6).  However, HST would have been released even if it 
was known that an existing orbiter systems problem 
would prevent a contingency rendezvous from being 
performed.  An orbiter systems problem could require the 
orbiter to return to Earth sooner than planned.  In this 
case a Minimum Duration Flight (MDF) could be 
declared, with the orbiter returning to Earth as soon as 72 
hours after launch.  The MDF mission timeline could not 
have supported a contingency rendezvous and EVA to 
open the failed closed aperture door.  
 
Figure 24.6  Stable orbit rendezvous profile for 
STS-31 (contingency) and STS-61 and STS-82 
(both nominal).   
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 The contingency rendezvous profile was the standard 
stable orbit profile (Figure 24.6) with an inertial approach 
(Figure 24.7).13  If a rendezvous and grapple were 
required, mission responsibility would revert from the 
STOCC to the Mission Control flight director in Houston.  
At sunrise, on the grapple orbit, HST would be 
maneuvered so that the –V1 axis would be pointed into 
the velocity vector at orbital noon.  At this time the –V1 
axis would also be pointed at the payload bay of the 
approaching Discovery when it arrived on the +V Bar.  At 
orbital noon HST would then roll about the V1 axis so 
that the –V3 RMS grapple fixture would be pointed in a 
specified direction out-of-plane and on the north side of 
the orbit (Figure 24.8).  After the roll maneuver was 
complete Discovery would approach to within 200 feet 
and the RCS system would be placed in the Low Z mode 
(Figure 24.2).  This HST maneuver sequence was 
designed to align the HST for capture with the RMS of 
Discovery and to reduce or eliminate the need for 
Discovery to perform additional maneuvers to prepare for 
capture. 
 
Figure 24.7  Inertial proximity operations approach  
for STS-31 (contingency) and STS-61 (nominal). 
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STS-42 – The Proposed HST Photo Inspection 
 
 In the months following HST deployment, exposure 
of the HST solar array support mechanisms to thermal 
gradients when passing through orbital sunrise and sunset 
resulted in solar array tip deflections as large as +/-1 
meter.  These sudden deflections could cause image 
blurring and loss of fine attitude pointing required for 
astronomical observations.  In addition, there was also 
concern that repeated deflections could lead to failure of 
the solar arrays and supporting hardware. 
 By August of 1991 the STS-42 mission was planned 
for launch in January of 1992 with the International 
Microgravity Laboratory 1 (IML-1) as the primary 
payload.  Concerns about HST solar array fluctuations 
and impacts to array structural integrity led NASA to 
examine the possibility of changing the STS-42 mission 
to perform a photo inspection of HST.  Photographic 
documentation of solar array deflections during orbital 
day and night would be used to verify newly developed 
math models of solar array tip deflection.  The math 
models were critical to predicting how close to failure the 
solar arrays were.  A hand held spotlight would be used to 
facilitate photography during orbital night.   
 Flying STS-42 to HST would involve changing the 
orbital inclination from 57 degrees to 28.5 degrees, and 
increasing the orbit insertion altitude from 163 nm to 316 
nm.  The HST rendezvous altitude was 323 nm.  IML-1 
would remain as the primary payload, but some of the 
secondary payloads in the payload bay or mid-deck could 
have been removed to reduce vehicle mass to 
accommodate the higher mission altitude and propellant 
budgeting requirements.  Proximity operations design and 
procedures had to minimize plume contamination risk 
since the aperture door was to remain open.  The original 
concept called for the orbiter to perform four in-plane 
inertial fly-arounds of HST at orbital rate and a range of 
300 feet to allow each solar array to be observed for two 
orbits.  A study reduced the fly-arounds to two due to 
dual shift crew sleep requirements in support of the IML-
1.  Use of the Low Z RCS mode could have allowed the     
. 
Figure 24.8  Nominal HST attitude  
as seen from the orbiter at grapple. 
Aperture door end of HST is  
pointed away from the orbiter. 
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fly-around range to be reduced.  There was also a 
possibility that placing the HST in a LVLH attitude hold 
with the orbiter station-keeping on the +V Bar would 
provide propellant savings over the two inertial fly-
arounds.  
 The proposed change of the STS-42 mission to 
perform the HST inspection was rejected in late August 
of 1991.  Photo documentation of the solar arrays was 
later accomplished on the first servicing mission before 
grapple (STS-61, December 1993). 
 
STS-57 – Servicing Procedures Tests During 
EVA 
 
 In preparation for the first HST servicing mission, a 
series of tests was conducted during an EVA to refine 
servicing procedures.   These tests concerned the use of 
the foot restraint on the RMS by the EVA crew members.  
Tests of safety tether management, handling and aligning 
large objects by hand, and the use of HST servicing tools 
while the EVA crew member was mounted on the RMS 
were conducted.  RMS handling qualities while the EVA 
crew member held a large object were also evaluated. 
 
STS-61 – Servicing Mission 1 (SM1) 
 
 On June 25, 1990, two months to the day after 
deployment from Discovery, a spherical aberration was 
discovered in Hubble's primary mirror, significantly 
reducing the quality of astronomical observations.  A 
major objective of the first servicing mission was to 
install the Corrective Optics Space Telescope Axial 
Replacement, or COSTAR.  Five corrective mirrors in 
COSTAR corrected the optical effects of the flawed 
mirror.  Additional upgrades made by the EVA crew 
included the Wide Field Planetary Camera 2 (WFPC2) to 
replace WFPC1, new solar arrays and solar array drive 
electronics, new magnetometers, new coprocessors for 
the flight computer, two new Rate Sensor Units, two new 
Gyroscope Electronic Control Units, and a Goddard High 
Resolution Spectrometer redundancy kit.  The new solar 
arrays reduced the vibration caused by array motion as 
HST moved from orbital night to day. 
 
STS-61 Rendezvous Burn Targeting Procedural 
Work-Around 
 
 In the months before the mission, a procedural work-
around had to be developed to resolve a crew display 
limitation.  Unlike STS-31, a contingency re-rendezvous 
after HST re-deploy during STS-61 could have occurred 
when the time since lift-off (Mission Elapsed Time, or 
MET) had a two digit value for days (10 or higher).  The 
Orbit Targeting display used by the crew to compute on-
board targeted Lambert maneuvers (NCC through MC4, 
Figure 24.6) could only accept a reference MET input by 
the crew, known as Base Time, for maneuvers with a         
. 
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single digit day.  All previous rendezvous profiles 
executed by the Shuttle Program occurred when the MET 
Base Time had a single digit day (less than 10).  A 
procedural work-around was developed that manipulated 
display inputs so that targeting could be performed for 
maneuver Base Times with double digit days (10 or 
higher).  This procedure was tested and verified on shuttle 
AP-101S computers in the NASA/Johnson Space Center 
Software Production Facility.  A procedural work-around 
was preferable to a higher risk software patch.  The crew 
display software was later modified to eliminate the need 
for the procedural work-around. 
 
HST Roll Maneuver Before Grapple Discussion 
 
 During mission planning for STS-61, the HST Project 
was asked to summarize the risks of HST performing a 
roll to grapple attitude rather than the orbiter performing 
a fly-around maneuver to achieve the grapple attitude.  
The roll maneuver exposed HST to the potential of 
extended loss of electrical power, increased thermal 
heating and outgassing concerns, and could lead to 
battery depletion requiring re-charging later.  Normally 
HST is restricted to power positive attitudes, and could 
only spend a limited amount of time in the grapple 
attitude.  Although an on-board safing system protects 
HST against credible failure scenarios, and HST 
sequences were designed to minimize risk, there were 
some systems risks that could not be avoided.  HST time 
in the grapple attitude could have been extended to three 
hours if required by: 1) reducing the electrical load for 
cases when the Sun was south of the orbital plane, or 2) 
slewing the solar arrays to an angle not normally flown.  
Electrical load reduction was undesirable and the solar 
array orientation was untested, and could expose the 
arrays to increased plume impingement.  The advantage 
of deleting the roll maneuver in favor of an orbiter fly-
around was that HST would remain in a power positive 
attitude, undesirable procedural work-arounds could be 
avoided, thermal heating and outgassing concerns would 
be eliminated, and the need for later battery re-charging 
would be minimized. 
 In place of the HST roll, a large orbiter yaw maneuver 
would have been required, with the magnitude dependent 
on the position of the solar line-of-sight with respect to 
the orbital plane.  The maneuver would be performed in 
Low Z to minimize plume impingement, and would take 
place at a safe distance from HST to avoid contact 
between the RMS end effector and the HST solar arrays.  
Disadvantages of the orbiter yaw included magnification 
of orbital mechanics effects that could cause the two 
spacecraft to separate due to the larger than normal 
station-keeping distance, cross coupling from the Low Z 
mode that would increase the difficulty of piloting, 
difficulty of performing the yaw maneuver while station-
keeping, and loss of RMS end effector camera range-rate 
cues for piloting.  Additional concerns with the orbiter      
. 
yaw maneuver included increased propellant 
consumption, maneuver completion during orbital night, 
RMS end effector camera pointed at the Sun if the 
maneuver ended during orbital day, and increased plume 
impingent and plume contamination of HST.  While the 
yaw maneuver was flyable, and is required as a 
contingency procedure regardless of the nominal mission 
plan, it was undesirable as a nominal procedure.  The 
HST roll maneuver was retained (Figure 24.7), but the 
HST roll angle was selected that facilitated a single joint 
non-orthogonal capture with the RMS. 
 
STS-61 Proximity Operations Piloting Aids 
 
 STS-61 carried three proximity operations piloting 
aids that were not in the shuttle baseline design in the 
1970s.  Two were hand held laser rangefinders, the 
Melios and the LTI.  The third was a laptop computer 
(Payload General Support Computer, or PGSC) running 
the Payload Bay (PLBAY) program.  PLBAY provided 
the crew with enhanced situational awareness of relative 
motion.  PLBAY could accept laser range, radar range 
and elevation angle, and shuttle payload bay Closed 
Circuit Television Camera (CCTV) angle measurements 
for improving the estimate of relative motion provided 
the crew.  Through the use of paper charts in the crew 
procedures book the crew could use radar angles, CCTV 
angles, and SPACEHAB camera angles to determine 
range out to 240 feet.  COAS subtended angles could 
provide a rough range estimate out to 1500 feet.  
However angles were backup sources of range 
measurement to be used only if the rendezvous radar 
failed. 
 
STS-61 Rendezvous and Proximity Operations  
 
 HST was successfully maneuvered to the rendezvous 
attitude and the aperture door closed on flight day 2.   The 
nominal rendezvous was designed with HST grapple on 
flight day 3.  The on-board targeted phase profile on the 
day of rendezvous was the standard stable orbit profile 
(Figure 24.6) that was also carried as a contingency for 
STS-31.  The crew sighted HST near the start of the first 
star tracker pass (Figure 24.6).  Two star tracker passes 
were performed before the first on-board targeted 
maneuver, Corrective Combination (NCC).†  Radar data 
was incorporated after NCC.  The Transition Initiation 
(Ti) maneuver targeted the orbiter for a HST intercept.  
Following Mid-course Correction 4 (MC4) the crew 
began the proximity operations phase and near-
continuous manual trajectory control.   
 † “N” originally (1960s) was a Docking Initiation (DKI) targeting 
program counter variable for the number of the crossing of the chaser 
line of apsides where the maneuver was performed (as in 1 for first 
apogee, 1.5 for first perigee, 5 for fifth apogee, etc.).  In documentation 
the burns were named NC (Catch-up or phasing), NH (Height), NPC 
(Plane Change), NSR (Slow Rate or coelliptic), and NCC (Corrective 
Combination).  See Appendix H. 
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 After the orbiter Ti maneuver, HST was configured 
by the STOCC to reduce the electrical power required, in 
order to accommodate the HST roll to grapple attitude 
during proximity operations.  At the start of the terminal 
phase (post MC4), the HST +V3 axis pointed at the sun.  
The solar arrays were aligned with the V1 axis and the –
V3 HGA was stowed to maximize clearance for the RMS 
grapple.  However, HST could have been grappled and 
berthed with the HGA deployed, if required.  
Approximately 20 minutes before the orbiter reached the 
+V Bar, HST began a roll maneuver to place the RMS 
grapple fixture on the north side of the orbital plane 
(Figure 24.8).   
 At a range of 400 feet the crew transitioned the flight 
control system to the Low Z mode to avoid plume over-
pressure on the HST solar arrays (Figures 24.2 and 24.7).  
Increased fidelity plume impingement analysis resulted in 
a procedural change to place the flight control system in 
the Low Z mode at a range of 400 feet, rather than 200 
feet as had been called out in the STS-31 contingency 
rendezvous procedures.  This change was made to avoid 
structural damage to the HST solar array bi-stems. 
 The HST roll maneuver was completed by the time 
the orbiter arrived on the +V Bar, at orbital noon, at a 
range of approximately 350 feet (Figure 24.7).  At this 
time the HST –V1 axis (end of HST opposite the aperture 
door) was aligned with the +V Bar and pointing at the 
orbiter (Figure 24.8).  The crew continued the inertial 
approach until reaching the station-keeping range of 35 
feet.  The grapple was successful, and was scheduled to 
occur 10 minutes after orbital sunset to minimize shuttle 
camera blooming and permit completion of photography 
of solar array deflection during sunset.   
 During the flight, considerable work was done on 
possible changes to the solar array jettison procedure to 
account for the possibility of having to jettison one 
jammed solar array while the other fragile array was also 
stuck in a deployed state (Table 24.2). One of the original 
solar arrays did not retract when commanded, and was 
subsequently jettisoned by an EVA crew member 
attached to the end of the RMS.  The other array was 
returned to Earth.  After jettison, rotational and 
translational motion imparted to the solar array by shuttle 
RCS jet plume impingement was clearly visible to the 
crew and Mission Control personnel.  Some personnel 
commented that the flapping motion of the array appeared 
to be like a prehistoric pterodactyl.  It was estimated that 
3 feet/second of delta-velocity was imparted to the array 
by RCS jet firings based on radar ground tracking and on-
board laser measurements.  Solar array motion heightened 
concerns about plume impingement on HST.  The new 
solar arrays were installed and unfurled successfully.  
However, the new arrays had a noticeable twist that 
contributed to increased plume impingement concerns on 
later missions.  Additional work during the flight focused 
on changes to the tool chasing procedure, and a 
separation that used the normal Z RCS jets (Figure 24.2).   
STS-61 Deploy  
 
 Before HST deploy the shuttle performed a re-boost, 
circularizing the HST orbit at 321 nm.  Starting with STS-
61, the aperture door was opened before HST was 
deployed from the shuttle (Figure 24.9).  If the door failed 
to open, the crew could perform an EVA with HST 
berthed in the payload bay to manually open the door.  
Unlike STS-31, no contingency re-rendezvous for the 
crew to manually open the aperture door during an EVA 
was planned for STS-61 or subsequent servicing 
missions.  However, this did not preclude one from being 
performed, if required.  The HST deploy and separation 
sequence was designed to be flexible to preserve a re-
rendezvous capability.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 The nominal separation sequence provided safe post-
deploy relative motion and minimized plume 
impingement, contamination, and propellant consumption 
(Figure 24.10).  Nominal HST deploy was designed to 
occur at least 20 minutes before sunset.  Ground 
communications with HST was required from before the 
opening of the deploy window to after deploy.  Both 
HGAs were deployed before HST release from the RMS, 
with the solar arrays aligned with the V1 axis and the 
+V3 axis pointed at the sun.  This deploy attitude was        
. 
Figure 24.9  HST deployment for STS-61 
and subsequent missions.  Note open 
door. 
Sun 
+V3 
+V2 
+V1 
Figure 24.10  Nominal and alternate STS-61 HST  
deploy profiles. 
•  
1. HST  
    deploy. 
+1000 
+V Bar (feet) 
+R Bar  
(feet) 
+2000 
+3000 
+1000 +2000 +3000 +4000 •  
•  
•  
•  
•  
2. SEP1 burn. 
3. Begin maneuver  
    to SEP2 attitude. 
4. SEP2 burn 
    (out-of-plane). 
5. Begin maneuver  
    to SEP3 attitude. 
6. SEP2  
    burn. 
NOMINAL 
ALTERNATE 
•  
•  
•  
2. SEP1  
    burn. 
3. Begin  
    maneuver  
    to SEP2  
    attitude. 
4. SEP2  
    burn 
A CLOSER LOOK AT THE HUBBLE SERVICING MISSIONS 
Approved for public release via STI DAA 
24483. See statement on title page. 208  
optimal for power generation.   An alternate separation 
sequence was developed late in the mission planning 
process that required less propellant, but it had a shorter 
deploy window.  HST was successfully re-deployed and 
the alternate separation sequence was flown.  
 
STS-82 – Servicing Mission 2 (SM2) 
 
 Two new science instruments were added to HST 
during the second servicing mission (Table 24.1).  These 
were the Space Telescope Imaging Spectrograph and the 
Near Infrared Camera and Multi-Object Spectrometer.  
Hardware replacements included a refurbished Fine 
Guidance Sensor, a new Solid State Recorder, one new 
Reaction Wheel Assembly to replace one of the four 
original units, and the addition of an Optical Control 
Electronics Enhancement kit.  Other maintenance items 
included replacement of one of the four Data Interface 
Units and replacement of one of the two Solar Array 
Drive Electronics units. 
 
STS-82 Proximity Operations Piloting Aids 
 
 STS-82 was the first Hubble mission to carry the 
Rendezvous and Proximity Operations Program (RPOP).  
RPOP was originally based on the PLBAY program 
flown on STS-61, but much improved.  Hand Held Lidar 
(HHL) units were also carried by the crew to obtain range 
and range rate measurements during the proximity 
operations phase.  By the time of STS-82, RPOP and 
HHL had been proven on a number of shuttle missions to 
the Mir space station.  The Trajectory Control Sensor 
(TCS) lidar normally carried in the payload bay was not 
carried on HST missions since HST does not have retro-
reflectors that are compatible with it. 
 
STS-82 Rendezvous and Proximity Operations 
 
 At the end of powered ascent, a 6.1 ft/sec Main 
Engine Cut-Off (MECO) under-speed occurred.  This 
resulted in the re-planning by Mission Control of two 
burns on the day of rendezvous, before on-board sensor 
tracking started (Figure 24.6).  Similar MECO under-
speeds were seen on other HST servicing missions as 
well.  While the under-speeds were within the design 
margins of the shuttle, mission planning for the later STS-
125 and Atlantis rescue mission was performed to 
minimize MECO under-speed and subsequent rendezvous 
burn impacts. 
 The rendezvous profile flown by STS-82 was the 
same stable orbit profile flown by STS-61 (Figure 24.6).  
During the first star tracker pass, the star tracker lost lock 
on a dim HST and began tracking what was later 
determined to be the star Saiph.  The relative navigation 
filter in the shuttle computer rejected two star tracker 
measurements and then momentarily re-established lock    
. 
on a slightly brighter HST.  Lock on HST was lost again 
and the star tracker acquired what was apparently nearby 
orbital debris.  The navigation state was corrupted by 
three navigation updates during the debris tracking 
period.  A crew command to inhibit navigation processing 
was not accepted by the shuttle computer due to a known 
timing issue.  The star tracker re-acquired HST and 
subsequent measurements corrected the error introduced 
by the spurious measurements.  The crew replaced the 
state vector that had received spurious updates with a 
backup vector.  The star tracker pass continued without 
incident.  Post flight analysis indicated that the HST solar 
arrays were parallel to the star tracker’s line-of-sight and 
pointed to the Sun.  The end of the HST (the V1 axis, 
Figure 24.1) was pointed to the orbiter.  This combination 
of HST attitude with the sun 90 degrees from the star 
tracker line-of-sight resulted in a dim target, causing the 
star tracker to lose lock on HST. 
 After the first star tracker pass, an additional 
unplanned out-of-plane correction maneuver was 
performed based on ground radar tracking data and the 
results of the first star tracker pass (Figure 24.6).  Out-of-
plane corrections during the rest of the rendezvous were 
minor.  The remaining rendezvous and grapple activities 
were nominal. 
 While the rendezvous profiles for STS-61 and STS-82 
were the same, STS-82 flew a different final approach 
during proximity operations.  Just after MC4 the crew 
transitioned from the inertial approach to a lower energy 
+R Bar approach (Figure 24.11).  The +R Bar approach 
(Figure 24.12) was developed for the shuttle missions to 
Mir and the ISS in 1994.  It was first flown on STS-66 
(November 1994) during the rendezvous with and 
retrieval of the CRISTA-SPAS deployed payload.13 
 The primary advantage of the new approach was 
natural orbital mechanics braking.  This reduced the risk 
of plume impingement as fewer RCS jet firings were 
required. The natural orbital mechanics braking allowed 
the HST Low Z range constraint to be increased to 1500 
ft to provide additional plume protection as the HST 
slowly rotated above the approaching shuttle (Table 
24.3).  A +R Bar approach also provided a hands-off 
separation, that required no RCS jet firings due to orbital 
mechanics.  Once the range to HST was less than 150 
feet, the crew would station-keep on the +R Bar and wait 
for the HST –V1 axis to align with the orbiter –Z axis 
(Figures 24.12 and 24.13).  Once the axes were aligned, 
the crew would establish an inertial attitude hold and 
perform an inertial approach to the 35 foot station-
keeping range for RMS grapple of HST.  
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STS-82 Contingency Inertial Approach 
 
 If the aperture door failed to close before rendezvous, 
the unprotected HST optics could be pointed at an orbiter 
performing a +R Bar approach (Figure 24.12).  This 
would result in unacceptable contamination of the HST 
optical system.  To protect for the aperture door failed 
open case an inertial proximity operations approach, like 
that flown on STS-61, would have been performed 
(Figure 24.7).  During an inertial approach the open 
aperture door would be pointed away from the 
approaching orbiter during proximity operations. The 
inertial approach, however, meant increased propellant 
consumption.  For STS-82, the inertial approach 
procedures were not part of the rendezvous procedures 
book flown on the orbiter, but they would have been 
uplinked to the crew, if required.   
 
STS-82 Nominal Deploy 
 
 STS-82 included a new deploy requirement as 
ultraviolet light reflected off of the Earth might enter the 
telescope when the aperture door was open.  The 
ultraviolet light could cause any contamination that might 
accumulate on the mirror during the servicing mission to 
permanently adhere to the mirror.  The STS-82 deploy 
procedure had the same RMS position as on STS-61, but 
a new orbiter attitude.  The new requirement was to point 
the HST +V1 axis away from the bright Earth limb.  HST 
was to be released in daylight before sunset to allow 
adequate HST sun sensor acquisition time.  The release 
attitude pointed the +V3 axis at the sun.  Both HGAs 
were deployed.  The overall deploy procedures 
minimized plume impingement, contamination, and 
propellant use.  Deploy design also ensured shuttle crew 
and ground communication with HST before and after 
release.   
 Two deploy and separation profiles were prepared for 
the mission (Figure 24.14 and 26.15).  The appropriate 
profile was chosen based on the side of the orbital plane 
where the Sun was located.  The initial HST separation 
burn was changed based on experience from procedures 
developed for deployments of spacecraft equipped with a 
solid rocket motor, such as the Inertial Upper Stage.  The 
first separation burn was performed with two forward 
firing –X RCS jets while the flight control system was in 
free drift.  As this burn moved the orbiter away from the 
HST, the +Z thrust component of the forward jets caused 
the orbiter to pitch nose-down until commanded to stop a 
short while later.  This rotation provided adequate 
clearance to the cabin while keeping HST visible to the 
crew over the payload bay.  The –X jet separation also 
used less propellant and had a lower risk of plume 
impingement than a Low Z separation.   
  HST re-deploy was nominal.  However, the 
second burn in the two burn separation sequence was 
under-burned (Figure 24.14).   While the post-burn            
. 
 
Figure 24.14  Nominal HST deploy profile 
for Sun north of the orbital plane, missions  
82, 103, 109, and 125. 
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Figure 24.15  Nominal HST deploy profile for  
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relative motion placed Discovery on a safe departure 
trajectory, the separation rate was less than desired.  In 
addition, cross-coupling, of RCS attitude control firings 
into translational motion, threatened to further decrease 
the separation rate of Discovery.   A third separation burn 
was computed by Mission Control.  Burn data was voiced 
to the crew and the burn was executed.  Post-flight 
analysis indicated that the under-burn was due to the high 
rate of Translational Hand Controller (THC) deflection.  
A restriction on the THC deflection rate was known at 
one time, but the constraint had not been included in the 
crew procedure.  The procedure was later modified for 
later flights to replace large numbers of pulses with a 
single continuous THC deflection, and crew training was 
improved to increase awareness of the deflection rate 
limit. 
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STS-103 – Servicing Mission 3A (SM3A) 
 
 The third servicing mission (SM3) was originally 
planned for June of 2000.  However, in February of 1999 
a third gyroscope failure occurred.  While HST was 
capable of supporting science activities with no fewer 
than three gyroscopes, NASA decided to re-schedule the 
third repair mission to fly before the end of 1999 and 
replace the failed gyroscopes.  Some hardware originally 
scheduled for the original SM3 mission in 2000 was not 
ready to support a flight in 1999.  As a result, SM3 was 
split into two missions, SM3A (STS-103) and SM3B 
(STS-109).  Replacement hardware, not available to 
support the 1999 SM3A mission, was redirected to the 
newly defined SM3B (STS-109) mission that was later 
flown in March of 2002.   
 SM3A servicing objectives included replacement of 
all six gyroscopes, a new computer, replacement of one 
of three Fine Guidance Sensors, an aft shroud latches 
repair, installation of handrail covers, a new outer blanket 
layer, a new S-Band Single Access Transmitter, 
shell/shield replacement fabric, and voltage/temperature 
improvement kits for the batteries.‡  SM3A did not install 
any new scientific instruments.  The failure of a fourth 
gyroscope on November 19, 1999, a month before the 
SM3A launch, resulted in HST entering a safe mode.  
Astronomical observations could not be performed while 
in safe mode.  Significant crew training resources were 
expended to develop and refine manual piloting 
techniques to approach and grapple HST in the HWSP 
and ZGSP safe mode configurations.  SM3A mission 
planning ensured that the deorbit and landing would 
occur in 1999 to avoid any potential year 2000 rollover 
computer issues. 
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STS-103 Rendezvous and Proximity Operations 
 
 The previous mission, STS-82, flew a stable orbit 
profile with a +R Bar final approach (Figure 24.6 and 
24.11).  However, the stable orbit profile baselined for the 
shuttle in April of 1983 was originally designed to 
support inertial approaches with lower energy than 
inertial approaches from the Apollo legacy coelliptic 
profile.13  While the stable orbit/+R Bar combination was 
successfully flown on a number of missions, starting with 
STS-66 in November of 1994, stable orbit was not a 
propellant optimal profile to support a +R Bar approach.  
A new version of stable orbit rendezvous, Optimized R 
Bar Targeted (ORBT) rendezvous, was specifically 
designed to support the +R Bar technique (Figure 24.16 
and 24.17).  ORBT required fewer jet firings for +R Bar 
trajectory stabilization and braking than stable orbit.  
ORBT was first flown on the STS-86 mission to Mir in 
September-October 1997.   STS-103 was the first HST 
servicing mission to fly the ORBT/+R Bar combination.  
The change from the stable orbit to the ORBT profile 
resulted in some differences in STS-82 and STS-103 +R 
Bar approach procedures.   
 On the day of rendezvous, during the first star tracker 
pass, the Moon approached the star tracker line-of-sight 
to the HST.  Anticipating that the bright Moon would 
cause an automatic closure of the star tracker shutter, 
flight controllers prepared for the event by providing the 
crew with times to inhibit star tracker measurements as 
the Moon passed through the star tracker field of view.  
However, the star tracker Bright Object Sensor did not 
close the shutter in response to the Moon until the Moon 
was well inside the field of view.  In response the crew 
inhibited star tracker measurements for approximately       
. 
A CLOSER LOOK AT THE HUBBLE SERVICING MISSIONS 
+R Bar Arrival 
MC4 
MC3 
MC2 
MC1 
MC1 
MC2 
MC3 
MC4 
Stable Orbit &  
Inertial Approach 
ORBT & +R Bar 
Approach  
Ti 
Ti 
-V Bar (nm) 
+R Bar (nm) 
•  
•  
•  
•  
•  
•  
•  
•  
•  
•  
•  
+1.0 
+2.0 
+0.5 
+1.5 
-2 -4 -6 -8 
Figure 24.17  Comparison of ORBT and contingency  
stable orbit rendezvous profiles for STS-103, STS-
109, and STS-125. 
‡ S. Lee, S. Anandakrishnan, C. Connor, E. Moy, D. Smith, M. 
Myslinski, L. Markley, and A. Vernacchio, “Hubble Space Telescope 
Servicing Missions 3A Rendezvous Operations,” 2001 Flight Mechanics 
Symposium, NASA/CP-2001-209986, NASA Goddard Space Flight 
Center, June 19-21, 2001, pages 529-543. 
Approved for public release via STI DAA 
24483. See statement on title page. 212  
seven and a half minutes during the first pass and for 
approximately eight minutes during the second pass 
(Figure 24.16).  Sufficient navigation data was collected 
during the two passes.  Some noise in the radar angle  
measurements was noted after the MC4 burn.  This was 
normal and the noise seen on HST missions is much less 
than that observed on ISS missions.   
 Due to the fourth gyro failure on November 19, 1999, 
the HST Program chose to maintain attitude using the 
Hardware Sunpoint mode and back-up gyros (RMGA).  
Fortunately, HST entered the Hardware Sunpoint mode 
with the V1 axis very close to the orbital plane.  The crew 
was able to confirm the Hardware Sunpoint attitude using 
binoculars about an hour before the grapple.  After a 
nominal +R bar approach the crew executed a 90 degree 
yaw maneuver on the +R Bar to achieve the grapple 
attitude.  HST was grappled with Discovery on the +V1 
aperture door end of HST (Figure 24.1).  Propellant 
consumption during proximity operations was higher than 
expected.  Possible causes included noisy radar range rate 
measurements, and RCS jet cross coupling during the 
yaw maneuver.  Low Z braking starting at 1500 feet also 
increased propellant consumption.  Had the V1 axis not 
been close to the orbital plane, the grapple alignment 
maneuver would have been more complicated than a 
simple yaw and cost even more propellant.  In addition, 
the Sun was close to the orbital plane and above HST, 
complicating observation of HST and washing out 
displays in the shuttle cockpit.   
 
STS-103 Contingency Stable Orbit and Inertial 
Approach 
 
 Starting with STS-103, the nominal rendezvous 
profile was ORBT, supporting a +R Bar approach 
(Figures 24.12, 24.16, and 24.17).  However, should the 
aperture door fail to close before rendezvous, a +R Bar 
approach could expose the HST optics to RCS jet plume 
contamination.  Like STS-82, in the event that the HST 
aperture door failed to close before rendezvous, the 
orbiter would perform an inertial approach (Figure 24.7).*  
However, this inertial approach would be flown from a 
legacy stable orbit profile (Figure 24.6, 24.17, and 24.18), 
instead of the nominal ORBT profile (Figure 24.16, 
24.17, and 24.18).  
 With the proper timing, the failed open HST aperture 
door could be pointed away from the approaching orbiter 
throughout an inertial approach, to minimize risk of 
optics contamination.  Execution of a contingency stable 
orbit would have required re-planning of the last ground 
targeted maneuver by Mission Control (NC in Figure 24.6 
and 26.16).  HST attitude would be managed so that the –
V1 axis would be pointed at the orbiter at the MC4 + 2 
minute point, where the crew took manual control and      
. 
placed the orbiter in an inertial attitude hold (Figure 
26.18).  At +V Bar arrival the –V1 axis would be pointed 
at the orbiter payload bay.  This combination of HST 
attitude and inertial approach ensured that the failed open 
aperture door would always be pointed away from the 
approaching orbiter during proximity operations, 
minimizing the risk of plume contamination of HST 
optics.  However, as the aperture door had closed at the 
time of the fourth gyro failure on November 19, there was 
no need to protect for this contingency.   
 
STS-103 Deploy 
 
 STS-103 mission planning included the same nominal 
deploy sequence options as STS-82 (Figure 24.14 and 
26.15).  Re-deployment of HST and separation by 
Discovery were nominal (Figure 24.15). 
 
STS-109 – Servicing Mission 3B (SM3B) 
 
 Servicing Mission SM3B (March 2002) placed new 
hardware on HST that was not ready in time to support 
the SM3A mission flown in December of 1999 (Table 
24.1).  Maintenance activities included an Advanced 
Camera for Surveys to replace the Faint Object Camera, 
replacement of a power control unit, one of four reaction 
wheel assemblies, and a new cooling system for the Near 
Infrared Camera and Multi-Object Spectrometer.  With 
the replacement of the Faint Object Camera, none of the 
optical sensors required the corrective optics installed in 
HST with COSTAR on STS-61 in December of 1993.  In 
addition, new solar arrays were installed that had more 
rigidity, produced more power, and were smaller than the 
arrays installed during STS-61. 
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STS-109 Rendezvous and Proximity Operations 
 
 The rate of orbital decay of HST resulted in a 
rendezvous altitude that was lower than the orbital 
insertion altitude.  To compensate, the normally posigrade 
catch-up maneuver (NC in Figure 24.16) before the first 
star tracker pass on the day of rendezvous was retrograde.   
 The ORBT rendezvous profile for STS-109 was 
modified from two revolutions to Ti to one revolution to 
Ti (Figure 24.16), taking advantage of experience gained 
in numerous shortened rendezvous profiles flown on 
missions to the Mir space station and ISS.  This 
eliminated one star tracker pass that had mainly served as 
a backup relative navigation opportunity, but provided 
extra time in the crew day in the timeline after HST 
grapple.  Other aspects of the STS-109 ORBT profile 
were the same as STS-103.  STS-109 also carried the 
same +R Bar approach procedure as STS-103 (Figures 
24.12, 24.13, 24.16, and 24.17). 
 The +R Bar approach proceeded more slowly than in 
ground simulations.  This was consistent with previous 
missions and likely due to noisy range rate measurements 
and the difficulty of viewing HST against the Sun.  
Welding goggles were used by the crew to view HST, but 
the goggles made it difficult to observe displays in the 
cockpit.  Proximity operations propellant consumption 
was higher than predicted, but within acceptable margins.  
HST was successfully grappled. 
 
STS-109 Contingency Stable Orbit and Inertial 
Approach 
 
 STS-109 carried the same contingency stable orbit 
and inertial approach procedures as STS-103 (Figures 
20.17 and 20.18).  Unlike the stable orbit profile in Figure 
24.6, the STS-109 stable orbit profile would have been 
one revolution between NC and Ti.  However, these 
procedures were not performed as the HST aperture door 
was successfully closed before rendezvous. 
 
STS-109 Deploy 
 
 STS-109 mission planning included the same nominal 
deploy procedures as STS-82 and STS-103 (Figures 
20.14 and 20.15).  HST was successfully deployed 
(Figure 24.14). 
 
The Columbia Accident, Robotic Servicing, and 
Servicing Mission 4 
 
 At the time of the loss of Columbia (February 1, 
2003) two further missions to HST were on the Shuttle 
Program flight planning manifest.  SM4 (STS-123) would 
be flown by Columbia on November 18, 2004.  Another 
mission by Columbia (STS-144), with a projected launch 
date of November 19, 2009, was to return HST to Earth if 
safety and payload bay structural issues could be                
. 
resolved.  However, the loss of Columbia and her crew 
resulted in significant changes to planning for future 
shuttle missions to the HST. 
 As a part of the Return to Flight (RTF) activity after 
the Columbia accident, NASA developed a plan to 
provide Contingency Shuttle Crew Support (CSCS) for a 
shuttle crew stranded on the ISS due to a compromised 
shuttle Thermal Protection System (TPS).  The crew 
would remain on the ISS until the shuttle TPS was 
repaired, or another shuttle was launched to the ISS to 
return the stranded crew to Earth.  However, the ISS 
would be available to a shuttle crew as a safe haven since 
the shuttle does not carry enough propellant to transfer 
from a HST servicing mission orbit to an ISS orbit.15 
 On January 16, 2004, NASA Administrator Sean 
O’Keefe announced that no more HST servicing missions 
would be flown since the ISS would not be accessible to 
the shuttle crew for a safe haven.  Future shuttle missions 
would be limited to those flying to the ISS.  However, 
without another servicing mission, it was expected that 
HST degraded hardware (gyroscopes, batteries) 
performance would not permit HST to perform 
astronomy beyond the year 2010.   
 On February 20, 2004, NASA issued a Request for 
Information to industry concerning the feasibility of a 
robotic servicing and deorbit mission to HST, known as 
the Hubble Robotic Servicing and De-orbit Mission 
(HRSDM).9  This mission would extend the life of the 
telescope and permit a safe deorbit over the Pacific Ocean 
once HST was no longer capable of performing the 
astronomy mission.16  In September of 2004 NASA 
awarded a contract to Lockheed Martin to build the de-
orbit module for the HST Robotic Vehicle (HRV).  The 
following month MacDonald, Dettwiler and Associates 
Ltd. was awarded a contract to build the robotic system 
for the HRV.  The NASA Goddard Space Flight Center 
was to develop the HRV Ejection Module where the 
robotics would be mounted.  HRV faced significant 
challenges to develop and certify robotic servicing, and 
automated and autonomous rendezvous, proximity 
operations, and grapple in time to meet the proposed 
December 14, 2007 launch date.  HRV development was 
canceled on February 8, 2005, due to cost, schedule, and 
technical risk concerns. 
 Successful shuttle missions in 2005 and 2006, along 
with successful development of TPS inspection and repair 
methods, led NASA Administrator Michael Griffin to 
announce in October of 2006 that NASA would fly 
another servicing mission before the end of the Shuttle 
Program in 2010.  NASA re-examined the risk of an HST 
mission and the use of existing TPS inspection and repair 
methods.  Shuttle TPS could be inspected and repaired by 
the crew using only equipment carried on the orbiter.  In 
addition, the concept of using another shuttle to rescue 
the servicing mission crew was determined to be feasible. 
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  STS-125 – Servicing Mission 4 (SM4) 
 
 The primary objective of SM4 (May 2009) was the 
installation of two new scientific instruments, the Wide 
Field Camera 3 (WFC3) and the Cosmic Origins 
Spectrograph (COS).17, 18  The COSTAR, installed during 
STS-61 to correct the spherical aberration of the primary 
mirror, was removed to make room for the COS and 
returned to Earth.  New scientific instruments installed 
since STS-61 in 1993 had corrective optics and COSTAR 
was no longer needed.  WFC2 was removed from HST as 
well.  The Advanced Camera for Surveys partially failed 
in 2007 due to an electrical short and it was repaired.  The 
Space Telescope Imaging Spectrograph suffered a power 
failure in 2004 and was also repaired.  In addition, all six 
gyroscopes and batteries were replaced.  One of three 
Fine Guidance Sensors was replaced and new Outer 
Blanket Layer insulation was installed.  The crew also 
replaced the Science Instrument Control & Data Handling 
(SIC&DH) unit.  Side A of the HST Control Unit/Science 
Data Formatter within the SIC&DH failed on September 
27, 2008.  Side B supported astronomy activities after the 
failure. 
 SM4 also mounted a Low Impact Docking System 
(LIDS) passive interface on the Hubble aft bulkhead.  
LIDS was developed as the docking hardware for the 
Constellation Program.  LIDS will enable future human 
or robotic vehicles to dock with HST for servicing or 
HST deorbit.  The Hubble soft capture mechanism, 
including the LIDS passive interface, was attached to the 
HST berthing pins that were used to berth Hubble to the 
Flight Support System (FSS) in the shuttle payload bay.  
Four retro-reflectors were also be mounted on the 
assembly to support relative navigation sensors of future 
human or robotic vehicles.19, 20  The retro-reflectors are 
designed to work with the lidar sensors that were 
commercially available at the time of the Hubble Robotic 
Servicing and Deorbit Mission design effort.8  Painted 
patterns on the target assembly are designed to work with 
future optical recognition algorithms.  The Relative 
Navigation Sensor (RNS), a NASA Goddard sensor, was 
also flown for testing during proximity operations.19, 20 
 
Impact of HST Hardware Failure 
 
 By September of 2008 STS-125 (Atlantis) launch was 
scheduled for October 8.  Endeavour was assigned the 
role of the Launch On Need (LON) rescue vehicle, 
mission STS-400.  If the LON mission was required 
Endeavour could launch within 10 days of the launch of 
Atlantis.  Atlantis was rolled from the Vehicle Assembly 
Building (VAB) to Pad 39A on Thursday, September 4, 
2008.  Endeavour was rolled from the VAB to Pad 39B 
on Friday, September 19.  This was the first time since 
July 2001 that two shuttles were on the launch pads at the 
same time.  However, on September 27, side A of the 
HST Control Unit/Science Data Formatter (CUSDF)        
. 
failed, preventing the transmission of science data to 
Earth.  The unit could not be reset.  This caused NASA to 
delay of the launch of STS-125 to no earlier than 
February of 2009, so that the STS-125 EVA crew could 
train to replace the malfunctioning hardware.  Atlantis 
was rolled back to the VAB.  Endeavour was moved to 
pad 39A for the STS-126 mission to ISS (flown 
November 2008).   
 The delay resulted in a switch of the LON rescue 
mission from Endeavour to the orbiter Discovery.  The 
Discovery LON was designated STS-401.  After STS-125 
flew, no earlier than February 2009, and if no STS-401 
mission was required, Discovery would fly STS-119.  
However, the STS-125 launch slipped past the launch 
date for STS-119.  Discovery flew the STS-119 mission 
before STS-125 in March 2009.  Endeavour was 
reassigned the role of rescue orbiter and the previous 
LON designation of STS-400 was re-established. 
 The original LON crew was the flight deck crew from 
STS-123 (Endeavour, March of 2008).  They were 
Dominic Gorie (commander), Gregory H. Johnson (pilot), 
Robert Behnken (Mission Specialist 1), and Michael 
Foreman (Mission Specialist 2).  By February of 2009 
they had been replaced by the flight deck crew from STS-
126 (Endeavour, November of 2008).  The new LON 
crew was Chris Ferguson (commander), Eric Boe (pilot), 
Robert Kimbrough (Mission Specialist 1), and Stephen 
Bowen (Mission Specialist 2). 
 
STS-125 Propellant, Deorbit, and Landing Challenges 
 
 The high HST orbital altitude increased the risk of a 
collision with orbital debris as the lower atmospheric 
density does not cause the debris to decay as rapidly as 
debris at lower orbital altitudes.  Increased concern about 
orbital debris at the HST orbital altitude led the Shuttle 
Program to reduce the amount of time the orbiter is at that 
altitude between HST deployment and the deorbit burn.  
In addition, it is necessary that any maneuvers performed 
by the orbiter after HST deploy contribute to deorbit.   
Placing the orbiter in an elliptical orbit before the deorbit 
burn limits the landing opportunities since deorbit burns 
near perigee are far more costly in propellant.  This is 
true even for landing sites that are within the orbiter’s 
entry cross-range capability.  The post deorbit burn 
perigee has to be placed at an appropriate latitude for a 
landing at the Kennedy Space Center or Edwards Air 
Force Base. 
 
STS-125 Nominal and Contingency Procedures for 
Rendezvous, Proximity Operations, and Deploy 
 
 STS-125 carried the same ORBT rendezvous profile 
and +R Bar approach procedures as STS-109 (Figures 
24.12, 24.13, 24.16, and 24.17).  In the event that the 
HST aperture door failed to close before final approach, 
STS-125 would have performed the same contingency      
. 
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  stable orbit and inertial approach that was prepared for 
STS-103 and STS-109.  The nominal STS-125 deploy 
sequence was the same as that flown on STS-82, STS-
103, and STS-109 (Figures 24.14 and 24.15). 
 
STS-125 Proximity Operations Piloting Aids 
 
 The crew would used HHL as a piloting aid during 
proximity operations, as was done on previous HST 
missions.  TCS was not flown since HST is not equipped 
with TCS retro-reflectors.  However, a TCS retro-
reflector would have been installed in the Atlantis 
payload bay on the ODS truss during a contingency EVA 
to support the rescue orbiter contingency rendezvous.   
 
STS-125 Atlantis Rendezvous With HST 
 
 STS-125 was launched on Monday, May 11, 2009, 
from launch pad 39A.21  The launch window was 66 
minutes long.  The crew timeline was packed and a slip in 
the launch time within the 66 minute window would 
result in a loss of crew timeline equal to the slip.  
However, the preferred (and actual) launch time was 20 
minutes inside the launch window to buy back ascent 
performance margin. 
 At MECO there was a 2 foot/second over-speed.  The 
post OMS-2 perigee was changed from 108 nm to 107 nm 
to account for this. 
 Pre-mission trajectory analysis indicated that the post 
Main Propulsion System dump would result in an apogee 
that was too high.  The high apogee could result in a NC-
4 burn on the day of rendezvous of less than 2 
feet/second.  During rendezvous with HST the orbiter’s 
perigee is raised in a controlled manner.  If apogee is 
already high, NC-4 and NH on the day of rendezvous can 
become very small and possibly retrograde.  It is 
desirable to avoid retrograde maneuvers.   
 A proposal was made to delete the post External Tank 
+X RCS burn.  Deleting the 5 foot/second burn after ET 
separation would add 5 feet/second to NC-4.  The post 
External Tank separation +X RCS burn is performed so 
that the orbiter umbilical well cameras can photograph 
the entire length of the External Tank.  A pitch rate from 
the maneuver enables the crew to later photograph the 
External Tank from long range through the aft cockpit 
overhead windows.  However, the proposal was not 
approved and the +X RCS burn was performed. 
 If un-repairable TPS damage had been detected 
during the inspections on FD2 (Flight Day 2), Atlantis 
systems and consumables (such as power and oxygen) 
could have been managed to keep the crew alive for up to 
24 days.  If the late TPS inspection on FD10 were to 
detect un-repairable TPS damage, the crew could have 
been supported for up to 16.5 days.  A STS-400 rescue of 
Atlantis by Endeavour could have been conducted no 
earlier than 15 days and 16 hours after the inspection 
revealed the damaged TPS.   
  
 On FD2 the HST STOCC completed all preparations 
for rendezvous on FD3.  The third rate sensor gyro was 
activated and added to the control loop, the telescope 
aperture door was closed, the high gain antennas were 
stowed, and HST was maneuvered to the rendezvous 
attitude.  The NC-2 burn on FD2 was so small it was not 
performed.   
 On FD2 the small predicted size (Delta Velocity, or 
DV, < 4 feet/second) of NC-4 on FD3 led to the 
development of multi-axis RCS burn procedures for that 
maneuver.  NC-4 is normally an OMS burn, and modified 
procedures were uplinked to the crew.    The procedures 
also called for the orbiter to be placed in target track after 
the FD3 NH maneuver. 
 A simultaneous supply water (fuel cell water) and 
waste water dump was completed approximately 30 
minutes before the NH burn on FD3.  The dump imparted 
about 0.6 to 0.7 feet/second of DV to the vehicle, 
increasing the orbital semi-major axis by about 1100 feet.  
Before the dump the predicted NC-4 DV was 1.5 
feet/second posigrade.  After the dump it was -0.4 
feet/second retrograde. 
 The NC-4 DV was so small that it was not burned, 
possibly a first for the Shuttle Program.  The star tracker 
pass was nominal and the crew visually sighted HST 
during the pass.  Star tracker and radar performance 
during the rendezvous were nominal.  The MC-1 and 
MC-2 DVs were small and not executed. 
 Between the Ti and MC-1 burns, rendezvous Payload 
Interrogator (PI) communications was established 
between Atlantis and HST.  Between the MC-1 and MC-2 
burns the crew reported PI communication problems with 
HST.  The shuttle was unable to lock onto or process 
HST telemetry.  A check by the crew of switch positions 
and cables associated with HST communications did not 
resolve the problem.  The ground determined that the Bit 
Synch Assembly (BSA) apparently failed resulting in loss 
of ability to establish communications with HST on 
Payload (PL) string 1.  However, the crew and STOCC 
could command over PL string 2, but commands could 
only be verified by the STOCC using TDRSS 
communications.  The crew could not receive telemetry 
from HST, and therefore could not verify the results of 
commanding.  The crew could  command HST in the 
blind, but command verification would have to be 
performed by the STOCC.   
 HST telemetry reception was restored through 
TDRSS direct communications with about 32 minutes 
remaining in the rendezvous.  The remaining commands 
were sent through Atlantis with confirmation of 
commanding performed by the HST STOCC using 
TDRSS direct communications.  The Atlantis crew used 
PL string 2 to command HST.  However, this prevented 
ground commanding of the Relative Navigation Sensor 
(RNS) payload on HST over PL string 2.19, 20  The crew 
was able to command the RNS payload via switch throws 
in the Atlantis cockpit. 
  
A CLOSER LOOK AT THE HUBBLE SERVICING MISSIONS 
Approved for public release via STI DAA 
24483. See statement on title page. 216  
   Due to periods of no HST data, time spent 
troubleshooting the communications problem, and a 
reluctance to command HST in the blind, the execution of 
the planned pre-flight commands to prepare HST for 
grapple was delayed by about an hour.  Normally the 
STOCC was to command HST to perform a roll 
maneuver (~42 degrees) to achieve the grapple attitude.  
This maneuver takes approximately 10 minutes, and is 
started at about the nominal MC-4 execution time.  If 
HST was commanded to perform the roll maneuver, the 
remaining scheduled TDRSS communications time might 
not have been long enough to allow the roll maneuver to 
complete while TDRSS was still available.  It was critical 
for the HST STOCC to stop the roll maneuver before 
TDRSS communications were lost.  The shuttle and HST 
control teams agreed to replace the HST roll maneuver 
with an Atlantis yaw maneuver.  This also saved 16 
minutes of HST commanding time.   
 After MC-4 the crew noted that the orbiter was further 
out-of-plane than expected.  RCS jet firings to null out-
of-plane velocity resulted in a faster closure rate from a 
range of about 1,200 feet to about 500 feet.  Out-of-plane 
position was at a nominal value by 400 feet.  An 
additional contributing factor to the faster approach was a 
lack of HHL measurements between 3,300 and 1,300 
feet.  The HST was in an inertial attitude hold and 
appeared to rotate with respect to the orbiter.  Good HHL 
marks could only be obtained when the aperture door was 
facing the orbiter.  Marks were difficult to obtain at other 
times due to a lack of flat reflective surfaces facing the 
orbiter.  Gaps in HHL marks also occurred during the 
three previous flights.   
 Rendezvous radar measurements became noisy within 
400 feet, a lower range than on ISS missions due to the 
smaller size of HST.  The payload bay keel camera was 
not always available for piloting cues due to the Sun in 
the camera field of view. 
 The crew performed about 30 minutes of station-
keeping on the +R Bar and flew a slower approach due to 
an early Atlantis arrival at the 150 foot point.  Station-
keeping was necessary to wait for the HST V1 axis to 
rotate into alignment with the +R Bar.  The 150 foot 
station-keeping was also performed since the HST roll to 
grapple maneuver had been canceled.   
 After re-initiating the +R Bar approach from the 150 
foot station-keeping point, the crew performed an Auto 
Inertial Flyaround Alignment contingency procedure to 
yaw Atlantis by ~42 degrees and achieve the grapple 
attitude.  Waiting for the HST V1 axis to align with the 
+R Bar enabled Atlantis to fly a more propellant efficient 
approach to the grapple relative position and attitude.  An 
orbiter fly-around to the grapple attitude would have 
consumed more RCS propellant. 
 Propellant consumption during proximity operations 
was higher than originally planned.  Approximately 100 
lbs more forward RCS propellant and 100 lbs more aft 
RCS propellant was consumed.  However, propellant        
. 
margins in both the forward and aft RCS tanks were still 
adequate to support the nominal end of mission (HST 
deploy and separation, deorbit, and entry).  The higher 
than anticipated propellant consumption was caused by 
the extended +R Bar station-keeping, a faster than normal 
+R Bar approach to the 150 foot point that required Low 
Z braking, and the yaw maneuver.  Radar and HHL 
performance during proximity operations were nominal.  
Due to the small size of HST the radar did not wander as 
it does on ISS missions. 
 Later investigation identified the cause of the 
communications problem.  The HST Data Management 
Unit Communications Module had not been reconfigured 
from the 1 Mbps science format to the 32 Kbps rate 
required for downlink through the Shuttle PI.  Full HST 
and RNS telemetry and commanding capability was later 
restored. 
 The post HST deploy Orbital Adjustment (OA) burn 
placed Atlantis in an elliptical orbit to reduce the 
probability that Atlantis could encounter orbital debris 
that do not decay as rapidly at the high orbital altitude of 
HST.  An additional requirement for the OA burn was to 
preserve two consecutive landing opportunities at KSC, 
Edwards Air Force Base, and Northrop Strip for the 
nominal End of Mission (EOM) day, EOM + 1 day, and 
EOM + 2 days.  In addition, these landing opportunities 
were required to the last and next-to-the-last for each day 
at each of the three landing sites.  These requirements 
were necessary for an effective crew timeline. 
 The post HST release OA burn to mitigate orbital 
debris risk at HST altitude significantly reduced the 
propellant margin of the vehicle.  For this reason a HST 
re-boost using the shuttle vernier jets was not planned 
pre-mission.  However, a request was made during the 
mission for a re-boost to reduce the risk of HST 
encountering orbital debris from the servicing period.  
The proposal was withdrawn when analysis indicated that 
raising the orbit of HST would increase the probability of 
encountering the debris.  A re-boost was not performed 
by Columbia on STS-109 (March 2002) due to the heavy 
structural weight of the orbiter.  A re-boost was 
performed by Discovery on STS-103 (December 1999). 
 A change to the pre-mission timeline was moving the 
OA burn from FD10 to FD9, one rev after the SEP-2 
maneuver.  The night before HST release a new SEP-2 
DV was uplinked to the crew.  The DV was increased to 
6 feet/second to ensure safe relative motion after the 
orbital adjustment maneuver.  HST release was delayed 
by 4 minutes due to intermittent communications.  A 
negative beta angle (Sun to the south of the orbital plane) 
separation was flown on FD9 after HST was released by 
the RMS.  About an hour and a half after SEP-2 the OA 
burn was performed to change the orbit of Atlantis from 
298 x 305 nm to 160 x 305 nm.   
 During the flight Mission Control personnel assessed 
the risk of 35 predicted conjunctions of orbital debris with 
Atlantis.  Additional Mission Control personnel were        
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called in to help perform conjunction evaluations.  
However, after extensive analysis no debris avoidance 
maneuvers were performed.  During STS-103 (December 
1999) 58 conjunctions were evaluated, while during STS-
109 (March 2002) 12 conjunctions were evaluated.  After 
landing an orbital debris hit was found on the nozzle of 
the right OMS engine. 
 All five EVAs to upgrade HST were successful.  All 
mission objectives, except for the reboost that was 
withdrawn, were accomplished.20, 21  The STS-400 rescue 
mission (Endeavour) was not required and Atlantis landed 
on Edwards Air Force Base runway 22 on Sunday, May 
24, 2009.  The landing was delayed by two days and 
moved to Edwards due to unacceptable weather 
conditions at the Kennedy Space Center. 
 On May 31, 2009, Endeavour was moved from pad 
39B to pad 39A to prepare for the STS-127 mission that 
flew in July of 2009.  Pad 39B was then handed over to 
the Constellation Program for modification to support the 
Ares I-X test flight that launched on October 28, 2009. 
 
Other Contingency Rendezvous Procedures 
 
 There are three contingency rendezvous procedures 
that were flown on all HST missions (Table 24.2).  These 
are Ti Delay, Radar Fail, and Rendezvous Breakout. 
 Ti Delay permits the orbiter to fly a relative motion 
football (Figures 24.6 and 24.16) at the 8 nm Ti point.  
This delay could provide the crew, Mission Control, and 
the HST STOCC at the Goddard Space Flight Center with 
time to resolve a problem before proceeding with the 
rendezvous.  Alternatively, if the problem could not be 
resolved in time to permit the rendezvous and grapple on 
that crew day, the orbiter could separate and phase away 
from the HST overnight.  Ti Delay has not been 
performed on a HST mission.  The only Ti Delay flown 
by the shuttle was on STS-49 (May 1992), in response to 
a Lambert burn targeting anomaly.13,22  
 The Radar Fail procedure would be used by the crew 
after the Mid-course Correction (MC3) maneuver, if 
radar data were not available for relative navigation and 
proximity operations (Figures 24.6, 24.16, and 24.17).  A 
radar failure did not occur on HST missions.   
 However, the rendezvous radar did fail before the 
STS-92 rendezvous with the ISS in October of 2000, and 
during the STS-131 rendezvous with ISS in April of 
2010.  The Radar Fail contingency procedure was 
successfully executed on those missions.13  
 If a shuttle or HST problem prevented the rendezvous 
and grapple from being completed, the Rendezvous 
Breakout procedure would enable the orbiter to establish 
a safe relative motion trajectory that would not come 
close to the HST.  A breakout during the rendezvous 
phase (Figures 24.6 and 24.16) has not been performed 
on a HST servicing mission, or on any other shuttle 
mission. 
 
 
Other Contingency Proximity Operations 
Procedures 
 
 Like nominal proximity operations procedures, the 
contingency procedures are heavily influenced by HST 
and shuttle hardware design.  Contingency proximity 
operations procedures have evolved, but the number of 
procedures stabilized by the third servicing mission, STS-
103 (Table 24.2).   
 Some contingency procedures are designed to enable 
the orbiter to safely leave the vicinity of the HST if a 
problem prevents grapple.  The orbiter may station-keep 
in the vicinity of the HST while Mission Control, the 
STOCC, and the crew work to resolve the problem.  If the 
problem cannot be resolved in a timely manner, a 
breakout is performed so the orbiter safely leaves the 
vicinity of the HST.  Prox Ops Backoff allows the orbiter 
to back away from HST to a safe station-keeping 
distance.  The HST +R Bar Breakout (Table 24.2) was 
designed for execution starting at a range of 500 feet until 
the crew initiates the final inertial grapple (Figure 24.12).  
A backout along the +R Bar may be required to at least 
75 feet before the orbiter can leave the +R Bar via a 
breakout to avoid undesirable contact with HST.  Prox 
Ops Breakout permits the orbiter to safely leave the 
vicinity of the HST and exit the proximity operations 
phase.   
 The EVA Rescue procedure is used to retrieve an 
EVA crew member that is no longer tethered to the 
orbiter or EVA tools that are no longer tethered to the 
crew member.  It is desirable for any EVA tools that are 
lost overboard to be retrieved as they present a collision 
hazard.  The procedures ensure that structural loads 
imparted by translational RCS jet activity will not cause 
failure of the connection between the HST and the FSS in 
the shuttle payload bay.   
 Some contingency procedures permit grapple to be 
accomplished or a breakout to be performed in the event 
of vernier or Low Z RCS jet failures.  The Loss of 
Vernier RCS procedure permits proximity operations to 
continue if the orbiter 25 pound thrust vernier RCS jets 
are no longer available for fine attitude control.  The Loss 
of Low Z Braking procedure provides options to use for 
any loss of or degradation of Low Z capability during the 
approach.  The approach could be continued or a Loss of 
Low Z breakout performed.  The HST Flyaround/Loss of 
Low Z Breakout is performed between initiation of 
inertial attitude hold by the crew and grapple.  By the 
time of STS-103, the number of breakout scenarios had 
increased and a new flow chart was implemented on a 
cue card to help the crew navigate through the many 
options.   
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 Other contingency proximity operations procedures 
listed in Table 24.2 are performed if HST is not in the 
correct attitude for grapple when the shuttle arrives.  
These include the STS Roll to Align, Manual Inertial Fly-
Around, Auto Inertial Fly-Around, Yaw/Pitch/Yaw Fly-
Around, and the R Bar Yaw Alignment. 
 
Contingency Deploy 
 
 Contingency deploy procedures have also been 
carried on all HST missions (Table 24.2).  These 
procedures permit HST deployment if the RMS is not 
available or if a faster than normal deployment must be 
accomplished in response to a systems performance 
anomaly.  These anomalies could require the orbiter to 
perform an emergency deorbit or a perigee adjust. 
 Contingency procedures were developed to cover 
partial or complete failures of the RMS (Table 24.2).  For 
a total RMS failure a backaway deployment would have 
been performed.  This procedure has been prepared for all 
HST missions.  The procedure for the STS-31 deploy 
mission involved releasing HST retaining latches in the 
payload bay and performing a +Z translation burn (Figure 
24.2) by the orbiter to slowly back away from the HST.  
The procedure for all subsequent flights was designed to 
allow the HST berthing pins to clear the FSS latches, 
while avoiding attitude jet firings that could cause the 
pins to re-contact.  The deploy attitude avoids shadowing 
of the HST solar arrays by orbiter structure.   
 All HST missions have been equipped with an 
Emergency RMS Deploy (STS-31) or a RMS Quick 
Deploy (STS-61, STS-82, STS-103, STS-109, and STS-
125) procedure.  The RMS Quick Deploy could be 
performed if a faster than normal release of HST is 
required in response to an orbiter systems problem.  The 
quick deploy has essentially the same sequence as the 
nominal deploy, but certain non-mandatory HST crew 
commanding and orbiter relative navigation procedures 
are omitted to save time. 
 
Jettison 
 
 Jettison procedures are carried to permit the release of 
payload bay hardware from the orbiter if it cannot be 
secured in the payload bay or it is stuck in an unsafe 
configuration (Table 24.2).  Jettison procedures are 
designed to permit the orbiter to safely leave the 
jettisoned hardware while minimizing risk of re-contact.  
Some jettison procedures can be executed by the crew 
from the cockpit, while other procedures may require 
crew action during EVA.  Jettison procedures are not 
considered nominal, are often payload and payload 
support hardware specific, and will vary from flight to 
flight.  Jettison procedures for servicing hardware include 
the Orbiter Replacement Unit Carrier (ORUC), Rigid 
Array Carrier (RAC), Solar Array Carrier (SAC), and the 
Super Lightweight Interchangeable Carrier (SLIC).           
.   
These procedures require that HST be jettisoned first.  
The ORUC, SAC, and SLIC jettison procedures require 
action by EVA crew members.   
 A HST Jettison would be performed if the orbiter 
were required to perform a time critical de-orbit in 
response to problems such as loss of crew cabin pressure 
or a propellant leak.  The jettison procedure can be 
performed in any attitude.  Low Z RCS jet firings are 
used to back the orbiter away from HST after the FSS 
latches are opened.   
 The orbiter payload bay doors must be closed for the 
orbiter to safely return to Earth.  If the RMS or the 
rendezvous radar cannot be stowed for entry, then they 
would be jettisoned to enable the payload bay doors to be 
closed.   A generic hardware jettison procedure is 
available on all flights if the crew has to jettison generic 
hardware, including EVA hardware. 
 A solar array jettison procedure was developed for 
STS-61 and STS-109 in case an array could not be fully 
retracted and stowed for return to Earth.  The power 
generation side of the array must face away from the Sun 
when the array electrical lines between HST and the array 
are disconnected by the EVA crew.  The array would be 
released by an EVA crew member mounted on the RMS 
with a foot restraint, using either a jettison handle or a 
portable grapple fixture.  One solar array was jettisoned 
on STS-61.  This is the only jettison that has been 
performed on a HST servicing mission. 
 
Atlantis Rescue, Prepared But Not Flown 
 
 After the loss of Columbia in 2003, each shuttle 
mission performed  inspection of the Thermal Protection 
System (TPS) to determine if the TPS sustained damage 
during ascent from External Tank foam shedding.  The 
primary means of inspection was the Orbiter Boom 
Sensor System (OBSS) mounted on the end of the RMS.  
On ISS missions, a +R Bar Pitch Maneuver (RPM) was 
performed ~600 foot below the ISS to permit ISS crew to 
photograph the orbiter TPS.23  Photographs provided an 
additional source of data on TPS integrity.  If TPS 
damage was detected and was considered to be a safety 
risk and could not be repaired on-orbit during an EVA, 
plans were developed to permit a Space Shuttle crew to 
use the ISS as a safe haven.  The next Space Shuttle in the 
launch preparation flow for an ISS mission would be 
launched to retrieve the crew from the ISS and return 
them to Earth.  Like ISS missions, the STS-125 crew 
performed a TPS inspection using the OBSS.  The TPS 
was not compromised during STS-125. 
 However, had the TPS been compromised and could 
not be repaired by the crew during an EVA, the STS-125 
Atlantis crew could not use the ISS as a safe haven as the 
shuttle did not have sufficient propellant to reach the ISS 
from the HST orbit.  To provide a rescue capability, a 
Launch On Need (LON) Atlantis rescue mission was 
prepared (Table 24.1).  A rescue shuttle flown by the four 
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  flight deck crew members from the STS-123 (March 
2008) mission to the ISS would have flown the rescue 
mission, if it were required.  The rescue concept required 
the pre-launch parallel processing of both Atlantis and the 
rescue orbiter at the Kennedy Space Center.  The rescue 
Space Shuttle was on one of the Complex 39 launch pads 
while Atlantis was launched from the other pad.  This was 
a first for the Shuttle Program.  Although maximum crew 
awake time was limited to 18 hours to avoid fatigue, this 
limit could have been waved in a rescue scenario to 
ensure the safe retrieval and return of the Atlantis crew. 
 
Atlantis Rescue Rendezvous Design 
 
 Rendezvous and proximity operations of Atlantis and 
the rescue orbiter would occur a considerable away from 
the HST.  The nominal rendezvous mission plan for the 
rescue was a flight day 2 grapple of Atlantis by the rescue 
orbiter, with the possibility of a flight day 3 or 4 grapple, 
if permitted by ample propellant margins.  A flight day 2 
grapple was preferred so that the rescue orbiter could 
reach Atlantis as quickly as possible and provide 
maximum on-orbit time for the crew transfer to be 
completed.  This was the first nominally planned flight 
day 2 rendezvous and grapple in the Shuttle Program and 
would have been the first rendezvous of one shuttle with 
another.  Ground-up shuttle rendezvous missions to the 
ISS normally conducted docking/grapple on flight day 3, 
with a flight day 2 or flight day 4 docking/grapple as a 
possible contingency.  Rendezvous trajectory dispersions 
were expected to be higher than normal due to the limited 
amount of time to track out dispersions on flight day 1 in 
support of rendezvous orbital adjustment burns.  The 
crew rendezvous checklists for both the STS-125 and the 
rescue mission were combined into one document. 
 The ORBT rendezvous on flight day 2 (the star 
tracker pass through the MC4 burn) was similar to that of 
ISS and HST servicing missions (Figure 24.17 and the 
one revolution to Ti profile in Figure 24.16).  For all 
shuttle rendezvous missions, in the event of a rendezvous 
radar failure, a correction burn is performed after the 
third mid-course correction burn.  If Atlantis had 
sufficient propellant and power, contingency night star 
tracker measurements could have been obtained by the 
rescue orbiter if the payload bay lights of Atlantis were 
turned on and the payload bay pointed in the direction of 
the approaching rescue orbiter.  However, if Atlantis was 
not able to perform the procedure, the rendezvous profile 
timing was adjusted pre-mission to insure Atlantis would 
be lit by the sun to support crew procedures for the radar 
fail correction burn.  
 
Atlantis Rescue Contingency Rendezvous Procedures 
 
 In the nominal rendezvous plan the rescue orbiter 
performed all maneuvering.  Contingency rendezvous 
recovery plans were also developed in case the rescue      
. 
orbiter could not execute the nominal rendezvous profile 
due to an ascent under-speed at MECO or a propellant 
failure.  The rendezvous recovery profile would preserve 
the flight day 2 grapple, if possible.  While it was 
preferred to fly a rendezvous with the rescue orbiter 
approaching from behind and below, off-nominal cases 
could have required a rendezvous with the rescue orbiter 
ahead and above Atlantis for much of the rendezvous.  In 
these contingency cases Atlantis might also have been 
required to perform orbit adjustments of relative altitude 
and phasing to enable the rescue orbiter to complete the 
rendezvous.  Propellant margins on both vehicles would 
have been carefully managed to ensure that the rescue 
orbiter had sufficient propellant for a safe deorbit.   
 This technique is known as control box rendezvous, 
and was performed on STS-49 (INTELSAT VI/F-3 
rendezvous, May 1992) and STS-72 (Space Flyer Unit 
rendezvous, January 1996).13  The target spacecraft 
executed a series of maneuvers after the chaser spacecraft 
was launched.  The maneuvers were designed so that the 
target entered a volume in space, called a control box, at a 
designated time. This technique reduced chaser vehicle 
(in this case, the rescue orbiter) propellant consumption. 
Once the target entered the box, it no longer maneuvered.  
Rendezvous recovery was planned so that Atlantis did not 
perform orbit adjustments on the day of rendezvous.    
 The final rendezvous orbit for the rendezvous 
recovery case impacted landing opportunities for the 
rescue orbiter.  The final orbit must preserve at least one 
continental United States landing opportunity for the 
rescue shuttle per day, with two opportunities preferred.  
If required, a landing could also have been performed at 
sites outside the continental United States.  In addition, 
achievement of acceptable disposal areas for Atlantis was 
also be factored into rendezvous recovery planning and 
determination of the final rendezvous orbit.  However, 
protecting the rescue orbiter deorbit propellant margins 
had a higher priority than Atlantis propellant margins for 
achieving a safe Atlantis disposal footprint.   
 For the on-board targeted phase on the day of 
rendezvous, the rescue orbiter would have flown three 
contingency rendezvous procedures flown by other HST 
servicing and ISS missions.  Those were Radar Fail, 
Rendezvous Breakout, and Ti Delay (Table 24.2). 
 
Atlantis Rescue Nominal Proximity Operations 
 
 Atlantis was to maneuver to the grapple attitude just 
before the rescue orbiter executed the MC4 burn (Figure 
24.17).   The grapple attitude placed the nose of Atlantis 
out-of-plane toward orbital south and the payload bay 
pointed at the Earth (Figure 24.19).  The flight control 
system was to maintain this attitude using the 25 pound 
thrust vernier RCS jets, if available.  In the event of a 
vernier failure the ALT/DAP and primary jets would 
have been used.  Atlantis would have also used the Low Z 
mode to limit plume impingement on the rescue orbiter.  
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  The proximity operations profile (starting at manual 
crew take-over after MC4) was a +R Bar approach.  
However, unlike ISS missions, the R Bar Pitch Maneuver 
would not have been performed.23  The rescue orbiter 
flight control system would have been placed in the Low 
Z mode from a range of 1000 feet through grapple.  This  
range was chosen as the crews from ISS missions are 
familiar with Low Z operation starting at this range.  
Atlantis and the rescue orbiter would have been at a 90 
degree angle to each other (Atlantis nose toward orbital 
south, the rescue orbiter nose pointed along the velocity 
vector) to minimize plume impingement effects during 
the Low Z +R Bar approach by the rescue orbiter (Figure 
24.19).  The rescue orbiter would have carried both 
Trajectory Control Sensor (TCS) and Hand Held Lidar 
(HHL) for use during proximity operations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Capture would have been performed with the RMS of 
the rescue orbiter grappling the forward grapple fixture 
on Atlantis berthed OBSS.  After grapple the OBSS 
would roll out and the RMS of the rescue orbiter would 
be used to maneuver Atlantis so that both orbiters were 
nose-to-nose for effective mated attitude control.  The 
rescue orbiter would have then maneuvered the mated 
stack to a gravity gradient attitude.  The RMS of Atlantis 
was not planned for use. 
 
EVA Crew Transfer, Separation, and Deorbit 
 
 The rescue involved the transfer by EVA of the seven 
member Atlantis crew to the rescue orbiter on flight days 
3 and 4.  A total of three EVA transfers from Atlantis to 
the rescue orbiter would have been performed using the 
white Extra-vehicular Mobility Unit (EMU) suits.  Only 
Atlantis crew members were to participate in the EVAs. 
The four members of the rescue orbiter crew (Table 24.1) 
. 
Figure 24.19  Rescue orbiter approach  
to Atlantis. 
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were to remain inside the rescue orbiter.  At the start of 
the first EVA participating crew members were to install 
a translation rope along the RMS of the rescue orbiter.  
Astronauts McArthur, Feustel, and Grunsfeld would have 
transferred to the rescue orbiter during the first EVA.  
Johnson was to transfer during the second EVA, along 
with all of the thermal protection system repair hardware.  
 The third and final EVA would have transferred 
Altman, Massimino, and Good.  Before the last EVA, the 
remaining crew members on Atlantis were to configure 
the cockpit for the separation and ground commanded 
deorbit burn.  Atlantis disposal procedures were based on 
those developed for damaged orbiter disposal on ISS 
missions.24  This included opening allowable attitude 
error and rate limits so that automatic flight control 
firings of the RCS jets would not have been performed 
with the rescue orbiter in close proximity to Atlantis.  
Atlantis was to be released by the rescue orbiter on flight 
day 4 (Figure 24.20).  TPS inspection using the OBSS 
was to be performed on flight day 5, and flight days 6 and 
7 were to be used for entry preparation.  Rescue orbiter 
entry and landing was planned for flight day 8.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Observations and Lessons Learned 
 
 HST missions succeeded in part due to the efforts of 
personnel from multiple disciplines that had extensive 
experience planning and flying servicing missions to a 
variety of spacecraft.  This facilitated application of best 
practices and lessons learned.6-11  These personnel are 
experienced at working in a multi-discipline environment 
involving multiple NASA organizations and supporting 
contractors that requires lateral communication.  Shuttle 
Program personnel are experienced in development of 
contingency procedures, both pre-mission and during a 
flight, and with interacting with development and 
operations personnel representing a variety of target 
spacecraft.   
 
Figure 24.20  Rescue orbiter  
separation from Atlantis.   
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   A flight program must be responsive to unanticipated 
satellite performance issues that may drive late and 
significant changes in servicing mission plans.  These 
events can drive changes to existing proximity operations, 
robotic operation, and servicing procedures, or require the 
creation of new procedures and mission plans.  The 
availability of additional qualified personnel to develop 
new procedures and operational work-arounds enables a 
flight program to effectively respond to off-nominal 
events during real-time operations. 
 Development and operations personnel continually 
learn about vehicle systems performance and limitations 
even after a spacecraft has been built and is in orbit.  
Unforeseen constraints and performance limitations will 
emerge that drive development of new or changes to 
existing nominal and contingency plans and procedures.  
Over the life of a flight program improvements in 
analysis and simulation fidelity may reveal additional 
operational constraints.   An example of this was the 
gradual discovery of HST sensitivity to plume 
impingement that resulted in the increasing range of Low 
Z mode initiation from 200 feet out to 1500 feet. 
 Servicing mission personnel should consider applying 
rendezvous, proximity operations, and other techniques 
from other spaceflight missions and flight programs to 
mitigate risk to mission success.  High value missions 
may drive significant investment in low-probability of 
occurrence contingency procedures to ensure mission 
success in the presence of failures and degraded systems 
performance.  However, this may result in an increase in 
the number of procedures that program personnel must 
maintain and be prepared to execute over the life of a 
flight program. 
 Many nominal and contingency HST procedures were 
driven by RCS plume impingement overpressure and 
contamination concerns.  Consideration should be given 
to building spacecraft structures and systems that are not 
as sensitive to servicing vehicle characteristics such as 
RCS jet plumes.  Furthermore, servicing spacecraft 
should be designed with RCS and other systems that do 
not pose a potential hazard to satellites that could be 
serviced.  
 The highly reflective surface of HST makes it a poor 
target for the HHL and causes shuttle payload bay camera 
blooming, complicating proximity operations piloting.  
Experience has shown that the RMS grapple fixtures on 
HST are good targets for the HHL.  Proximity operations 
contingency procedure development for the ZGSP and 
HWSP HST attitude control safe modes was complicated 
by a lack of HST retro-reflectors to support the shuttle 
TCS and HHL.   In addition, Mission Control and crew 
insight into HST attitude during these safe modes was 
limited, and based primarily on crew observations.  
Comprehensive telemetry, sensor aids on the vehicle to 
be serviced, and relative sensors capable of performing      
. 
relative attitude determination can simplify proximity 
operations piloting.   
 In spite of the previously mentioned challenges, 
ground personnel (HST STOCC, Space Shuttle Mission 
Control) and shuttle crew members possessed the 
flexibility, creativity, and situational awareness to analyze 
unforeseen issues and develop new procedures in a timely 
manner.  Spacecraft and ground support organizations in 
future robotic or human flight programs should be 
flexible enough to accommodate late changes in mission 
requirements.  Such responsiveness significantly 
enhances the probability of mission success.   
 
Summary 
 
 The Space Shuttle Program has successfully flown 
servicing missions that have repaired and upgraded the 
Hubble Space Telescope.  These repair missions 
increased the science return and extended the life of the 
telescope by correcting performance problems, replacing 
malfunctioning hardware, and equipping it with more 
advanced astronomy sensors.  Conducting these missions 
required the development, adaption, and evolution of 
numerous crew procedures and flight techniques for 
performing rendezvous, proximity operations, and 
deployment.  Nominal and contingency procedure 
development required the efforts of both shuttle and HST 
Program personnel in disciplines including trajectory 
design, robotics, flight control, thermal control, power 
generation, structures, orbital debris, and extra-vehicular 
activity.  Space Shuttle and HST hardware design and 
limitations placed requirements and constraints on these 
nominal and contingency techniques.  Some constraints 
were known early in the development of mission 
techniques in the 1980s, others emerged after HST was 
placed in orbit in 1990.  Particular care was taken to “do 
no harm” to HST and not impede the ability of HST to 
perform the science mission. The HST servicing 
experience and lessons learned are applicable to other 
programs that perform on-orbit servicing and rendezvous, 
both human and robotic. 
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CHAPTER 25 - STS-130 MISSION TO THE ISS 
Introduction 
 
 The majority of Space Shuttle rendezvous missions 
were to the International Space Station (ISS).  There was 
some variation in proximity operations procedures for 
flights to Mir and the ISS, but overall these flights had 
less mission-to-mission variation in mission plans and 
procedures as compared to the deploy/retrieve and 
satellite repair missions of the 1980s and 1990s. 
 This chapter provides an overview of rendezvous, 
proximity operations, and separation activities for the 
February 2010 flight of Endeavour to the ISS.  Mission 
activities are discussed by flight day. 
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Figure 25.1  STS-130 as flown crew overview timeline for orbiter free flight and activities concerning rendezvous 
and separation.  Flight Days 4 through 11 while docked to the ISS are not shown.  Rendezvous and separation 
activities are in bold. 
Mission Plan 
 
 The primary objective of the STS-130 mission (ISS 
Flight 20A) of the space shuttle Endeavour was to 
transport the ISS Node 3 (Tranquility) to the ISS for 
installation by the STS-130 and ISS Expedition 22 crew 
members.  It was nominally a 13 day mission (during the 
flight it was extended to 14 days) with a 10 minute 
launch window.  
  At docking the mated stack was predicted to weigh, 
for the first time, in excess of one million pounds.  There 
were no planned hardware jettisons during the docked 
phase nor any payload deploys from Endeavour after 
undocking and separation. 
JSC – 63400 
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Nickname 
 
Zambo 
TV 
Nick 
Dr. Bob 
Stevie Ray 
Kay 
Name 
 
George D. Zamka 
Terry W. Virts Jr. 
Nicholas J.M. Patrick 
Robert L. Behnken 
Stephen K. Robinson 
Kathyrn P. Hire 
Assignment 
 
Commander 
Pilot 
Mission Specialist 1 
Mission Specialist 2 
Mission Specialist 3 
Mission Specialist 4 
Table 25.2  STS-130 Crew Members 
 Figure 25.1 provides a detailed overview of crew 
activities directly concerning ascent, rendezvous, 
proximity operations, separation, and landing.  Table 25.1 
provides a summary of major shuttle and ISS crew 
activities performed on each flight day. Crew members 
for the STS-130 mission are listed in Table 25.2. 
Launch Date 
 
February  7, 2010 
Sunday (nominal) 
 
February  8, 2010 
Monday (actual) 
 
February  9, 2010 
Tuesday 
 
Launch Time 
 
04:39:47 EST 
 
 
04:14:05 EST 
 
 
03:51:34 EST 
Flight Day 3 
Launch Window 
 
04:34:47 to  
04:44:47 EST 
 
04:09:05 to  
04:19:05 EST 
 
03:46:34 to  
03:56:34 EST 
Insertion Orbit 
 
123.6 x 84.9 nm 
 
 
123.6 x 109.9 nm 
 
 
123.6 x 84.9 nm 
Phase  
Angle 
 
273.3  
 
 
  88.1  
 
 
275.4  
Docking 
 
Tuesday, Feb 9 
12:18 AM CST 
 
Tuesday, Feb 9 
11:09 PM CST 
 
Wednesday, Feb 10 
11:30 PM CST  
Undocking 
 
Wednesday, Feb. 17 
6:12 PM CST 
 
Thursday,  Feb. 18 
6:35 PM CST 
 
Friday, Feb. 19 
5:25 PM CST 
Table 25.3  STS-130 Launch Opportunities Based on Launch Minus 7 Days Flight Dynamics Officer Data 
HISTORY OF SPACE SHUTTLE RENDEZVOUS 
Flight  
Day 
 
  1  
  2  
 
  3  
  
  4  
  5  
  6  
  7  
  8  
  9  
10  
11  
12  
 
13  
14  
15  
 
Primary Crew Activities 
 
• Ascent, Post Insertion, NC-1/NPC, RMS Checkout 
• NC-2/NPC, Inspection, Rendezvous Tools Checkout,  
  NC-3/NPC 
• Water Dump, Rendezvous, Docking, Open Hatches,  
  OBSS H/O 
• EVA Prep, Off Duty 
• EVA1 (Node 3 Install, OTP Relocate) 
• Focused Inspection, Node 3 Activation 
• EVA2 (Node 3 External Outfitting) 
• Cupola Relocate 
• PMA3 Relocate, Off Duty 
• EVA3 (Node 3, Cupola, & PMA Tasks) 
• ECLSS Rack Transfers, Get Aheads 
• Transfer, Rendezvous Tools Checkout, Reboost,  
  Hatch Close 
• Undock, Fly-Around, TPS Inspection 
• Cabin Stow, FCS Checkout, RCS Hotfire 
• Deorbit Preparation, Entry & Landing 
Table 25.1  Primary Crew Activities by Flight Day 
ECLSS – Environmental Control and Life Support Systems, EVA – Extra-
Vehicular Activity, FCS – Flight Control System, NC – Phasing or catch-up 
burn, NPC – Plane Change  burn, OBSS H/O – Orbiter Boom Sensor 
System Hand-Off, OTP – Orbital Replacement Unit Tool Platform, PMA – 
Pressurized Mating Adapter, RCS – Reaction Control System, RMS – 
Remote Manipulator System, TPS – Thermal Protection System 
Launch Windows 
 
 Launch windows and rendezvous burn plans were 
periodically revised during the mission planning process 
and just before launch based on improved predictions of 
the ISS state vector. 
 Most Mir and ISS launches were successfully 
performed at the in-plane launch time, when the targeted 
orbital plane crossed the launch site.  Selection of the 
launch time was a balance between four considerations, 
1) maximize the launch window, 2) provide sufficient 
East Coast Abort Landing opportunities for multiple 
Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) failure cases, 3) 
maximize ascent performance to cover SSME failure 
cases observed during flights (chamber pressure shifts, 
nozzle leaks, fuel flow meter malfunctions), and 4) 
achieve the earliest SSME failure time that would permit 
completion of the mission. 
 Launch opportunities on all three days met the solar 
beta angle constraint of |β| < 60 degrees for thermal 
considerations during mated operations.  For these days a 
Return to Launch Site (RTLS) abort and nominal end of 
mission landing would occur during darkness, but a 
Trans-Oceanic Abort Landing (TAL) would occur in 
daylight. 
  Data for the primary launch opportunity (Sunday, 
February 7) and backup opportunities is given in Table 
25.3. Figure 25.2 illustrates the planar launch windows 
and OMS-2 phasing limits for the February 7, 8, and 9 
launch opportunities.  The launch window consists of 
both planar and phase windows.  The maximum duration 
of the planar window is 10 minutes based on thermal 
limits.  The thermal limits and ET disposal footprint 
constraints end the planar window. The ET disposal limits 
keep the External Tank from coming too close to national 
boundaries and landmasses. ET thermal limits are 
necessary since as the vehicle steers into the desired plane 
due to a launch slip, the side slip angle of the vehicle 
increases ET heating.  The opening of the planar window 
occurred approximately 24 minutes earlier each day, and 
the opening times repeated approximately every 59 days. 
 Shuttle missions to the ISS typically docked on Flight 
Day 3 on orbit 30 or 31.  The rev number varied based on 
phase angle at OMS-2, ISS crew sleep shifting, and 
achieving orbital lighting conditions for the on-board 
targeted phase and proximity operations.  ISS crew sleep  
. 
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used for equipment checkout and troubleshooting, 4) 
provides greater launch window probabilities than Flight 
Day 1 and Flight Day 2 rendezvous, and depending on 
target spacecraft orbital altitude may provide an in-plane 
launch window everyday within phase angle limits, and 
5) provides sufficient opportunities for ground tracking 
and orbital adjustment burns to correct trajectory 
dispersions. 
  However, phasing limits may permit both a Flight 
Day 2 and a Flight Day 3 option.  A Flight Day 2 
rendezvous could be flown if a Minimum Duration Flight 
(MDF) was declared in response to degraded orbiter 
systems performance or a component failure.  The 
objective of a MDF is to allow high priority mission 
objectives to be accomplished in the presence of degraded 
systems performance while minimizing exposure to 
subsequent failures that could threaten crew safety.  In the 
case of a MDF a Flight Day 2 rendezvous would be 
acceptable. 
  Note that in Figure 25.2 for a Monday, February 8 
launch there were overlapping planar windows for both 
Flight Day 3 and Flight Day 4 rendezvous.  If the launch 
was delayed and the predicted launch time slipped out of 
the Flight Day 3 planar window and into the Flight Day 4 
planar window, and if enough propellant was available, a 
Flight Day 4 rendezvous could have been flown (Figure 
25.6).  Or the Shuttle Program could have chosen to scrub 
the launch attempt and wait a day to attempt a launch in a 
Flight Day 3 launch window.  
 The phase window was based on a 185 nm average 
ISS orbital altitude and an 85 nm minimum perigee limit 
for the orbiter.  The phase angle at OMS-2 can vary from 
37 degrees to 311 degrees for a Flight Day 3 rendezvous 
and 211 degrees to 505 degrees for a Flight Day 4 
rendezvous.  However, a Flight Day 4 phase angle 
window could go as low as 50 or 60 degrees depending 
on the rendezvous burn plan.  Since a Flight Day 3 
docking is preferable to a Flight Day 4 docking, the Flight 
Day 3 window is used and a transition is made to the 
Flight Day 4 window once the Flight Day 3 window 
closes.  The portion of the Flight Day 4 window that 
overlaps Flight Day 3 is not used. 
  Flight Day 4 planar windows did exist for the 
Sunday, February 7 and Tuesday, February 9 launch 
opportunities.  However, the Flight Day 4 phasing 
windows for those dates did not fit into the Flight Day 4  
planar windows; hence they are not shown in the Figure 
25.2.  The Flight Day 4 window is about 372 degrees 
greater that the Flight Day 3 planar window for all cases.  
Since the Flight Day 4 windows are limited to a 
maximum of 522 degrees, adding 372 degrees to 
February 7th and 9th windows result in a planar window 
that cannot be supported by phasing. 
 If the OMS-2 phase angle is low, there is a possibility 
that the same altitude used in OMS-2 burn targeting can 
be used for both a Flight Day 2 and a Flight Day 3 
rendezvous. This allows the trajectory for both a Flight     
. 
Figure 25.2  Daily planar window opening and closing 
times with phase angle limits at OMS-2.  Note that 
February 8 has both Flight Day 3 and 4 windows.  This 
plot is based on February 1, 2010 flight design data. 
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STS-130 MISSION TO THE ISS 
shifting and meeting lighting constraints could shift the 
time of docking earlier or later in the day. 
 The Space Shuttle Program has never flown a Flight 
Day 1 rendezvous and docking/grapple since it results in 
small launch windows that do not repeat on a daily or 
weekly basis.  Furthermore, Space Adaption Syndrome 
(SAS) can occur on Flight Days 1 and 2.  A Flight Day 3 
rendezvous and docking/grapple has been preferred for 
several reasons: 1) it provides time for the crew to 
overcome SAS, 2) results in a less challenging crew 
timeline on Flight Day 1, 3) it permits Flight Day 2 to be   
. 
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Day 2 and Flight Day 3 rendezvous to remain the same 
up until the NC-1 burns.  This provides the Shuttle 
Program two hours in which to declare a MDF before 
committing to a Flight Day 3 rendezvous at the NC-1 
burn.  Propellant is budgeted for a Flight Day 3 
rendezvous.  Since a Flight Day 2 rendezvous requires 
less propellant the Flight Day 3 budget covers it.   
 For a Flight Day 2 docking the orbiter must have a 
lower orbital altitude that provides a higher phasing (or 
catch-up) rate (Figure 25.5).  For a Flight Day 3 docking 
the orbiter is at a higher orbital altitude that provides a 
slower phasing rate (Figure 25.4).  The OMS-2 burn 
controls the altitude of the orbit half an orbital revolution 
after the burn.  This orbital altitude (the OMS-2 burn 
target altitude) controls the phasing rate until the NC-1 
burn.  If both Flight Day 2 and Flight Day 3 docking 
options are to be preserved until the NC-1 burn, the 
altitude target for the OMS-2 burn is limited by a subset 
of the orbital altitudes (and therefore phasing rates)           
required for the Flight Day 2 and Flight Day 3 docking 
options.  In order to accommodate phasing requirements 
for both options, the launch window is generally broken    
. 
up into two segments. The first segment (planar window 
open to the in-plane launch time) requires a higher OMS-
2 target altitude.  However, the first segment was not 
used on the later Mir and all ISS flights since the nominal 
launch time was the in-plane time.  The second segment 
(in-plane launch time to planar window close) requires a 
lower OMS-2 target altitude. 
 The maximum phase angle for a Flight Day 2 
rendezvous is about 110 degrees.  The minimum phase 
angle to achieve either a Flight Day 2 or Flight Day 3 
rendezvous varies from 36 to 40 degrees.  As the launch 
date approaches ISS orbit determination has less 
uncertainty and rendezvous planners can be less 
conservative with phasing angle limits.  Note in Figure 
25.2 only the Flight Day 3 planar window for Monday, 
February 8 overlapped with Flight Day 2 phasing limits. 
 
Rendezvous Plans 
 The pre-launch Flight Day 3 docking rendezvous 
maneuver plans for each launch opportunity are given in 
Tables 25.4, 25.5, and 25.6.  The data in the tables was     
. 
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insertion.  The February 9 profile was similar due to 
ISS orbit design.  See Tables 25.4 and 25.6. 
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Figure 25.4   February 8 launch opportunity Flight  
Day 3 docking rendezvous profile, 92 degree phase  
angle at insertion.  This profile was flown on STS-
130.  See Tables 25.5 and 25.7.   
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degree phase angle at insertion.  
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CHASER L E1        M 000:00:10:29.000        STS-130 2/7 Launch 
TARGET L E3        M 000:00:10:29.000        ISS MDOL 2/7 Launch 
 
  CHASER  DVtot =  390.07  DVx =  388.00  DVy =    1.96  DVz =    1.17 
  TARGET  DVtot =    0.00  DVx =    0.00  DVy =    0.00  DVz =    0.00 10  MNVRS 
 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
| MNVR  NAME |      GMTIG  IMP  |   DVx   |    HA   |    RANGE   |       Y     | 
|  COMMENT   |      METIG       |   DVy   |    HP   |    PHASE   |      Ydot   | 
|  DVMag     |       DT         |   DVz   |    DH   | Noon/Mid - |    SR/SS -  | 
|------------+------------------+---------+---------+------------+-------------| 
|  1 HA      | 038:10:18:08.201 |   98.18 |  123.60 |  4942.9924 |   -173842.6 | 
| OMS-2      | 000:00:38:21.201 |    0.00 |   84.91 |   -86.7611 |        -5.7 | 
|   98.2     | 000:02:56:40.840 |    0.00 |   63.63 | N-00:21:06 | SS-00:49:44 | 
|------------+------------------+---------+---------+------------+-------------| 
|  2 NC      | 038:13:14:49.040 |   42.97 |  123.27 |  5923.8992 |   -153024.5 | 
| NC-1       | 000:03:35:02.040 |    0.00 |  108.85 |  -110.8250 |        -4.8 | 
|   43.0     | 000:13:19:02.138 |    0.00 |   63.93 | N-00:27:12 | SS-00:55:52 | 
|------------+------------------+---------+---------+------------+-------------| 
|  3 EXDV    | 039:02:33:51.179 |    8.00 |  123.43 |  7041.9123 |   -106559.5 | 
| NC-2       | 000:16:54:04.179 |    0.00 |  112.80 |   156.3549 |        -3.6 | 
|    8.0     | 000:00:12:09.963 |    0.00 |   64.13 | M-00:05:03 | SR-00:22:11 | 
|------------+------------------+---------+---------+------------+-------------| 
|  4 NPC     | 039:02:46:01.142 |    0.00 |  123.43 |  7024.1573 |    -76378.9 | 
| NPC        | 000:17:06:14.142 |   -1.88 |  112.68 |   155.1690 |        80.5 | 
|    1.9     | 000:08:40:59.128 |    0.00 |   65.20 | N-00:38:36 | SR-00:10:02 | 
|------------+------------------+---------+---------+------------+-------------| 
|  5 EXDV    | 039:11:27:00.270 |    3.00 |  123.14 |  5360.6120 |    -62554.8 | 
| NC-3       | 001:01:47:13.270 |    0.00 |  114.41 |    96.3256 |        15.0 | 
|    3.0     | 000:13:56:41.730 |    0.00 |   64.27 | M-00:20:14 | SS-00:02:57 | 
|------------+------------------+---------+---------+------------+-------------| 
|  6 NH      | 040:01:23:42.000 |  114.11 |  187.20 |   216.7811 |       840.5 | 
| NH         | 001:15:43:55.000 |    0.00 |  114.16 |     3.2787 |         1.5 | 
|  114.1     | 000:00:45:51.000 |    0.00 |   68.89 | M-00:06:04 | SR-00:23:30 | 
 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
|  7 NC      | 040:02:09:33.000 |  110.02 |  187.20 |    40.1780 |      -158.8 | 
| NC-4       | 001:16:29:46.000 |    0.00 |  176.62 |     0.6339 |        -0.2 | 
|  110.0     | 000:01:29:35.000 |    0.00 |    0.25 | N-00:05:55 | SS-00:34:14 | 
|------------+------------------+---------+---------+------------+-------------| 
|  8 NCC     | 040:03:39:08.000 |    8.95 |  187.34 |     8.0055 |         0.3 | 
| Ti         | 001:17:59:21.000 |   -0.03 |  181.74 |     0.1263 |        -0.0 | 
|    9.0     | 000:01:16:54.000 |    0.15 |    0.20 | N-00:07:43 | SS-00:36:00 | 
|------------+------------------+---------+---------+------------+-------------| 
|  9 SOI     | 040:04:56:02.000 |    1.51 |  187.64 |     0.3306 |        -1.8 | 
| MC-4       | 001:19:16:15.000 |   -0.05 |  182.44 |     0.0023 |         0.0 | 
|    1.7     | 000:00:13:00.000 |    0.69 |    0.30 | N-00:22:12 | SS-00:50:15 | 
|------------+------------------+---------+---------+------------+-------------| 
| 10 SOR     | 040:05:09:02.000 |    1.26 |  187.67 |     0.0968 |         2.3 | 
| Rbar       | 001:19:29:15.000 |   -0.01 |  183.08 |     0.0000 |         0.0 | 
|    1.3     | 000:00:00:00.000 |    0.33 |    0.10 | N-00:09:12 | SS-00:37:27 | 
 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 STS-130/L-7_Feb7    Trajectory Sequence of Events 
  
=============================================================================== 
|  EVENT           |     TIG        |   ORB    |    DV     |  HA     |  HP    | 
|                  |     MET        |          |    FPS    |  NM     |  NM    | 
=============================================================================== 
| OMS-2               00/00:37:47         1         98.2      123.6      84.9 | 
| NC-1                00/03:34:46         3         42.9      123.3     108.8 | 
| NC-2                00/16:53:57        12          8.0      123.4     112.8 | 
| NPC                 00/17:06:10        12          1.9      123.4     112.7 | 
| NC-3                01/01:47:06        18          3.0      123.2     114.4 | 
| NH                  01/15:43:16        27        114.3      187.3     114.2 | 
| NC-4                01/16:29:08        28        109.8      187.3     176.5 | 
| Ti                  01/17:59:21        29          9.1      187.4     181.7 | 
| MC-4                01/19:16:15        30          1.7      187.7     182.4 | 
| Dock                01/20:39:00        31          0.0      187.9     183.1 | 
| Undock              10/14:33:00       169          0.0      189.5     180.8 | 
| Sep-1               10/15:48:00       169          3.0      189.1     181.2 | 
| Sep-2               10/16:16:00       170          1.5      189.8     181.3 | 
|=============================================================================| 
Table 25.4  Launch minus 7 days rendezvous profile, Flight Day 3 docking, for the 
February 7 (Sunday) launch opportunity.  See also Figure 25.3. 
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CHASER L E1        M 000:00:10:29.000        STS-130 2/8 Launch 
TARGET L E3        M 000:00:10:29.000        ISS MDOL 2/8 Launch 
 
  CHASER  DVtot =  387.67  DVx =  385.98  DVy =    1.59  DVz =    1.08 
  TARGET  DVtot =    0.00  DVx =    0.00  DVy =    0.00  DVz =    0.00  9  MNVRS 
 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
| MNVR  NAME |      GMTIG  IMP  |   DVx   |    HA   |    RANGE   |       Y     | 
|  COMMENT   |      METIG       |   DVy   |    HP   |    PHASE   |      Ydot   | 
|  DVMag     |       DT         |   DVz   |    DH   | Noon/Mid - |    SR/SS -  | 
|------------+------------------+---------+---------+------------+-------------| 
|  1 HA      | 039:09:52:26.213 |  143.22 |  123.59 |  5004.3597 |    -53645.2 | 
| OMS2       | 000:00:38:21.213 |    0.00 |  109.90 |    88.1243 |        11.3 | 
|  143.2     | 000:02:13:12.683 |    0.00 |   63.95 | M-00:23:25 | SS-00:06:09 | 
|------------+------------------+---------+---------+------------+-------------| 
|  2 NC      | 039:12:05:38.895 |  109.36 |  185.40 |  4270.8262 |     40308.6 | 
| NC1        | 000:02:51:33.895 |    0.00 |  110.01 |    72.9660 |       -11.2 | 
|  109.4     | 000:14:16:51.105 |    0.00 |   73.48 | N-00:27:18 | SS-00:55:36 | 
|------------+------------------+---------+---------+------------+-------------| 
|  3 NH      | 040:02:22:30.000 |  102.14 |  186.72 |  1232.2807 |     -7874.9 | 
| NC2        | 000:17:08:25.000 |    0.00 |  165.81 |    19.5439 |         5.0 | 
|  102.1     | 000:00:02:40.501 |    0.00 |    2.65 | M-00:38:42 | SS-00:21:13 | 
|------------+------------------+---------+---------+------------+-------------| 
|  4 NPC     | 040:02:25:10.501 |    0.00 |  186.72 |  1231.7574 |     -7715.0 | 
| NPC        | 000:17:11:05.501 |   -1.52 |  165.78 |    19.5402 |         7.0 | 
|    1.5     | 000:08:38:54.499 |    0.00 |    3.73 | M-00:36:00 | SS-00:18:31 | 
|------------+------------------+---------+---------+------------+-------------| 
|  5 EXDV    | 040:11:04:05.000 |    3.00 |  187.17 |   726.8121 |       772.1 | 
| NC3        | 001:01:50:00.000 |    0.00 |  167.19 |    11.5018 |       -12.0 | 
|    3.0     | 000:13:57:13.000 |    0.00 |    4.55 | N-00:19:44 | SS-00:47:44 | 
|------------+------------------+---------+---------+------------+-------------| 
|  6 NC      | 041:01:01:18.000 |   16.62 |  187.51 |    40.0213 |      -172.9 | 
| NC4        | 001:15:47:13.000 |    0.00 |  176.44 |     0.6314 |        -0.2 | 
|   16.6     | 000:01:28:25.000 |    0.00 |    0.31 | N-00:05:00 | SS-00:33:06 | 
 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
|  7 NCC     | 041:02:29:43.000 |    8.87 |  187.66 |     8.0002 |        -6.8 | 
| Ti         | 001:17:15:38.000 |   -0.02 |  181.55 |     0.1262 |        -0.0 | 
|    8.9     | 000:01:16:54.000 |    0.11 |    0.21 | N-00:07:58 | SS-00:36:02 | 
|------------+------------------+---------+---------+------------+-------------| 
|  8 SOI     | 041:03:46:37.000 |    1.51 |  187.94 |     0.3305 |        -2.2 | 
| MC4        | 001:18:32:32.000 |   -0.04 |  182.13 |     0.0023 |         0.0 | 
|    1.6     | 000:00:13:00.000 |    0.64 |    0.30 | N-00:22:27 | SS-00:50:17 | 
|------------+------------------+---------+---------+------------+-------------| 
|  9 SOR     | 041:03:59:37.000 |    1.26 |  187.99 |     0.0969 |         2.2 | 
| Rbar       | 001:18:45:32.000 |   -0.01 |  182.83 |     0.0000 |         0.0 | 
|    1.3     | 000:00:00:00.000 |    0.33 |    0.10 | N-00:09:27 | SS-00:37:29 | 
 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 STS-130/L-7_Feb8    Trajectory Sequence of Events 
  
=============================================================================== 
|  EVENT           |     TIG        |   ORB    |    DV     |  HA     |  HP    | 
|                  |     MET        |          |    FPS    |  NM     |  NM    | 
=============================================================================== 
| OMS2                00/00:37:33         1        143.2      123.6     109.9 | 
| NC1                 00/02:50:56         2        109.4      185.4     110.0 | 
| NC2                 00/17:07:50        12        102.0      186.7     165.8 | 
| NPC                 00/17:11:02        12          1.5      186.7     165.8 | 
| NC3                 01/01:49:53        18          3.0      187.2     167.1 | 
| NC4                 01/15:47:06        27         16.7      187.5     176.4 | 
| Ti                  01/17:15:38        28          8.9      187.6     181.6 | 
| MC4                 01/18:32:32        29          1.7      187.9     182.1 | 
| Dock                01/19:55:00        30          0.0      188.1     182.9 | 
| Undock              10/15:21:00       169          0.0      189.6     180.5 | 
| Sep-1               10/16:36:00       169          3.0      189.2     180.9 | 
| Sep-2               10/17:04:00       170          1.5      190.0     181.0 | 
|=============================================================================| 
Table 25.5  Launch minus 7 days rendezvous profile, Flight Day 3 docking, for the 
February 8 (Monday) launch opportunity.  See also Figure 25.4. 
HISTORY OF SPACE SHUTTLE RENDEZVOUS 
Approved for public release via STI DAA 
24483. See statement on title page. 231  
CHASER L E1        M 000:00:10:29.000        STS-130 2/9 Launch 
TARGET L E3        M 000:00:10:29.000        ISS MDOL 2/9 Launch 
 
  CHASER  DVtot =  389.95  DVx =  387.89  DVy =    2.02  DVz =    1.03 
  TARGET  DVtot =    0.00  DVx =    0.00  DVy =    0.00  DVz =    0.00 10  MNVRS 
 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
| MNVR  NAME |      GMTIG  IMP  |   DVx   |    HA   |    RANGE   |       Y     | 
|  COMMENT   |      METIG       |   DVy   |    HP   |    PHASE   |      Ydot   | 
|  DVMag     |       DT         |   DVz   |    DH   | Noon/Mid - |    SR/SS -  | 
|------------+------------------+---------+---------+------------+-------------| 
|  1 HA      | 040:09:29:55.220 |   98.18 |  123.60 |  4844.7793 |   -175934.1 | 
| OMS-2      | 000:00:38:21.220 |    0.00 |   84.91 |   -84.6318 |        -6.2 | 
|   98.2     | 000:02:56:40.843 |    0.00 |   64.06 | N-00:22:30 | SS-00:50:30 | 
|------------+------------------+---------+---------+------------+-------------| 
|  2 NC      | 040:12:26:36.063 |   40.78 |  123.27 |  5846.1166 |   -154955.0 | 
| NC-1       | 000:03:35:02.063 |    0.00 |  107.63 |  -108.6828 |        -4.7 | 
|   40.8     | 000:13:18:49.812 |    0.00 |   64.35 | N-00:28:35 | SR-00:00:29 | 
|------------+------------------+---------+---------+------------+-------------| 
|  3 EXDV    | 041:01:45:25.875 |    8.00 |  123.41 |  7058.7115 |   -107359.4 | 
| NC-2       | 000:16:53:51.875 |    0.00 |  111.57 |   157.7307 |        -4.2 | 
|    8.0     | 000:00:13:46.348 |    0.00 |   64.57 | M-00:06:33 | SR-00:24:13 | 
|------------+------------------+---------+---------+------------+-------------| 
|  4 NPC     | 041:01:59:12.223 |    0.00 |  123.40 |  7038.8957 |    -67911.9 | 
| NPC        | 000:17:07:38.223 |   -1.87 |  111.45 |   156.3991 |        89.2 | 
|    1.9     | 000:08:39:14.291 |    0.00 |   66.26 | N-00:38:29 | SR-00:10:28 | 
|------------+------------------+---------+---------+------------+-------------| 
|  5 EXDV    | 041:10:38:26.514 |    3.00 |  123.11 |  5397.0059 |    -63388.5 | 
| NC-3       | 001:01:46:52.514 |    0.00 |  113.19 |    97.1957 |        14.9 | 
|    3.0     | 000:13:57:02.486 |    0.00 |   64.73 | M-00:21:50 | SS-00:04:03 | 
|------------+------------------+---------+---------+------------+-------------| 
|  6 NH      | 042:00:35:29.000 |  114.67 |  187.53 |   217.7958 |       867.0 | 
| NH         | 001:15:43:55.000 |    0.00 |  112.94 |     3.2919 |         1.5 | 
|  114.7     | 000:00:45:37.000 |    0.00 |   69.77 | M-00:07:15 | SR-00:25:06 | 
 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
|  7 NC      | 042:01:21:06.000 |  111.57 |  187.64 |    39.9993 |      -153.3 | 
| NC-4       | 001:16:29:32.000 |    0.00 |  176.29 |     0.6311 |        -0.3 | 
|  111.6     | 000:01:30:35.000 |    0.00 |    0.22 | N-00:07:19 | SS-00:35:13 | 
|------------+------------------+---------+---------+------------+-------------| 
|  8 NCC     | 042:02:51:41.000 |    8.92 |  187.80 |     8.0136 |        13.7 | 
| Ti         | 001:18:00:07.000 |    0.07 |  181.36 |     0.1264 |        -0.0 | 
|    8.9     | 000:01:16:54.000 |    0.02 |    0.20 | N-00:08:07 | SS-00:36:00 | 
|------------+------------------+---------+---------+------------+-------------| 
|  9 SOI     | 042:04:08:35.000 |    1.51 |  188.06 |     0.3303 |        -2.5 | 
| MC-4       | 001:19:17:01.000 |   -0.07 |  181.95 |     0.0023 |         0.0 | 
|    1.7     | 000:00:13:00.000 |    0.69 |    0.30 | N-00:22:36 | SS-00:50:15 | 
|------------+------------------+---------+---------+------------+-------------| 
| 10 SOR     | 042:04:21:35.000 |    1.26 |  188.09 |     0.0970 |         2.3 | 
| Rbar       | 001:19:30:01.000 |   -0.01 |  182.60 |     0.0000 |         0.0 | 
|    1.3     | 000:00:00:00.000 |    0.33 |    0.10 | N-00:09:36 | SS-00:37:28 | 
 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 STS-130/L-2_Feb9    Trajectory Sequence of Events 
  
=============================================================================== 
|  EVENT           |     TIG        |   ORB    |    DV     |  HA     |  HP    | 
|                  |     MET        |          |    FPS    |  NM     |  NM    | 
=============================================================================== 
| OMS-2               00/00:37:47         1         98.2      123.6      84.9 | 
| NC-1                00/03:34:47         3         40.7      123.3     107.6 | 
| NC-2                00/16:53:45        12          8.0      123.4     111.6 | 
| NPC                 00/17:08:29        12          1.9      123.4     111.5 | 
| NC-3                01/01:46:45        18          3.0      123.2     113.2 | 
| NH                  01/15:43:16        27        114.9      187.6     113.0 | 
| NC-4                01/16:28:54        28        111.3      187.7     176.1 | 
| Ti                  01/18:00:07        29          9.2      187.9     181.4 | 
| MC-4                01/19:17:01        30          1.7      188.1     181.9 | 
| Dock                01/20:39:00        31          0.0      188.3     182.6 | 
| Undock              10/14:34:00       169          0.0      189.8     180.2 | 
| Sep-1               10/15:49:00       169          3.0      189.4     180.6 | 
| Sep-2               10/16:17:00       170          1.5      190.1     180.7 | 
|=============================================================================| 
Table 25.6  Launch minus 7 days rendezvous profile, Flight Day 3 docking, for the 
February 9 (Tuesday) launch opportunity.  See Figure 25.3. 
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computed at launch minus 7 days (L-7). Data in Table 
25.5 does not necessarily reflect the as-flown rendezvous 
profile.  Table 25.7 provides actual burn data for the 
rendezvous and separation burns. 
 Rendezvous maneuver plans were re-computed after 
orbit insertion and changed based on vehicle 
performance. The ground targeted phase of shuttle 
rendezvous profiles is designed to place the Transition 
Initiation (Ti) maneuver on the day of rendezvous at the 
appropriate time relative to sunset to achieve the proper 
lighting during the R Bar Pitch Maneuver (RPM).   
 Figure 25.3 is the Flight Day 3 profile for the 
February 7 launch opportunity. The actual profile flown 
after the launch on February 8 is illustrated in Figure 
25.4.  The February 8 launch opportunity also had 
options for Flight Day 2 and Flight Day 4 rendezvous 
and docking.  Figure 25.5 illustrates the Flight Day 2 
profile and Figure 25.6 the Flight Day 4 profile.  The 
Flight Day 3 and Flight Day 2 profiles (Figures 25.4 and 
25.5) were the same up until the NC-1 burn.  This 
preserved the Flight Day 2 and Flight Day 3 docking 
options up to the NC-1 burn. 
 
Flight Day One – Launch and Orbit Insertion 
 
 The launch attempt on Sunday, February 7 was 
scrubbed due to cloud conditions that violated constraints 
for a Return to Launch Site abort.  The scrub was              
. 
Table 25.7  STS-130 Rendezvous and Separation Burns As Executed 
Burn 
 
 
OMS-2 
 
NC-1 
 
NC-2 
 
NC-3 
 
NC-4 
 
NCC 
 
Ti 
 
MC-1 
 
MC-2 
 
MC-3 
 
MC-4 
 
 
Undock 
 
SEP-1 
 
SEP-2 
MET 
d/hh:mm:ss 
 
0/00:38:35 
 
0/02:59:20 
 
0/17:15:58 
 
1/02:27:59 
 
1/15:42:09 
 
1/16:16:36 
 
1/17:14:18 
 
1/17:34:18 
 
1/18:02:23 
 
1/18:19:23 
 
1/18:29:23 
 
 
11/15:39:45 
 
11/16:47:47  
 
11/17:16:50  
GMT 
d/hh:mm:ss 
 
39/09:52:40 
 
39/12:13:25 
 
40/02:30:03 
 
40/11:42:04 
 
41/00:56:14 
 
41/01:30:43  
 
41/02:28:25 
 
41/02:48:25 
 
41/03:16:30 
 
41/03:33:30 
 
41/03:43:30   
 
 
51/00:53:50 
 
51/02:01:52 
 
51/02:30:55 
Local (CST) 
d, hh:mm:ss 
 
Mon, 03:52:40 
 
Mon, 06:13:25 
 
Mon, 20:30:03 
 
Tue, 05:41:64 
 
Tue, 18:56:14 
 
Tue, 19:30:43 
 
Tue, 20:28:25 
 
Tue, 20:48:25 
 
Tue, 21:16:30 
 
Tue, 21:33:30 
 
Tue, 21:43:40 
 
 
Fri, 18:53:50 
 
Fri, 20:01:52 
 
Fri, 20:30:55 
DV Total 
ft./sec. 
 
141.96 
 
102.94 
 
104.28 
 
1.40 
 
22.60 
 
0.36 
 
6.65 
 
0.44 
 
0.51 
 
0.25 
 
1.93 
 
 
 
 
1.50 
 
3.30 
LVLH X DV 
ft./sec. 
 
+141.9 
 
+102.7 
 
+104.2 
 
+1.4 
 
+22.6 
 
+0.4 
 
+6.6 
 
+0.1 
 
+0.1 
 
-0.2 
 
+1.7 
 
 
 
 
0.0 
 
-3.3 
LVLH Y DV 
ft./sec. 
 
0.0 
 
-5.2 
 
0.0 
 
0.0 
 
0.0 
 
0.0 
 
-0.3 
 
+0.3 
 
0.0 
 
-0.1 
 
-0.2 
 
 
 
 
0.0 
 
0.0 
LVLH Y DZ 
ft./sec. 
 
0.0 
 
+4.2 
 
+4.1 
 
0.0 
 
0.2 
 
-0.1 
 
+0.8 
 
-0.3 
 
-0.5 
 
-0.1 
 
+0.9 
 
 
 
 
-1.5 
 
0.0 
Docking occurred on Tuesday, February 9, 2010.  Undocking occurred on Friday, February 19, 2010. 
  
declared during the poll of the launch team to come out 
of the T-9 minute hold.  The Mission Management Team 
later decided to conduct a 24 hour launch turn-around. 
 Endeavour launched at 4:14:05 AM EST from Pad 
39A on Monday, February 8, 2010.  Ascent was nominal.  
The 141.96 feet/second OMS-2 burn was performed and 
no RCS trim burn was required (Table 25.7).  The shuttle 
Ku band antenna used for both TDRSS communications 
and rendezvous radar was activated.  The 102.9 
feet/second NC-1 burn was also successful and no RCS 
trim was required.  The NC-1 burn was earlier than on 
previous flights due to the short phase angle at insertion 
(92 degrees).  Since a nodal crossing occurred near the 
planned NC-1 time NC-1 was moved to the nodal 
crossing and a NPC burn was combined with NC-1. 
 
Flight Day Two – Rendezvous Tools and TPS 
Checkout 
 
 Rendezvous related activities performed on Flight 
Day 2 (Figure 25.1) included the NC-2 and NC-3 phasing 
burns, centerline camera installation, docking ring 
extension, laptop computer set-up, and the Trajectory 
Control Sensor (TCS) and Hand Held Laser (HHL) 
checkouts. 
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NC-2 and NC-3 Burns 
 
 The NC-2 burn on Flight Day 2 was successful and 
no RCS trim was required (Table 25.7).  The 50 foot long 
Orbiter Boom Sensor System (OBSS) was grappled by 
the Remote Manipulator System (RMS), un-berthed, and 
thermal protection surveys of the starboard wing, port 
wing, and nose cap were completed.  Imagery analysis by 
ground personnel began.  The OBSS was re-berthed 
before the NC-3 burn.  Both Extra-vehicular Mobility 
Units (EMUs) were checked out.  On the ISS PMA-2 
pressurization was performed in preparation for the 
docking. 
STS-130 MISSION TO THE ISS 
Rendezvous Tools Checkout 
 
 The crew installed and aligned the centerline camera 
that would be used on Flight Day 3 during the docking.  
The crew reported that the installation went well and that 
camera performance at the 10 and 40 degree zoom 
settings was satisfactory.  No shimming was required.  
The APAS Docking ring was extended and the docking 
hardware was then powered down.   
 The crew set up the two laptop computers (primary 
and backup) that ran Rendezvous and Proximity 
Operations Program (RPOP) and TCS software. A third 
laptop that ran WinDECOM software to provide orbiter 
Pulse Code Modulation Master Unit (PCMMU) data to     
. 
 
Table 25.8  STS-130 Prime Orbit Timeline For Nominal Approach and Docking 
Event 
 
 
Ti 
US Solar Arrays Feathered for Docking 
Range = 33000 ft 
ISS Tracking Light On 
Sunset 
ISS Maneuver Start 
ISS In Docking Attitude 
Range = 10000 ft 
Range = 5000 ft 
ISS In Prox Ops Mode 
Sunrise 
ISS Tracking Light Off 
Range = 3000 ft 
MC4 
Range = 1500 ft 
RPM Start Window Open 
Range = 1000 ft 
KU to LO (800 ft) 
+Rbar Arrival (725 ft) 
Range = 600 ft 
Start Pitch Maneuver 
Noon 
End Pitch Maneuver 
RPM Full Photo Window Close 
Initiate TORVA (575 ft) 
RPM Start Window Close 
Russian Solar Arrays Feathered 
+Vbar Arrival (310 ft) 
Range = 300 ft 
Range = 250 ft 
Sunset 
Range = 200 ft 
Range = 170 ft 
Range = 150 ft 
Range = 100 ft 
Range = 75 ft 
Range = 50 ft 
Range (30 ft) SK Start 
SK (30 ft) End (Push To Dock) 
Range = 10 ft 
Contact 
Sunrise 
Noon 
PET 
d/hh:mm:ss 
 
-0/02:38:06 
-0/02:07:31 
-0/02:04:07 
-0/02:02:24 
-0/02:02:13 
-0/01:48:31 
-0/01:43:31 
-0/01:39:30 
-0/01:30:51 
-0/01:27:31 
-0/01:26:55 
-0/01:26:24 
-0/01:25:22 
-0/01:21:12 
-0/01:17:12 
-0/01:14:51 
-0/01:12:12 
-0/01:09:12 
-0/01:08:12 
-0/01:03:00 
-0/01:01:06 
-0/00:58:53 
-0/00:53:06 
-0/00:50:56 
-0/00:50:30 
-0/00:42:32 
-0/00:42:24 
-0/00:39:00 
-0/00:38:10 
-0/00:34:00 
-0/00:30:52 
-0/00:29:50 
-0/00:27:20 
-0/00:25:40 
-0/00:21:30 
-0/00:18:30 
-0/00:14:20 
-0/00:11:00 
-0/00:06:00 
-0/00:01:40 
+0/00:00:00 
+0/00:04:27 
+0/00:32:28 
MET 
d/hh:mm:ss 
 
1/17:14:18 
1/17:44:53 
1/17:48:17 
1/17:50:00 
1/17:50:11 
1/18:03:53 
1/18:08:53 
1/18:12:54 
1/18:21:33 
1/18:24:53 
1/18:25:29 
1/18:26:00 
1/18:27:02 
1/18:31:12 
1/18:35:12 
1/18:37:33 
1/18:40:12 
1/18:43:12 
1/18:44:12 
1/18:49:24 
1/18:51:18 
1/18:53:31 
1/18:59:18 
1/19:01:28 
1/19:01:54 
1/19:09:52 
1/19:10:00 
1/19:13:24 
1/19:14:14 
1/19:18:24 
1/19:21:32 
1/19:22:34 
1/19:25:04 
1/19:26:44 
1/19:30:54 
1/19:33:54 
1/19:38:04 
1/19:41:24 
1/19:46:24 
1/19:50:44 
1/19:52:24 
1/19:56:51 
1/20:24:52 
GMT 
d/hh:mm:ss 
 
41/02:28:25 
41/02:59:00 
41/03:02:24 
41/03:04:07 
41/03:04:18 
41/03:18:00 
41/03:23:00 
41/03:27:01 
41/03:35:40 
41/03:39:00 
41/03:39:36 
41/03:40:07 
41/03:41:09 
41/03:45:19 
41/03:49:19 
41/03:51:39 
41/03:54:19 
41/03:57:19 
41/03:58:19 
41/04:03:31 
41/04:05:25 
41/04:07:37 
41/04:13:25 
41/04:15:35 
41/04:16:01 
41/04:23:59 
41/04:24:07 
41/04:27:31 
41/04:28:21 
41/04:32:31 
41/04:35:39 
41/04:36:41 
41/04:39:11 
41/04:40:51 
41/04:45:01 
41/04:48:01 
41/04:52:11 
41/04:55:31 
41/05:00:31 
41/05:04:51 
41/05:06:31 
41/05:10:58 
41/05:38:59 
Local (CST) 
d, hh:mm:ss 
 
Tue, 20:28:25 
Tue, 20:59:00 
Tue, 21:02:24 
Tue, 21:04:07 
Tue, 21:04:18 
Tue, 21:18:00 
Tue, 21:23:00 
Tue, 21:27:01 
Tue, 21:35:40 
Tue, 21:39:00 
Tue, 21:39:36 
Tue, 21:40:07 
Tue, 21:41:09 
Tue, 21:45:19 
Tue, 21:49:19 
Tue, 21:51:39 
Tue, 21:54:19 
Tue, 21:57:19 
Tue, 21:58:19 
Tue, 22:03:31 
Tue, 22:05:25 
Tue, 22:07:37 
Tue, 22:13:25 
Tue, 22:15:35 
Tue, 22:16:01 
Tue, 22:23:59 
Tue, 22:24:07 
Tue, 22:27:31 
Tue, 22:28:21 
Tue, 22:32:31 
Tue, 22:35:39 
Tue, 22:36:41 
Tue, 22:39:11 
Tue, 22:40:51 
Tue, 22:45:01 
Tue, 22:48:01 
Tue, 22:52:11 
Tue, 22:55:31 
Tue, 23:00:31 
Tue, 23:04:51 
Tue, 23:06:31 
Tue, 23:10:58 
Tue, 23:38:59 
DMT 
d/hh:mm:ss 
 
41/05:28:25 
41/05:59:00 
41/06:02:24 
41/06:04:07 
41/06:04:18 
41/06:18:00 
41/06:23:00 
41/06:27:01 
41/06:35:40 
41/06:39:00 
41/06:39:36 
41/06:40:07 
41/06:41:09 
41/06:45:19 
41/06:49:19 
41/06:51:39 
41/06:54:19 
41/06:57:19 
41/06:58:19 
41/07:03:31 
41/07:05:25 
41/07:07:37 
41/07:13:25 
41/07:15:35 
41/07:16:01 
41/07:23:59 
41/07:24:07 
41/07:27:31 
41/07:28:21 
41/07:32:31 
41/07:35:39 
41/07:36:41 
41/07:39:11 
41/07:40:51 
41/07:45:01 
41/07:48:01 
41/07:52:11 
41/07:55:31 
41/08:00:31 
41/08:04:51 
41/08:06:31 
41/08:10:58 
41/08:38:59 
CST – Central Standard Time, DMT – Decreed Moscow Time, GMT – Greenwich Mean Time, ISS – International Space Station, LO – Low, MC4 – 
Mid-course Correction 4, MET – Mission Elapsed Time, PET – Phase Elapsed Time, RPM – R Bar Pitch Maneuver, SK – Station Keeping, Ti – 
Transition Initiation, TORVA – Twice Orbital Rate V Bar Approach 
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the RPOP laptops was also set up.  This hardware was left 
set up overnight for use on Flight Day 3. 
 TCS checkout was good.  The crew tested the HHL 
with the night scope by using an Orbital Maneuvering 
System (OMS) pod as a target since the aft bulkhead was 
obscured by Node 3 (Tranquility) in the payload bay.  
HHL marks indicated that the OMS pod was not moving 
relative to the crew cabin.  Quick thinking Mission 
Control personnel concurred that this was desirable.  
 At MET 0/17:30 (Monday, February 8, 8:44 pm CST) 
a star/Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU) alignment was 
performed using data from stars 93 (Iota Centauri) and 83 
(Theta Aurigae). 
 
Rendezvous Event and Lighting Information 
 
 The crew was provided with a rendezvous event and 
lighting information summary by Mission Control (Table 
25.8).  The Transition Initiation (Ti) maneuver was 
planned to occur at MET 1/17:14:18, about 36 minutes 
before orbital sunset.  This provided appropriate lighting 
for the RPM photo session.  The RPM was a 0.75 
degree/second attitude maneuver that permitted the ISS 
crew to photograph the thermal protection system on the 
underside of the  orbiter. 
 The solar beta angle during the approach would be 
minus 23 degrees (Sun south of the orbital plane).  The 
Sun was not expected to enter the centerline camera field 
of view but could skirt the edges of the cockpit overhead 
windows during proximity operations near the +R Bar 
and again near the +V Bar when the Sun set behind the 
ISS.   
 The ISS was to begin a 5 minute maneuver to the 
docking attitude approximately 50 minutes after the Ti 
burn, at an MET of 1/18:04.  If a post Ti night star tracker 
pass were required due to a rendezvous radar failure the 
ISS attitude maneuver would occur during the pass.  The 
US solar arrays were to be feathered about 10 minutes 
after the MC-1 burn, at an MET of 1/17:45.  Russian 
Service Module solar arrays were to be feathered before 
orbiter arrival on the +V Bar at an MET of 1/19:10. 
 The RPM window was predicted to open at MET 
1/18:37:33 and close at 1/19:09:52 (Figure 25.7).  The 
RPM window is driven by the Sun and camera lines-of-
sight to the orbiter and ISS shadowing of the orbiter.  The 
latest time the crew could start the RPM and allow the 
ISS crew to obtain two complete sets of RPM photos 
within the prescribed lighting constraints was MET 
1/19:01:28.  Optimum RPM lighting occurred +/- 4 
minutes with respect to orbital noon.  For the February 8 
launch date no +R Bar station-keeping was required 
before the opening of the RPM start window for a 
nominal trajectory.  Had the launch occurred on February 
7 no station-keeping would have been required either.  
However, if the launch had slipped to February 9 +R Bar 
station-keeping would have been required before the 
RPM. 
Figure 25.7 Full and partial RPM photo windows. 
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 Sunset was predicted to occur approximately half an 
hour before docking, at a range on the +V Bar of about 
200 feet, at an MET of 1/19:22.  The predicted docking 
time was 1/19:52 MET, approximately four minutes 
before sunrise.  This time assumed 5 minutes of +V Bar 
station-keeping for an auto-angular flyout at a range of 30 
feet.  However, if the relative alignment determined by 
the Endeavour crew from reading the ISS docking target 
was within limits the station-keeping and auto-angular 
flyout would not be performed. 
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Flight Day Three – Rendezvous and Docking 
  
 The crew was awakened at approximately 1/13:00 
MET (4:14 pm CST, Tuesday, February 9, 2010) to 
begin Flight Day 3, the day of rendezvous (Figure 25.1). 
After the Group B power-up IMUs 2 and 3 were aligned 
to IMU 1.  Stars 88 (Zeta Canis Majoris) and 80 (Epsilon 
Persei) were acquired for the alignment at MET 1/13:40. 
A retrograde waste water dump was begun at  an MET of  
approximately 01/13:53 (5:07 pm CST).  The retrograde 
dump ensured that the water would remain below the ISS 
orbital altitude, avoiding contamination of the ISS.   
 
Handover to the Rendezvous Execute Shift 
 
 The handover briefing for the Mission Control Orbit 
1 team, also known as the execute shift, started at MET 
01/14:04 (5:18 pm CST) on the AFD CONF DVIS loop   
.(Table 25.9).  All Mission Control positions reported 
that their systems were performing well.  The Flight 
Activities Officer (FAO) reported that the waste water 
dump was in progress.   
 The Flight Dynamics Officer (FDO) reported that the 
orbiter was in a 187x165 nm orbit, trailing ISS by 119 
nm, closing at a rate of 85 nm per orbit.  The NC-3 burn 
performed yesterday (Flight Day 2) was nominal with a 
total delta-velocity of 1.4 ft/sec.  There was no NH 
(altitude adjust burn) in the rendezvous profile today.  
NC-4 TIG was MET 1/15:42 and at a range of 33 nm.      
. 
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Table 25.9  Rendezvous Team  Audio Communication (DVIS) Loops 
AFD CONF – Alternate Flight Director Conference, DVIS – Digital Voice Intercommunications System, DYN – 
Dynamics, FD – Flight Director, FDO – Flight Dynamics Officer, GNC – Guidance, Navigation, and Control, MARS – 
Maneuver and Rendezvous Specialist, MER – Mission Evaluation Room, MOCR – Mission Operations Control 
Room, MPSR – Multi-Purpose Support Room, NAV – Navigation, ONAV – On-board Navigation, PROFILE – 
Rendezvous Trajectory Profile, PROP – Propellant Officer, PROX OPS – Proximity Operations, RGPO – 
Rendezvous Guidance and Procedures Officer, RPS – Rendezvous Procedures Support, TRAJ – Trajectory 
Loop 
 
AFD CONF 
 
A/G 
 
FD 
 
GNC Coord 
 
Landing Support 
 
Nav Support 
 
MOCR DYN1 
 
MOCR GNC/PROP 
 
MPSR DYN A 
 
MPSR DYN B 
 
Function 
 
Shift handover briefings and special topics. 
 
Communication with orbiter crew. 
 
Flight Director loop. 
 
Rendezvous tools and GNC discussions with the MER. 
 
Additional loop for rendezvous team. 
 
Communication between FDO/TRAJ and ONAV and NAV. 
 
RGPO and FDO with personnel other than Flight Dynamics.   
 
Front room console discussions with GNC and PROP. 
 
FDO loop for communicating with MARS and PROFILE. 
 
RGPO loop for communicating with TARGET, ONAV, RPS, and PROX OPS. 
 
behind the ISS.  Although the nominal NC-4 range was 
40 nm, the shorter 33 nm range was within the shuttle 
flight experience base. 
 The Rendezvous Guidance and Procedures Officer 
(RGPO) saw no issues with the 33 nm range at NC-4. 
The Flight Day 2 centerline camera checkout was good, 
as was the rendezvous tools checkout.  A message on 
proximity operations lighting and an event timeline were 
sent to the crew on Flight Day 2.  Some of the predicted 
proximity operations times could change due to MC-2 
TIG slip and manual piloting.  The nominal docking time 
was predicted to be 11:06 pm CST.  Some TDRSS 
communications gaps had been closed by Ground 
Control (GC).  It was expected that the crew would enter 
the rendezvous procedures book at a MET of 1/14:30.   
  GC reported a 6 minute TDRSS communications gap 
starting 16 minutes after the nominal docking time.  GC 
was working hard to close it.  The Guidance, Navigation, 
and Control (GNC) controller reported that GNC systems 
were performing well.  A star of opportunity IMU 
alignment had just completed.  The Assembly Checkout 
Officer (ACO) reported that the ISS was making 
progress in preparing for docking later in the day.  The 
Payload Deployment and Retrieval System (PDRS) 
officer reported that the OBSS was berthed.  The orbiter 
RMS was cradled and both Manipulator Positioning 
Mechanisms (MPMs) were deployed. 
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Figure 25.8  Diagram of orbiter flight deck showing 
approximate positions of crew members during 
rendezvous thru Ti.  Crew positioning varied in zero 
gravity. 
World Map 
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Table 25.10  STS-130 Task Assignments for Rendezvous Thru MC-4 
Zamka 
 
Primary/Backup 
Backup 
Task 
 
Targeting/Burns/DAP (Pre & Post Ti) 
Navigation (sensors) 
Master Checklist 
Communications/PADS 
CCTV Configuration 
TRAD/PGSC Configuration 
TRAD/PGSC Ops (RPOP/TCS) 
Systems/Reference Data 
Photo/TV OPS (Recorder, V10) 
Virts 
 
Backup/Primary 
Primary 
Primary 
Primary 
 
 
 
Backup 
Backup 
Robinson 
 
 
 
Backup 
 
Primary 
Primary 
Primary 
Hire 
 
 
 
 
Backup 
Backup 
 
Backup 
Primary 
Primary 
Patrick 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Behnken 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Backup 
CCTV – Closed Circuit Television, DAP – Digital Auto Pilot, OPS – Operations, PADS – Burn data read to the crew by Mission Control 
and recorded in the crew procedures, PGSC – Payload General Support Computer (laptop), RPOP – Rendezvous and Proximity 
Operations Program, TCS – Trajectory Control Sensor, TRAD – Tools for Rendezvous and Docking, Ti – Transition Initiation, TV - 
Television 
Table 25.11  Flight Day 3 Rendezvous Package  
Preliminary Burn TIGs 
Mission Elapsed Time (day:hr:min:sec) 
 
001:15:42:17.648 
001:16:16:36.000 
001:17:14:18.000 PET = 0:0, SS – 36 MIN 
001:17:34:18.000 
001:18:04:12.000 PET = 0:0 
001:18:21:12.000 MC2 + 17 MIN 
001:18:31:12.000 MC2 + 27 MIN 
001:19:52:00.000 
Burn 
 
NC4 
NCC 
TI 
MC1 
MC2 
MC3 
MC4 
DOCK 
MC – Mid-course Correction, MIN – Minute, NC – Phasing 
burn, NCC – Corrective Combination burn, PET – Phase 
Elapsed Time, SS – Sunset, Ti – Transition Initiation 
 
NC-4 to Radar Acquisition 
 
 Figure 25.8 shows approximate crew positions from 
pre-NC-4 thru the Ti burn.  Table 25.10 lists rendezvous 
task assignments for each crew member thru the MC-4 
burn.  Figure 25.9 illustrates the Flight Day 3 rendezvous 
profile and Table 25.11 lists the burn Times of Ignition 
(TIGs) provided to the crew by Mission Control. 
 The waste water dump was completed at MET 
01/14:33 (5:47 pm CST).  The crew entered the 
rendezvous book before the NC-4 burn.  Orbiter and 
target state vectors and a target KFACTOR were 
uplinked to the vehicle.  The Ku (rendezvous radar) self 
test was successful.  The crew was informed that after 
NC-4 a period of ratty communications would begin at 
about 1/15:51 MET and end at about 1/16:03 MET. NC-4 
was performed using both OMS engines.  The crew 
performed one -X RCS pulse for trim.  After the burn the 
. 
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Ti 
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Figure 25.9  Flight Day 3 rendezvous profile.  The 
MC-1, MC-2, and MC-3 burns between Ti and MC-4 
are not shown. 
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crew reported that Payload General Support Computer 
(PGSC) set-up for the rendezvous and docking was 
complete.   
  The crew was not able to get through the entire initial 
star tracker relative navigation pass procedures before the 
period of ratty communications began.  Rather than being 
a period of intermittent communications, the period was 
actually a black-out. The crew performed the 
intermediate Lambert targeting of the NCC burn in the 
blind.  Continuous communications were re-established 
before the end of the star tracker pass due to the handover 
from the TDRS at 171 degrees west longitude to the 
TDRS at 41 degrees east longitude.  
 Overall the star tracker pass was successful and the 
crew inhibited star tracker measurement processing after 
115 marks had been obtained.  The brightness of the ISS 
could cause the star tracker shutter to close shortening the 
pass.  However, that did not occur.  The star tracker pass 
had the lowest FILT-PROP position difference of the ISS 
flights so far, 349 feet.  One Mir flight had a lower 
number, and STS-109 (HST servicing mission 3B) had 
the record for lowest FILT-PROP position difference at 
187 feet.  NCC, the first on-board targeted maneuver, 
was successful.  Radar tracking began at a range of 
approximately 138,500 feet.   
 Radar measurement processing began once the orbiter 
was within 135,000 feet of the ISS.  The first position 
update based on radar was 410 feet.  Subsequent position 
updates were 294, 204, and 80 feet.  Radar processing 
was continued until the Ku antenna was transitioned to 
communications mode during final approach, except for 
during burns (Ti, MC-1, MC-2, MC-3, and MC-4) and 
the maneuvers to and from the Ti burn attitude. 
 
  
  
 
Figure 25.11  Photo of Endeavour taken by the ISS  
crew at orbital sunset.  At this point (30:56 after Ti 
and 11:15 before MC-2) the range from Endeavour 
to the ISS was ~27,763 feet. 
N
A
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Ti Through MC-2 
 
 Mission Control gave the crew a go to perform the Ti 
burn at an MET of 01/16:44 (7:58 pm CST).  The crew 
later reported that before Ti the ISS was extremely bright 
and that much ISS detail was visible.  Ti was successfully 
performed with the left OMS engine.  The crew 
performed one +Y RCS pulse to trim the residual delta-
velocity.  Approximate crew positions on the orbiter 
flight deck from post-Ti thru MC-4 are shown in Figure 
25.10.  After Ti the proximity operations covariance 
matrix was uplinked.  MC-1 was successfully performed. 
 After MC-1 the TCS unit was activated and it passed 
the self test.  Between MC-1 and MC-2 the ISS crew took 
sunset photos of the orbiter (Figure 25.11). The 
preliminary, intermediate, and final MC-2 on-board 
Lambert targeting all had a TIG slip of minus 1 minute 
49 seconds.  Normally variation in TIG slip is observed.  
MC-2 was successfully executed. 
 After MC-2, at MET 01/18:05 (9:19 pm CST) ISS 
was maneuvering to the docking attitude and the U.S. 
solar arrays had been feathered.  U.S. solar array 
feathering is required before the orbiter can proceed 
inside of 600 feet during the Twice Orbital Rate +V Bar 
Approach (TORVA). 
 
HHL and TCS Acquisition, MC-3, and MC-4 
  
 The first HHL range measurement of 15,620.3 feet 
was acquired at MET 01/18:03:53 (Figures 25.12 and 
25.13).  At MET 01/18:11 (9:25 pm CST) the range to the 
ISS passed below 10,000 feet and the TCS shutter 
opened.  At MET 01/18:12 (9:26 pm CST) ISS reported 
that it was in the docking attitude and that the ISS crew 
was go for the shuttle RPM.  The ISS is required to be in 
the docking attitude (0 degrees in pitch, yaw, and roll in a 
Local Vertical Local Horizontal or LVLH frame) by the 
time the orbiter reached a range of 620 feet before the 
RPM.  However, the solar arrays did not have to be           
. 
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Figure 25.10  Diagram of orbiter flight deck showing 
approximate positions of crew members from post Ti 
thru MC-4.  Crew positioning varied in zero gravity. 
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Table 25.12  Day of Rendezvous Predictions for TCS 
Acquisition Range* 
*Actual TCS acquisition range was 4,595 feet. 
DM – Flight Dynamics Division, PROX – Proximity Operations, 
RGPO – Rendezvous Guidance and Procedures officer, SPAN 
DM – Flight Dynamics Division representative in the SPacecraft 
ANalysis control room, TCS – Trajectory Control Sensor 
Name 
 
 
Ray Bigonesse  
 
Jessica LoPresti-Bellock  
 
Steve Gauvain  
 
Andrzej Stewart  
 
Jorge Frank  
 
Alan Fox  
 
Dave Dannemiller  
 
John Goodman  
Range 
(feet) 
 
4200 
 
4900 
 
5267 
 
5280 
 
6429 
 
7000 
 
7001 
 
7002 
Function 
 
 
RGPO Console 
 
PROX Ops Console 
 
Crew Training 
 
Observer 
 
Crew Training 
 
Crew Training 
 
Observer 
 
SPAN DM 
Figure 25.13  Mission Specialist Steve Robinson 
photographed on the port side of the aft flight deck.  
The primary RPOP laptop is to the right of him and he 
holds an HHL unit.  Above left of Robinson is a CCTV 
screen with a ranging ruler overlay.  Above that is 
another CCTV screen for the centerline camera, also 
equipped with an overlay.  Robinson used the LED 
headlamp to read procedures in the low-light 
environment on the flight deck.  Photo taken before 
MC-3 and around the time the first HHL mark was 
taken.  
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Figure 25.12  RPOP1 (primary) laptop photo soon after 
the first HHL mark of 15,620.3 feet was taken.  Paper to 
the left of the laptop screen, for easy reference, is a 
chart (TRAD FAIL RANGE AND RANGE RATE 
DETERMINATION) that details how the crew should 
determine range and range rate during proximity 
operations in the event of sensor failures. 
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feathered by this time for the RPM to proceed.  MC-3 
was successfully performed.   
 Before TCS acquisition rendezvous personnel 
performed the customary ritual of estimating the TCS 
acquisition range (Table 25.12).  At a range of about 
4,600 feet TCS went through several loss of 
lock/reacquisition cycles before continuous tracking with 
the pulse laser began at a range of 4,595 feet.  Normally 
TCS did not exhibit loss of lock/reacquisition cycles.  
Two minutes before MC-4 the crew reported HHL range 
was within 6 feet of TCS range, and HHL derived range   
. 
rate computed by RPOP was within 0.2 ft/sec of TCS 
range rate. 
 Mission Control was happy with the on-board 
Lambert targeted MC-4 burn solution.  However, the 
RGPO asked the crew to ignore the Y body axis (the Y 
body axis corresponded to the Y LVLH axis at this point) 
delta velocity burn solution component due to radar 
noise.  The RPOP relative state that included filtered TCS 
measurements indicated that the orbiter’s out-of-plane 
relative motion was as desired and further tweaking was 
not necessary.  Ground personal noted that the vehicle 
executed MC-4 when it was inside the MC-4 circle on the 
ground RPOP display, indicating very low trajectory 
dispersions (Figure 25.14). 
  
RPM, TORVA, and TCS Performance 
  
 After MC-4 the crew transitioned to the approach cue 
card and Mission Control gave them a go to perform the 
RPM.  Approximate crew positions on the flight deck 
from post-MC-4 thru docking are illustrated in Figure 
25.15 (see also Figure 25.16).  Crew tasks are listed in 
Table 25.13.  Two crew members were assigned to 
Attitude Flyout since the commander considered this to 
be a two person task.  Planned proximity operations 
relative motion and events are depicted in Figure 25.17.  
At this time the crew reported that TCS range and HHL 
range were within a few feet of each other and within 0.4 
feet/second of each other in range rate (Figure 25.18).  
The crew transitioned the Digital Auto Pilot (DAP) to the 
Low Z mode at a range of 1,000 feet.  Mission Control 
gave the crew a go to proceed inside of 600 feet.   
  . 
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Figure 25.15  Diagram of orbiter flight deck showing 
approximate positions of crew members during 
proximity operations (post MC-4) and docking.  Crew 
positioning varied in zero gravity. 
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Figure 25.14  Re-created STS-130 RPOP display.  Oval in center of display represents relative  
position of the MC-4 burn under nominally expected dispersions. 
Figure 25.16 Pilot Terry Virts at the commander’s 
station between MC-4 and +R Bar arrival.  He is 
holding the APPROACH cue card. The RNDZ TIGs 
flight note and the RCS FAILURE/RESPONSE cue card 
are clamped to the overhead panel in front of him for 
easy reference. At the lower right of the photo is a 
laptop running a centerline camera repeater. 
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Task 
 
Piloting (aft station) 
Hand Held Lidar (HHL) Operations 
APDS Configuration (Docking System) 
Range Ruler Callouts (TCS & Range Ruler) 
Attitude Flyout 
Virts 
 
Backup 
 
 
Backup 
Backup 
Table 25.13  STS-130 Task Assignments for Proximity Operations (Post MC-4) 
Robinson 
 
 
Backup 
 
Primary 
Primary 
Hire 
 
 
Primary 
 
 
Primary 
Patrick 
 
 
 
Primary 
Behnken 
 
 
 
Backup 
Zamka 
 
Primary 
 
APDS – Androgynous Peripheral Docking System, TCS – Trajectory Control Sensor 
400 
TERMINAL PHASE, RPM, AND TORVA 
EVENT 
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MOD DAP A PRI./VERN ROT RATE TO 0.75 DEG/SEC 
AND YAW JET OPTION TO BOTH NOSE & TAIL (ALL) 
LOAD UNIV PTG P=145 DEG 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
STATIONKEEP TO AVOID SHADOWING IF REQUIRED 
 
INITIATE RPM: DAP A/PRI, ITEM 19 
WHEN –Z ADI PITCH > 100 DEG; DAP A/VERN 
WHEN –Z ADI PITCH > 170 DEG, DAP FREE DRIFT 
UNIV PTG P=270 DEG, ITEM 19, DAP PRI 
DIGITAL IMAGERY TAKEN FROM ISS SM 
WHEN –Z ADI PITCH . 10 DEG: DAP AUTO 
WHEN RPM COMPLETE: DAP VERN 
 
RELOAD DAP A9, LOAD UNIV PTG P=179 DEG, 
REESTABLISH RDOT PER TORVA ICs 
INITIATE TORVA: DAP A, ITEM 19 (+X PULSES AS 
REQ‟D TO NULL TARGET MOTION IN CAMERA) 
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Figure 25.17  Planned proximity operations profile and events. 
Figure 25.18  Kay Hire (left) taking HHL marks through 
the aft port overhead window while Steve Robinson 
(right) looks at the ISS.  This photo was taken when 
the range was just outside of 1,000 feet between MC-4 
and +R Bar arrival.  
N
A
S
A
 
 The crew reported that the TCS range rate 
measurements were noisy.  Mission Control personnel 
observed that the raw TCS range rate value fluctuated 
between 0.7 feet/second and 5 feet/second.  Normally 
TCS transitioned from the pulse laser to the CW laser at a 
range of around 1,000 feet.  TCS remained mostly in 
pulse laser tracking with occasional and temporary 
transitions to CW laser tracking.  TCS did not perform 
continuous tracking of ISS with the CW laser.  However, 
the TCS filter edited the noisy measurements and the 
filtered state provided flight controllers with expected 
range and range rate values. 
 Before the RPM flight controllers discussed options to 
achieve continuous CW laser tracking during the 
TORVA to support +V Bar acquisition and the final 
approach.  If TCS re-acquired pulse mode tracking after 
 . 
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completion of the RPM and did not transition to CW 
mode tracking, the crew could force the TCS to perform 
CW tracking as a test.  This might result in continuous 
CW laser tracking.  If TCS failed to acquire in CW mode 
it would transition back to pulse.  If pulse laser data was 
acceptable it could be used by the crew up until a range 
of approximately 65 feet, the minimum TCS tracking 
range in pulse mode.   
 The RPM was nominally initiated at a range of ~600 
feet (center-of-gravity to center-of-gravity) with a closing 
rate of ~0.3 feet/second.  80 degrees into the maneuver 
the orbiter DAP was placed in free drift to prevent RCS 
firings that could cause RCS jet plume loads on the ISS.  
The DAP remained in free drift until ~80 degrees of 
rotation were left in the maneuver.  No station-keeping 
was performed before the RPM and the crew successfully 
initiated the rotation. 
 Before and after the RPM (at a range of 
approximately 600 feet) CW laser measurements were 
noisy but usable.  The RPM was successfully completed 
and the TORVA fly-around from the +R Bar to the +V 
Bar was begun.  Figure 25.19 is a re-creation of the 
Mission Control RPOP display depicting relative motion 
before, during, and after the RPM using flight data.  
Figure 25.20 is a photo of the aft flight deck taken during 
the RPM.  Figure 25.21 is a photo of Endeavour taken by 
the ISS crew during the TORVA.  The RGPO elected to 
delay the pulse mode override until the orbiter was stable 
. 
 
 
 
RPOP – STS-130 ISS Rendezvous (Rev C) 
File  Edit   Control  Views  Display  Sensors  Help 
   RPOP 
RESID 
 -0.3 
-0.07 
-0.20 
-0.17 
RATIO 
 0.02 
 0.01 
 0.28 
 0.23 
ACPT 
42 
39 
43 
43 
REJ 
1 
0 
0 
0 
RNG 
RDOT 
ELV 
AZI 
Prop Age   1 
Orb CG to Tgt CG  
R 
X 
Y 
Z 
 31 
-35 
582 
X 
Y 
Z 
•  
•  
•  
 0.85 
 0.04 
-0.70 
 584 R 
•  
-0.65 
Raw TCS 2(Pls) 
Refl 
Age 
Rng 
Rdot 
Elv 
Azi 
 7 
     1 
   568 
 -0.74 
 -3.20 
 -3.17 
1/18:58:10 
Pitch   89 
Alt    187 
MET: 
X 
Z 
TGT 
LVLH 
TCS NAV PCM 
500 
8 
6 
4 
1 
3 
7 
9 
5 
2 
500 
Figure 25.19  Re-created STS-130 RPOP display showing relative motion during the RPM and the  
start of the TORVA.   
Figure 25.20  Commander George Zamka (left) and 
Steve Robinson looking at the ISS through the Orbiter 
overhead windows just before RPM completion. 
Zamka piloted the orbiter throughout proximity 
operations and docking.  Zamka was wearing his hat 
backwards so that the bill would not limit his ability to 
get close to the overhead window.  The hat was from 
the II Marine Expeditionary Force Air Ground Logistics 
Team at Camp LeJeune, North Carolina.  This photo 
was taken from the aft flight deck floor. 
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on the +V Bar.  However, even without the pulse 
override to force CW tracking TCS personnel in the 
Mission Evaluation Room (MER) were able to determine 
that the CW laser was not functioning properly and that 
there were jumps in range and range rate.   
. 
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Figure 25.21  Photo of Endeavour during the 
TORVA taken by the ISS Expedition 22 crew 
from the forward and port window in the 
Docking Compartment.  In the foreground is 
Soyuz TMA-17/21S docked to the FGB nadir 
port.   
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Figure 25.22  Planned final approach profile and events. 
feet. At a range of approximately 250 feet on the +V Bar 
the crew overrode the pulse laser to force CW laser 
tracking.  A MER recommendation to override the CW 
laser to re-establish pulse laser tracking was vetoed since 
additional TCS troubleshooting could distract the crew 
and good CW tracking data would provide the crew with 
a backup source of range and range rate data.  The 
RGPO elected to maintain the present configuration of 
TCS for the rest of the approach.   
 CW laser tracking was not an improvement over the 
earlier pulse mode performance.  The RPOP TCS filter 
edited bad data, but the filter re-initialized several times 
due to consecutive edits of bad measurements.  Jumps in 
position and changes in range rate occurred.  At one 
point the Mission Control RPOP display showed the 
orbiter approaching the ISS at a rate of 5 feet/second.  
 Figure 25.23 illustrates the poor TCS performance 
that resulted in relative motion on the RPOP display that 
did not reflect actual relative motion during the corridor 
approach.  Note that the range rate at this point was -5.15 
feet/second, an unrealistic value for this point in the 
approach.  Figure 25.24, from STS-126 (November 
2008), illustrates actual relative motion during an 
approach with good TCS performance.  The rendezvous 
team lost confidence in TCS and recommended that the 
crew use HHL as the primary source of range data, in 
conjunction with the centerline camera vertical angle and 
the ranging ruler overlay on the CCTV camera display.  
RPOP computed range rate based on HHL range 
measurements.   
  
+V Bar Acquisition Through Docking 
 
 Planned relative motion and events from +V Bar 
acquisition through docking are illustrated in Figure 
25.22.  By +V Bar acquisition the TCS had performed 
solid tracking with the CW laser for 8 minutes.  The 
crew reported that HHL and TCS range were within 8 
feet of each other and that docking mechanism power-up 
was complete. 
 Mission Control gave the crew a go for docking. The 
Ku sub-system was transitioned from radar to 
communications mode on the +V Bar at a range of 283     
. 
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Figure 25.24  Re-creation of Shuttle RPOP display from STS-126 (November 2008).  Numbers in 
front of the orbiter represent  future predicted relative position at one minute intervals. 
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 Use of HHL as the primary source of range data was 
preferable since attempts to recover acceptable TCS 
performance during the final approach could have 
distracted the crew and reduced situational awareness.  
Mission Control also recommended that the crew keep 
TCS and RPOP running in case good data was available 
to compare with HHL.  Good TCS measurements were 
occasionally available and it was obvious to the crew 
when the measurements were good or bad.   During 
periods of good TCS the measurements were compared to 
RPOP range and range rate measurements as a sanity 
check on HHL data. 
 The crew had been taking HHL measurements and 
inputting centerline camera vertical angle measurements 
(with horizontal measurements locked at zero degrees) 
into RPOP throughout the manual piloting phase even 
when TCS performance was acceptable.  This resulted in 
a seamless transition from TCS to HHL as the primary 
range sensor.  The crew had practiced this back-up 
procedure extensively during training to prepare for a 
TCS failure scenario.  Although the crews normally take 
marks by placing the HHL against the window, 
acceptable marks were taken with the HHL further inside 
the cockpit, as long as the crew member was braced and 
not moving.  Node 2 Forward on the ISS was used as the 
HHL aim point during the approach. 
 The crew checked the range to the ISS twice using the 
angle subtended by specific parts of the ISS structure on 
the centerline camera image in conjunction with a chart.  
These range values agreed with RPOP range determined 
by filtering HHL range and vertical centerline camera      
  . 
angle measurements.  The crew did not use range 
determined by centerline camera sub-tended angles 
during the approach. 
 The crew had planned to start reading the docking 
target on the ISS hatch at range of 50 feet, but was able to 
read the target on the PGSC repeater outside of 50 feet.   
The crew determined relative misalignment using the 
repeated centerline camera image (Figure 25.25).  The 
centerline camera had to be re-focused throughout the 
final approach. 
 The crew continued to provide RPOP with HHL range 
measurements and centerline camera angles (Figure 
25.26).  At 50 feet the vertical centerline camera angles 
input into RPOP were frozen at zero degrees. At a range 
of 35 feet the crew reported that no auto-angular fly-out 
was required. At 12 feet the crew switched to the ranging 
ruler overlay on the CCTV screen for range data.  The 
minimum range for HHL is 12 feet (docking interface to 
docking interface range at this point is 6 feet). Range rate 
computed from ranging ruler measurements was 
consistent with the HHL derived range rate computed by 
RPOP.  In addition, the TCS remained in CW mode and 
TCS data just before docking was good.   The crew 
armed Post Contact Thrusting inside 15 feet.  Docking 
hardware capture and transition of the shuttle and ISS 
attitude control systems to free drift were confirmed.  The 
contact velocity determined by post-flight analysis was 
0.113 feet/second. The successful docking was facilitated 
by intensive crew training in backup procedures 
developed to enable the crew to dock if TCS failed.  
 The docking occurred during orbital night therefore 
there were no solar lighting issues.  The crew later 
reported that the Orbiter Docking System (ODS) truss 
lights were adequate for the final approach.  Sunlight (the 
solar beta angle was -23 degrees) during manual piloting 
was not a problem and solar lighting did not degrade 
camera images used for piloting cues. 
 The ISS is visually complex with many elements that 
move and reflect differently, presenting a potential            
. 
Figure 25.25  Digital still camera photo of docking 
target and PMA-2 during orbital night about 6 minutes 
before reaching the 30 foot point.  The continuous 
starboard red ISS moding light on PMA-2 indicates 
that ISS is still in attitude hold.  A flashing light 
indicated that ISS attitude control was in free drift.   
One of three methods of informing the orbiter crew of 
the ISS attitude control status is required.  These are 
the moding light, Mission Control, or the ISS crew. 
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Figure 25.26  Post hard dock on-board photo of 
primary RPOP showing purple relative motion 
trajectory based on HHL range marks and centerline 
camera vertical angle measurements.  
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priority to support the TCS failure investigation.  All 
RPOP and TCS data files were downlinked from 
Endeavour and provided to investigators.  The team was 
eager to resolve the TCS performance issue and develop a 
sensor plan to support the undocking and separation then 
scheduled for Flight Day 12 (Thursday, February 18).  
Questions to be answered were, 1) Why did the TCS have 
trouble transitioning to the CW laser mode? and 2) Which 
laser provided better data, Pulse mode or CW mode? 
 
Flight Day Five – TCS Investigation 
 
 On Friday, February 12, results of the NASA/JSC 
Engineering Directorate TCS failure investigation were 
presented to STS-130 rendezvous and proximity 
operations personnel.  One of the three electronic tone 
boards that controlled the CW laser, the intermediate 
board that generated the range signal, was intermittently 
emitting a bad bit resulting in range measurement spikes 
of approximately +/- 30 feet.  The problem could not be 
overcome with a TCS power cycle since it was a  
hardware problem.  A review of data from the previous 
flight of TCS unit 1007 on STS-127 did not show this 
poor performance.  STS-130 was the first time a loss of a 
TCS tone board had occurred during flight.   
 However, pulse laser performance was not impacted 
by the CW laser problem.  Pulse laser performance seen 
during the rendezvous (measurement noise) matched that 
seen on previous missions.  This was confirmed during a 
playback of the Flight Day 3 rendezvous and proximity 
operations RPOP data on Flight Day 4 (Thursday).  The 
questionable pulse laser lock-on signature had also been 
seen on previous missions.   
 The TCS unit flown on Endeavour (1007) had been 
designated to fly on the next flight of Endeavour, STS-
134, in support of the ISS docking and the Sensor Test for 
Orion RelNav Risk Mitigation Detailed Test Objective 
(STORRM DTO).  After the mission NASA/JSC 
Engineering personnel planned to pull the TCS unit from 
Endeavour for further investigation.  TCS unit 1010 
would be shipped to KSC for installation on Endeavour to 
support STS-134.  It had recently completed between 
flight maintenance. 
 
Modified TCS Procedures for Undocking and 
Separation 
 
 RGPO and GNC personnel had reviewed and redlined 
modified TCS procedures to be used by the crew during 
the separation and fly-around later in the mission (Figure 
25.28).  Since the CW laser was not recoverable the pulse 
laser would be used during the separation and fly-around, 
even though it was less accurate than the CW laser.  
Although the pulse laser was noisier than the CW laser it 
was deemed acceptable for separation since the RPOP 
navigation filter filtered the noise and provided good 
relative state information during the approach on Flight    
.  . 
distraction.  Identifying specific elements of the complex 
ISS structure station required effort due to its constantly 
changing appearance.  This was caused by spacecraft 
relative motion coupled with variations in solar lighting. 
 Digital still and video photography of the ISS was 
performed throughout proximity operations and the final 
approach (Figure 25.25 is one example).  Before the flight 
the two shuttle crew members assigned to the Photo/TV 
task practiced in simulations with the other crew members 
assigned to proximity operations and docking tasks.  This 
ensured that all tasks on the flight deck were performed in 
a seamless manner. 
 Docking mechanism alignment was lost during 
retraction.  Approximately 35 minutes was required to 
permit relative motion to dampen and regain alignment 
due to the gravity gradient before continuing retraction 
and hook drive (Figure 25.27).  A similar signature was 
seen after the STS-126 (November 2008) docking.  In 
addition it was noted that petal 3 drove slightly slower 
than expected. This had been seen on previous flight of 
Endeavour (STS-127, July 2009).   
 Both the orbiter and the ISS were successfully hard 
docked.  Rendezvous personnel in Mission Control 
remained on console until hard docking was confirmed in 
the event they were needed to support a contingency 
undock and separation.  After hard dock the ISS initiated 
attitude control of the mated stack in the Torque 
Equilibrium Attitude.  The orbiter controled mated stack 
attitude for large attitude maneuvers, dumps, and orbital 
re-boost burns.  Before the ISS hatch was opened the 
crew of Endeavour removed the stand-off cross from the 
docking target and placed a protective cover over it. 
 
Post Docking 
 
 After docking the RGPO informed the FAO that 
downlinking files with RPOP and TCS data was a high       
. 
Figure 25.27  After capture, hard dock was delayed 
until relative motion between the two docking 
mechanisms was dampened and alignment was 
achieved. This photo, taken from an orbiter aft flight 
deck payload bay window, shows the large angular 
misalignment between the mechanisms after capture. 
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Day 3.  The pulse laser was only capable of tracking 
outside a minimum range of 66 feet. 
 However, HHL had always been the primary 
proximity operations sensor during fly-arounds, and HHL 
must be working before an ISS fly-around could be 
initiated.  The ranging ruler would provide the initial 
range and range rate data at undocking for the first five 
feet of the separation, until HHL data became usable.  
The APDS ring would not be extended as it was for 
docking and therefore would not match the cockpit 
television screen overlay.  The crew would have to point 
payload bay cameras A and D so that the image matched 
the overlay.  Range was expected to be in error by one 
foot therefore ranging ruler data could only be used for 
calculating range rate by hand.  
 
Flight Day Eight 
 
 On Monday, February 15, starting at 1 pm RGPO and 
crew training personnel verified the modified TCS 
procedure for use of pulse laser tracking for separation 
and fly-around in the Shuttle Mission Simulator.   
 
Flight Day Twelve 
 
 The crew successfully performed the rendezvous tools 
checkout in preparation for the undocking and separation 
on Flight Day 13.  The CW laser self-test was good 
during the checkout.  However, this did not change the 
undocking procedure to not use the CW laser.  The HHL 
was checked by firing it at the ISS S0 truss.  The                           
. 
centerline camera was aligned and did not require 
shimming.  Transfer of the shuttle crew to Endeavour was 
complete by 1 am CST on Friday, February 19.  The crew 
re-installed the stand-off cross on the ISS docking target.  
The hatch was closed at 2:08 am CST. 
 
Flight Day Thirteen – Undocking and Separation 
 
 Undocking was originally planned for Flight Day 12.  
However, the Shuttle Program decided to add one docked 
day to provide more time for working Node 3 installation 
issues and other activities. 
 
Change to Separation-2 Burn 
 
 Soon after docking the ISS Program decided to 
perform an 11.8 foot/second posigrade re-boost using the 
Russian Service Module engines.  The burn was 
scheduled to be performed on February 20, after the 
undocking of Endeavour.  This orbit raising maneuver of 
25 minute 57 seconds duration, in conjunction with the 
orbiter vernier RCS jet re-boost burn while docked, was 
designed to set up the appropriate phasing to support the 
upcoming Soyuz TMA-16/20S undocking and landing,  
the Soyuz TMA-18/22S launch and docking, and the 
STS-131/19A launch and docking.  However, this 
conflicted with the planned 1.5 foot/second posigrade 
Separation-2 (SEP-2) burn to be performed by Endeavour 
after undocking.  Both vehicles would have performed 
orbit raising maneuvers within 24 hours of each other and 
risked the possibility of unsafe relative motion.  The         
. 
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RATE OUTSIDE 600 FEET; PERFORM 3/4 LAP TORF 
BETWEEN 600 AND 700 FT; THEN PERFORM SEP1] 
 
SEP2: 3.0 FPS +X, NORMZ RETROGRADE BURN 
Range 
(ft) 
DP - DP 
 
0 
 
 
0 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
>30 
 
 
50 
 
75 
 
>400 
(CG-CG) 
 
 
 
 
>2000 
(CG-CG) 
UNDOCK 
ET 
(h:mm) 
 
-0:03 
 
 
0:00 
 
 
0:01 
 
 
 
>0:03 
 
 
 
 
0:07 
 
0:29 
[1:15]* 
 
 
 
 
0:57 
[1:43]* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
3 
 
 
 
 
 
4 
* Alternate times are for Flyaround Case. 
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400 
200 
-200 
-200 
-400 
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~
 ~
 
~
 
600 400 
Figure 25.28  Planned separation profile and events. 
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Table 25.14  STS-130 Prime Orbit Timeline For Nominal Undock  
MET 
d/hh:mm:ss 
 
11/12:44:53 
11/12:57:14 
11/13:25:14 
11/13:30:53 
11/13:53:14 
11/14:24:54 
11/14:28:37 
11/14:52:53 
11/14:56:38 
11/15:24:39 
11/15:30:00 
11/15:40:00 
11/15:40:05 
11/15:41:00 
11/15:41:40 
11/15:45:00 
11/15:47:00 
11/16:00:11 
11/16:00:12 
11/16:09:00 
11/16:18:30 
11/16:18:31 
11/16:18:54 
11/16:20:30 
11/16:28:08 
11/16:32:00 
11/16:43:30 
11/16:55:00 
11/16:56:05 
11/17:23:00 
PET 
hh:mm:ss 
 
-0/02:55:07 
-0/02:42:46 
-0/02:14:46 
-0/02:09:07 
-0/01:46:46 
-0/01:15:06 
-0/01:11:23 
-0/00:47:07 
-0/00:43:22 
-0/00:15:21 
-0/00:10:00 
+0/00:00:00 
+0/00:00:05 
+0/00:01:00 
+0/00:01:40 
+0/00:05:00 
+0/00:07:00 
+0/00:20:11 
+0/00:20:12 
+0/00:29:00 
+0/00:38:30 
+0/00:38:31 
+0/00:38:54 
+0/00:40:30 
+0/00:48:08 
+0/00:52:00 
+0/01:03:30 
+0/01:15:00 
+0/01:16:05 
+0/01:43:00 
GMT 
d/hh:mm:ss 
 
50/21:59:00 
50/22:11:21 
50/22:39:21 
50/22:45:00 
50/23:07:21 
50/23:39:01 
50/23:42:44 
51/00:07:00 
51/00:10:45 
51/00:38:46 
51/00:44:07 
51/00:54:07 
51/00:54:12 
51/00:55:07 
51/00:55:47 
51/00:59:07 
51/01:01:07 
51/01:14:18 
51/01:14:19 
51/01:23:07 
51/01:32:37 
51/01:32:38 
51/01:33:01 
51/01:34:37 
51/01:42:15 
51/01:46:07 
51/01:57:37 
51/02:09:07 
51/02:10:12 
51/02:37:07 
Local (CST) 
hh:mm:ss 
 
Fri, 15:59:00 
Fri, 16:11:21 
Fri, 16:39:21 
Fri, 16:45:00 
Fri, 17:07:21 
Fri, 17:39:01 
Fri, 17:42:44 
Fri, 18:07:00 
Fri, 18:10:45 
Fri, 18:38:46 
Fri, 18:44:07 
Fri, 18:54:07 
Fri, 18:54:12 
Fri, 18:55:07 
Fri, 18:55:47 
Fri, 18:59:07 
Fri, 19:01:07 
Fri, 19:14:18 
Fri, 19:14:19 
Fri, 19:23:07 
Fri, 19:32:37 
Fri, 19:32:38 
Fri, 19:33:01 
Fri, 19:34:37 
Fri, 19:42:15 
Fri, 19:46:07 
Fri, 19:57:37 
Fri, 20:09:07 
Fri, 20:10:12 
Fri, 20:37:07 
DMT 
d/hh:mm:ss 
 
51/00:59:00 
51/01:11:21 
51/01:39:21 
51/01:45:00 
51/02:07:21 
51/02:39:01 
51/02:42:44 
51/03:07:00 
51/03:10:45 
51/03:38:46 
51/03:44:07 
51/03:54:07 
51/03:54:12 
51/03:55:07 
51/03:55:47 
51/03:59:07 
51/04:01:07 
51/04:14:18 
51/04:14:19 
51/04:23:07 
51/04:32:37 
51/04:32:38 
51/04:33:01 
51/04:34:37 
51/04:42:15 
51/04:46:07 
51/04:57:37 
51/05:09:07 
51/05:10:12 
51/05:37:07 
Event 
 
 
ISS in Prox Ops Mode 
Sunrise 
Noon 
US Arrays Feathered 
Sunset 
Start Maneuver to Undock Attitude 
Sunrise 
Orbiter/ISS in Undock Attitude 
Noon 
Sunset 
Russian Segment Arrays Feathered 
Undocking 
DAP:B/LVLH/ALT, Maintain Corridor  
Initial Separation Pulses 
ISS Snaps and Holds Current Attitude  
Range = 50 feet (DP-DP), Reselect –X jets 
Range = 75 feet (DP-DP), DAP: LOW Z 
Sunrise 
RS Arrays Resume Tracking 
Range = 400 ft (CG-CG), Start Flyaround 
Range = 600 feet (CG-CG) 
US Arrays Resume Tracking 
ISS Maneuver to TEA (Range > 600 ft) 
–Rbar Crossing 
Noon 
–Vbar Crossing 
+Rbar Crossing 
Sep 1 Burn on +Vbar (1.5 fps radial burn) 
Sunset 
Sep 2 Burn (3.0 fps +X retrograde burn) 
ALT – Alternate DAP, CG – Center of Gravity, CST – Central Standard Time, DAP – Digital Auto Pilot, DMT – Decreed Moscow Time, DP – 
Docking Port, GMT – Greenwich Mean Time, ISS – International Space Station, LVLH – Local Vertical Local Horizontal,  MET – Mission Elapsed 
Time, PET – Phase Elapsed Time, RS – Russian Solar arrays, Sep – Separation, TEA – Torque Equilibrium Attitude 
shuttle flight control team determined that SEP-2 could be 
changed to a 3.0 foot/second retrograde burn to maintain 
safe relative motion while preserving enough propellant 
to raise Endeavour’s orbit for a contingency re-
rendezvous with the ISS.  Re-rendezvous and docking 
with the ISS would be required if the late thermal 
protection system inspection found damage that ruled out 
a safe re-entry.   
  The separation plan was for a standard +V Bar 
undocking and corridor separation followed by one 
complete fly-around of the ISS (Figure 25.28).  Planned 
event times are in Table 25.14.  Nominal undocking was 
planned to occur two minutes before orbital midnight to 
ensure lighting for the entire fly-around.  The mated stack 
was to be in a 0,0,0 LVLH attitude, also known as +XVV 
+ZLV.  The ISS automatically re-established ISS attitude 
control 100 seconds after undocking and snapped and 
held the current LVLH attitude. Mission Control read the 
attitude to the Endeavour crew for entry into RPOP.  At 
MET 11/16:19, or when the orbiter was at a range of 
more than 600 feet, the ISS automatically began a 5 
minute maneuver to the Torque Equilibrium Attitude 
(TEA) of -2.2 degrees pitch, +1.0 degrees yaw, and +0.7 
degrees roll in the LVLH frame.  Mission Control read 
the TEA to the Endeavour crew for entry into RPOP.        
. 
RPOP used the ISS attitude to perform accurate TCS 
reflector identification. 
 The US solar arrays were to be feathered by 11/13:00 
MET.  US array sun tracking would resume once the 
orbiter range increased beyond 600 feet.  The Russian 
solar arrays were to be feathered by 11/15:10 MET, 30     
. 
Figure 25.29  ISS graphic transmitted to the 
crew in preparation for the fly-around.  The 
location of the loose MLI blanket on Soyuz 
TMA-16 to be photographed during the fly-
around is indicated by the arrow and box. 
STS-130 MISSION TO THE ISS 
Approved for public release via STI DAA 
24483. See statement on title page. 248  
minutes before undocking.  Sun tracking would resume at 
MET 11/16:00 as the orbiter approached the fly-around 
range. 
 Sunrise would occur after undocking at an MET of 
11/16:00, about 10 minutes before the start of the fly-
around.  The next sunset would occur at about MET  
11/16:56, at about the scheduled SEP-1 burn time.   
 During the fly-around the crew was to take photos of 
the ISS and a loose Multilayer Insulation (MLI) blanket 
on the Soyuz TMA-16 (20S) that was docked to Mini-
Research Module 2 (MRM 2, also known as the Poisk 
docking module, located on the Zvezda module's zenith 
Port, Figure 25.29).  The photos were to be taken while 
the orbiter traversed from the –R Bar to the –V Bar. 
 The solar beta angle was 22.8 degrees placing the sun 
in the overhead widows of the orbiter crew compartment 
near the end of the fly-around.  The sun was not expected 
to enter the centerline camera field of view.  SEP-1 was 
planned to be a 1.5 foot/second radial up burn.  SEP-2, a 
3 foot/second retrograde burn, would follow 28 minutes 
later.   
 
Pre-Undocking Activities 
 
 The crew completed an IMU alignment at MET 
11/14:15.  At MET 11/14:23 ISS attitude control was in 
FREE DRIFT and Endeavour assumed automated attitude 
control of the mated stack.  A 27 minute 48 second 
attitude maneuver to the undocking attitude was 
performed.  TCS was initialized at MET 11/14:56.  The 
undocking attitude was achieved.  Mission Control stated 
that Endeavour was go for undocking at MET 11/15:22 
and ISS reported that they were go for undocking at MET 
11/15:28.  The Russian solar arrays were reported 
feathered one minute later.  Mated stack attitude and rates 
were acceptable and within the desired limits.  The 
undocking attitude was the same as the docking attitude.  
Before undocking the orbiter was placed in attitude            
. 
Task 
 
Piloting (aft station) 
Navigation (sensors) 
Guidance & Control (targeting/burns) 
Master Checklist 
Communications/PADS 
APDS Operations (docking flights) 
CCTV Operations 
PGSC Configuration 
TRAD/PGSC Operations 
Hand Held Lidar (HHL) Operations 
Systems/Reference Data 
Photo/TV Operations 
Virts 
 
Primary 
Backup 
Primary 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Backup 
Table 25.15  STS-130 Task Assignments for Undocking and Fly-Around 
Robinson 
 
 
 
 
Backup 
 
 
Primary 
Primary 
Primary 
Backup 
Hire 
 
 
 
 
 
Backup 
 
Backup 
 
Backup 
Primary 
Primary 
Primary 
Patrick 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Backup 
Behnken 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Primary 
Zamka 
 
Backup 
Primary 
Backup 
Primary 
Primary 
 
 
 
 
 
Backup 
APDS – Androgynous Peripheral Docking System, CCTV – Closed Circuit Television, PADS – Burn data read to the crew by 
Mission Control and recorded in the crew procedures, PGSC – Payload General Support Computer (laptop), TRAD – Tools 
for Rendezvous and Docking, TV – Television 
Camera D Camera A 
Behnken Zamka 
Panel C3 
RPOP 2 
RPOP 1 
AFD1 CCTV 
Panel 7 
APDS 
Panel A6 
DAP 
Robinson Hire Virts 
CRT4 
Orbiter 
Docking 
System 
TCS 
Figure 25.30  Diagram of orbiter flight deck showing 
approximate positions of crew members during the 
undocking and fly-around.  Crew positioning varied in 
zero gravity. 
Payload 
Bay 
control of the stack and the ISS was in free drift.  The 
orbiter flight control system was placed in free drift 3 
minutes before undocking. 
 
Undocking Through Fly-Around Start 
 
 Approximate crew positions on the flight deck are 
illustrated in Figure 25.30.  Crew task assignments for 
undocking and separation are listed in Table 25.15.  
Undocking occurred at MET 11/15:39:45 (6:53 pm, 
Friday, February 19).  As soon as the docking system        
. 
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petals were clear, a few seconds after physical separation,  
the crew of Endeavour placed the DAP in an LVLH 
attitude hold with attitude control provided by the vernier 
RCS jets (Figure 25.28).  ISS automatically resumed 
attitude control 100 seconds after physical separation by 
snapping and holding the current LVLH attitude. 
 The crew used the ranging ruler for range data and 
then transitioned to the HHL.  The crew had trained for a 
TCS fail separation extensively, just as they had trained 
for the TCS fail approach.  During the +V Bar separation 
the front of Node 2 (Figure 25.25), at the 1 o’clock 
position opposite the NASA logo, was used as the HHL 
aim point.  The crew transitioned to ISS Node 3 as the 
HHL aim point during the fly-around.  The base of the 
Cupola was also used.  Airlock range data, formerly 
considered a good HHL aim point, was less consistent 
than Node 3 range data due to the presence of tanks on 
the airlock. 
 TCS began tracking in pulse laser mode at a range of 
approximately 66 feet, as expected.  The Endeavour DAP 
was placed in LOW Z mode at a range of 75 feet (MET 
11/15:47).  The ISS crew rang the bell to signal that 
Endeavour had departed the ISS. The Endeavour crew 
completed the docking mechanism power down at MET 
11/15:47.  Figure 25.31 illustrates relative motion during 
the corridor back-out. Approximately 100 seconds after 
docking the ISS snapped the current LVLH attitude and 
the ISS attitude control system held that attitude.   
RPOP – STS-130 ISS Rendezvous (Rev C) 
File  Edit   Control  Views  Display  Sensors  Help 
   RPOP 
RESID 
 -0.1 
 0.12 
-0.11 
 0.05 
RATIO 
 0.01 
 0.02 
 0.13 
 0.06 
ACPT 
105 
105 
105 
105 
REJ 
0 
0 
0 
0 
RNG 
RDOT 
ELV 
AZI 
Prop Age   3 
Orb DP to Tgt DP  
R 
X 
Y 
Z 
196 
 -5 
 27 
X 
Y 
Z 
•  
•  
•  
 0.34 
 0.00 
 0.03 
198 R 
•  
 0.34 
Raw TCS 2(Pls) 
Refl 
Age 
Rng 
Rdot 
Elv 
Azi 
1 
    2 
  200 
 0.32 
 4.87 
-1.32 
11/15:53:12 
 Pitch  177 
 Alt    181 
MET: 
X 
Z 
TGT 
LVLH 
TCS PROP PCM HHL/CAM 
 
1 2 3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
100 
100 
  
  
Figure 25.31  Re-created RPOP display showing relative motion during the corridor backout before 
the start of the fly-around.  The trajectory that starts at undocking is based on HHL range and 
range rate measurements.  The slow variation in the HHL trajectory is due to orbiter attitude dead-
banding.  The trajectory that starts at ~66 feet is based on TCS. 
 
Fly-Around and Separation 
 
 Figure 25.32 illustrates relative motion during the 
corridor back-out and the initial part of the twice orbital 
rate fly-around.  The crew began the fly-around 
approximately eight minutes early.  The orbiter reached  
the 600 foot range approximately 7 minutes ahead of 
schedule, with sunrise occurring as both vehicles flew 
over the Himalayas.  The orbiter crossed the –R Bar about 
7.5 minutes early at an MET of 11/16:13.  The fly-around 
range of 600 feet is nominally reached about the time the 
orbiter reaches the –R Bar.  Both the fly-around start and 
the arrival at a range of 600 feet were early since the crew 
flew the +V Bar separation slightly faster than the 
published 0.2 foot/second separation rate.  This had no 
impact on the mission. 
 Two minutes later TCS tracking was temporarily lost 
while the ISS was maneuvering back to the Torque 
Equilibrium Attitude.  ISS achieved the TEA at MET 
11/16:20.  At MET 11/16:27 the Rendezvous Guidance 
and Procedures Officer noted that RPOP did a good job of 
accurately propagating the orbiter state between the –R 
Bar and -V Bar when TCS measurements were not 
available due to ISS structural blockage.  On the RPOP 
display (Figure 25.33) orbiter relative position during 
TCS tracking is indicated by a triangle, while propagated 
relative position when TCS data is not available is 
indicated by a cross.  While the mission commander flew 
.  
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Figure 25.32  Re-created Shuttle RPOP display showing the backout  and part of the twice orbital 
rate fly-around. 
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requested photos of Soyuz TMA-16 (Figure 25.35).  They 
did not observe any loose MLI. 
 Approximately 8 minutes before fly-around complete 
(+V Bar arrival) and the SEP-1 burn the crew began the 
rendezvous radar acquisition procedure.  After radar 
converged the first position update was 1,176 feet.  The 
crew executed the 1.5 foot/second radial up burn at MET 
11/16:47:47.  At MET 11/17:02 the orbiter was in the 
SEP-2 burn attitude.  At MET 11/17:10 (range from the. 
ISS approximately 5,000 feet) the on-board navigation 
console reported that radar tracking was good with some 
beam wandering about the ISS and large measurement 
ratios.  However, the relative navigation filter had not        
. 
Figure 25.34  Pilot Terry Virts flying the orbiter during 
the later part of the fly-around, before the SEP-1 burn.  
Virts manipulated the Translational Hand Controller 
with his left hand (as shown) to control relative 
motion during the fly-around.  His right hand is 
guarding the Rotational Hand Controller (not normally 
used) from accidental deflection by other crew 
members taking photos through the other overhead 
window.  Sunglasses were worn to improve visibility 
of the ISS in the presence of direct sunlight while the 
Sun skirted the edge of the overhead window field of 
view. 
N
A
S
A
 
Figure 25.35  Soyuz TMA-16 photographed during the 
fly-around, close to the –V Bar, to check for loose MLI. 
N
A
S
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Figure 25.36  Re-created RPOP display depicting orbiter relative motion during the latter half of the 
fly-around and after the SEP-1 burn. 
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the approach and docking, the pilot flew the undocking, 
fly-around, and separation (Figure 25.34).  This was 
standard practice on ISS flights.  The crew obtained the     
. 
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Figure 25.37  Re-created RPOP display approximately one minute after the SEP-2 burn was  
performed.  Relative state data is derived from rendezvous radar measurements. 
edited any radar measurements.  At MET 11/17:14 (range 
approximately 6,500 feet) the crew deactivated the TCS.    
Figure 25.36 illustrates relative motion during the latter 
part of the fly-around and the initial part of the separation 
after the SEP-1 burn.  Note that the radial SEP-1 burn 
results in the orbiter eventually returning to the vicinity    
of the ISS if the SEP-2 burn were not performed. 
 Just before the SEP-2 burn was performed the relative 
navigation filter edited a radar measurement.  This was 
expected and the crew inhibited radar data.  The SEP-2 
burn began at MET 11/17:16:50 and a range from the ISS 
of approximately 7,500 feet.  The Flight Dynamics 
Officer reported that a retrograde burn of 3.3 feet/second 
was executed by the crew.  The crew transitioned the Ku 
antenna to communications mode and by MET 11/17:20 
(8:36 pm CST) the crew had completed all separation 
procedures.  Predicted relative motion after the SEP-2 
burn is depicted in Figure 25.37. 
 The next day, Saturday, February 20, the ISS executed 
the re-boost burn at 3:15 pm CST.  The burn was 
successful and a delta-velocity of 12.3 feet/second was 
achieved.. 
 
Flight Day Fifteen 
 
 Endeavour landed on the first KSC opportunity on 
runway 15 at 10:20 pm EST on Sunday, February 21, 
2010. 
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Summary 
 
 STS-130 was the 32nd Space Shuttle mission to the 
International Space Station.  Most rendezvous and 
proximity operations activities on ISS missions were 
standard and exhibited little flight-to-flight variation, 
particularly after TORVA and +V Bar approaches were 
introduced on STS-102 (March 2001). 
 After the loss of Columbia much of Flight Day 2 was 
devoted to thermal protection system inspection.  The 
rendezvous tools checkout, docking ring extension, and 
centerline camera installation continued to be conducted 
on Flight Day 2.  The R Bar Pitch Maneuver was added to 
proximity operations to permit the ISS crew to 
photograph the underside of the orbiter to help check 
thermal protection system integrity.   
 What made STS-130 unusual was the partial failure of 
the TCS lidar during proximity operations.  This had not 
occurred on a shuttle mission since the first operational 
flight of TCS on STS-71 (June-July 1995).  Extensive 
crew training with backup procedures using the HHL, 
RPOP, and the centerline camera was the key to a smooth 
approach, docking, undocking, and fly-around. 
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Introduction 
 
 An understanding of the rationale behind decisions 
on automation in previous NASA human flight programs 
is necessary to understand the technical, programmatic, 
and cultural challenges faced by rendezvous and 
proximity operations personnel working to meet future 
spacecraft automation requirements.1,2 
 The design philosophy behind the Gemini and Apollo 
spacecraft was to keep systems and system interfaces 
simple by using manual sequencing and manual systems 
management whenever practical.13-15 This took advantage 
of the human ability to recognize, analyze, and diagnose 
performance anomalies and take corrective action. In 
addition, the safety critical nature of Apollo rendezvous in 
lunar orbit, coupled with 1950s and 1960s experiences 
with autopilots in high performance aircraft, led to a 
requirement to accomplish rendezvous in the event of a 
computer failure. 
 Balancing system complexity with technical, cost, 
and schedule risk was an important consideration 
associated with meeting President Kennedy’s goal of 
reaching the Moon and returning to Earth by 1970. The 
Soviets took a different approach during development of 
the Soyuz spacecraft in the 1960s. Soyuz systems 
management and rendezvous were highly automated. The 
possibility that the high level of automation designed into 
Soyuz had a negative impact on the progress of Soyuz 
development during the 1960s has been a topic of 
discussion since then.1, 2, 16 
 Attitude control of all U.S. human flight vehicles 
while on-orbit has been performed using automated, 
semiautomatic, and manual modes. Each new spacecraft 
has possessed increasingly sophisticated on-orbit 
automated attitude control, resulting in lower crew  
workload and increased attitude and pointing flexibility to 
meet mission requirements. This chapter concerns             
. 
CHAPTER 26 - WHY WAS SHUTTLE RENDEZVOUS AND DOCKING  
NOT FULLY AUTOMATED? 
 
 Frequent questions concerning NASA human flight vehicles are, “Why do the astronauts always manually pilot 
rendezvous and docking?” or “Why hasn’t rendezvous been automated?”   Automated rendezvous and docking is not 
new.  The Soviets accomplished the first automated rendezvous and docking with the Kosmos 186 and 188 spacecraft 
on October 1967.1,2  Since that time there have been numerous successful automated rendezvous and dockings flown by 
Soviet/Russian Soyuz and Progress vehicles.  Automated rendezvous and docking has been flown to add modules to 
Salyut-7 (three TKS vehicles), Mir (two Kvant, Kristall, Spektr, Priroda), and the ISS (Zvezda, Pirs, Poisk).3-6   At the 
time of this writing the European Space Agency has successfully flown two automated missions to the ISS (Automated 
Transfer Vehicle, or ATV) and the Japanese have flown two automated missions to the ISS as well (H-II Transfer 
Vehicle, or HTV).7-9  More ATV and HTV missions are planned.  Four American demonstration missions have been 
flown to demonstrate various activities of automated rendezvous, proximity operations, and docking.  These are DART, 
XSS-10, XSS-11, and Orbital Express.10  The Orion and Altair vehicles in the Constellation Program had requirements 
for automated rendezvous and docking.11  
 This chapter first appeared as an appendix in a 2007 AIAA conference paper titled “Challenges of Orion 
Rendezvous Development.”  It was written to provide insight into what has, and what has not, been automated on the 
Mercury, Gemini, Apollo, and Space Shuttle vehicles.   The text has been updated since it was first published in 2007.11 
automated versus manual control of translational 
dynamics. 
 
Mercury 
 
  The three primary objectives of the Mercury Project 
were: 1) Place a manned spacecraft in orbital flight 
around the earth, 2) Investigate man's performance 
capabilities and his ability to function in the environment 
of space, and 3) Recover the man and the spacecraft 
safely.17  The Project Mercury Summary lists the 
philosophy behind manual and automatic control for the 
Mercury Spacecraft:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Mercury ascent was automated. The on-orbit and re-
entry phases of flight were used to test manual, 
automated, and semi-automated means of attitude control. 
Mercury translational control on-orbit was limited to the 
booster separation and deorbit maneuvers. 
 The planned primary mode of attitude control for the 
deorbit burn and re-entry was automatic. However, due to 
systems problems, only one Mercury orbital flight (MA-8, 
October 1962) used automated attitude control                   
. 
“Redundancy probably increased the complexity 
of the systems more than any other requirement. 
Because the spacecraft had to be qualified by 
space flight first without a man onboard and then 
because the reactions of man and his capabilities 
in the space environment were unknown, 
provisions for a completely automatic operation 
of the critical spacecraft functions were provided. 
To insure reliable operation, these automatic 
systems were backed up by redundant automatic 
systems.” 17 
 
“The pilot must be given the capability of 
manually controlling spacecraft attitude.” 17 
JSC – 63400 
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exclusively for the deorbit burn and re-entry. The other 
three orbital missions used a combination of automatic, 
semi-automatic, and manual control.17 
 
Gemini 
 
  The short development  schedule of Gemini (3.3 
years from contract award to first human flight) 
necessitated careful decisions concerning what tasks to 
automate and what tasks to perform manually.  Project 
Mercury flight experience proved that a human was 
capable of efficient operation of a spacecraft in 
weightlessness.  The Gemini design philosophy was to 
increase the level of human participation in piloting and 
spacecraft operation.18 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Gemini Ascent 
 
 Ascent during Gemini was flown automated. Since 
Gemini had an on-board computer and IMU, both were 
used to provide a back-up automated ascent guidance 
capability in the event of a Titan II radio guidance failure. 
The switch from the primary Titan II guidance to the 
automated backup was performed by the crew based on 
predefined criteria. 
 
Gemini Orbit and Rendezvous 
 
 One goal of the Gemini Program was to determine 
what activities could be accomplished by a crew in zero 
gravity. Gemini rendezvous and docking was performed 
manually by the crew using data from a computer, a 
rendezvous radar, an IMU, visual observations, charts and 
graphs, and hand calculations.  
“In the Mercury Program, automatic systems were 
used almost exclusively in the Guidance and 
Control System with manual operations used 
solely as optional back-up modes.  The experience 
gained proved that man is fully capable of making 
decisions and executing control during most 
phases of a space mission.   There are obvious 
advantages to exploiting this proven capability, 
such as savings in equipment and providing 
mission flexibility, therefore, the Gemini Project 
had attempted to fully integrate into the system 
such manual abilities as decision making, 
navigation, mode selection, and flight control.” 19 
 
“Although manual systems are emphasized, 
automatic control modes still afford many of the 
same advantages to a space vehicle that they do to 
a high performance aircraft.  For instance, 
solutions to problems of launch guidance, re-
entry, and long term attitude control are better 
suited to automatic systems.” 19 
 On-orbit pitch and roll attitude could be controlled 
automatically while yaw control was manual.18 
 
Gemini Re-Entry 
 
 Another programmatic objective of the Gemini 
Program was to successfully demonstrate both automated 
and manual re-entry of a lifting capsule to a target 
splashdown point in preparation for Apollo. The on-board 
computer could perform automated entry as well as 
provide cues for manual piloting. Back-up manual 
procedures were also available in the event of a computer 
failure. The Gemini III crew initially flew the manual 
back-up procedure, then used computer generated piloting 
cues. A computer failure on Gemini IV forced the crew to 
fly the manual backup procedure. Entries for Gemini 
missions V through X were flown manually using 
computer cues. Automated entry was successfully flown 
on Gemini missions XI and XII.20 
 
Apollo, Skylab, and Apollo-Soyuz 
 
 Apollo spacecraft development was subjected to a 
short development schedule like Gemini.  Minimizing risk 
to cost, schedule, development, and certification required 
careful choices concerning automation versus manual 
control, and on-board versus Mission Control roles and 
responsibilities. 
 
Apollo Ascent Into Low Earth Orbit 
 
 Ascent into Earth orbit on the Saturn IB and Saturn V 
was flown in an automated mode. Starting with Apollo 
10, backup guidance was available in the event of a 
Saturn Instrumentation Unit (IU) Inertial Measurement 
Unit (IMU) failure. During the first stage, the crew could 
switch to automatic backup guidance provided by the 
Command Module Primary Guidance, Navigation, and 
Control System (PGNCS). For backup guidance during 
the second and third stages the crew provided hand 
controlled steering inputs via the PGNCS to the Saturn 
IU. 
 
Apollo Rendezvous, Docking, and In-Space Operations 
 
 On many missions the separation and transposition 
maneuver, carried out before the Apollo CSM docked 
with the LM, was executed in an automated mode using 
the digital autopilot. An upgrade to the digital autopilot on 
Apollo 10 eliminated the need for a crew member to 
monitor and periodically adjust the thermal control roll 
mode performed to and from the Moon. This automation 
enabled all three crew members to sleep at the same time. 
The Gemini missions proved that rendezvous and docking 
could be performed using manual piloting procedures. An 
excerpt from a 1966 NASA memo by Bill Tindall, the 
Chief of Apollo Data Priority Coordination, concerning      
. 
HISTORY OF SPACE SHUTTLE RENDEZVOUS 
Approved for public release via STI DAA 
24483. See statement on title page. 255  
Apollo terminal phase guidance requirements, best 
illustrates the rationale behind automatic versus manual 
approach and docking decisions during the Apollo and 
Shuttle Programs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Although the Apollo CSM was nominally the passive 
vehicle during rendezvous, the CSM pilot performed 
relative navigation and targeting tasks using the PGNCS  
lest a LM systems problem kept the LM from completing 
the rendezvous. CSM procedures for both the passive and 
active vehicle roles were complex and labor intensive. 
The first test of Apollo CSM single piloting for 
rendezvous occurred during the Apollo 7 rendezvous with 
it’s own S-IVB stage (October 1968). 
 After the return of Apollo 11, comments made by 
CSM pilot Michael Collins regarding the heavy single 
piloting workload (approximately 850 keystrokes) 
prompted the Apollo Program to automate some CSM 
rendezvous procedures in the fall of 1969. This resulted in 
the MINKEY program that was flown on the last three 
lunar missions, as well as the Skylab and Apollo-Soyuz 
missions. The level of automation in the CSM passive and 
active rendezvous procedures was limited by on-board 
computer capacity and the need for the CSM pilot to 
manually take sextant marks. When available, ground 
monitoring of CSM systems reduced the workload of the 
pilot so he could concentrate on guidance, navigation, and 
control procedure execution and performance monitoring. 
The automation of some crew tasks did not reduce the 
flexibility already inherent in the CSM rendezvous 
procedures. 
 
 
“Based on Gemini experience, the crew has 
emphasized that there is no requirement for 
automatic execution of the braking maneuvers by 
the G&N system. As previously reported, it is felt 
that this task can be carried out just as well, if not 
better, by the crew if they are provided the proper 
information; namely, the range and range rate 
data.......................Recognizing that procedures 
are available for utilizing the remaining computer 
processors to carry out the G&N controlled 
braking maneuvers by proper pilot manipulation 
of the computer, we deleted the requirement for 
automatic computer logic for this task. The point 
is, we felt that there was insufficient justification 
to carry out the extra programming, debugging, 
verification, and documentation, as well as using 
some 50 to 100 words of precious computer 
storage, for a program which was not needed, 
except in rather remote contingency situations, as 
long as procedures were available to handle all 
situations. And, they are.” 21 
Apollo Lunar Landing and Ascent Into Lunar Orbit 
 
 The Apollo lunar landing profile was flown 
automatically from 50,000 feet to an altitude under 500 
feet above the lunar surface. During this phase the crew 
could re-designate the landing point based on visual 
observation of boulders, craters, or sloping terrain. This 
feature was used on missions 12, 14, 15, 16, and 17 as 
surface conditions differed from what was expected,  
based on photographs taken from low lunar orbit.22, 23  At 
an altitude under 500 feet the crew transitioned to a semi-
automatic control mode (manual attitude control with 
automated descent engine throttle control) for the rest of 
the descent. Completely automatic or completely manual 
modes (manual attitude and throttle control) were also 
available, but the semi-automatic mode reduced crew 
workload through automatic throttling while manual 
attitude control provided precise control over the landing 
location.24-27 LM ascent was flown automatically, 
although a manual procedure was available in the event of 
certain hardware failures. 
 
Apollo Re-entry 
 
 All Apollo atmospheric entries were flown 
automatically by the PGNCS, though the initiation 
altitude of automated control varied on the early missions. 
Backup manual piloting options were available to support 
a PGNCS failure or failures of other sensors. In the event 
of a digital computer or IMU failure (PGNCS), the Entry 
Monitoring System (EMS) provided piloting cues for 
manual flight of the entry profile.27-28  Entry was flown 
automatically once cross checks between the PGNCS and 
the EMS verified PGNCS performance as acceptable.  
Much of the entry profile was flown automatically on 
each Apollo mission, although Apollo 7 did not begin 
automatic control until an altitude of ~202,000 feet. 
 
Space Shuttle 
 
 The Space Shuttle was more automated than the 
Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo vehicles. However, there 
was a requirement for manual backup for all automated 
flight modes.15 Additional automation was introduced 
over the life of the program. Shuttle Program emphasis 
has been placed on applying automation to flight phases 
where manual or semiautomatic control is difficult, 
thereby increasing safety. Over the life of the Shuttle 
Program priority has been given to upgrades that provide 
return in terms of improved safety, correction of software 
anomalies, reduction of life cycle costs, or the ability to 
support a new mission requirement. In the context of an 
operational system, automation of a task for which a 
proven, procedural work-around exists is considered to be 
a “nice to have.” The benefit such automation would 
provide may not justify the cost and the risk associated 
with making changes to safety-critical software. The         
. 
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practice of carefully considering where to apply program 
resources is illustrated by an automation decision made 
early in the Shuttle Program. In 1974 a proposal was 
drafted to develop an automated flight capability that 
would allow the shuttle to be test flown without a crew, in 
the same manner that the Soviet Buran shuttle was later 
tested in 1988. After careful consideration, Shuttle 
Program management decided that the budget and. 
resources needed to develop such an automated capability  
would be better spent on enhancing safety of flight for 
piloted shuttle missions.29 
 The Space Shuttle was the first human space flight 
vehicle that flew with a crew on the first mission.  All 
previous vehicles were first tested without a crew.  One 
consideration that led to the decision to fly the first Space 
Shuttle flight with a crew was uncertainty about 
hypersonic flight control system performance during the 
13 minute communications blackout during re-entry.  
Flight control system stability derivatives had been 
determined through wind tunnel testing but there was 
some uncertainty about the accuracy of the derivatives.  If 
a flight control system problem occurred Mission Control 
had no insight into vehicle performance nor could it take 
action to resolve the issue and save the shuttle orbiter 
during the communications blackout.  If a crew flew the 
first mission they could recognize a stability problem, 
change flight control system gains, and handle dynamic 
instabilities to ensure that the orbiter successfully returned 
to a runway landing.30  
 
Shuttle Ascent and Aborts 
 
 To date all Space Shuttle ascents have been flown 
automatically, although a manual backup option, called 
Control Stick Steering (CSS), is available in the event of a 
contingency.  However, procedures do not permit the 
crew to engage CSS in the event of a guidance problem 
until 1 minute 30 seconds after lift-off.  This restriction is 
in place since the dynamics of aerodynamic load relief 
during the high dynamic pressure (q-bar) region are too 
complex for the crew to fly manually.  In the event of a 
guidance problem between liftoff and T+1:30 procedures 
call for the crew to engage the Back-up Flight System 
(BFS). 
 The Space Shuttle mission profile includes intact 
abort modes for loss of a single main engine during ascent 
that would prevent the vehicle from reaching the desired 
orbit. These aborts, which permit safe return to a runway 
landing, originally included Return to Launch Site, Abort 
Once Around, and Abort to Orbit.31  However, a runway 
landing was not possible for some failure scenarios. 
Training simulations led the STS-2 crew (Engle and 
Truly) to recommend the development of manual 
procedures to enable a runway landing in Spain as an 
alternative to a crew ejection procedure. Cue cards with 
the manual Transoceanic Abort Landing (TAL) 
procedures were flown on STS-2 (November 1981). TAL 
. 
procedures were automated for STS-3 (March 1982). 
 Contingency aborts are performed in response to 
failures other than the loss of one main engine. These 
failures included loss of thrust from multiple engines or 
multiple failures in other orbiter systems. In the twenty 
years since the loss of Challenger, contingency 
procedures during ascent and entry have been 
continuously developed and refined. Time critical ascent 
and entry contingency procedures that are difficult for the 
crew to execute have been automated to improve safety. 
These include flight computer software changes made to 
automate challenging procedures for emergency landings 
due to multiple ascent engine failures. One example of 
automation of manual procedures is the East Coast Abort 
Landing (ECAL). Automated ECAL was first available 
on STS-102 (March 2001) and permits landings at sites on 
the eastern coast of the United States and Canada for high 
inclination missions. 
 In addition to TAL (1982) and ECAL (2001), other 
conversions of manual piloting procedures to automation 
were the Main Propulsion System (MPS) Dump 
Capability (1983), Automation of Normal Acceleration 
(Nz) Hold Maneuver (1989), Single Engine (2 failed 
engines) Contingency Abort Procedure Automation 
(1992), Low Energy TAL Automation (1993), and Three 
Engine Out Automation (1997).  Software improvements 
to existing ascent abort automation included the Abort 
Sequencing Redesign (1992), Trans-Atlantic Abort 
Landing (TAL) Droop Capability (1993), and Return to 
Launch Site (RTLS) External Tank (ET) Separation 
Improvements (2007).  Crew monitoring of automated 
flight performance during powered ascent and hypersonic 
re-entry was improved with new Ascent/Entry Bearing 
Displays (2007). 50 
 
Shuttle Rendezvous, Docking, and On-Orbit 
 
 The Remote Manipulator System (RMS, the robotic 
arm) has been used by the shuttle for grappling and 
deploying payloads during proximity operations. It has 
both manual and supervised automation modes of 
operation.  Rendezvous was defined as a shuttle capability 
at the beginning of the Shuttle Program and early in the 
Program some studies of automated rendezvous and 
docking were performed. However, the success of 
rendezvous and docking during Gemini and Apollo led to 
rendezvous being of lower priority (an “optional 
service”), than ascent and entry, during the development 
and flight phases of the Shuttle Program. The shuttle had 
to overcome other significant technical challenges in 
rendezvous and proximity operations in areas such as 
plume impingement and variation in target spacecraft 
characteristics. However, these challenges were not as 
safety critical as those in the ascent and entry phases of 
flight. 
 A proximity operations autopilot was tested on two 
missions in 1985 (STS-51G and STS-61B), but was not   
.. 
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certified for regular use during missions.31, 32  At that time 
the shuttle did not have proximity operations sensors to 
enable effective automation of guidance, navigation, and 
control during proximity operations. A programmatic 
requirement driving certification of a proximity 
operations autopilot for routine use during missions did 
not exist.  Furthermore, the proximity operations autopilot 
was added to a special version of flight software that was 
only to be used for the test.  It was not added to and 
certified for use in the on-orbit flight software normally 
used during the on-orbit phase of missions. 
 The Universal Pointing function provided a higher 
level of on-orbit attitude maintenance automation than 
was available on previous vehicles. Attitude control 
during rendezvous, proximity operations, and docking is 
performed automatically with the crew performing 
systems management and oversight.  Therefore shuttle 
rendezvous, proximity operations, and docking is more 
accurately described as semi-automatic rather than 
manual. 
 One example of automated attitude control is the final 
alignment of the orbiter with the ISS for docking. At 30 
feet, the crew checks the alignment of the orbiter with the 
docking target on the ISS. Attitude errors are determined 
visually by the crew and input into the Universal Pointing 
display for automatic attitude adjustment. This method is 
preferred over the Rotational Hand Controller (RHC) as 
the Digital Auto Pilot can more accurately remove small 
attitude errors while minimizing ISS plume impingement. 
This procedure was also performed on the missions to 
Mir. 
 Normally the RHC was not used during the on-orbit 
phase of a shuttle mission due to automated attitude 
control.  However, there were several procedures that 
required manual attitude control: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 At times during rendezvous and proximity operations 
automated attitude control is performed to track the target 
spacecraft to facilitate relative sensor measurements.  This 
in turn requires that an on-board relative navigation 
solution be maintained.  The advantage of a manual 
attitude control capability is that it permits the crew to      
.. 
• Any attitude separation from another spacecraft. 
 
•  Calibration and alignment of the Crew Optical 
Alignment Sight (COAS) or Heads Up Display.  
 
• The manual attitude alignment contingency 
procedure during before grapple of the HST.  
 
• Small payload fly-arounds during proximity 
operations.   
 
• During the Shuttle-Mir missions there was a 
contingency separation procedure for the no 
forward RCS jet case that started with a RHC 
deflection in pitch. 
 
keep another spacecraft under visual observation even if 
relative sensor measurements and a relative navigation 
solution are not available to support automated attitude 
control.  Continuous out-the-window observation of 
another spacecraft is required to detect off-nominal 
relative motion and reduce the risk of collision. 
 In 2004, Shuttle Program personnel examined the 
integration of TCS and RPOP into the flight-critical 
avionics system. In addition, an automated proximity 
operations capability using RPOP guidance for 
translational control was successfully demonstrated in a 
high fidelity simulator for ISS approach and docking. 
However, the crew still would have been required to 
perform a visual check of alignment with the ISS docking 
hardware, and command the automatic attitude 
adjustment. These shuttle modification proposals were not 
adopted due to the decision to retire the shuttle fleet in 
2010. 
  Due to the wide variety of target vehicles and 
associated constraints placed on shuttle proximity 
operations, proximity operations procedures varied 
significantly from flight to flight.32  Flight to flight 
variation of procedures would have made automation of 
shuttle rendezvous and proximity operations for all target 
vehicles expensive in terms of safety critical software life 
cycle costs. While automated translational control was 
never implemented for rendezvous, attitude control during 
all phases of shuttle rendezvous, proximity operations, 
target capture, target berthing, and docking is performed 
in an automated manner with the crew performing a 
systems management and oversight function. 
 There are two examples of automation proposals that 
were not approved due to higher priorities for software 
development resources and budget.  The first involved 
automating the set-up of attitudes to be flown.   
 The Universal Pointing function in the on-orbit 
guidance, navigation, and control (GNC) flight software 
provided desired attitude and rate commands to the 
Digital Auto Pilot (DAP).  The DAP in turn automatically 
maneuvered to and maintained the commanded attitude.  
The crew performed keyboard inputs to the Universal 
Pointing display to set up the attitude maneuvers.  The 
ASTRO-1 astronomy payload flown on STS-35 
(December 1990) required over 200 different attitudes to 
facilitate astronomical observations.  This amounted to 
about 8,930 crew keystrokes.   
 After the mission the heavy crew workload and 
potential for input errors led Mission Control personnel to 
devise an automated attitude table concept that eventually 
became a GNC flight software requirements change 
request (CR 90702, OI-24 candidate, 1992).  The table 
would have contained a sequence of attitude commands as 
a function of time that would have been uplinked to the 
orbiter GNC software by Mission Control.  The capability 
would have eliminated the need for crew item entries to 
define and command new attitudes to be maintained 
automatically by the DAP.  Addition of the automated       
..      . 
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attitude maneuver set-up capability to the GNC software 
was not approved due to other software changes that had a 
higher priority for budget and software development 
resources.  Only one shuttle mission, STS-35, has 
required such a large number of attitude maneuvers.  
 The second example concerns automation of 
translational burns performed with the 870 pound thrust 
primary Reaction Control System (RCS) jets.  Burns 
executed with the Orbital Maneuvering System (OMS) 
engines were performed automatically by the GNC 
software after the crew gave an authority to proceed.  
Smaller burns executed with the primary RCS jets were 
performed manually by the crew using a Translational 
Hand Controller (THC).  The STS-51A mission 
(November 1984) performed rendezvous with two 
different communications satellites, PALAPA-B2 and 
WESTAR-VI.  Both had been deployed on STS-41B 
(February 1984) but did not reach their assigned orbits 
due to malfunctions of the Payload Assisted Modules on 
each satellite.  In addition, two satellites were deployed, 
TELESAT-H and SYNCOM IV-I.  The satellite 
deployments and both rendezvous profiles required a total 
of 44 OMS and RCS burns.   
 After the mission the crew recommended that the 
GNC software be modified so that the crew could chose 
to automatically execute a translational RCS burns in the 
same manner that OMS burns were automated.  
Automating RCS burns could reduce crew work-load, 
eliminate the need to maneuver to a burn attitude for some 
RCS burns, and lower the risk of errors during burn 
execution that could result in trajectory dispersions and 
higher propellant consumption.  However, this would not 
have automated execution of burns during proximity 
operations and docking.   
 This proposal was seriously considered several times 
over the life of the Shuttle Program, the last time during 
the Cockpit Avionics Upgrade (CAU, canceled in 
December of 2004).  However, it was never approved for 
implementation in the orbiter GNC software since 
propellant savings could not be quantified and there were 
other software upgrades that provided more payback (risk 
reduction, necessary to meet new mission requirements) 
and therefore had a higher priority for the limited 
software development budget and resources.  Most shuttle 
missions did not have as many OMS and RCS burns as 
STS-51A (44 total). 
 
Shuttle Re-Entry and Landing 
 
 Shuttle entries are typically flown in an automated 
mode until just below Mach 1. Mach 1 typically occurs  
between 47,000 to 55,000 feet Above Ground Level 
(AGL). At this point the crew transitions to Control Stick 
Steering (manual piloting via the shuttle computers). All 
Space Shuttle landings, including the five Approach and 
Landing Tests (ALT) conducted at Edwards Air Force 
Base in 1977, have been flown manually.   
  
  
 The shuttle was designed and built with an automatic 
landing (autoland) capability for flight between 
approximately 10,000 feet and wheels stop on the runway.  
The autoland requirement developed during shuttle design 
in the 1970s was driven by Department of Defense shuttle 
reference Missions 3A and 3B (never flown) that could 
encounter fog while landing at Vandenberg Air Force 
Base.51, 52  Use of autoland required the presence of a 
Microwave Landing System (MLS) at the runway.  One 
possible advantage of autoland was that it could permit a 
landing at a runway with a lower cloud ceiling than would 
be permissible for a manually piloted landing.  Manual 
piloting capability was provided as a backup in the event 
of performance issues and systems failures.33   Not all 
shuttle contingency runways around the world were 
equipped with MLS, therefore autoland was not an option 
for landings at these runways.  Autoland guidance and use 
of MLS data for navigation was only in the primary 
computer software.  The backup computer software did 
not support autoland or MLS navigation. Several tests of 
autoland during parts of the landing phase were conducted 
early in the Shuttle Program. During the third ALT free 
flight (September 1977) autoland was flown down to an 
altitude of 900 feet AGL.34, 35  More ALT autoland test 
flights had been proposed but the total number of free 
flights was reduced to five due to budget issues.  This 
reduced the amount of testing performed. 
 On STS-2 (November 1981) autoland was flown 
from 5,000 feet to 1,300 feet AGL in roll and yaw and to 
300 feet AGL in pitch. STS-3 (March 1982) flew autoland 
from 10,000 feet to 120 feet AGL, and STS-4 (June/July 
1982) flew autoland from 10,000 feet to 2,500 feet 
AGL.33   However, manual takeover and crew monitoring 
issues, coupled with successful manual landings, led the 
Shuttle Program to designate manual landing as the 
primary method.  The orbiter autoland capability was 
never certified and only to be used for contingencies.36 
 MLS accuracy was also an issue for autoland.  There 
were two configurations of the runway based MLS.  In 
the senior configuration the elevation transmission 
antennas were 3,350 feet from the runway threshold on 
the approach end of the runway.  Senior azimuth and 
range transmissions were from a transmitter at a different 
station at the far end of the runway.  The lower elevation 
angle of MLS Senior resulted in higher multi-path errors 
close to touchdown.  A low elevation angle cut-out to 
mitigate the worst multipath resulted in no MLS data for 
approximately the last 100 feet of the approach.  This in 
turn could result in unacceptable errors at touchdown.  
The MLS junior configuration, the configuration used 
during much of the Shuttle Program, had the elevation, 
azimuth, and range transmitters at a point 1,500 from the 
runway threshold at the approach end of the runway.  The 
MLS Junior configuration did not supply measurements 
during rollout while the MLS Senior configuration still 
supplied range and azimuth data during rollout.  
  Over the next 10 years a number of flight control      
. 
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system changes were made to improve performance of 
both manual and automated flight below 10,000 feet. This 
included automation of the speed brake function during 
manual piloting.31 
Another test of autoland, including an automated 
landing, was planned for STS-53 (December 1992) in 
support of the Long Duration Orbiter (LDO) project 
(missions of longer than 30 days).37  The LDO concept 
would have also required automated deployment of the air 
data probes, landing gear, the drag chute, and automatic 
braking on the runway.  The proposed STS-53 Detailed 
Test Objective (DTO) required the use of the MLS Junior 
configuration.  In the Junior configuration all MLS signals 
were transmitted from the MLS hardware to the orbiter 
from a location near the touchdown point.  MLS Junior 
would have avoided the multipath and associated 
navigation errors of the MLS Senior configuration 
(azimuth antenna at the far end of the runway, therefore 
low elevation angles and greater multipath).  The Junior 
configuration permitted MLS data use all the way to 
touchdown.  There was also a special ground monitoring 
alarm limit requirement for MLS.  However, MLS Junior 
azimuth antenna locations did not support automated 
steering during rollout and manual steering was required 
after nose gear touchdown.  Limits (placards) were placed 
on orbiter weight and center-of-gravity location for 
automated landings.  Autoland was certified for the STS-
53 DTO and as a backup for LDO missions.  Certification 
for the full range of orbiter center-of-gravity and weight 
values would have required more work on MLS antenna 
locations and tighter MLS monitoring alarm limits.  In 
addition, incorporation of radar altimeter data may have 
been necessary.38, 39 
The STS-53 commander and pilot underwent 
extensive autoland and late manual takeover training in 
the Vertical Motion Simulator at NASA/Ames in 
California.  The crew trained for the DTO with the serious 
attitude of test piloting professionals.  The autoland DTO 
had the support of Shuttle Program Manager and former 
astronaut Robert Crippen.  However, a new Shuttle 
Program Manager canceled the STS-53 autoland DTO 
due to safety concerns based on his experience with 
legacy automated landings on aircraft carriers.  Shuttle 
autoland personnel believed that these concerns were not 
relevant to shuttle autoland.  The Space Shuttle never flew 
an LDO mission. 
 Astronauts were occasionally asked why automated 
landings are not flown as a nominal flight technique.  A 
summary of their responses follows. 40-44 * 
 
1. Since the shuttle is a glider, it does not have the 
ability, like a powered airplane, of calling off an 
approach and making another landing attempt in the 
event of a problem.   
 
 
2. Autoland touchdown airspeed dispersions using the 
Shuttle Training Aircraft (the STA, a Gulfstream II 
modified to fly like the shuttle orbiter) have been 
very close to the airspeed limit of the landing gear.  
Manual piloting could control the touchdown 
airspeed slightly better than the autoland system. † 
 
3. Unlike a powered aircraft that performs automatic 
landings, the shuttle orbiter did not have redundant 
airspeed measurements nor was there an independent 
means for the crew to cross check autoland 
performance during the approach.   
 
4. In the event of poor autoland performance, a crew 
member who has been in a weightless environment 
for several days or weeks might have difficulty 
making the necessary corrections during the dynamic 
and time critical final approach phase.  An earlier 
manual takeover, well before the final approach, 
provides the crew member with more time to become 
acclimated to stick feedback and vehicle response. 
 
 After the loss of Columbia (February 2003), a 
Remote Control Orbiter (RCO) capability was developed 
to return an uncrewed orbiter with thermal protection 
system damage to Earth for a runway landing. The crew 
of the damaged orbiter would use the ISS as a safe haven, 
and would be returned to Earth by a later shuttle mission.  
Return of an uncrewed orbiter in this manner requires the 
use of autoland.46  STS-121 (July 2006) was the first 
mission with RCO capability. 
On STS-126 (November 30, 2008 landing) the orbiter 
Endeavour was to perform a 340 degree left overhead 
turn on the Heading Alignment Cone (HAC) before 
landing on Edwards Air Force Base runway 04.  HAC 
turns this large were rare for the shuttle.  A large turn 
coupled with high winds required that the commander 
precisely follow the guidance commands on the Heads Up 
Display during Control Stick Steering (CSS).  If the 
guidance commands were not precisely followed it could 
result in an undesirable low energy and low altitude          
. 
* Autoland was the subject of many studies and debates in 
1981-1983 and during the planning for STS-53 (1991-1992).  It 
should be noted that interviewees are relying on memories of 
meetings and events many years in the past.  The STS-2 and 
STS-3 landings had a strong influence on people’s opinions 
about autoland.  For a technical discussion about the STS-3 
landing from a control system perspective see pages 41 and 42 
of reference 45. 
† It is possible that the inconsistent autoland performance during 
STA landings was caused by the MLS Senior configuration.  
The STA eventually incorporated radar altimeter data to 
stabilize errors during autoland.  Although the orbiters have 
radar altimeter data, the data was never incorporated into the 
GNC system.  On several early shuttle missions the altimeter 
locked onto the orbiter nose gear. 
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scenario with headwinds.  In addition, too many g’s could 
be pulled as the commander attempted to catch-up with 
the guidance commands.  Normally the commander 
engaged CSS before HAC intercept.  However, after 
analysis by landing personnel and discussion with the 
crew, the commander chose to let autoland fly the orbiter 
onto the HAC.  Autoland performed an automatic energy  
dump/pull-up maneuver to achieve a subsonic HAC 
intercept at Mach 0.95.  The commander engaged CSS 22 
seconds after HAC intercept at Mach 0.81.  
 In summary, autoland was a contingency capability 
only to be used if the crew were incapacitated or 
incapable of landing the orbiter using Control Stick 
Steering.  Since autoland was only a contingency 
capability the Shuttle Program never identified a firm 
requirement to demonstrate it and accept the additional 
risk of a demonstration.  Return to Launch Site (RTLS) 
abort and Trans-oceanic Abort Landing (TAL) were never 
demonstrated for the same reason. ‡ 
 Although the Space Shuttle did not fly an automated 
landing, the shuttle autoland development and 
certification effort did contribute to successful automated 
landing of another space vehicle.  While the X-37 project 
was run by NASA, before it was transferred to the           
Department of Defense, Boeing based the X-37 autoland 
capability on that of the shuttle.  After seven months in 
orbit the X-37B performed a successful automated and 
autonomous re-entry and landing at Vandenberg Air 
Force Base on December 3, 2010.  Although some within 
the Shuttle Program had reservations about the safety and 
performance aspects of shuttle autoland, the successful X-
37B experience should be taken into account.  Shuttle 
autoland specialists believed that shuttle autoland would 
have worked and the success of the shuttle based X-37B 
autoland capability was proof. 
 
Historical Automation Summary 
 
 Choosing complete automation, semi-automatic 
control, or completely manual control is done on a case-
by-case basis. Considerations include cost, technical risk, 
schedule risk, safety, and the ability of the crew to 
accomplish the task. 
 All powered flight ascents flown by the Mercury 
(Redstone, Atlas), Gemini (Titan II), Apollo (Saturn IB, 
Saturn V, Apollo Lunar Module ascent stage), Skylab 
(Saturn IB), Apollo-Soyuz (Saturn IB), and the Space 
Shuttle vehicles have been flown in an automated mode. 
The X-15 and the Scaled Composites SpaceShipOne are   
. 
the only U.S. vehicles that reached space while being 
flown manually during powered flight.47, 48, **  Most 
entries have been flown in an automated mode as well, 
although the crew manually flies most of the shuttle 
landing profile below Mach 1. 
 During flights of the Gemini Program (1965-1966) it 
was proven that manual control of close proximity           
spacecraft translation and docking using sensor 
measurements and out-the-window piloting cues was 
intuitive once skills were developed through training; 
much like flying an airplane, driving a car, or skiing.   
Manual piloting during powered flight (ascent) and 
hypersonic re-entry was not intuitive and entailed greater 
risk and fewer margins for error.  Therefore automation 
development and application during the Gemini, Apollo, 
and Space Shuttle Programs focused on powered flight 
and hypersonic re-entry.  Unlike powered ascent and 
hypersonic re-entry, the risk posed by manual piloting of 
rendezvous and docking/capture was not great enough to 
warrant development of fully automated rendezvous and 
docking.  The Gemini, Apollo, and Space Shuttle vehicles 
were not equipped to perform fully automatic rendezvous 
and docking since programmatic requirements for such a 
capability were not needed to meet mission objectives 
with an adequate safety margin.  Automation of attitude 
control during rendezvous and docking was performed to 
reduce the crew workload. 
 Successful Space Shuttle automated powered flight 
and hypersonic re-entry was demonstrated throughout the 
Shuttle Program starting with STS-1 (1981).  Automated 
abort modes were also developed for the shuttle and were 
available (if needed) starting with STS-1.  Over the life of 
the Shuttle Program new powered flight contingency 
abort flight techniques were developed to lower the risk 
of loss of vehicle and crew.  These manual piloting 
procedures were eventually automated since they were 
difficult to manually fly and required very precise timing.  
Software improvements to existing ascent abort 
automation were also performed. 50 
 When evaluating the use of manual piloting 
techniques versus automation for rendezvous and 
docking, it is important to note that between June 1965 
and July 2011 a total of 101 U.S. human flight missions   
have included at least one objective related to rendezvous, 
docking, capture and berthing, or proximity operations. 
Only one of those missions (Gemini IV, June 1965) failed 
to achieve the relative motion required to accomplish 
mission objectives due to difficulty in controlling relative 
motion. 
 
 
 
‡ See Appendix B - NASA Response to March 1993 Annual 
Report, Finding and Recommendation #9, on pages B-10 and B-
11 of reference 39. 
** The Scaled Composites SpaceShipTwo built for Virgin 
Galactic was also planned to be manually flown from release 
from the WhiteKnightTwo aircraft through landing.  See 
reference 49. 
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A NOTE ON SOURCES 
 
 This history was originally written for an AIAA Journal of Spacecraft and Rockets article.  Publication 
considerations prevented all of the material from being published in the journal.  The first edition of this JSC document 
was published in October of 2006 to preserve all of the material. 
 Many of the references in this work are available in the open literature.  These references will provide the reader 
with additional detail and insight. 
 Other sources were internal memos, presentations, reports, crew procedures, console procedures, and training 
documents.  Some of these sources were found in the mission binders maintained by NASA/JSC Flight Dynamics 
Division Rendezvous Guidance and Procedures Office (Code DM34).  Others were obtained from United Space 
Alliance Flight Design and Dynamics personnel that supported the NASA/JSC Flight Dynamics Division (Code DM).  
Other sources were found in the NASA/JSC Scientific and Technical Information Center (STIC) Library in Building 
45.  Still other sources were collected by the author over the years.  At the end of the Shuttle Program many of those 
sources were preserved by the author in the following JSC documents as compilations.  These are available from the 
STIC Library in Building 45. 
 
• Goodman, John L. (editor), Space Shuttle Rendezvous and Proximity Operations Overview and Experience Papers,  
  Volumes 1 (1970-1985) and 2 (1986-2009), JSC-35050, NASA Johnson Space Center, July 2011.  
 
• Goodman, John L. (editor), Space Shuttle Rendezvous Profile Papers, Volumes 1 (1969-1983) and 2 (1984-2007),  
  JSC-35051, NASA Johnson Space Center, July 2011.  
 
• Goodman, John L. (editor), Space Shuttle Proximity Operations Papers, Volumes 1 (1970-1979) and 2 (1980-2009),  
  JSC-35052, NASA Johnson Space Center, July 2011. 
 
• Goodman, John L. (editor), Space Shuttle Rendezvous Maneuver Targeting Papers, JSC-35053, NASA Johnson Space   
  Center, July 2011.  
 
• Goodman, John L. (editor), Space Shuttle Relative Navigation Papers, Volumes 1 (1969-1979) and 2 (1980-2010),  
  JSC-35054, NASA Johnson Space Center, July 2011.  
 
• Goodman, John L. (editor), Gemini Rendezvous Papers, JSC-35055, NASA Johnson Space Center, July 2011. 
 
• Goodman, John L. (editor), Apollo Rendezvous Papers, Volumes 1 (Lunar Missions) and 2 (Skylab and  
  Apollo/Soyuz), JSC-35056, NASA Johnson Space Center, July 2011.  
 
 
 Two documents by James Oberg provide detail on rendezvous development and shuttle missions through 1986.  
The History of Orbital Rendezvous contains excerpts from some internal memos and reports. 
 
• Oberg, James E., Rendezvous and Proximity Operations Handbook, Appendix: STS Rendezvous And Proximity   
  Operations Experiences 1981-1986 – Basic, JSC- 10589, Flight Design and Dynamics Division, Mission Operations  
  Directorate, NASA/JSC, May 16, 1988. 
 
• Oberg, James E., The History Of Orbital Rendezvous, 660-FO-730-91-225, Flight Design and Dynamics Department,  
   Rockwell Space Operations Company, Houston, TX, October 1, 1991.  Accession number 92T-10780. 
 
 
 Additional detail on shuttle rendezvous may be found in the following reports. 
 
• Goodman, John L., and Kelli S. Wiuff, Space Shuttle Rendezvous and Proximity Operations Experience Report, JSC-  
  49626, Flight Design and Dynamics Division, Mission Operations Directorate, NASA Johnson Space Center,   
  February 2003. 
 
• Goodman, John L., Lessons Learned From Seven Space Shuttle Missions, NASA Contractor Report NASA/CR-2007-  
  213697, NASA Johnson Space Center, January 2007.  See the NASA Technical Reports server at http://ntrs.nasa.gov/. 
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 Technical details on shuttle rendezvous and rendezvous concepts in general may be found in the following training 
books. 
 
• Goodman, John L., Introduction to Space Shuttle Rendezvous Guidance, Navigation, and Control, Fourth Edition,  
  JSC-49686, NASA JSC Flight Design and Dynamics Division, November 2009. 
 
• Goodman, John L., Introduction to Relative Navigation Concepts for Visiting Vehicles Officers, First Edition, JSC- 
  36583, Flight Dynamics Division, Mission Operations Directorate, NASA Johnson Space Center, September 2010. 
 
• Goodman, John L., Introduction to Rendezvous Burn Targeting and Guidance Concepts for Visiting Vehicles Officers,  
  First Edition, JSC-36584, Flight Dynamics Division, Mission Operations Directorate, NASA Johnson Space Center,  
  September 2010. 
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RENDEZVOUS PERSONNEL 
 
 It is impossible to assemble an accurate list of all personnel that supported some aspect of rendezvous, proximity 
operations, docking, or berthing from the initial Phase A studies in 1969 through the end of the Shuttle Program over 40 
years later.  However, the author felt it would be prudent to acknowledge in some way the work performed by NASA 
and contractor personnel.  Appendices A through F give the names of those who performed real-time support of 
rendezvous and proximity operations or trained the crews for this flight phase.  The author did not attempt to expand 
the appendices beyond real-time support and crew training due to the complexity of the task and the limited time 
available.   
 Unfortunately assembling even these records was not easy.  Finding the names of trajectory backroom personnel 
that supported rendezvous and proximity operations before the Space Transportation System Operations Contract 
(STSOC) was particularly challenging.  Rendezvous and proximity operations missions flown during that period 
spanned STS-7 (June 1983) to STS-61B (November 1985).   Errors and omissions likely exist in the appendices. 
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APPENDIX A – RENDEZVOUS GUIDANCE AND PROCEDURES OFFICERS 
 
 This appendix lists the flight assignments for Rendezvous Guidance and Procedures Officers (RGPO) and their 
associated Trajectory Multi-Purpose Support Room (TRAJ MPSR, the backroom) support position, Rendezvous 
Procedures Support (RPS).   
 Starting with STS-7 the Rendezvous Procedures Group of the Operations Division (Mission Operations 
Directorate, or MOD) supported proximity operations and rendezvous missions with three Mission Control positions.  
The front room position was the Rendezvous Phase Specialist, call sign Rendezvous.  There were two backroom 
support positions called Rendezvous Phase Support 1 and 2 (RPS-1 and RPS-2).  In 1985 when part of the Mission 
Planning and Analysis Division (MPAD) became part of MOD the Rendezvous Procedures Group became part of the 
Flight Design and Dynamics Division (DM).  In 1987-1988 the Rendezvous Phase Specialist position was combined 
with the Orbit Guidance Officer (GUIDO) position to become the Rendezvous Guidance and Procedures Officer 
(RGPO). 
 Two other potions are listed, Mir Approach and Docking Support (MADS) and Station Approach and Docking 
Support (SADS).  The Lead RGPO was the primary point-of-contact for a specific mission, the Backup RGPO was the 
secondary point-of-contact.  GR stands for Ground-up Rendezvous, D-R stands for Deploy-Retrieve. 
 The source of the flight assignments was a webpage maintained by the Rendezvous Guidance and Procedures 
Office (Code DM34).  Names of personnel in the following flight assignment tables are: 
 
 
Ray Bigonesse 
Mick Chang 
Sally Davis 
Andy Dougherty 
Scott Dunham 
Tom Erkenswick 
Malise Fletcher 
Sarah Graybeal (Ruiz) 
Craig Gross 
Dustin Hamm 
Dave Harshman 
Rick Heib 
Gary Johnson 
Mike Machula 
Joe Malarkey 
Chris Meyer 
Todd Miller 
Randy Moon 
Duane Mosel 
Bill Ober 
Jim Oberg 
Nick O’Dosey 
Sean O’Rourke 
Ted Rickerl 
Mark Rowles 
Jose Ruiz 
Barbara Schwartz 
Lynda Slifer (Gavin) 
Paul Snow 
Jeannette Spehar 
Mark Thomas 
Michael Veres 
Steve Walker 
Joe Williams 
Jerry Yencharis 
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Mission 
 
 
STS-7 
Challenger 
 
STS-41B 
Challenger 
 
STS-41C 
Challenger 
 
 
STS-51A 
Discovery 
 
STS-51D 
Discovery 
 
STS-51G 
Discovery 
 
STS-51F 
Challenger 
 
STS-51I 
Discovery 
 
STS-61B 
Atlantis 
 
STS-51L 
Challenger 
 
STS-32 
Columbia 
 
 
STS-31 
Discovery 
 
STS-37 
Atlantis 
 
STS-39 
Discovery 
 
 
STS-48 
Discovery 
 
STS-49 
Endeavour 
Launch 
Date 
 
6/18/83 
 
 
2/3/84 
 
 
4/6/84 
 
 
 
11/8/84 
 
 
4/12/85 
 
 
6/17/85 
 
 
7/29/85 
 
 
8/27/85 
 
 
11/26/85 
 
 
1/28/86 
 
 
1/9/90 
 
 
 
4/24/90 
 
 
4/5/91 
 
 
4/28/91 
 
 
 
9/12/91 
 
 
5/7/92 
 
 
 
Rndz 
Type 
 
D-R 
 
 
D 
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
GR 
GR  
 
D-R 
 
 
D-R 
 
 
D-R 
 
 
GR 
 
 
D 
 
 
D 
D-R 
 
GR 
D  
 
 
D 
 
 
D 
 
 
D-R 
 
 
 
D 
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
Mission 
Payload 
 
SPAS-01 
 
 
GAS-IRT 
 
 
Solar Max 
 
 
 
PALAPA-B2 
WESTAR-VI 
 
LEASAT-3 
 
 
Spartan-1 
 
 
PDP 
 
 
LEASAT-3 
 
 
OEX 
DAP Target  
 
TDRS-2 
Spartan Halley  
 
LDEF 
SYNCOM IV  
 
 
HST 
 
 
GRO 
 
 
IBSS-SPAS-II 
 
 
 
UARS 
 
 
Intelsat VI 
 
 
 
Lead 
Backup 
 
Mosel 
 
 
Rowles 
 
 
Heib 
 
 
 
Thomas 
Heib 
 
Heib 
 
 
Gross 
Rolwes 
 
Veres 
 
 
Thomas 
   
  
Veres 
  
 
Dougherty 
  
 
Oberg 
  
 
 
Dougherty 
  
 
Meyer 
  
 
Malarkey 
  
 
 
Slifer 
  
 
Meyer 
Schwartz 
 
 
Console 
Position 
 
RGPO 
RPS 
 
RGPO 
RPS 
 
RGPO 
RPS 
OJT  
 
RGPO 
RPS 
 
RGPO 
RPS 
 
RGPO 
RPS 
 
RGPO 
RPS 
 
RGPO 
RPS 
 
RGPO 
RPS 
 
RGPO 
RPS 
 
RGPO 
RPS1 
RPS2  
 
RGPO 
RPS 
 
RGPO 
RPS 
 
RGPO 
RPS1 
RPS2  
 
RGPO 
RPS 
 
RGPO 
RPS1 
RPS2  
 
Orbit 1 
Shift 
 
Mosel 
Rolwes 
 
Rolwes 
 
 
Heib 
Veres 
Thomas  
 
Heib 
Thomas 
 
Heib 
Mosel/Gross 
 
Gross 
Rolwes 
 
Veres 
 
 
Thomas 
 
 
Veres 
 
 
Dougherty 
Harshman 
 
Oberg 
Meyer 
Johnson  
 
Dougherty 
 
 
Meyer 
Dougherty 
 
Thomas 
 
 
 
Slifer 
Oberg 
 
Meyer 
Miller 
Ober  
 
Orbit 2 
Shift 
 
Heib 
Oberg 
 
Mosel 
Gross 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Heib 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Malarkey 
Thomas 
Schwartz  
 
 
 
 
Malarkey 
 
 
Malarkey 
Dougherty 
Schwartz  
 
Thomas 
 
 
Slifer 
Schwartz  
 
 
 
Orbit 3 
Shift 
 
 
 
 
Rolwes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thomas 
Veres 
 
Thomas 
 
 
Thomas 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dougherty 
Harshman  
 
 
 
 
 
Oberg 
 
 
Meyer 
Oberg  
Slifer  
 
Oberg 
 
 
Thomas 
 
 
 
Orbit 4 
Shift 
HISTORY OF SPACE SHUTTLE RENDEZVOUS 
Approved for public release via STI DAA 
24483. See statement on title page. 271 
Mission 
 
 
STS-46 
Atlantis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
STS-52 
Columbia 
 
STS-56 
Discovery 
 
STS-57 
Endeavour 
 
STS-51 
Discovery 
 
STS-61 
Endeavour 
 
STS-60 
Discovery 
 
STS-64 
Discovery 
 
 
STS-66 
Atlantis 
 
 
STS-63 
Discovery 
 
 
 
 
 
STS-71 
Atlantis 
 
 
STS-69 
Endeavour 
 
 
 
 
 
 
STS-74 
Atlantis 
 
 
Launch 
Date 
 
7/31/92 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10/22/92 
 
 
4/8/93 
 
 
6/21/93 
 
 
9/12/93 
 
 
12/2/93 
 
 
2/3/94 
 
 
9/9/94 
 
 
 
11/3/94 
 
 
 
2/3/95 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6/27/95 
 
 
 
9/7/95 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11/12/95 
 
Rdnz 
Type 
 
D 
 
 
 
 
D-R  
 
 
D 
D  
 
D-R 
 
 
GR 
 
 
D-R 
D  
 
GR 
 
 
D-R 
 
 
D-R 
 
 
 
D-R 
 
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
D-R 
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
D-R 
 
 
 
D-R 
 
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
Mission 
Payload 
 
TSS 1 
 
 
 
 
EURECA  
 
 
Lageos-II 
CANEX-2 
 
Spartan 201-01 
 
 
EURECA 
Spacehab 
 
ORFEUS-SPAS 
ACTS/TOS  
 
HST 
SM-01 
 
WSF-01 
Spacehab 
 
Spartan 201-02 
 
 
 
CRISTA-SPAS 
 
 
 
Mir-00 
Spacehab 
 
 
Spartan-204 
 
 
Mir-01 
 
 
 
WSF-02 
 
 
 
Spartan 201-03 
 
 
 
Mir-02 
Docking  
Module 
ODS  
 
Lead 
Backup 
 
Malarkey 
Gavin 
 
 
 
Meyer 
   
 
Miller 
  
 
Miller 
  
 
Meyer 
Williams 
 
Ober 
Thomas 
 
Gavin 
Harshman 
 
Miller 
Ober 
 
Ober 
Fletcher 
 
 
Davis 
Harshman 
 
 
Williams 
Gavin 
 
 
Harshman 
Davis  
 
Gavin 
Fletcher 
 
 
Ober 
Walker 
 
 
Harshman 
Moon  
 
 
Miller 
Fletcher 
 
 
Console 
Position 
 
RGPO 
RPS 
Tether 
Profile 
 
RGPO 
RPS  
 
RGPO 
RPS 
 
RGPO 
RPS 
 
RGPO 
RPS 
 
RGPO 
RPS 
 
RGPO 
RPS 
 
RGPO 
RPS 
 
RGPO 
RPS 
OJT  
 
RGPO 
RPS 
OJT  
 
RGPO 
RPS 
MADS 
 
RGPO 
RPS  
 
RGPO 
RPS 
MADS 
  
RGPO 
RPS 
OJT 
 
RGPO 
RPS 
OJT  
 
RGPO 
RPS 
MADS 
  
Orbit 1 
Shift 
 
Malarkey 
Miller 
Snow 
Williams 
 
Malarkey 
Miller  
 
Miller 
Thomas 
 
Miller 
Schwartz 
 
Meyer 
Williams 
 
Thomas 
Ober 
 
Gavin 
Harshman 
 
Thomas 
Harshman 
 
Miller 
 
Davis 
 
Harshman 
Thomas 
Davis 
 
Davis 
Harshman 
 
 
Davis 
Harshman 
 
Gavin 
Fletcher  
Spehar 
  
Ober 
Thomas 
 
 
Harshman 
Moon 
 
 
Miller 
Fletcher  
Dunham  
 
Orbit 2 
Shift 
 
Gavin 
 
 
 
 
Gavin 
 
 
 
 
 
Meyer 
 
 
Gavin 
Ober  
 
Gavin 
 
 
Thomas 
 
 
Miller 
Williams 
 
Ober 
Fletcher 
 
 
Williams 
 
 
 
Williams 
Fletcher 
Dunham 
 
Williams 
Fletcher  
 
Williams 
 
Dunham 
 
Miller 
Moon 
Hamm 
 
Miller 
 
Hamm  
 
Gavin 
 
Erkenswick 
 
Orbit 3 
Shift 
 
Meyer 
Ober 
Chang 
Hamm  
 
Meyer 
Ober  
 
 
 
 
Thomas 
Williams  
 
Thomas 
 
 
Miller 
 
 
Ober 
Williams  
 
Ober 
 
 
Harshman 
 
 
 
Gavin 
Ober 
 
 
Gavin 
Ober 
 
 
Gavin 
Ober  
 
Miller 
Moon  
 
 
Davis 
 
 
 
Davis 
 
 
 
Williams 
Moon  
 
 
Orbit 4 
Shift 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thomas 
 
 
 
Miller 
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Mission 
 
 
STS-72 
Endeavour 
 
 
 
 
 
 
STS-75 
Endeavour 
 
 
STS-76 
Atlantis 
 
 
STS-77 
Endeavour 
 
 
 
 
 
 
STS-79 
Atlantis 
 
 
STS-80 
Columbia 
 
 
 
 
STS-81 
Atlantis 
 
 
STS-82 
Discovery 
 
STS-84 
Atlantis 
 
 
STS-85 
Discovery 
 
STS-86 
Atlantis 
 
 
STS-87 
Columbia 
 
Launch 
Date 
 
1/11/96 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2/22/96 
 
 
 
3/22/96 
 
 
 
5/19/96 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9/16/96 
 
 
 
11/19/96 
 
 
 
 
 
1/12/97 
 
 
 
3/13/97 
 
 
5/15/97 
 
 
 
8/7/97 
 
 
9/25/97 
 
 
 
11/19/97 
 
 
Rndz 
Type 
 
GR 
 
 
D-R 
   
 
 
 
D-R 
 
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
D-R 
 
 
 
D-R 
 
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
D-R 
 
 
D-R 
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
GR 
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
D-R 
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
D-R 
 
 
Mission 
Payload 
 
SFU 
 
 
OAST-Flyer 
 
 
 
 
TSS 1-R 
 
 
 
Mir-03 
Spacehab  
 
 
Spartan-207 
IAE-Inflatable 
Antenna Exp  
 
PAMS-STU 
 
 
 
Mir-04 
Spacehab 
 
 
ORFEUS- 
SPAS-02 
 
WSF-03 
 
 
Mir-05 
Spacehab D  
 
 
HST 
SM-02  
 
Mir-06 
Spacehab D 
SMOE  
 
CRISTA- 
SPAS-02  
 
Mir-07 
 
 
 
Spartan 201-04 
 
 
Lead 
Backup 
 
Harshman 
Hamm 
 
Moon 
Harshman 
 
 
 
Williams 
Davis 
 
 
Fletcher 
Miller 
 
 
Harshman 
Walker 
 
 
Harshman 
Snow 
 
 
Davis 
Miller 
 
 
Williams 
Snow 
 
Williams 
Hamm 
 
Ober 
Harshman 
 
 
Walker 
Thomas  
 
Harshman 
Snow 
 
 
Hamm 
Williams  
 
Snow 
Walker 
 
 
Harshman 
Spehar  
 
Console 
Position 
 
RGPO 
RPS 
 
RGPO 
RPS 
RGPO 
RPS  
 
RGPO 
TPS 
Tether 
 
RGPO 
RPS 
MADS  
 
RGPO 
RPS 
OJT 
 
RGPO 
RPS 
OJT  
 
RGPO 
RPS 
MADS  
 
RGPO 
RPS 
 
RGPO 
RPS 
 
RGPO 
RPS  
MADS  
 
RGPO 
RPS  
 
RGPO 
RPS 
MADS  
 
RGPO 
RPS  
 
RGPO 
RPS 
MADS  
 
RGPO 
RPS  
 
Orbit 1 
Shift 
 
Harshman 
Ober 
 
Harshman 
Ober 
Moon 
Harshman 
 
Williams 
Snow 
Staas 
 
Fletcher 
Harshman 
Dunham  
 
Ober 
Thomas 
Snow 
 
Ober 
Thomas 
Snow  
 
Davis 
Ober  
Erkenswick  
 
Williams 
Snow 
 
Williams 
Hamm 
 
Ober 
Snow 
Spehar  
 
Walker 
Thomas  
 
Harshman 
Williams 
Dunham  
 
Fletcher 
 
 
Snow 
Walker 
Erkenswick  
 
Harshman 
Spehar  
 
Orbit 2 
Shift 
 
Moon 
Davis 
 
Moon 
Davis 
Davis 
 
 
Davis 
Hamm 
Le 
 
Miller 
 
Erkenswick 
 
Harshman 
Walker 
 
 
Harshman 
Walker 
 
 
Miller 
 
Spehar 
 
Harshman 
Hamm 
 
Harshman 
Snow 
 
Harshman 
 
Erkenswick  
 
Ober 
Hamm 
 
Walker 
 
Erkenswick  
 
Williams 
Hamm 
 
Harshman 
 
Spehar 
 
Snow 
Hamm 
 
Orbit 3 
Shift 
 
Fletcher 
 
 
Fletcher 
 
Fletcher 
 
 
Ober 
Moon 
Hamilton 
 
Moon 
Ober 
 
 
Miller 
Williams 
 
 
Miller 
Williams 
 
 
Fletcher 
Walker  
 
 
Walker 
Gavin 
 
Walker 
Gavin 
 
Fletcher 
Hamm 
 
 
Williams 
Snow  
 
Snow 
Fletcher 
 
 
Thomas 
 
 
Williams 
Thomas 
Dunham 
 
Thomas 
Walker  
 
Orbit 4 
Shift 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thomas 
Ober 
 
Thomas 
Ober  
 
 
 
 
 
Fletcher 
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Mission 
 
 
STS-89 
Endeavour 
 
 
STS-91 
Discovery 
 
STS-95 
Discovery 
 
STS-88 
Endeavour 
 
 
STS-96 
Discovery 
 
STS-103 
Discovery 
 
STS-101 
Atlantis 
 
STS-106 
Atlantis 
 
STS-92 
Discovery 
 
 
STS-97 
Endeavour 
 
STS-98 
Atlantis 
 
STS-102 
Discovery 
 
 
STS-100 
Endeavour 
 
 
 
STS-104 
Atlantis 
 
STS-105 
Discovery 
 
 
 
Launch 
Date 
 
1/22/98 
 
 
 
6/2/98 
 
 
10/29/98 
 
 
12/4/98 
 
 
 
5/27/99 
 
 
12/19/99 
 
 
5/19/00 
 
 
9/8/00 
 
 
10/11/00 
 
 
 
11/30/00 
 
 
2/7/01 
 
 
3/8/01 
 
 
 
4/19/01 
 
 
 
 
7/12/01 
 
 
8/10/01 
 
 
 
 
Rndz 
Type 
 
GR 
 
 
 
GR 
 
 
D-R 
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
GR 
 
 
GR 
 
 
GR 
 
 
GR 
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
GR 
 
 
GR 
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
 
GR 
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
 
Mission 
Payload 
 
Mir-08 
 
 
 
Mir-09 
Spacehab  
 
Spartan 201-05 
 
 
ISS-2A 
Node 1 
PMA-1&2  
 
ISS-2A 1 
Starshine  
 
HST 
SM-03A 
 
ISS-2A 2A 
 
 
ISS-2A 2B 
 
 
ISS-3A 
Z1 Truss 
PMA-3  
 
ISS-4A 
P6 Truss  
 
ISS-5A 
US Lab  
 
ISS-5A 1 
MPLM- 
Leonardo 
 
ISS-6A 
SSRMS 
MPLM- 
Raffaello  
 
ISS-7A 
Airlock 
 
ISS-7A 1 
EAS  
MPLM- 
Leonardo 
 
Lead 
Backup 
 
Walker 
Hamm 
 
 
Dunham 
Snow 
 
Harshman 
Walker  
 
Williams 
Yencharis  
 
 
Snow 
Rickerl  
 
Walker 
O'Rourke  
 
Yencharis 
Rickerl  
 
Harshman 
O‟Dosey  
 
Spehar 
Harshman  
 
 
Walker 
O'Rourke  
 
Yencharis 
O‟Dosey  
 
Rickerl 
Harshman  
 
 
O'Rourke 
Yencharis  
 
 
 
Harshman 
Bigonesse  
 
Rickerl 
Walker  
 
 
Console 
Position 
 
RGPO 
RPS 
MADS  
 
RGPO 
RPS  
 
RGPO 
RPS  
 
RGPO 
RPS  
 
 
RGPO 
RPS  
 
RGPO 
RPS  
 
RGPO 
RPS  
 
RGPO 
RPS  
 
RGPO 
RPS  
 
 
RGPO 
RPS  
 
RGPO 
RPS  
 
RGPO 
RPS  
 
 
RGPO 
RPS  
 
 
 
RGPO 
RPS  
 
RGPO 
RPS  
Orbit 1 
Shift 
 
Walker 
Dunham 
Erkenswick  
 
Dunham 
Fletcher  
 
Harshman 
Yencharis  
 
Williams 
Yencharis  
 
 
Snow 
Rickerl  
 
Walker 
O'Rourke  
 
Yencharis 
Fletcher  
 
Harshman 
O‟Dosey  
 
Spehar 
Harshman  
 
 
Walker 
O'Rourke  
 
Yencharis 
O‟Dosey  
 
Rickerl 
Harshman  
 
 
O'Rourke 
Walker  
 
 
 
Harshman 
Bigonesse  
 
Rickerl 
Walker  
Orbit 2 
Shift 
 
Harshman 
Thomas 
Spehar  
 
Harshman 
Yencharis 
 
Thomas 
 
 
Walker 
Snow 
 
 
Fletcher 
Walker 
 
Harshman 
Rickerl 
 
Dunham 
Rickerl 
 
Fletcher 
O'Rourke 
 
Dunham 
O‟Dosey 
 
 
Fletcher 
O‟Dosey 
 
O'Rourke 
Dunham 
 
Fletcher 
 
 
 
Yencharis 
 
 
 
 
O'Rourke 
 
 
Yencharis 
 
 
 
 
Orbit 3 
Shift 
 
Fletcher 
Hamm 
 
 
Snow 
Thomas  
 
Walker 
Spehar  
 
Dunham 
Fletcher  
 
 
Yencharis 
Harshman  
 
Yencharis 
Spehar 
 
Spehar 
Walker  
 
Walker 
Yencharis  
 
Yencharis 
Rickerl  
 
 
Rickerl 
Spehar  
 
Walker 
Bigonesse  
 
Dunham 
Spehar  
 
 
Rickerl 
Bigonesse  
 
 
 
O‟Dosey 
Walker  
 
Harshman 
O‟Dosey  
 
 
 
Orbit 4 
Shift 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Harshman 
Spehar  
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Mission 
 
 
STS-108 
Endeavour 
 
 
 
STS-109 
Columbia 
 
STS-110 
Atlantis 
 
STS-111 
Endeavour 
 
 
STS-112 
Atlantis 
 
STS-113 
Endeavour 
 
STS-114 
Discovery 
 
 
STS-121 
Discovery 
 
 
STS-115 
Atlantis 
 
STS-116 
Discovery 
 
 
STS-117 
Atlantis 
 
STS-118 
Endeavour 
 
 
STS-120 
Discovery 
 
 
STS-122 
Atlantis 
 
STS-123 
Endeavour 
 
 
Launch 
Date 
 
12/5/01 
 
 
 
 
3/1/02 
 
 
4/8/02 
 
 
6/5/02 
 
 
 
10/7/02 
 
 
11/23/02 
 
 
7/26/05 
 
 
 
7/4/06 
 
 
 
9/9/06 
 
 
12/9/06 
 
 
 
6/22/07 
 
 
8/8/07 
 
 
 
10/23/07 
 
 
 
2/7/08 
 
 
3/11/08 
 
 
 
Rndz 
Type 
 
GR 
 
 
 
 
GR 
 
 
GR 
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
GR 
 
 
GR 
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
GR 
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
GR 
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
GR 
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
Mission 
Payload 
 
ISS-UF1 
MPLM- 
Raffaello 
Starshine 2  
 
HST 
SM-03B  
 
ISS-8A 
S0 Truss  
 
ISS-UF2 
MPLM- 
Leonardo 
 
ISS-9A 
S1 Truss  
 
ISS-11A 
P1 Truss  
 
ISS-LF1 
MPLM- 
Raffaello 
 
ISS-ULF1 1 
MPLM- 
Leonardo 
 
ISS-12A 
P3/P4 Truss 
 
ISS-12A 1 
P5 Truss 
Spacehab  
 
ISS-13A 
S3/S4 Truss 
 
ISS-13A 1 
S5 Truss 
Spacehab  
 
ISS-10A 
Node 2 
P6 Relocate  
 
ISS-1E 
Columbus Lab 
 
ISS-1J/A 
JEM-PS 
SPDM (Dexter) 
 
Lead 
Backup 
 
O‟Dosey 
Yencharis  
 
 
 
Walker 
O'Rourke  
 
Bigonesse 
Harshman  
 
Yencharis 
Rickerl  
 
 
O'Rourke 
Spehar  
 
Walker 
Bigonesse  
 
O‟Dosey 
O'Rourke  
 
 
Machula 
Bigonesse  
 
 
Harshman 
Yencharis  
 
Rickerl 
O‟Dosey  
 
 
Bigonesse 
Machula  
 
O'Rourke 
Harshman  
 
 
Yencharis 
J  Ruiz 
 
 
Machula 
O‟Dosey  
 
Rickerl 
Bigonesse 
 
 
 
Console 
Position 
 
RGPO 
RPS  
 
 
 
RGPO 
RPS  
 
RGPO 
RPS  
 
RGPO 
RPS  
 
 
RGPO 
RPS  
 
RGPO 
RPS  
 
RGPO 
RPS  
 
 
RGPO 
RPS  
 
 
RGPO 
RPS  
 
RGPO 
RPS  
 
 
RGPO 
RPS  
 
RGPO 
RPS  
 
 
RGPO 
RPS  
 
 
RGPO 
RPS  
 
RGPO 
RPS  
 
 
Orbit 1 
Shift 
 
O’Dosey 
Yencharis  
 
 
 
Walker 
O‟Dosey  
 
Bigonesse 
Harshman  
 
Yencharis 
Spehar  
 
 
O'Rourke 
Spehar  
 
Walker 
Machula  
 
O’Dosey 
O'Rourke  
 
 
Machula 
Bigonesse  
 
 
Harshman 
Yencharis  
 
Rickerl 
O‟Dosey  
 
 
Bigonesse 
Machula  
 
O'Rourke 
Harshman  
 
 
Yencharis 
J  Ruiz 
 
 
Machula 
O‟Dosey  
 
Rickerl 
Bigonesse  
 
 
Orbit 2 
Shift 
 
Fletcher 
 
 
 
 
O'Rourke 
Fletcher 
 
Dunham 
 
 
O‟Dosey 
 
 
 
Dunham 
Yencharis 
 
Fletcher 
O‟Dosey 
 
Machula 
Yencharis 
 
 
Spehar 
Harshman 
 
 
O'Rourke 
Walker 
 
Yencharis 
Bigonesse  
 
 
Harshman 
Spehar 
 
O‟Dosey 
Machula 
 
 
Bigonesse 
Rickerl 
 
 
Harshman 
O'Rourke 
 
O'Rourke 
Yencharis 
 
 
Orbit 3 
Shift 
 
Bigonesse 
Dunham  
 
 
 
Yencharis 
Rickerl  
 
O‟Dosey 
Spehar  
 
Rickerl 
Machula  
 
 
Walker 
Rickerl  
 
Bigonesse 
Harshman  
 
Rickerl 
Bigonesse  
 
 
Rickerl 
O‟Dosey  
 
 
O‟Dosey 
Rickerl  
 
Machula 
O'Rourke  
 
 
Walker 
Yencharis  
 
Rickerl 
Spehar  
 
 
O‟Dosey 
Walker  
 
 
Bigonesse 
J  Ruiz 
 
O‟Dosey 
Walker  
 
 
Orbit 4 
Shift 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Walker 
 
 
 
Yencharis 
O'Rourke  
 
 
Bigonesse 
Machula  
 
Harshman 
Spehar  
 
 
Rickerl 
O‟Dosey  
 
Bigonesse 
Yencharis  
 
 
O'Rourke 
Harshman  
 
 
Yencharis 
Walker  
 
Machula 
Spehar  
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Mission 
 
 
STS-124 
Discovery 
 
 
STS-126 
Endeavour 
 
 
STS-119 
Discovery 
 
STS-125 
Atlantis 
 
STS-400 
Endeavour 
 
 
 
 
STS-127 
Endeavour 
 
 
STS-128 
Discovery 
 
 
 
STS-129 
Atlantis 
 
STS-130 
Endeavour 
 
 
STS-131 
Discovery 
 
STS-132 
Atlantis 
 
STS-133 
Discovery 
 
STS-134 
Endeavour 
 
 
 
STS-135 
Atlantis 
Launch 
Date 
 
5/31/08 
 
 
 
11/14/08 
 
 
 
3/15/09 
 
 
5/11/09 
 
 
N/A 
 
 
 
 
 
7/15/09 
 
 
 
8/28/09 
 
 
 
 
11/16/09 
 
 
2/8/10 
 
 
 
4/5/10 
 
 
5/14/10 
 
 
2/14/11 
 
 
5/16/11 
 
 
 
 
7/08/11 
Type of  
Rndz 
 
GR 
 
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
GR 
 
 
GR 
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
 
GR 
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
GR 
 
 
GR 
 
 
GR 
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
 
GR 
Mission 
Payload 
 
ISS-1J 
Kibo Module 
J-RMS  
 
ISS-ULF2 
MPLM- 
Leonardo 
 
ISS-15A 
S6 Truss 
 
HST 
SM-04 
 
Atlantis 
 
 
 
 
 
ISS-2J/A 
JEM-ES 
ELM-ES  
 
ISS-17A 
MPLM- 
Leonardo 
TriDAR  
 
ISS-ULF3 
ELC 1&2 
 
ISS-20A 
Cupola/ 
Node 3 
 
ISS-19A 
MPLM 
 
ULF4 
MRM1 
 
ULF5 
PLM 
 
ULF6 
AMS  
STORRM 
DTO 
 
ULF7 
MPLM 
Lead 
Backup 
 
Harshman 
Graybeal  
 
 
Bigonesse 
Yencharis  
 
 
Rickerl 
Graybeal  
 
O‟Dosey 
O'Rourke  
 
400 Team 
 
 
125 Team 
 
 
O'Rourke 
Harshman  
 
 
Yencharis 
O‟Dosey  
 
 
 
S  Ruiz 
Bigonesse 
 
Bigonesse 
Rickerl 
 
 
O'Dosey 
S  Ruiz 
 
Rickerl 
O'Rourke 
 
S  Ruiz 
O„Rourke 
 
Harshman 
O'Dosey 
 
 
 
O'Dosey 
Rickerl 
Console 
Position 
 
RGPO 
RPS  
 
 
RGPO 
RPS  
 
 
RGPO 
RPS  
 
RGPO 
RPS  
 
RGPO 
RPS 
 
RGPO 
RPS 
 
RGPO 
RPS  
 
 
RGPO 
RPS  
 
 
 
RGPO 
RPS  
 
RGPO 
RPS 
 
 
RGPO 
RPS 
 
RGPO 
RPS 
 
RGPO 
RPS 
 
RGPO 
RPS 
 
 
 
RGPO 
RPS 
 
Orbit 1 
Shift 
 
Harshman 
Graybeal  
 
 
Bigonesse 
Yencharis  
 
 
Rickerl 
Graybeal  
 
O’Dosey 
O'Rourke  
 
O’Dosey 
O'Rourke 
 
Bigonesse 
Rickerl 
 
O'Rourke 
Harshman  
 
 
Yencharis 
O‟Dosey  
 
 
 
S  Ruiz 
Bigonesse  
 
Bigonesse 
Rickerl 
 
 
O'Dosey 
S  Ruiz 
 
Rickerl 
O'Rourke 
 
S  Ruiz 
Rickerl 
 
Harshman 
O'Dosey 
 
 
 
O'Dosey 
Rickerl 
 
Orbit 2 
Shift 
 
Machula 
J  Ruiz 
 
 
Harshman 
J  Ruiz 
 
 
O‟Dosey 
Yencharis 
 
Walker 
Graybeal  
 
Harshman 
Graybeal 
 
Walker 
Spehar 
 
Bigonesse 
Yencharis  
 
 
S  Ruiz 
Bigonesse  
 
 
 
Harshman 
Rickerl  
 
Yencharis 
Harshman 
 
 
Rickerl 
O'Rourke 
 
O'Dosey 
Harshman 
 
O'Dosey 
O'Rourke 
 
O'Rourke 
Bigonesse 
 
 
 
Harshman 
Ruiz 
Orbit 3 
Shift 
 
Yencharis 
Spehar  
 
 
Machula 
Graybeal  
 
 
O'Rourke 
Spehar  
 
Bigonesse 
Rickerl  
 
Yencharis 
Machula 
 
N/A 
N/A 
 
Rickerl 
S  Ruiz  
 
 
Machula 
O'Rourke  
 
 
 
O‟Dosey 
O'Rourke  
 
O'Rourke 
 
 
 
Harshman 
 
 
Bigonesse 
 
 
Bigonesse 
 
 
S  Ruiz 
 
 
 
 
O‟Rourke 
Bigonesse 
Orbit 4 
Shift 
 
Rickerl 
Bigonesse  
 
 
O'Rourke 
O‟Dosey  
 
 
Bigonesse 
 
 
Harshman 
Yencharis 
 
N/A 
N/A 
 
N/A 
N/A 
 
Machula 
 
 
 
Harshman 
 
 
 
 
Yencharis 
 
 
S  Ruiz 
 
 
 
Bigonesse 
 
 
S  Ruiz 
 
 
Harshman 
 
 
Rickerl 
 
 
 
 
Bigonesse 
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APPENDIX B – RENDEZVOUS AND ORBIT FLIGHT DYNAMICS OFFICERS 
 
 This appendix lists the flight assignments for Rendezvous and Orbit Flight Dynamics Officers (FDO).  The source 
of the flight assignments was a webpage maintained by the NASA/JSC Flight Dynamics Division Orbit Flight 
Dynamics Office (Code DM32).  Names of personnel in the following flight assignment tables are: 
  
 
 
 
  
 
Marc Abadie 
Dan Adamo 
Mark Anderson 
Roger Balettie 
Bill Britz 
Phil Burley 
Bill Clarke 
Ron Cohen 
Chris Edelen 
Ed Gonzalez 
Mark Haynes 
Rebecca Cutri-Kohart 
Bill Jacobs 
Brian Jones 
Darrin Leleux 
Bryan Lowman 
David Mayhew 
Jen Mendeck 
Roger Rojas 
Roger Simpson 
Jason Smith 
Bob Stein 
Steve Stich 
Dick Theis 
Bill Tracy 
 
JSC – 63400 
REVISION 3 
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Mission 
 
 
STS-7 
Challenger 
 
STS-41B 
Challenger 
 
STS-41C 
Challenger 
 
 
STS-51A 
Discovery 
 
STS-51D 
Discovery 
 
STS-51G 
Discovery 
 
STS-51F 
Challenger 
 
STS-51I 
Discovery 
 
STS-61B 
Atlantis 
 
STS-51L 
Challenger 
 
STS-32 
Columbia 
 
 
STS-31 
Discovery 
 
STS-37 
Atlantis 
 
STS-39 
Discovery 
 
 
STS-48 
Discovery 
 
STS-49 
Endeavour 
Launch 
Date 
 
6/18/83 
 
 
2/3/84 
 
 
4/6/84 
 
 
 
11/8/84 
 
 
4/12/85 
 
 
6/17/85 
 
 
7/29/85 
 
 
8/27/85 
 
 
11/26/85 
 
 
1/28/86 
 
 
1/9/90 
 
 
 
4/24/90 
 
 
4/5/91 
 
 
4/28/91 
 
 
 
9/12/91 
 
 
5/7/92 
Rndz 
Type 
 
D-R 
 
 
D 
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
GR 
GR  
 
D-R 
 
 
D-R 
 
 
D-R 
 
 
GR 
 
 
D 
 
 
D 
D-R 
 
GR 
D  
 
 
D 
 
 
D 
 
 
D-R 
 
 
 
D 
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
Mission 
Payload 
 
SPAS-01 
 
 
GAS-IRT 
 
 
Solar Max 
 
 
 
PALAPA-B2 
WESTAR-VI 
 
LEASAT-3 
 
 
Spartan-1 
 
 
PDP 
 
 
LEASAT-3 
 
 
OEX 
DAP Target  
 
TDRS-2 
Spartan Halley  
 
LDEF 
SYNCOM IV  
 
 
HST 
 
 
GRO 
 
 
IBSS-SPAS-II 
 
 
 
UARS 
 
 
Intelsat VI 
 
 
 
Console 
Position 
 
FDO 
TRAJ 
 
FDO 
TRAJ 
 
FDO 
TRAJ 
 
 
FDO 
TRAJ 
 
FDO 
TRAJ 
 
FDO 
TRAJ 
 
FDO 
TRAJ 
 
FDO 
TRAJ 
 
FDO 
TRAJ 
 
FDO 
TRAJ 
 
FDO 
TRAJ 
 
 
FDO 
TRAJ 
 
FDO 
TRAJ 
 
FDO 
TRAJ 
 
 
FDO 
TRAJ 
 
FDO 
TRAJ 
 
Orbit 1 
Shift 
 
I'Anson 
Cohen 
 
 
 
 
Epp 
Combs 
 
 
B.Jones 
Combs 
 
Burley 
W.Jones 
 
Epp 
Stewart 
 
Lancaster 
Stewart 
 
B.Jones 
Haynes 
 
W.Jones 
Haynes 
 
N/A 
N/A 
 
Haynes 
Fletcher 
 
 
Burley 
Tracy 
 
Theis 
Balettie 
 
Haynes 
Britz 
 
 
Stich 
Adamo 
 
Haynes 
Stich 
Orbit 2 
Shift 
 
 
 
 
B. Jones 
 
 
Cohen 
Perry 
 
 
Epp 
Soileau 
 
González 
Stewart 
 
B.Jones 
Lancaster 
 
Rask 
Brown 
 
W.Jones 
Hilty 
 
Stewart 
Sims 
 
N/A 
N/A 
 
Burley 
Brown 
 
 
Fletcher 
Langan 
 
Burley 
Stich 
 
Burley 
Shore 
 
 
Theis 
Shore 
 
Burley 
Britz 
Orbit 3 
Shift 
 
Oliver 
González 
 
González 
 
 
B.Jones 
W.Jones 
 
 
Cohen 
Rask 
 
Rask 
Lancaster 
 
W.Jones 
Hilty 
 
González 
Haynes 
 
Lancaster 
Brown 
 
Rask 
Fletcher 
 
N/A 
N/A 
 
Rask 
Kessler 
 
 
Theis 
Adamo 
 
Kessler 
Haynes 
 
Brown 
Theis  
(Stich) 
 
Burley 
Riggio 
 
Theis 
Brown  
(Riggio) 
Orbit 4 
Shift 
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Mission 
 
 
STS-46 
Atlantis 
 
STS-52 
Columbia 
 
STS-56 
Discovery 
 
STS-57 
Endeavour 
 
STS-51 
Discovery 
 
STS-61 
Endeavour 
 
STS-60 
Discovery 
 
STS-64 
Discovery 
 
STS-66 
Atlantis 
 
STS-63 
Discovery 
 
 
STS-71 
Atlantis 
 
STS-69 
Endeavour 
 
STS-74 
Atlantis 
 
 
 
STS-72 
Endeavour 
 
STS-75 
Endeavour 
 
STS-76 
Atlantis 
 
STS-77 
Endeavour 
 
Launch 
Date 
 
7/31/92 
 
 
10/22/92 
 
 
4/8/93 
 
 
6/21/93 
 
 
9/12/93 
 
 
12/2/93 
 
 
2/3/94 
 
 
9/9/94 
 
 
11/3/94 
 
 
2/3/95 
 
 
 
6/27/95 
 
 
9/7/95 
 
 
11/12/95 
 
 
 
 
1/11/96 
 
 
2/22/96 
 
 
3/22/96 
 
 
5/19/96 
Rndz 
Type 
 
D 
D-R  
 
D 
D  
 
D-R 
 
 
GR 
 
 
D-R 
D  
 
GR 
 
 
D-R 
 
 
D-R 
 
 
D-R 
 
 
GR 
D-R 
 
 
GR 
 
 
D-R 
D-R 
 
GR 
 
 
 
 
GR 
D-R 
   
D-R 
 
 
GR 
 
 
D-R 
 
 
D-R 
Console 
Position 
 
FDO 
TRAJ 
 
FDO 
TRAJ 
 
FDO 
TRAJ 
 
FDO 
TRAJ 
 
FDO 
TRAJ 
 
FDO 
TRAJ 
 
FDO 
TRAJ 
 
FDO 
TRAJ 
 
FDO 
TRAJ 
 
FDO 
TRAJ 
 
 
FDO 
TRAJ 
 
FDO 
TRAJ 
 
FDO 
TRAJ 
 
 
 
FDO 
TRAJ 
 
FDO 
TRAJ 
 
FDO 
TRAJ 
 
FDO 
TRAJ 
 
Orbit 1 
Shift 
 
Adamo 
Shore 
 
Burley 
Simpson 
 
Stich 
Adamo 
 
Theis 
Adamo 
 
Burley 
Shore 
 
Stich 
Britz 
 
Adamo 
Tracy 
 
Burley 
Balettie 
 
Britz 
Adamo 
 
Britz 
Stich 
 
 
Burley 
Balettie 
 
Tracy 
Balettie 
 
Stich 
Stein 
 
 
 
Theis 
McCraw 
 
McCraw 
Theis 
 
Balettie 
Simpson 
 
Burley 
Simpson 
 
Orbit 2 
Shift 
 
Tracy 
Simpson 
 
Shore 
Brown 
 
Theis 
Riggio 
 
Britz 
Stich 
 
Balettie 
Tracy 
 
Theis 
Shore 
 
Stich 
Theis 
 
Tracy 
Theis 
 
Theis 
McCraw 
 
Adamo 
Balettie 
 
 
Stich 
Hammer 
 
Theis 
Edelen 
 
Balettie 
Edelen 
 
 
 
Simpson 
Britz 
 
Tracy 
Hammer 
 
Stich 
Edelen 
 
Tracy 
Britz 
 
Orbit 3 
Shift 
 
Brown 
Britz 
 
Tracy 
Stich 
 
Tracy 
Balettie 
 
Burley 
Shore 
 
Adamo 
Theis 
 
Tracy 
Adamo 
 
Britz 
Balettie 
 
Stich 
Stein 
 
Balettie 
Tracy 
 
Burley 
Theis 
 
 
Theis 
Shore 
 
Adamo 
McCraw 
 
Adamo 
Hammer 
 
 
 
Adamo 
Edelen 
 
Stein 
Stich 
 
Adamo 
McCraw 
 
Theis 
Hammer 
 
Orbit 4 
Shift 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Burley 
Simpson 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Stein 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Simpson 
Edelen 
 
 
Mission 
Payload 
 
TSS 1 
EURECA  
 
Lageos-II 
CANEX-2 
 
Spartan 201-01 
 
 
EURECA 
Spacehab 
 
ORFEUS-SPAS 
ACTS/TOS  
 
HST 
SM-01 
 
WSF-01 
Spacehab 
 
Spartan 201-02 
 
 
CRISTA-SPAS 
 
 
Mir-00 
Spacehab 
Spartan-204 
 
Mir-01 
 
 
WSF-02 
Spartan 201-03 
 
Mir-02 
Docking  
Module 
ODS  
 
SFU 
OAST-Flyer 
 
TSS 1-R 
 
 
Mir-03 
Spacehab  
 
Spartan-207 
IAE-Inflatable 
Antenna Exp  
PAMS-STU 
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Mission 
 
 
STS-79 
Atlantis 
 
STS-80 
Columbia 
 
 
STS-81 
Atlantis 
 
STS-82 
Discovery 
 
STS-84 
Atlantis 
 
 
STS-85 
Discovery 
 
STS-86 
Atlantis 
 
STS-87 
Columbia 
 
STS-89 
Endeavour 
 
STS-91 
Discovery 
 
STS-95 
Discovery 
 
STS-88 
Endeavour 
 
 
STS-96 
Discovery 
 
STS-103 
Discovery 
 
STS-101 
Atlantis 
 
STS-106 
Atlantis 
 
STS-92 
Discovery 
 
 
STS-97 
Endeavour 
Launch 
Date 
 
9/16/96 
 
 
11/19/96 
 
 
 
1/12/97 
 
 
3/13/97 
 
 
5/15/97 
 
 
 
8/7/97 
 
 
9/25/97 
 
 
11/19/97 
 
 
1/22/98 
 
 
6/2/98 
 
 
10/29/98 
 
 
12/4/98 
 
 
 
5/27/99 
 
 
12/19/99 
 
 
5/19/00 
 
 
9/8/00 
 
 
10/11/00 
 
 
 
11/30/00 
Rndz 
Type 
 
GR 
 
 
D-R 
 
D-R 
 
GR 
 
 
GR 
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
D-R 
 
 
GR 
 
 
D-R 
 
 
GR 
 
 
GR 
 
 
D-R 
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
GR 
 
 
GR 
 
 
GR 
 
 
GR 
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
GR 
Mission 
Payload 
 
Mir-04 
Spacehab 
 
ORFEUS- 
SPAS-02 
WSF-03 
 
Mir-05 
Spacehab D  
 
HST 
SM-02  
 
Mir-06 
Spacehab D 
SMOE  
 
CRISTA- 
SPAS-02  
 
Mir-07 
 
 
Spartan 201-04 
 
 
Mir-08 
 
 
Mir-09 
Spacehab  
 
Spartan 201-05 
 
 
ISS-2A 
Node 1 
PMA-1&2  
 
ISS-2A 1 
Starshine  
 
HST 
SM-03A 
 
ISS-2A 2A 
 
 
ISS-2A 2B 
 
 
ISS-3A 
Z1 Truss 
PMA-3  
 
ISS-4A 
P6 Truss  
 
 
Console 
Position 
 
FDO 
TRAJ 
 
FDO 
TRAJ 
 
 
FDO 
TRAJ 
 
FDO 
TRAJ 
 
FDO 
TRAJ 
 
 
FDO 
TRAJ 
 
FDO 
TRAJ 
 
FDO 
TRAJ 
 
FDO 
TRAJ 
 
FDO 
TRAJ 
 
FDO 
TRAJ 
 
FDO 
TRAJ 
 
 
FDO 
TRAJ 
 
FDO 
TRAJ 
 
FDO 
TRAJ 
 
FDO 
TRAJ 
 
FDO 
TRAJ 
 
 
FDO 
TRAJ 
 
 
Orbit 1 
Shift 
 
Stich 
Stein 
 
Adamo 
McCraw 
 
 
Simpson 
Adamo 
 
Tracy 
Hammer 
 
Adamo 
Balettie 
 
 
Edelen 
Tracy 
 
Balettie 
McCraw 
 
Schaf 
Adamo 
 
Tracy 
Clarke 
 
Stein 
Tracy 
 
Edelen 
Tracy 
 
Adamo 
Tran 
 
 
Theis 
Barrett 
 
Tracy 
Clarke 
 
Adamo 
Clarke 
 
Burley 
Barrett 
 
Tracy 
McDonald 
 
 
Theis 
Barrett 
Orbit 2 
Shift 
 
Balettie 
Edelen 
 
Britz 
Edelen 
 
 
Balettie 
Hammer 
 
McCraw 
Stich 
 
Simpson 
Schaf 
 
 
Theis 
Schaf 
 
Tracy 
Adamo 
 
Burley 
Clarke 
 
Stein 
Jones 
 
Edelen 
Spencer 
 
Clarke 
Burley 
 
Theis 
Barrett 
 
 
Adamo 
Clarke 
 
Stein 
Spencer 
 
Theis 
Schaf 
 
Tran 
Tracy 
 
Adamo 
Schaf 
 
 
Burley 
McCraw 
 
Orbit 3 
Shift 
 
Adamo 
Hammer 
 
Theis 
Schaf 
 
 
Edelen 
Theis 
 
Stein 
Britz 
 
McCraw 
Tracy 
 
 
Britz 
Clarke 
 
Stich 
Jones 
 
Theis 
Tran 
 
Adamo 
Tran 
 
Jones 
Theis 
 
Theis 
Tran 
 
Tracy 
Spencer 
 
 
Tracy 
Tran 
 
Adamo 
Schaf 
 
Tracy 
Tran 
 
Edelen 
McDonald 
 
Stein 
Edelen 
 
 
Spencer 
Stein 
 
Orbit 4 
Shift 
 
 
 
 
Burley 
Stein 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Gonzalez 
Rask 
 
Edelen 
McCraw 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Spencer 
Theis 
 
Barrett 
Clarke 
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Mission 
 
 
STS-98 
Atlantis 
 
STS-102 
Discovery 
 
 
STS-100 
Endeavour 
 
 
 
STS-104 
Atlantis 
 
STS-105 
Discovery 
 
 
 
STS-108 
Endeavour 
 
 
 
STS-109 
Columbia 
 
STS-110 
Atlantis 
 
STS-111 
Endeavour 
 
 
STS-112 
Atlantis 
 
STS-113 
Endeavour 
 
STS-114 
Discovery 
 
 
STS-121 
Discovery 
 
 
STS-115 
Atlantis 
 
STS-116 
Discovery 
 
 
STS-117 
Atlantis 
Launch 
Date 
 
2/7/01 
 
 
3/8/01 
 
 
 
4/19/01 
 
 
 
 
7/12/01 
 
 
8/10/01 
 
 
 
 
12/5/01 
 
 
 
 
3/1/02 
 
 
4/8/02 
 
 
6/5/02 
 
 
 
10/7/02 
 
 
11/23/02 
 
 
7/26/05 
 
 
 
7/4/06 
 
 
 
9/9/06 
 
 
12/9/06 
 
 
 
6/22/07 
Rndz 
Type 
 
GR 
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
 
GR 
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
 
GR 
 
 
GR 
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
GR 
 
 
GR 
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
GR 
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
GR 
Mission 
Payload 
 
ISS-5A 
US Lab  
 
ISS-5A 1 
MPLM- 
Leonardo 
 
ISS-6A 
SSRMS 
MPLM- 
Raffaello  
 
ISS-7A 
Airlock 
 
ISS-7A 1 
EAS  
MPLM- 
Leonardo 
 
ISS-UF1 
MPLM- 
Raffaello 
Starshine 2  
 
HST 
SM-03B  
 
ISS-8A 
S0 Truss  
 
ISS-UF2 
MPLM- 
Leonardo 
 
ISS-9A 
S1 Truss  
 
ISS-11A 
P1 Truss  
 
ISS-LF1 
MPLM- 
Raffaello 
 
ISS-ULF1 1 
MPLM- 
Leonardo 
 
ISS-12A 
P3/P4 Truss 
 
ISS-12A 1 
P5 Truss 
Spacehab  
 
ISS-13A 
S3/S4 Truss 
 
Console 
Position 
 
FDO 
TRAJ 
 
FDO 
TRAJ 
 
 
FDO 
TRAJ 
 
 
 
FDO 
TRAJ 
 
FDO 
TRAJ 
 
 
 
FDO 
TRAJ 
 
 
 
FDO 
TRAJ 
 
FDO 
TRAJ 
 
FDO 
TRAJ 
 
 
FDO 
TRAJ 
 
FDO 
TRAJ 
 
FDO 
TRAJ 
 
 
FDO 
TRAJ 
 
 
FDO 
TRAJ 
 
FDO 
TRAJ 
 
 
FDO 
TRAJ 
 
Orbit 1 
Shift 
 
Edelen 
McDonald 
 
Burley 
Tran 
 
 
Tracy 
McDonald 
 
 
 
Stein-Tran 
Tran-Clarke 
 
Clarke 
Edelen 
 
 
 
Theis 
Rojas 
 
 
 
Tracy 
Stein 
 
Edelen 
Barrett 
 
Burley 
Rojas 
 
 
Stein 
Mayhew 
 
Theis 
Leleux 
 
Tracy 
Rojas 
 
 
Burley 
Mendeck 
 
 
Theis 
Barrett 
 
Stein 
Mayhew 
 
 
Rojas 
Jacobs 
 
Orbit 2 
Shift 
 
Adamo 
Clarke 
 
Barrett 
Adamo 
 
 
Spencer 
Adamo 
 
 
 
Burley-Tracy 
Rojas-McDonald 
 
Adamo 
Schaf 
 
 
 
Edelen 
Tran 
 
 
 
McDonald 
Theis 
 
Tran 
Adamo 
 
Tracy 
Mayhew 
 
 
Barrett 
Adamo 
 
Adamo 
McDonald 
 
Edelen 
Tran 
 
 
Stein 
Mayhew 
 
 
Rojas 
Jacobs 
 
Adamo 
Cutri-Kohart 
 
 
Burley 
Cutri-Kohart 
 
Orbit 3 
Shift 
 
Tran 
Stein 
 
Stein 
Rojas 
 
 
Clarke 
Edelen 
 
 
 
Theis 
Schaf 
 
McDonald 
Tracy 
 
 
 
Burley 
Barrett 
 
 
 
Adamo 
Rojas 
 
Theis 
Mayhew 
 
Stein 
Leleux 
 
 
Spencer 
Tracy 
 
Burley 
Rojas 
 
Adamo 
Mendeck 
 
 
Rojas 
Leleux 
 
 
Mayhew 
Gruber 
 
Mendeck 
Leleux 
 
 
Leleux 
Mayhew 
 
Orbit 4 
Shift 
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Mission 
 
 
STS-118 
Endeavour 
 
 
STS-120 
Discovery 
 
 
STS-122 
Atlantis 
 
STS-123 
Endeavour 
 
 
STS-124 
Discovery 
 
 
STS-126 
Endeavour 
 
 
STS-119 
Discovery 
 
STS-125 
Atlantis 
 
STS-400 
Endeavour 
 
STS-127 
Endeavour 
 
 
STS-128 
Discovery 
 
 
 
STS-129 
Atlantis 
 
STS-130 
Endeavour 
 
 
STS-131 
Discovery 
 
STS-132 
Atlantis 
 
Launch 
Date 
 
8/8/07 
 
 
 
10/23/07 
 
 
 
2/7/08 
 
 
3/11/08 
 
 
 
5/31/08 
 
 
 
11/14/08 
 
 
 
3/15/09 
 
 
5/11/09 
 
 
Not 
Flown 
 
7/15/09 
 
 
 
8/28/09 
 
 
 
 
11/16/09 
 
 
2/8/10 
 
 
 
4/5/10 
 
 
5/14/10 
 
Rndz 
Type 
 
GR 
 
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
GR 
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
GR 
 
 
GR 
 
 
GR 
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
 
GR 
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
GR 
 
 
GR 
Mission 
Payload 
 
ISS-13A 1 
S5 Truss 
Spacehab  
 
ISS-10A 
Node 2 
P6 Relocate  
 
ISS-1E 
Columbus Lab 
 
ISS-1J/A 
JEM-PS 
SPDM (Dexter) 
 
ISS-1J 
Kibo Module 
J-RMS  
 
ISS-ULF2 
MPLM- 
Leonardo 
 
ISS-15A 
S6 Truss 
 
HST 
SM-04 
 
Atlantis 
 
 
ISS-2J/A 
JEM-ES 
ELM-ES  
 
ISS-17A 
MPLM- 
Leonardo 
TriDAR  
 
ISS-ULF3 
ELC 1&2 
 
ISS-20A 
Cupola/ 
Node 3 
 
ISS-19A 
MPLM 
 
ULF4 
MRM1 
 
Console 
Position 
 
FDO 
TRAJ 
 
 
FDO 
TRAJ 
 
 
FDO 
TRAJ 
 
FDO 
TRAJ 
 
 
FDO 
TRAJ 
 
 
FDO 
TRAJ 
 
 
FDO 
TRAJ 
 
FDO 
TRAJ 
 
FDO 
TRAJ 
 
FDO 
TRAJ 
 
 
FDO 
TRAJ 
 
 
 
FDO 
TRAJ 
 
FDO 
TRAJ 
 
 
FDO 
TRAJ 
 
FDO 
TRAJ 
 
Orbit 1 
Shift 
 
Theis 
Leleux 
 
 
Tracy 
Cutri-Kohart 
 
 
Leleux 
Barrett 
 
Mendeck 
Mayhew 
 
 
Stein 
Cutri-Kohart 
 
 
Rojas 
Smith 
 
 
Mayhew 
Tracy 
 
Tracy 
Abadie 
 
 
 
 
Mendeck 
Abadie 
 
 
Stein 
Jacobs 
 
 
 
Rojas 
Anderson 
 
Tracy 
Mayhew 
 
 
Mayhew 
Smith 
 
Cutri-Kohart 
Anderson 
Orbit 2 
Shift 
 
Adamo 
Tracy 
 
 
Mayhew 
Adamo 
 
 
Rojas 
Adamo 
 
Rojas 
Abadie 
 
 
Mayhew 
Abadie 
 
 
Mendeck 
CutriKohart 
Abadie 
 
Jacobs 
Abadie 
 
Stein 
Smith 
 
 
 
 
Cutri-Kohart 
Smith 
 
 
Abadie 
Anderson 
 
 
 
CutriKohart 
Stein 
 
Smith 
Jacobs 
 
 
Jacobs 
Anderson 
 
Smith 
Lowman 
 
Orbit 3 
Shift 
 
Gruber 
Cutri-Kohart 
 
 
Mendeck 
Jacobs 
 
 
Stein 
Jacobs 
 
Tracy 
Cutri-Kohart 
 
 
Jacobs 
Smith 
 
 
Jacobs 
Abadie 
 
 
Stein 
Anderson 
 
Cutri-Kohart 
Burley 
 
 
 
 
Leleux 
Anderson 
 
 
Rojas 
Smith 
 
 
 
Smith 
Burley 
 
Abadie 
Rojas 
 
 
Stein 
Lowman 
 
Abadie 
Burley 
 
Orbit 4 
Shift 
 
 
 
 
 
Tran 
Abadie 
 
 
 
 
 
Tran 
Smith 
 
 
Burley 
Rojas 
 
 
Leleux 
Burley 
 
 
Cutri-Kohart 
Burley 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mayhew 
Jacobs 
 
 
Tracy 
Barrett 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Burley 
Leleux 
 
 
Mendeck 
Burley 
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Mission 
 
 
STS-133 
Discovery 
 
STS-134 
Endeavour 
 
 
 
STS-135 
Atlantis 
Launch 
Date 
 
2/24/11 
 
 
5/16/11 
 
 
 
 
7/08/11 
Rndz 
Type 
 
GR 
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
 
GR 
Mission 
Payload 
 
ULF5 
PLM 
 
ULF6 
AMS  
STORRM 
DTO 
 
ULF7 
MPLM 
LMC 
 
Orbit 1 
Shift 
 
Stein 
Lowman 
 
Rojas 
Mendeck 
 
 
 
Smith 
Cutri-Kohart 
Orbit 2 
Shift 
 
Mayhew 
Smith 
 
Anderson 
Abadie 
 
 
 
Anderson 
Mayhew 
 
Orbit 3 
Shift 
 
Anderson 
Burley 
 
Cutri-Kohart 
Tracy 
 
 
 
Lowman 
Abadie 
Orbit 4 
Shift 
 
 
 
 
Smith 
Leleux 
Console 
Position 
 
FDO 
TRAJ 
 
FDO 
TRAJ 
 
 
 
FDO 
TRAJ 
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APPENDIX C – RENDEZVOUS CREW TRAINERS 
 
 This appendix lists the flight assignments for rendezvous crew training personnel.  The crew trainers created this 
list at the request of the author in Feburary of 2010.  Names of personnel in the following flight assignment tables are: 
 
Rob Banfield 
Steve Clark 
Rick Davis 
Alan Fox 
Jorge Frank 
Steve Gauvain 
Tim Hagin 
Gail Hennington Barnett 
Bob Mahoney 
Lisa Martignetti 
Todd Miller 
Chuck Moede 
Val Murdock 
Jim Pendergast 
Dave Rose 
Dan Sedej 
Jeff Tuxhorn 
JSC – 63400 
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Trainer 
 
 
Dan Sedej 
Steve Clark 
 
Alan Fox  
Dan Sedej 
 
Dan Sedej 
Alan Fox 
 
Alan Fox 
Dan Sedej 
 
Todd Miller 
Dan Sedej 
 
Alan Fox 
 
 
 
Alan Fox 
Dan Sedej 
 
Dan Sedej 
 
 
Alan Fox    
 
  
 
 
 
Alan Fox 
  
 
Alan Fox  
 
 
Rob Banfield  
 
 
Chuck Moede  
 
 
Gail Hennington 
  
 
Rob Banfield  
 
 
Alan Fox 
 
 
Rob Banfield 
Bob Mahoney 
 
Chuck Moede 
Mission 
 
 
STS-7 
Challenger 
 
STS-41B 
Challenger 
 
STS-41C 
Challenger 
 
STS-41G 
Challenger 
 
STS-51A 
Discovery 
 
STS-51D 
Discovery 
 
 
STS-51G 
Discovery 
 
STS-51F 
Challenger 
 
STS-51I 
Discovery 
 
STS-61B 
Atlantis 
 
STS-51L 
Challenger 
 
STS-32 
Columbia 
 
STS-31 
Discovery 
 
STS-37 
Atlantis 
 
STS-39 
Discovery 
 
STS-48 
Discovery 
 
STS-49 
Endeavour 
 
STS-46 
Atlantis 
 
Launch 
Date 
 
6/18/83 
 
 
2/3/84 
 
 
4/6/84 
 
 
10/5/84 
 
 
11/8/84 
 
 
4/12/85 
 
 
 
6/17/85 
 
 
7/29/85 
 
 
8/27/85 
 
 
11/26/85 
 
 
1/28/86 
 
 
1/9/90 
 
 
4/24/90 
 
 
4/5/91 
 
 
4/28/91 
 
 
9/12/91 
 
 
5/7/92 
 
 
7/31/92 
Type of  
Rndz 
 
D-R 
 
 
D 
 
 
GR 
 
 
D 
 
 
GR 
GR  
 
D-R 
 
 
 
D-R 
 
 
D-R 
 
 
GR 
 
 
D 
 
 
D 
D-R 
 
GR 
D  
 
D 
 
 
D 
 
 
D-R 
 
 
D 
 
 
GR 
 
 
D 
 
 
D-R  
Mission 
Payload 
 
SPAS-01 
 
 
GAS-IRT 
 
 
Solar Max 
 
 
Earth Radiation  
Budget Satellite (ERBS) 
 
PALAPA-B2 
WESTAR-VI 
 
LEASAT-3 
(contigency rndz 
with Flyswatter) 
 
Spartan-1 
 
 
PDP 
 
 
LEASAT-3 
 
 
OEX 
DAP Target  
 
TDRS-2 
Spartan Halley  
 
LDEF 
SYNCOM IV  
 
HST 
 
 
GRO 
 
 
IBSS-SPAS-II 
 
 
UARS 
 
 
Intelsat VI 
 
 
TSS 1 
 
 
EURECA  
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Mission 
 
 
STS-52 
Columbia 
 
STS-56 
Discovery 
 
STS-57 
Endeavour 
 
STS-51 
Discovery 
 
STS-61 
Endeavour 
 
STS-60 
Discovery 
 
STS-64 
Discovery 
 
STS-66 
Atlantis 
 
STS-63 
Discovery 
 
 
STS-71 
Atlantis 
 
STS-69 
Endeavour 
 
STS-74 
Atlantis 
 
 
STS-72 
Endeavour 
 
STS-75 
Endeavour 
 
STS-76 
Atlantis 
 
STS-77 
Endeavour 
 
 
 
STS-79 
Atlantis 
 
STS-80 
Columbia 
 
Launch 
Date 
 
10/22/92 
 
 
4/8/93 
 
 
6/21/93 
 
 
9/12/93 
 
 
12/2/93 
 
 
2/3/94 
 
 
9/9/94 
 
 
11/3/94 
 
 
2/3/95 
 
 
 
6/27/95 
 
 
9/7/95 
 
 
11/12/95 
 
 
 
1/11/96 
 
 
2/22/96 
 
 
3/22/96 
 
 
5/19/96 
 
 
 
 
9/16/96 
 
 
11/19/96 
 
Type of  
Rndz 
 
D 
D  
 
D-R 
 
 
GR 
 
 
D-R 
D  
 
GR 
 
 
D-R 
 
 
D-R 
 
 
D-R 
 
 
GR 
D-R 
 
 
GR 
 
 
D-R 
D-R 
 
GR 
 
 
 
GR 
D-R 
   
D-R 
 
 
GR 
 
 
D-R 
D-R 
 
 
 
GR 
 
 
D-R 
 
D-R 
Mission 
Payload 
 
Lageos-II 
CANEX-2 
 
Spartan 201-01 
 
 
EURECA 
Spacehab 
 
ORFEUS-SPAS 
ACTS/TOS  
 
HST 
SM-01 
 
WSF-01 
Spacehab 
 
Spartan 201-02 
 
 
CRISTA-SPAS 
 
 
Mir-00 
Spacehab 
Spartan-204 
 
Mir-01 
 
 
WSF-02 
Spartan 201-03 
 
Mir-02 
Docking Module 
ODS  
 
SFU 
OAST-Flyer 
 
TSS 1-R 
 
 
Mir-03 
Spacehab  
 
Spartan-207 
IAE-Inflatable 
Antenna Exp  
PAMS-STU 
 
Mir-04 
Spacehab 
 
ORFEUS- 
SPAS-02 
WSF-03 
 
Trainer 
 
 
Alan Fox 
 
 
Rick Davis 
  
 
Gail Hennington 
 
 
Alan Fox 
  
 
Alan Fox 
 
 
Rick Davis 
 
 
Alan Fox 
 
 
Gail Hennington 
 
 
Bob Mahoney 
 
 
 
Alan Fox 
 
 
Jim Pendergast 
 
 
Gall Hennington 
 
 
 
Rick Davis 
 
 
Bob Mahoney 
Dave Rose 
 
Alan Fox 
 
 
Rick Davis 
 
 
 
 
Alan Fox 
 
 
Bob Mahoney 
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Mission 
 
 
STS-81 
Atlantis 
 
STS-82 
Discovery 
 
STS-84 
Atlantis 
 
 
STS-85 
Discovery 
 
STS-86 
Atlantis 
 
STS-87 
Columbia 
 
STS-89 
Endeavour 
 
STS-91 
Discovery 
 
STS-95 
Discovery 
 
STS-88 
Endeavour 
 
 
STS-96 
Discovery 
 
STS-103 
Discovery 
 
STS-101 
Atlantis 
 
STS-106 
Atlantis 
 
STS-92 
Discovery 
 
 
STS-97 
Endeavour 
 
STS-98 
Atlantis 
 
STS-102 
Discovery 
Launch 
Date 
 
1/12/97 
 
 
3/13/97 
 
 
5/15/97 
 
 
 
8/7/97 
 
 
9/25/97 
 
 
11/19/97 
 
 
1/22/98 
 
 
6/2/98 
 
 
10/29/98 
 
 
12/4/98 
 
 
 
5/27/99 
 
 
12/19/99 
 
 
5/19/00 
 
 
9/8/00 
 
 
10/11/00 
 
 
 
11/30/00 
 
 
2/7/01 
 
 
3/8/01 
Type of  
Rndz 
 
GR 
 
 
GR 
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
D-R 
 
 
GR 
 
 
D-R 
 
 
GR 
 
 
GR 
 
 
D-R 
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
GR 
 
 
GR 
 
 
GR 
 
 
GR 
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
GR 
 
 
GR 
 
 
GR 
Mission 
Payload 
 
Mir-05 
Spacehab D  
 
HST 
SM-02  
 
Mir-06 
Spacehab D 
SMOE  
 
CRISTA- 
SPAS-02  
 
Mir-07 
 
 
Spartan 201-04 
 
 
Mir-08 
 
 
Mir-09 
Spacehab  
 
Spartan 201-05 
 
 
ISS-2A 
Node 1 
PMA-1&2  
 
ISS-2A 1 
Starshine  
 
HST 
SM-03A 
 
ISS-2A 2A 
 
 
ISS-2A 2B 
 
 
ISS-3A 
Z1 Truss 
PMA-3  
 
ISS-4A 
P6 Truss 
  
ISS-5A 
US Lab  
 
ISS-5A 1 
MPLM- 
Leonardo 
Trainer 
 
 
Dave Rose 
 
 
Lisa Martignetti 
 
 
Jorge Frank 
 
 
 
Bob Mahoney 
Lisa Martignetti 
 
Alan Fox 
 
 
Jorge Frank 
 
 
Lisa Martignetti 
 
 
Val Murdock 
 
 
Lisa Martignetti 
 
 
Alan Fox 
 
 
 
Jorge Frank 
 
 
Tim Hagin 
 
 
Val Murdock 
 
 
Tim Hagin 
 
 
Alan Fox 
 
 
 
Jorge Frank 
 
 
Tim Hagin 
Val Murdoc 
 
Tim Hagin 
HISTORY OF SPACE SHUTTLE RENDEZVOUS 
Approved for public release via STI DAA 
24483. See statement on title page. 289  
Mission 
 
 
STS-100 
Endeavour 
 
 
 
STS-104 
Atlantis 
 
STS-105 
Discovery 
 
 
 
STS-108 
Endeavour 
 
 
 
STS-109 
Columbia 
 
STS-110 
Atlantis 
 
STS-111 
Endeavour 
 
 
STS-112 
Atlantis 
 
STS-113 
Endeavour 
 
STS-114 
Discovery 
 
 
STS-121 
Discovery 
 
 
STS-115 
Atlantis 
 
STS-116 
Discovery 
 
 
STS-117 
Atlantis 
 
STS-118 
Endeavour 
 
Launch 
Date 
 
4/19/01 
 
 
 
 
7/12/01 
 
 
8/10/01 
 
 
 
 
12/5/01 
 
 
 
 
3/1/02 
 
 
4/8/02 
 
 
6/5/02 
 
 
 
10/7/02 
 
 
11/23/02 
 
 
7/26/05 
 
 
 
7/4/06 
 
 
 
9/9/06 
 
 
12/9/06 
 
 
 
6/22/07 
 
 
8/8/07 
 
Type of  
Rndz 
 
GR 
 
 
 
 
GR 
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
 
GR 
 
 
GR 
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
GR 
 
 
GR 
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
GR 
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
GR 
 
 
GR 
 
Mission 
Payload 
 
ISS-6A 
SSRMS 
MPLM- 
Raffaello  
 
ISS-7A 
Airlock 
 
ISS-7A 1 
EAS  
MPLM- 
Leonardo 
 
ISS-UF1 
MPLM- 
Raffaello 
Starshine 2  
 
HST 
SM-03B  
 
ISS-8A 
S0 Truss  
 
ISS-UF2 
MPLM- 
Leonardo 
 
ISS-9A 
S1 Truss  
 
ISS-11A 
P1 Truss  
 
ISS-LF1 
MPLM- 
Raffaello 
 
ISS-ULF1 1 
MPLM- 
Leonardo 
 
ISS-12A 
P3/P4 Truss 
 
ISS-12A 1 
P5 Truss 
Spacehab 
  
ISS-13A 
S3/S4 Truss 
 
ISS-13A 1 
S5 Truss 
Spacehab  
 
Trainer 
 
 
Jorge Frank 
 
 
 
 
Alan Fox 
 
 
Val Murdoc 
 
 
 
 
Jorge Frank 
 
 
 
 
Tim Hagin 
 
 
Jeff Tuxhorn 
 
 
Alan Fox 
 
 
 
Val Murdoc 
 
 
Jorge Frank 
 
 
Jeff Tuxhorn 
 
 
 
Jorge Frank 
 
 
 
Alan Fox 
 
 
Jeff Tuxhorn 
 
 
 
Jorge Frank 
 
 
Steve Gauvain 
 
RENDEZVOUS CREW TRAINERS 
Approved for public release via STI DAA 
24483. See statement on title page. 290  
HISTORY OF SPACE SHUTTLE RENDEZVOUS 
Mission 
 
 
STS-120 
Discovery 
 
 
STS-122 
Atlantis 
 
STS-123 
Endeavour 
 
 
STS-124 
Discovery 
 
 
STS-126 
Endeavour 
 
 
STS-119 
Discovery 
 
STS-125 
Atlantis 
 
STS-400 
Endeavour 
 
 
STS-127 
Endeavour 
 
 
STS-128 
Discovery 
 
 
 
STS-129 
Atlantis 
 
STS-130 
Endeavour 
 
STS-131 
Discovery 
 
STS-132 
Atlantis 
 
STS-133 
Discovery 
 
STS-134 
Endeavour 
 
STS-135 
Atlantis 
Launch 
Date 
 
10/23/07 
 
 
 
2/7/08 
 
 
3/11/08 
 
 
 
5/31/08 
 
 
 
11/14/08 
 
 
 
3/15/09 
 
 
5/11/09 
 
 
Not Flown 
 
 
 
7/15/09 
 
 
 
8/28/09 
 
 
 
 
11/16/09 
 
 
2/8/10 
 
 
4/5/10 
 
 
5/14/10 
 
 
2/24/11 
 
 
5/16/11 
 
 
7/08/11 
Type of  
Rndz 
 
GR 
 
 
 
GR 
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
GR 
 
 
GR 
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
 
GR 
 
 
GR 
 
 
GR 
 
 
GR 
 
 
GR 
 
 
GR 
 
 
GR 
Mission 
Payload 
 
ISS-10A 
Node 2 
P6 Relocate  
 
ISS-1E 
Columbus Lab 
 
ISS-1J/A 
JEM-PS 
SPDM (Dexter) 
 
ISS-1J 
Kibo Module 
J-RMS  
 
ISS-ULF2 
MPLM- 
Leonardo 
 
ISS-15A 
S6 Truss 
 
HST 
SM-04 
 
STS-125 Rescue 
 
 
 
ISS-2J/A 
JEM-ES 
ELM-ES  
 
ISS-17A 
MPLM- 
Leonardo 
TriDAR  
 
ISS-ULF3 
ELC 1&2 
 
ISS-20A 
Cupola/Node 3 
 
ISS-19A 
MPLM 
 
ULF4 
MRM1 
 
ULF5 
PLM 
 
ULF6 
AMS STORRM 
 
ULF7 
Trainer 
 
 
Alan Fox 
 
 
 
Jeff Tuxhorn 
 
 
Jorge Frank 
 
 
 
Steve Gauvain 
 
 
 
Jeff Tuxhorn 
 
 
 
Jorge Frank 
 
 
Alan Fox 
 
 
Alan Fox  
Jorge Frank  
Jeff Tuxhorn 
 
Alan Fox 
 
 
 
Jeff Tuxhorn 
 
 
 
 
Steve Gauvain 
 
 
Jorge Frank 
 
 
Alan Fox 
 
 
Steve Gauvain 
 
 
Alan Fox 
 
 
Jorge Frank 
 
 
Alan Fox 
Steve Gauvain 
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APPENDIX D – ON-BOARD NAVIGATION PERSONNEL 
 
 This appendix lists the flight assignments for on-board rendezvous navigation personnel who supported the 
Rendezvous Guidance and Procedures Officer (RGPO) from the Trajectory Multi-Purpose Support Room (TRAJ 
MPSR, the backroom) Michele Kocen provided this information to the author in February of 2010. 
 The author was unable to locate names of on-board navigators that supported rendezvous and proximity operations 
before the Space Transportation System Operations Contract (STSOC).  Pre-STSOC rendezvous and proximity 
operations missions flown spanned STS-7 (June 1983) to STS-61B (November 1985).  
 Names of personnel in the following flight assignment tables are: 
Mark Biggs 
Steve Carothers 
Wayne Hensley 
Michele Kocen 
Bryan Lowman 
Todd Michaels 
Todd Miller 
Darrel Monroe 
Valerie Murdock 
Carolyn Propst 
Jerry Yencharis 
Patrick Zimmerman 
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Mission 
 
 
STS-7 
Challenger 
 
STS-41B 
Challenger 
 
STS-41C 
Challenger 
 
 
STS-51A 
Discovery 
 
STS-51D 
Discovery 
 
STS-51G 
Discovery 
 
STS-51F 
Challenger 
 
STS-51I 
Discovery 
 
STS-61B 
Atlantis 
 
STS-51L 
Challenger 
 
STS-32 
Columbia 
 
 
STS-31 
Discovery 
 
STS-37 
Atlantis 
 
STS-39 
Discovery 
 
 
STS-48 
Discovery 
 
STS-49 
Endeavour 
Launch 
Date 
 
6/18/83 
 
 
2/3/84 
 
 
4/6/84 
 
 
 
11/8/84 
 
 
4/12/85 
 
 
6/17/85 
 
 
7/29/85 
 
 
8/27/85 
 
 
11/26/85 
 
 
1/28/86 
 
 
1/9/90 
 
 
 
4/24/90 
 
 
4/5/91 
 
 
4/28/91 
 
 
 
9/12/91 
 
 
5/7/92 
Rndz 
Type 
 
D-R 
 
 
D 
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
GR 
GR  
 
D-R 
 
 
D-R 
 
 
D-R 
 
 
GR 
 
 
D 
 
 
D 
D-R 
 
GR 
D  
 
 
D 
 
 
D 
 
 
D-R 
 
 
 
D 
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
Mission 
Payload 
 
SPAS-01 
 
 
GAS-IRT 
 
 
Solar Max 
 
 
 
PALAPA-B2 
WESTAR-VI 
 
LEASAT-3 
 
 
Spartan-1 
 
 
PDP 
 
 
LEASAT-3 
 
 
OEX 
DAP Target  
 
TDRS-2 
Spartan Halley  
 
LDEF 
SYNCOM IV  
 
 
HST 
 
 
GRO 
 
 
IBSS-SPAS-II 
 
 
 
UARS 
 
 
Intelsat VI 
 
 
 
Rendezvous 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Kocen 
Miller 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Miller 
Michaels 
 
 
 
 
 
Kocen 
Murdock 
 
Undock Deploy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Miller 
Biggs 
 
Kocen 
 
 
Kocen 
Biggs 
 
 
Kocen 
Michaels 
 
Observer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Biggs 
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Mission 
 
 
STS-46 
Atlantis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
STS-52 
Columbia 
 
STS-56 
Discovery 
 
STS-57 
Endeavour 
 
STS-51 
Discovery 
 
STS-61 
Endeavour 
 
STS-60 
Discovery 
 
STS-64 
Discovery 
 
 
STS-66 
Atlantis 
 
 
STS-63 
Discovery 
 
 
 
 
 
STS-71 
Atlantis 
 
 
STS-69 
Endeavour 
 
 
 
 
 
 
STS-74 
Atlantis 
 
 
Launch 
Date 
 
7/31/92 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10/22/92 
 
 
4/8/93 
 
 
6/21/93 
 
 
9/12/93 
 
 
12/2/93 
 
 
2/3/94 
 
 
9/9/94 
 
 
 
11/3/94 
 
 
 
2/3/95 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6/27/95 
 
 
 
9/7/95 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11/12/95 
 
Rndz 
Type 
 
D 
 
 
 
 
D-R  
 
 
D 
D  
 
D-R 
 
 
GR 
 
 
D-R 
D  
 
GR 
 
 
D-R 
 
 
D-R 
 
 
 
D-R 
 
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
D-R 
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
D-R 
 
 
 
D-R 
 
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
Mission 
Payload 
 
TSS 1 
 
 
 
 
EURECA  
 
 
Lageos-II 
CANEX-2 
 
Spartan 201-01 
 
 
EURECA 
Spacehab 
 
ORFEUS-SPAS 
ACTS/TOS  
 
HST 
SM-01 
 
WSF-01 
Spacehab 
 
Spartan 201-02 
 
 
 
CRISTA-SPAS 
 
 
 
Mir-00 
Spacehab 
 
 
Spartan-204 
 
 
Mir-01 
 
 
 
WSF-02 
 
 
 
Spartan 201-03 
 
 
 
Mir-02 
Docking  
Module 
ODS  
 
Rendezvous 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Kocen 
Hensley 
 
Murdock 
Kocen 
 
Kocen 
Hensley 
 
Hensley 
Murdock 
 
Miller 
Biggs 
 
Zimmerman 
Hensley 
 
 
Kocen 
Propst 
 
 
Biggs 
Hensley 
 
Propst 
Biggs 
 
 
Hensley 
 
 
 
Zimmerman 
 
 
 
Kocen 
 
 
 
Propst 
 
Undock 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Hensley 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Propst 
 
Deploy 
 
 
Biggs (1) 
Murdock (1) 
Kocen (2) 
Miller (3) 
 
 
 
 
Michaels 
 
 
Kocen 
Hensley 
 
 
 
 
Kocen 
Hensley 
 
Hensley 
 
 
Miller 
Biggs 
 
 
Zimmerman 
 
 
Kocen 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Propst 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Zimmerman 
 
 
 
Kocen 
 
 
 
Observer 
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Mission 
 
 
STS-72 
Endeavour 
 
 
 
 
 
 
STS-75 
Endeavour 
 
 
STS-76 
Atlantis 
 
 
STS-77 
Endeavour 
 
 
 
 
 
 
STS-79 
Atlantis 
 
 
STS-80 
Columbia 
 
 
 
 
STS-81 
Atlantis 
 
 
STS-82 
Discovery 
 
STS-84 
Atlantis 
 
 
STS-85 
Discovery 
 
STS-86 
Atlantis 
 
 
STS-87 
Columbia 
 
Launch 
Date 
 
1/11/96 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2/22/96 
 
 
 
3/22/96 
 
 
 
5/19/96 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9/16/96 
 
 
 
11/19/96 
 
 
 
 
 
1/12/97 
 
 
 
3/13/97 
 
 
5/15/97 
 
 
 
8/7/97 
 
 
9/25/97 
 
 
 
11/19/97 
 
 
Rndz 
Type 
 
GR 
 
 
D-R 
   
 
 
 
D-R 
 
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
D-R 
 
 
 
D-R 
 
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
D-R 
 
 
D-R 
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
GR 
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
D-R 
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
D-R 
 
 
Mission 
Payload 
 
SFU 
 
 
OAST-Flyer 
 
 
 
 
TSS 1-R 
 
 
 
Mir-03 
Spacehab  
 
 
Spartan-207 
IAE-Inflatable 
Antenna Exp  
 
PAMS-STU 
 
 
 
Mir-04 
Spacehab 
 
 
ORFEUS- 
SPAS-02 
 
WSF-03 
 
 
Mir-05 
Spacehab D  
 
 
HST 
SM-02  
 
Mir-06 
Spacehab D 
SMOE  
 
CRISTA- 
SPAS-02  
 
Mir-07 
 
 
 
Spartan 201-04 
 
 
Rendezvous 
 
 
 
 
 
Biggs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Zimmerman 
 
 
 
Propst 
 
 
 
Kocen 
 
 
 
Hensley 
 
 
 
Kocen 
 
 
Zimmerman 
 
 
Kocen 
 
 
 
Zimmerman 
 
 
Yencharis 
 
 
 
Propst 
 
 
Zimmerman 
 
 
 
Kocen 
 
Undock 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Zimmerman 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Hensley 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Kocen 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Yencharis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Zimmerman 
 
Deploy 
 
 
Hensley 
 
 
 
Kocen 
 
 
 
Hensley 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Propst 
 
 
 
Kocen 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Kocen 
 
 
Zimmerman 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Zimmerman 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Propst 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Kocen 
Observer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Yencharis 
 
 
Santos 
Yencharis 
 
Yencharis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Propst 
 
 
 
Propst 
 
 
Santos 
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Mission 
 
 
STS-89 
Endeavour 
 
 
STS-91 
Discovery 
 
STS-95 
Discovery 
 
STS-88 
Endeavour 
 
 
STS-96 
Discovery 
 
STS-103 
Discovery 
 
STS-101 
Atlantis 
 
STS-106 
Atlantis 
 
STS-92 
Discovery 
 
 
STS-97 
Endeavour 
 
STS-98 
Atlantis 
 
STS-102 
Discovery 
 
 
STS-100 
Endeavour 
 
 
 
STS-104 
Atlantis 
 
STS-105 
Discovery 
 
 
 
Launch 
Date 
 
1/22/98 
 
 
 
6/2/98 
 
 
10/29/98 
 
 
12/4/98 
 
 
 
5/27/99 
 
 
12/19/99 
 
 
5/19/00 
 
 
9/8/00 
 
 
10/11/00 
 
 
 
11/30/00 
 
 
2/7/01 
 
 
3/8/01 
 
 
 
4/19/01 
 
 
 
 
7/12/01 
 
 
8/10/01 
 
 
 
 
Rndz 
Type 
 
GR 
 
 
 
GR 
 
 
D-R 
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
GR 
 
 
GR 
 
 
GR 
 
 
GR 
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
GR 
 
 
GR 
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
 
GR 
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
 
Mission 
Payload 
 
Mir-08 
 
 
 
Mir-09 
Spacehab  
 
Spartan 201-05 
 
 
ISS-2A 
Node 1 
PMA-1&2  
 
ISS-2A 1 
Starshine  
 
HST 
SM-03A 
 
ISS-2A 2A 
 
 
ISS-2A 2B 
 
 
ISS-3A 
Z1 Truss 
PMA-3  
 
ISS-4A 
P6 Truss  
 
ISS-5A 
US Lab  
 
ISS-5A 1 
MPLM- 
Leonardo 
 
ISS-6A 
SSRMS 
MPLM- 
Raffaello  
 
ISS-7A 
Airlock 
 
ISS-7A 1 
EAS  
MPLM- 
Leonardo 
 
Rendezvous 
 
 
Propst 
 
 
 
Zimmerman 
 
 
Zimmerman 
 
 
Kocen 
 
 
 
Kocen 
 
 
Carothers 
 
 
Kocen 
 
 
Zimmerman 
 
 
Carothers 
 
 
 
Kocen 
 
 
Zimmerman 
 
 
Carothers 
 
 
 
Kocen 
 
 
 
 
Zimmerman 
 
 
Kocen 
 
Undock 
 
 
Propst 
 
 
 
Zimmerman 
 
 
Zimmerman 
 
 
Kocen 
 
 
 
Kocen 
 
 
 
 
 
Kocen 
 
 
Zimmerman 
 
 
Carothers 
 
 
 
Kocen 
 
 
 
Zimmerman 
 
Carothers 
 
 
 
Kocen 
 
 
 
 
Zimmerman 
 
 
Kocen 
 
Deploy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Carothers 
Observer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Carothers 
 
 
Carothers 
 
 
Carothers 
 
 
 
Carothers 
 
 
Kocen 
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Mission 
 
 
STS-108 
Endeavour 
 
 
 
STS-109 
Columbia 
 
STS-110 
Atlantis 
 
STS-111 
Endeavour 
 
 
STS-112 
Atlantis 
 
STS-113 
Endeavour 
 
STS-114 
Discovery 
 
 
STS-121 
Discovery 
 
 
STS-115 
Atlantis 
 
STS-116 
Discovery 
 
 
STS-117 
Atlantis 
 
STS-118 
Endeavour 
 
 
STS-120 
Discovery 
 
 
STS-122 
Atlantis 
 
STS-123 
Endeavour 
 
 
Launch 
Date 
 
12/5/01 
 
 
 
 
3/1/02 
 
 
4/8/02 
 
 
6/5/02 
 
 
 
10/7/02 
 
 
11/23/02 
 
 
7/26/05 
 
 
 
7/4/06 
 
 
 
9/9/06 
 
 
12/9/06 
 
 
 
6/22/07 
 
 
8/8/07 
 
 
 
10/23/07 
 
 
 
2/7/08 
 
 
3/11/08 
Rndz 
Type 
 
GR 
 
 
 
 
GR 
 
 
GR 
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
GR 
 
 
GR 
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
GR 
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
GR 
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
GR 
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
Mission 
Payload 
 
ISS-UF1 
MPLM- 
Raffaello 
Starshine 2  
 
HST 
SM-03B  
 
ISS-8A 
S0 Truss  
 
ISS-UF2 
MPLM- 
Leonardo 
 
ISS-9A 
S1 Truss  
 
ISS-11A 
P1 Truss  
 
ISS-LF1 
MPLM- 
Raffaello 
 
ISS-ULF1 1 
MPLM- 
Leonardo 
 
ISS-12A 
P3/P4 Truss 
 
ISS-12A 1 
P5 Truss 
Spacehab  
 
ISS-13A 
S3/S4 Truss 
 
ISS-13A 1 
S5 Truss 
Spacehab  
 
ISS-10A 
Node 2 
P6 Relocate  
 
ISS-1E 
Columbus Lab 
 
ISS-1J/A 
JEM-PS 
SPDM (Dexter) 
 
Rendezvous 
 
 
Zimmerman 
 
 
 
 
Zimmerman 
 
 
Zimmerman 
 
 
Kocen 
 
 
 
Zimmerman 
 
 
Kocen 
 
 
Zimmerman 
 
 
 
Kocen 
 
 
 
Zimmerman 
 
 
Kocen 
 
 
 
Monroe 
Kocen 
 
Zimmerman 
 
 
 
Monroe 
 
 
 
Kocen 
 
 
Zimmerman 
 
 
Undock 
 
 
Zimmerman 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Zimmerman 
 
 
 
Kocen 
 
 
Zimmerman 
 
 
Kocen 
 
 
Zimmerman 
 
 
 
Kocen 
 
 
 
Zimmerman 
 
 
Kocen 
 
 
 
Monroe 
Kocen 
 
Zimmerman 
 
 
 
Monroe 
 
 
 
Kocen 
 
 
Zimmerman 
 
Deploy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Zimmerman 
Observer 
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ON-BOARD NAVIGATION PERSONNEL 
Mission 
 
 
STS-124 
Discovery 
 
 
STS-126 
Endeavour 
 
 
STS-119 
Discovery 
 
STS-125 
Atlantis 
 
STS-400 
Endeavour 
 
 
 
 
STS-127 
Endeavour 
 
 
STS-128 
Discovery 
 
 
 
STS-129 
Atlantis 
 
STS-130 
Endeavour 
 
 
STS-131 
Discovery 
 
STS-132 
Atlantis 
 
STS-133 
Discovery 
 
STS-134 
Endeavour 
 
 
 
STS-135 
Atlantis 
Launch 
Date 
 
5/31/08 
 
 
 
11/14/08 
 
 
 
3/15/09 
 
 
5/11/09 
 
 
Not 
Flown 
 
 
 
 
7/15/09 
 
 
 
8/28/09 
 
 
 
 
11/16/09 
 
 
2/8/10 
 
 
 
4/5/10 
 
 
5/14/10 
 
 
2/24/11 
 
 
5/16/11 
 
 
 
 
7/08/11 
Rndz 
Type 
 
GR 
 
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
GR 
 
 
GR 
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
 
GR 
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
GR 
 
 
GR 
 
 
GR 
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
 
GR 
Mission 
Payload 
 
ISS-1J 
Kibo Module 
J-RMS  
 
ISS-ULF2 
MPLM- 
Leonardo 
 
ISS-15A 
S6 Truss 
 
HST 
SM-04 
 
Atlantis 
 
 
 
 
 
ISS-2J/A 
JEM-ES 
ELM-ES  
 
ISS-17A 
MPLM- 
Leonardo 
TriDAR  
 
ISS-ULF3 
ELC 1&2 
 
ISS-20A 
Cupola/ 
Node 3 
 
ISS-19A 
MPLM 
 
ULF4 
MRM1 
 
ULF5 
PLM 
 
ULF6 
AMS  
STORRM 
DTO 
 
ULF7 
Rendezvous 
 
 
Monroe 
 
 
 
Zimmerman 
 
 
 
Lowman 
Kocen 
 
Kocen 
 
 
Kocen 
 
 
 
 
 
Monroe 
 
 
 
Kocen 
 
 
 
 
Zimmerman 
 
 
Kocen 
 
 
 
Monroe 
 
 
Kocen 
 
 
Monroe  
 
 
Zimmerman  
 
 
 
 
Monroe 
Undock 
 
 
Monroe 
 
 
 
Zimmerman 
 
 
 
Lowman 
Kocen 
 
 
 
 
Kocen 
 
 
 
 
 
Monroe 
 
 
 
Kocen 
 
 
 
 
Zimmerman 
 
 
Kocen 
 
 
 
Monroe 
 
 
Kocen 
 
 
Monroe  
 
 
Zimmerman  
 
 
 
 
Monroe 
Deploy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Kocen 
Observer 
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APPENDIX E – BURN TARGETING AND PROXIMITY OPERATIONS PERSONNEL 
 
 This appendix lists the flight assignments for Trajectory Multi-Purpose Support Room (TRAJ MPSR, the 
backroom) who supported the Flight Dynamics Officer with ground burn targeting and the Rendezvous Guidance and 
Procedures Officer (RGPO) with on-board burn targeting or proximity operations.  Names in the tables were assembled 
by USA Flight Design and Dynamics Department Orbit personnel at the request of the author in March of 2010.   The 
tables may contain errors and omissions and are not a complete record of flight assignments. 
 The author was not able to find accurate flight assignment records for TRAJ MPSR Orbit personnel that supported 
rendezvous and proximity operations before the 1986 Space Transportation System Operations Contract (STSOC).  
Pre-STSOC rendezvous and proximity operations missions flown spanned STS-7 (June 1983) to STS-61B (November 
1985).    
 
Personnel that supported these positions were: 
 
NASA/DM, RSOC, and USA (1988-2011) 
 
Bill Atkins 
Jim Bacher 
Charlie Barrett 
Greg Bartz 
Lynda Bermudez (Slifer/Gavin) 
Brian Bertrand 
Ray Bigonesse 
Colleen de Bont 
Bill Britz 
Dana Brownfield 
Jay Chadwell 
Rick Christian 
Anthony Foti 
Jorge Frank 
Dawn Gabriel 
Rick Gavin 
Barton Gibson 
Eduardo Guevara 
John Hallstrom 
Doug Hamilton 
Paul Lane 
Jessica LoPresti-Bellock 
Scott McKeel 
Tom Meissen 
Chris Meyer 
Mark Miller 
Raymundo Moreno 
Sean O’Rourke 
Joe Pascucci 
Don Pearson 
Kris Pettinger 
Jared Renshaw 
Ted Rickerl 
Bill Roberts 
Dan Sawin 
Greg Schrage 
Mark Schrock 
Kurt Seidensticker 
Katie Simons Spotz 
Megan Sip 
Paul Snow 
Susan Stultz Snyder 
Tom Snyder 
Matt Steinmueller 
Kyle Stovall 
Tim Stuit 
Bill Summa 
Farhad Teymurian 
Bill Tracy 
Hung Tran 
Steve Walker 
Brian Yarbrough 
Jerry Yencharis 
 
 
NASA Mission Planning and Analysis Directorate 
(1983-1986) 
 
Bob Becker  
Al DuPont 
Don Pearson 
Ken Young 
 
 
McDonnell Douglas (1983-1986) 
 
Norm Alexander  
Palmer Chiu 
Dave Dannemiller 
Paul Dowty 
Rick Gavin 
M. Dan Johnston 
Don Pearson 
Greg Schrage 
Steve Staas  
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Mission 
 
 
 
STS-7 
Challenger 
 
STS-41B 
Challenger 
 
STS-41C 
Challenger 
 
 
STS-51A 
Discovery 
 
STS-51D 
Discovery 
 
STS-51G 
Discovery 
 
STS-51F 
Challenger 
 
STS-51I 
Discovery 
 
STS-61B 
Atlantis 
 
STS-51L 
Challenger 
 
STS-26 
Discovery 
 
STS-32 
Columbia 
 
 
 
STS-31 
Discovery 
 
STS-37 
Atlantis 
 
 
 
STS-39 
Discovery 
 
 
 
STS-48 
Discovery 
 
STS-49 
Endeavour 
Launch 
Date 
 
 
6/18/83 
 
 
2/3/84 
 
 
4/6/84 
 
 
 
11/8/84 
 
 
4/12/85 
 
 
6/17/85 
 
 
7/29/85 
 
 
8/27/85 
 
 
11/26/85 
 
 
1/28/86 
 
 
9/29/88 
 
 
1/9/90 
 
 
 
 
4/24/90 
 
 
4/5/91 
 
 
 
 
4/28/91 
 
 
 
 
9/12/91 
 
 
5/7/92 
Rndz 
Type 
 
 
D-R 
 
 
D 
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
GR 
GR  
 
D-R 
 
 
D-R 
 
 
D-R 
 
 
GR 
 
 
D 
 
 
D 
D-R 
 
D 
 
 
GR 
D  
 
 
 
D 
 
 
D 
 
 
 
 
D-R 
 
 
 
 
D 
 
 
GR 
Mission 
Payload 
 
 
SPAS-01 
 
 
GAS-IRT 
 
 
Solar Max 
 
 
 
PALAPA-B2 
WESTAR-VI 
 
LEASAT-3 
 
 
Spartan-1 
 
 
PDP 
 
 
LEASAT-3 
 
 
OEX 
DAP Target  
 
TDRS-2 
Spartan Halley 
 
TDRS-3/IUS 
  
 
LDEF 
SYNCOM IV  
 
 
 
HST 
 
 
GRO 
 
 
 
 
IBSS-SPAS-II 
 
 
 
 
UARS 
 
 
Intelsat VI 
Profile 
Support 
 
 
 
 
 
Pearson (O1) 
 
 
Pearson (O1) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bermudez 
Gavin 
Yarbrough 
 
 
Roberts 
 
 
Atkins 
Roberts 
de Bont 
 
 
de Bont (O1) 
Atkins (O2) 
Roberts (O3) 
 
 
 
 
 
Roberts 
Lane 
deBont  
O‟Rourke (O3) 
Maneuver 
and Rndz 
Specialist 
 
Target 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pearson (O1) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sawin 
Britz 
Snow 
Chadwell 
 
 
 
 
Sawin (T1/T2) 
Snyder (T1) 
Simons (T2) 
Chadwell (T1/T2) 
 
Sawin (T1) 
Snyder (T1) 
Simons (T2) 
Chadwell (T2) 
 
 
 
 
Sawin 
Snyder (T1) 
Simons (T2) 
Prox Ops /  
Tools  
Checkout 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Gibson 
Meyer 
 
Schrock 
Schrage 
 
 
 
Walker 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Schrock 
Summa 
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Mission 
 
 
 
STS-46 
Atlantis 
 
 
 
STS-52 
Columbia 
 
STS-56 
Discovery 
 
 
STS-57 
Endeavour 
 
STS-51 
Discovery 
 
 
STS-61 
Endeavour 
 
 
STS-60 
Discovery 
 
 
STS-64 
Discovery 
 
 
STS-66 
Atlantis 
 
 
STS-63 
Discovery 
 
 
 
STS-71 
Atlantis 
 
 
STS-69 
Endeavour 
 
 
STS-74 
Atlantis 
Launch 
Date 
 
 
7/31/92 
 
 
 
 
10/22/92 
 
 
4/8/93 
 
 
 
6/21/93 
 
 
9/12/93 
 
 
 
12/2/93 
 
 
 
2/3/94 
 
 
 
9/9/94 
 
 
 
11/3/94 
 
 
 
2/3/95 
 
 
 
 
6/27/95 
 
 
 
9/7/95 
 
 
 
11/12/95 
 
Rndz 
Type 
 
 
D 
 
D-R  
 
 
D 
D  
 
D-R 
 
 
 
GR 
 
 
D-R 
D  
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
D-R 
 
 
 
D-R 
 
 
 
D-R 
 
 
 
GR 
 
D-R 
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
D-R 
D-R 
 
 
GR 
Mission 
Payload 
 
 
TSS 1 
 
EURECA  
 
 
Lageos-II 
CANEX-2 
 
Spartan 201-01 
 
 
 
EURECA 
Spacehab 
 
ORFEUS-SPAS 
ACTS/TOS  
 
 
HST 
SM-01 
 
 
WSF-01 
Spacehab 
 
 
Spartan 201-02 
 
 
 
CRISTA-SPAS 
 
 
 
Mir-00 
Spacehab 
Spartan-204 
 
 
Mir-01 
 
 
 
WSF-02 
Spartan 201-03 
 
 
Mir-02 
Docking  
Module 
ODS  
Profile 
Support 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Lane 
Roberts 
O‟Rourke (O3) 
 
Roberts 
 
 
O‟Rourke (O1) 
Lane 
Roberts 
 
Lane 
Spotz 
O‟Rourke 
 
Lane 
Roberts 
Spotz 
 
Spotz 
Lane 
Pettinger (O3) 
 
O‟Rourke (O1) 
Lane (O2) 
Pettinger (O3) 
 
Pettinger (O1) 
Spotz 
Lane 
 
 
Lane (O1) 
O‟Rourke (O2) 
Spotz (O3) 
 
Spotz 
O‟Rourke 
Lane 
 
Spotz (O1) 
Pettinger (O2) 
O‟Rourke (O3) 
Maneuver 
and Rndz 
Specialist 
 
Target 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Snyder (T1) 
Spotz (T2) 
 
 
Gabriel 
Spotz 
 
Gabriel (T1) 
T. Snyder (T2) 
 
 
Gabriel 
Rickerl (T2) 
 
 
Snyder 
Rickerl 
 
 
Tran 
Snyder 
 
 
Snow  (T1) 
Gabriel (T2) 
 
 
Sawin (T1) 
Snyder (T2) 
Gabriel (T1) 
Rickerl (T2) 
 
Snyder 
Gabriel 
 
 
Gabriel 
 
 
 
Tran 
Prox Ops /  
Tools  
Checkout 
 
 
 
Bertrand 
Brownfield 
 
Rickerl 
Stovall 
 
Walker 
Seidensticker 
 
 
Bertrand 
Brownfield 
 
Walker 
Rickerl 
Frank 
 
Walker 
Brownfield 
 
 
Walker 
Summa (WSF) 
Rickerl (ODERACS) 
 
 
 
 
 
Rickerl 
 
 
 
Bertrand 
Michaux 
 
 
 
Frank 
Bertrand 
 
 
McKeel 
 
 
 
Rickerl 
Summa 
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Mission 
 
 
 
STS-72 
Endeavour 
 
 
 
 
STS-75 
Endeavour 
 
STS-76 
Atlantis 
 
 
STS-77 
Endeavour 
 
 
 
 
STS-79 
Atlantis 
 
 
STS-80 
Columbia 
 
 
 
 
 
 
STS-81 
Atlantis 
 
 
STS-82 
Discovery 
 
 
STS-84 
Atlantis 
 
 
STS-85 
Discovery 
 
 
STS-86 
Atlantis 
 
 
STS-87 
Columbia 
 
Launch 
Date 
 
 
1/11/96 
 
 
 
 
 
2/22/96 
 
 
3/22/96 
 
 
 
5/19/96 
 
 
 
 
 
9/16/96 
 
 
 
11/19/96 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1/12/97 
 
 
 
3/13/97 
 
 
 
5/15/97 
 
 
 
8/7/97 
 
 
 
9/25/97 
 
 
 
11/19/97 
 
Rndz 
Type 
 
 
GR 
D-R 
   
 
 
 
D-R 
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
D-R 
 
 
 
D-R 
 
GR 
 
 
 
D-R 
 
 
D-R 
 
 
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
D-R 
 
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
D-R 
Mission 
Payload 
 
 
SFU 
OAST-Flyer 
 
 
 
 
TSS 1-R 
 
 
Mir-03 
Spacehab  
 
 
Spartan-207 
IAE-Inflatable 
Antenna Exp  
 
PAMS-STU 
 
Mir-04 
Spacehab 
 
 
ORFEUS- 
SPAS-02 
 
WSF-03 
 
 
 
 
Mir-05 
Spacehab D  
 
 
HST 
SM-02  
 
 
Mir-06 
Spacehab D 
SMOE  
 
CRISTA- 
SPAS-02  
 
 
Mir-07 
 
 
 
Spartan 201-04 
 
Profile 
Support 
 
 
Spotz (O1) 
Pettinger (O1) 
 
O'Rourke (O2) 
Lane (O3) 
 
 
 
 
Christian 
Lane 
Pettinger 
 
O‟Rourke 
Christian 
Lane 
Pettinger 
 
 
Christian 
Bacher 
Lane 
 
Bacher (O1) 
 
 
Pettinger (O1) 
 
O‟Rourke 
Christian 
 
Christian 
O‟Rourke 
Yarbrough 
 
Christian 
Bacher 
O‟Rourke 
 
Yarbrough 
Bacher 
Lane 
 
Yarbrough 
O‟Rourke 
Bacher 
 
Bacher (O1) 
O'Rourke (O2) 
Pettinger (O3) 
 
O'Rourke (O1) 
Lane (O2) 
Bacher (O3) 
Maneuver 
and Rndz 
Specialist 
 
Target 
 
 
 
Snyder 
Yencharis 
 
 
 
 
Hamilton 
 
 
Gabriel 
 
 
 
Tran 
Snyder 
Yencharis 
 
 
 
Yencharis 
 
 
 
Snyder 
Gabriel 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Miller 
 
 
 
Gabriel 
 
 
 
Miller 
 
 
 
Hamilton 
 
 
 
Gabriel 
 
 
 
Miller 
Prox Ops /  
Tools  
Checkout 
 
Schrock 
Brownfield 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
McKeel 
 
 
 
Bertrand 
Moreno 
 
 
 
 
Rickerl 
Brownfield 
 
 
Rickerl 
Guevara 
 
 
 
 
 
 
McKeel 
Moreno 
 
 
Summa 
Teymurian 
 
 
Rickerl 
Guevara 
 
 
McKeel 
Brownfield 
 
 
Summa 
Teymurian 
 
 
McKeel 
Moreno 
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Mission 
 
 
 
STS-89 
Endeavour 
 
 
STS-91 
Discovery 
 
 
STS-95 
Discovery 
 
 
STS-88 
Endeavour 
 
 
STS-96 
Discovery 
 
 
STS-93 
Columbia 
 
STS-103 
Discovery 
 
 
STS-101 
Atlantis 
 
 
STS-106 
Atlantis 
 
 
STS-92 
Discovery 
 
 
STS-97 
Endeavour 
 
 
STS-98 
Atlantis 
 
 
STS-102 
Discovery 
 
 
STS-100 
Endeavour 
Launch 
Date 
 
 
1/22/98 
 
 
 
6/2/98 
 
 
 
10/29/98 
 
 
 
12/4/98 
 
 
 
5/27/99 
 
 
 
7/23/99 
 
 
12/19/99 
 
 
 
5/19/00 
 
 
 
9/8/00 
 
 
 
10/11/00 
 
 
 
11/30/00 
 
 
 
2/7/01 
 
 
 
3/8/01 
 
 
 
4/19/01 
 
 
 
Rndz 
Type 
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
D-R 
 
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
D 
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
 
Mission 
Payload 
 
 
Mir-08 
 
 
 
Mir-09 
Spacehab  
 
 
Spartan 201-05 
 
 
 
ISS-2A 
Node 1 
PMA-1&2  
 
ISS-2A 1 
Starshine  
 
 
Chandra X-Ray  
Observatory 
 
HST 
SM-03A 
 
 
ISS-2A 2A 
 
 
 
ISS-2A 2B 
 
 
 
ISS-3A 
Z1 Truss 
PMA-3  
 
ISS-4A 
P6 Truss  
 
 
ISS-5A 
US Lab  
 
 
ISS-5A 1 
MPLM- 
Leonardo 
 
ISS-6A 
SSRMS 
MPLM- 
Raffaello  
Profile 
Support 
 
 
Yarbrough (O1) 
Pettinger (O2) 
Lane (O3) 
 
Pettinger (O1) 
O‟Rourke (O2) 
Lane (O3) 
 
Lane (O1) 
Pettinger (O2) 
Bacher (O3) 
 
Yarbrough (O1) 
Lane (O2) 
Bacher (O3) 
 
Yarbrough (O1) 
Bacher (O2) 
Pettinger (O3) 
 
 
 
 
Bacher (O1) 
Snow (O2) 
Stultz (O3) 
 
Pettinger (O1) 
Yarbrough (O2) 
Stuit (O3) 
 
Pettinger (O1) 
Stuit (O2) 
Bacher (O3) 
 
Stultz (O1) 
Yarbrough (O2) 
Bacher (O3) 
 
Stuit (O1) 
Pettinger (O2) 
Stultz (O3) 
 
Bacher (O1) 
Stultz (O2) 
Stuit (O3) 
 
Pettinger (O1) 
Bacher (O2) 
Yarbrough (O3) 
 
Yarbrough (O1) 
Pettinger (O2) 
Stultz (O3) 
Maneuver 
and Rndz 
Specialist 
 
Target 
 
 
 
Snyder 
 
 
 
Hamilton 
 
 
 
Hamilton 
 
 
 
T. Snyder 
 
 
 
Miller 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Hallstrom  
 
 
 
T. Snyder 
 
 
 
Hallstrom 
 
 
 
Snyder 
 
 
 
Bigonesse 
 
 
 
Hallstrom 
 
 
 
Hamilton 
 
 
 
T. Snyder 
Prox Ops /  
Tools  
Checkout 
 
Rickerl 
Guevara 
 
 
Summa 
Moreno 
 
 
Moreno 
Foti 
 
 
Schrock 
Teymurian 
 
 
Summa 
Guevara 
 
 
Brownfield 
 
 
Moreno 
Foti 
 
 
Schrock 
Teymurian 
Pascucci 
 
Moreno 
Pascucci 
 
 
Summa 
 
 
 
Moreno 
 
 
 
Summa 
 
 
 
Schrock 
 
 
 
Summa 
Approved for public release via STI DAA 
24483. See statement on title page. 304  
HISTORY OF SPACE SHUTTLE RENDEZVOUS 
Mission 
 
 
 
STS-104 
Atlantis 
 
 
STS-105 
Discovery 
 
 
 
STS-108 
Endeavour 
 
 
 
STS-109 
Columbia 
 
 
STS-110 
Atlantis 
 
 
STS-111 
Endeavour 
 
 
STS-112 
Atlantis 
 
 
STS-113 
Endeavour 
 
 
STS-114 
Discovery 
 
 
 
STS-121 
Discovery 
 
 
 
STS-115 
Atlantis 
 
 
STS-116 
Discovery 
 
 
 
STS-117 
Atlantis 
 
Rndz 
Type 
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
 
GR 
 
 
Mission 
Payload 
 
 
ISS-7A 
Airlock 
 
 
ISS-7A 1 
EAS  
MPLM- 
Leonardo 
 
ISS-UF1 
MPLM- 
Raffaello 
Starshine 2  
 
HST 
SM-03B  
 
 
ISS-8A 
S0 Truss  
 
 
ISS-UF2 
MPLM- 
Leonardo 
 
ISS-9A 
S1 Truss  
 
 
ISS-11A 
P1 Truss  
 
 
ISS-LF1 
MPLM- 
Raffaello 
 
 
ISS-ULF1 1 
MPLM- 
Leonardo 
 
 
ISS-12A 
P3/P4 Truss 
 
 
ISS-12A 1 
P5 Truss 
Spacehab  
 
 
ISS-13A 
S3/S4 Truss 
Profile 
Support 
 
 
Stuit (O1) 
Yarbrough (O2) 
Pettinger (O3) 
 
Stultz (O1) 
Stuit (O2) 
Bacher (O3) 
 
 
Pettinger (O1) 
Stultz (O2) 
Yarbrough (O3) 
 
 
Bacher (O1) 
Pettinger (O2) 
Stuit (O3) 
 
Yarbrough 
 
 
 
Bacher 
 
 
 
Bacher 
 
 
 
Yarbrough 
 
 
 
Yarbrough (O1) 
Pettinger (O2) 
Steinmueller (O3) 
 
 
Pettinger (O1) 
S. Synder (O2) 
Renshaw (O3) 
 
 
Bacher (O1) 
 
Renshaw (O3) 
 
Yarbrough (DOL O1) 
Stuit (O1) 
 
 
 
Renshaw (O1) 
 
Pascucci (O3) 
Maneuver 
and Rndz 
Specialist 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Stultz (O1) 
Pettinger (O2) 
Stuit (O3) 
 
Stuit (O1) 
Barrett (O2) 
Pettinger (O3) 
 
Pettinger (O1) 
Stuit (O2) 
S. Snyder (O3) 
 
Pettinger (O1) 
Tracy (O2) 
S. Snyder (O3) 
 
S. Snyder (O1) 
Bacher (O2) 
Stuit (O3) 
 
 
Bacher (O1) 
Stuit (O2) 
Yarbrough (O3) 
 
 
Stuit (O1) 
S. Snyder (O2) 
Pettinger (O3) 
 
S. Snyder (O1) 
Stuit (DOL O1) 
Bacher (O2) 
Renshaw (O3) 
 
Pettinger (O1) 
Tracy (O2) 
Stuit (FD2 O2) 
Yarbrough (O3) 
Target 
 
 
 
Hallstrom 
 
 
 
Hamilton 
 
 
 
 
T. Snyder 
 
 
 
 
Hallstrom 
 
 
 
Hamilton 
 
 
 
T. Snyder 
 
 
 
Hallstrom 
 
 
 
Meissen 
 
 
 
Hallstrom 
 
 
 
 
Hallstrom 
 
 
 
 
Hallstrom 
 
 
 
Bartz 
 
 
 
 
Hallstrom 
Prox Ops /  
Tools  
Checkout 
 
Pascucci 
 
 
 
Schrock 
 
 
 
 
Summa 
 
 
 
 
Pascucci 
 
 
 
Summa 
 
 
 
Schrock 
 
 
 
Summa 
 
 
 
LoPresti 
Schrock 
 
 
Schrock 
LoPresti (C/O) 
Schrock 
Pascucci (C/O) 
 
Summa 
LoPresti (C/O) 
Summa 
Pascucci (C/O) 
 
Pascucci 
Schrock (C/O) 
 
 
Pascucci 
Summa (C/O) 
 
 
 
LoPresti 
Schrock (C/O) 
Launch 
Date 
 
 
7/12/01 
 
 
 
8/10/01 
 
 
 
 
12/5/01 
 
 
 
 
3/1/02 
 
 
 
4/8/02 
 
 
 
6/5/02 
 
 
 
10/7/02 
 
 
 
11/23/02 
 
 
 
7/26/05 
 
 
 
 
7/4/06 
 
 
 
 
9/9/06 
 
 
 
12/9/06 
 
 
 
 
6/22/07 
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Mission 
 
 
 
STS-118 
Endeavour 
 
 
STS-120 
Discovery 
 
 
STS-122 
Atlantis 
 
 
STS-123 
Endeavour 
 
 
STS-124 
Discovery 
 
 
STS-126 
Endeavour 
 
 
 
STS-119 
Discovery 
 
 
STS-125 
Atlantis 
 
 
 
 
STS-400 
Endeavour 
 
 
 
STS-127 
Endeavour 
 
 
 
STS-128 
Discovery 
 
 
 
STS-129 
Atlantis 
 
Launch 
Date 
 
 
8/8/07 
 
 
 
10/23/07 
 
 
 
2/7/08 
 
 
 
3/11/08 
 
 
 
5/31/08 
 
 
 
11/14/08 
 
 
 
 
3/15/09 
 
 
 
5/11/09 
 
 
 
 
 
Not 
Flown 
 
 
 
7/15/09 
 
 
 
 
8/28/09 
 
 
 
 
11/16/09 
Rndz 
Type 
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
 
GR 
 
Mission 
Payload 
 
 
ISS-13A 1 
S5 Truss 
Spacehab  
 
ISS-10A 
Node 2 
P6 Relocate  
 
ISS-1E 
Columbus Lab 
 
 
ISS-1J/A 
JEM-PS 
SPDM (Dexter) 
 
ISS-1J 
Kibo Module 
J-RMS  
 
ISS-ULF2 
MPLM- 
Leonardo 
 
 
ISS-15A 
S6 Truss 
 
 
HST 
SM-04 
 
 
 
 
Atlantis 
 
 
 
 
ISS-2J/A 
JEM-ES 
ELM-ES  
 
 
ISS-17A 
MPLM- 
Leonardo 
TriDAR  
 
ISS-ULF3 
ELC 1&2 
Profile 
Support 
 
 
Renshaw 
 
 
 
Pascucci (O1) 
 
Sip (O3) 
 
Pettinger (O1) 
 
Sip (O3) 
 
Stuit (O1) 
 
Sip 
 
Sip 
 
 
 
Sip 
 
 
 
 
Pettinger (O1) 
 
Renshaw (O3) 
 
Pettinger (O1) 
Sip (O2) 
Stuit (O3) 
 
 
 
Yarbrough (O1) 
Sip (O2) 
Renshaw (O3) 
 
 
Stuit 
 
 
 
 
Yarbrough 
 
 
 
 
Renshaw 
Maneuver 
and Rndz 
Specialist 
 
Stuit (O1) 
S. Snyder (O2) 
Pettinger (O3) 
 
Yarbrough (O1) 
Pettinger (O2) 
S. Snyder (O3) 
 
Stuit (O1) 
Renshaw (O2) 
Yarbrough (O3) 
 
Renshaw (O1) 
Yarbrough (O2) 
Pettinger (O3) 
 
Pettinger (O1) 
S. Snyder (O2) 
Stuit (O3) 
 
S. Snyder (O1) 
Stuit (O2) 
Pascucci (O3) 
 
 
Pascucci (O1) 
S. Snyder (O2) 
Sip (O3) 
 
S. Snyder (O1) 
Yarbrough (O2) 
Renshaw (O3) 
 
 
 
Stuit (O1) 
Snyder (O2) 
Pettinger (O3) 
 
 
Sip (O1) 
S. Snyder (O2) 
Pascucci (O2) 
Pettinger (O3) 
 
Pettinger (O1) 
S. Snyder (O2) 
Stuit (O3) 
 
 
S. Snyder (O1) 
Sip (O2) 
Yarbrough (O3) 
Target 
 
 
 
Bartz 
 
 
 
Hallstrom 
 
 
 
Bartz 
 
 
 
Hallstrom 
 
 
 
Bartz 
 
 
 
Bartz 
 
 
 
 
Hallstrom 
 
 
 
Hallstrom 
 
 
 
 
 
Hallstrom 
 
 
 
 
Bartz 
 
 
 
 
Hallstrom 
 
 
 
 
Bartz 
Prox Ops /  
Tools  
Checkout 
 
Schrock 
Summa (C/O) 
 
 
Summa 
LoPresti- 
Bellock (C/O) 
 
Schrock 
LoPresti- 
Bellock (C/O) 
 
Pascucci 
Summa (C/O) 
 
 
LoPresti- 
Bellock  
Schrock (C/O) 
 
Summa 
Schrock (C/O) 
Summa 
Pascucci (C/O) 
 
Schrock 
Summa (C/O) 
 
 
Pascucci 
Summa (C/O) 
Pascucci 
LoPresti- 
Bellock (C/O) 
 
Summa 
Pascucci (C/O) 
 
 
 
Summa 
Schrock (C/O) 
 
 
 
LoPresti- 
Bellock 
Pascucci (C/O) 
 
 
Pascucci 
Schrock (C/O) 
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Mission 
 
 
 
STS-130 
Endeavour 
 
 
STS-131 
Discovery 
 
 
STS-132 
Atlantis 
 
 
STS-133 
Discovery 
 
 
STS-134 
Endeavour 
 
 
 
STS-135 
Atlantis 
Launch 
Date 
 
 
2/8/10 
 
 
 
4/5/10 
 
 
 
5/14/10 
 
 
 
2/24/11 
 
 
 
5/16/11 
 
 
 
 
7/08/11 
Rndz 
Type 
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
GR 
 
 
 
 
GR 
Mission 
Payload 
 
 
ISS-20A 
Cupola/ 
Node 3 
 
ISS-19A 
MPLM 
 
 
ULF4 
MRM1 
 
 
ULF5 
PLM 
 
 
ULF6 
AMS  
STORRM 
DTO 
 
ULF7 
MPLM 
LMC 
Profile 
Support 
 
 
Sip 
 
 
 
Pettinger 
 
 
 
Pascucci 
 
 
 
S. Snyder 
 
 
 
Pettinger 
 
 
 
 
S. Snyder 
Maneuver 
and Rndz 
Specialist 
 
Pettinger (O1) 
Stuit (O2) 
S. Snyder (O3) 
 
Yarbrough (O1) 
Sip (O2) 
Stuit (O3) 
 
S. Snyder (O1) 
Stuit (O2) 
Pettinger (O3) 
 
Sip (O1) 
Yarbrough (O2) 
Pettinger (O3) 
 
Stuit (O1) 
S. Snyder (O2) 
Sip (O3) 
 
 
Yarbrough (O1) 
Sip (O2) 
Stuit (O3) 
Target 
 
 
 
Hallstrom 
 
 
 
Hallstrom 
 
 
 
Bartz 
 
 
 
Bartz 
 
 
 
Hallstrom 
 
 
 
 
LoPresti- 
Bellock 
Prox Ops /  
Tools  
Checkout 
 
LoPresti- 
Bellock 
Summa (C/O) 
 
Schrock 
Summa (C/O) 
 
 
LoPresti- 
Bellock 
Schrock (C/O) 
 
Pascucci 
Schrock (C/O) 
 
 
Summa 
LoPresti- 
Bellock (C/O) 
 
 
Summa (rndz) 
LoPresti- 
Bellock  
(undock C/O) 
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APPENDIX F – MISSION EVALUATION ROOM PERSONNEL 
 
 Starting with STS-51 (September 1993) NASA/JSC Engineering Directorate personnel and supporting contractor 
personnel supported rendezvous tools (Rendezvous and Proximity Operations Program, or RPOP, Hand Held Lidar, or 
HHL, and Trajectory Control Sensor, or TCS) in the Mission Evaluation Room (MER).  These specialists worked 
closely with Mission Operations Rendezvous Guidance and Procedures Officer (RGPO) and crew training personnel 
before, during, and after flights.  These names were supplied by Jack Brazzel and Jim Duron in February of 2010. 
Rendezvous and Proximity Operations Program 
(RPOP) 
 
Jim Barrett 
Jack Brazzel 
Fred Clark 
Chris Foster 
Heather Hinkel 
Zoran Milenkovic 
Pete Spehar 
Scott Tamblyn 
 
  
Hand Held Lidar (HHL) 
 
Quinn Dunn 
Bill Foster 
Chris Hovanetz 
Tiffany Biehl McFadden 
Harold Nitschke 
Chau Phan 
Mark Schuette 
Joe Victor 
Trajectory Control Sensor (TCS) 
 
Marty Barr 
Mike Brieden 
Tamara Cougar 
Kent Dekome 
Quinn Dunn 
Jim Duron 
Rodney Elmore 
Tim Fisher 
Bill Foster 
John Handy 
Hank Holt 
Chris Hovanetz 
Johnny Lewis 
Tiffany Biehl McFadden 
Ken Moreland 
Joe Prather 
Mark Schuette 
Joe Victor 
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 Relative motion is often depicted in a Local Vertical 
Local Horizontal (LVLH) or Local Vertical Curvilinear 
(LVC) frame (Figure G.1).1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  The target position and velocity vectors are used to 
define the axes.  Nomenclature for the axes follows the 
convention used within the Shuttle Program.  
 
The +Z axis, also call the +R Bar axis, is defined as: 
 
iZ = -unit[rT] 
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APPENDIX G – RELATIVE FRAME
  
Figure G.1   Local Vertical Curvilinear reference frame. 
Earth 
orbital  
motion  
of target 
+X or  
+V Bar 
+Z or 
+R Bar 
+Y or -H Bar  
into the page. 
The +Y axis, also called the –H Bar axis, is defined as: 
 
iY = -unit[rT x vT] 
 
The +X axis, also called the +V Bar axis, is defined as: 
 
iX = unit[(rT x vT) x rT] 
 
In the LVC frame, the V Bar is curvilinear, rather than 
rectilinear. 
 
 
Reference 
 
1. Adamo, D. R., “A Meaningful Relative Motion 
Coordinate System For Generic Use,” 2005 
AAS/AIAA Astrodynamics Specialist Conference, 
Advances in the Astronautical Sciences, Univelt, San 
Diego, CA, 2005.  
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 The nomenclature for ground targeted burns (NC, NH, 
NPC, NSR) originated during rendezvous trajectory and 
Mission Control software development for the Gemini 
Program in the 1962-1964 time period.  The naming 
convention has been retained through the Gemini, Apollo, 
Skylab, Apollo/Soyuz, Space Shuttle, and Orion Programs 
due to the large amount of software and documentation 
that use these burn names. 
 The NPC (Plane Change) maneuver controls out-of-
plane motion relative to the target. The NH (Height) 
maneuver controls height relative to the target at a future 
time.    NC (Catch-up) controls the phasing rate of the 
chaser spacecraft.  NSR (Slow Rate) establishes a chaser 
coelliptic orbit with respect to the target orbit. If there is 
more than one burn of a type, such as NC, the burns are 
labeled as NC1, NC2, etc.   
 The burn names also served as counter variables in the 
Docking Initiation (DKI) program that was developed by 
late 1964 to compute rendezvous burns during pre-
mission planning and during a flight in Mission Control.  
In reports and memos from that time the names were 
written as NSR, NC, NH, and NPC.  NASA Mission 
Planning and Analysis Directorate (MPAD) personnel 
that developed the rendezvous trajectories and techniques 
also designed the burn targeting algorithms for DKI. 
 Various versions of DKI were used for pre-mission 
planning and burn targeting in Mission Control during the 
Gemini, Apollo, Skylab, and Apollo-Soyuz Programs.  
Some software from DKI was also included in the Orbital 
Maneuver Processor (OMP) used during the Shuttle 
Program. 
  The names NC, NH, NPC, and NSR represented the Nth 
crossing of the chaser line of apsides, the point where the 
burns were typically performed.  The line of apsides was 
also called the maneuver line.*  A numerical value for the 
burn enabled personnel and the DKI program to tell 
where in the mission plan a ground targeted maneuver 
would be executed. N=1 represented the first apogee, 
N=1.5 the first perigee, as so on.  For example, if the 
second NC maneuver was to be executed at the fifth 
apogee, the burn would be written as NC2=5 in reports, 
memos, and presentations.  Plane change burns (NPC) 
typically occurred 90 degrees from an apsis crossing.  An 
NPC burn would be written as NPC=2.25 or NPC=3.75.  
However, over time, in discussions of burns in 
presentations and documents the variable names were 
simply written as NC, NH, NPC, and NSR, without the 
line of apsides crossing count number and subscripts.  
APPENDIX H – BURN NOMENCLATURE 
 In Gemini, Apollo, Skylab, and Apollo-Soyuz 
documentation the term M=x (where x is an integer) is 
occasionally encountered.  M represented the number of 
the chaser spacecraft apogee nearest the rendezvous point.  
For example, M=17 meant that the final phase of 
rendezvous occurred near the 17th chaser spacecraft 
apogee. 
 The lowercase “n” in the below definitions represents 
the numerical sequence of burns in the mission. 
 
CDH – Constant Delta Height established the LM in a 
coelliptic orbit with respect to the CSM (Apollo lunar 
missions). 
 
CIRC – Establishes a circular orbit. 
 
CSI – Coelliptic Sequence Initiation sets up the proper 
conditions for the CDH and TPI maneuvers (Apollo).  
 
Insertion – Establishment of a safe orbit after powered 
flight ascent has been completed. 
 
NCn – Phasing burns are used to control the relative 
catch-up rate, and are typically executed at apogee or 
perigee.  However, an NC burn may be deliberately 
performed off the line of apsides in order to shift the line 
of apsides and eliminate the need for an NSR burn to 
control lighting during proximity operations.  It may also 
be shifted off of an axis to lower the radial component of 
a subsequent Ti or NSR burn. 
 
NCCn – A Corrective Combination maneuver is a 
combination of NC and NH burns, and can also include 
an out-of-plane component.  This is a Lambert targeted 
burn. 
 
NHn – A Height maneuver, executed at either apogee or 
perigee, controls the differential height (DH) between the 
chaser and target orbits.   It may also be shifted off an axis 
for the same reasons as a NC burn. 
 
NPC – A Plane Change maneuver corrects for planar 
dispersions, and is performed at the intersection (node) of 
the chaser and target phantom orbital planes.  If a NC, 
NSR, or NH burn occurs near a nodal crossing an out-of-
plane delta-velocity component may be added to it to 
avoid performing a separate NPC burn.   
 
NSRn – Slow Rate maneuver places the chaser in a co-
elliptic orbit with the target, aligning the lines of apsides 
of both vehicles.  NSR burns can be used to meet lighting 
requirements on the day of rendezvous. 
 
* Young, Kenneth A., and Catherine T. Osgood, Preflight Orbital And 
Reentry Trajectory Data for Gemini VI, MSC Internal Note No. 65-FM-
125, Mission Planning and Analysis Division, NASA Manned 
Spacecraft Center, Houston, TX, September 17, 1965.  See also JSC-
35055 in the A Note on Sources chapter in this volume. 
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OMS-n – Shuttle Orbital Maneuvering System (OMS) 
burns conducted for orbit insertion following ascent. 
 
Out-of-Plane Null – Performed manually during the on-
board targeted phase to constrain chaser relative motion to 
the orbital plane of the target. 
 
Sep – A separation burn establishes a safe departure 
trajectory after deployment of a target spacecraft or 
undocking from a space station. 
 
SORn – nth Stable Orbit Rendezvous maneuver. 
 
TPF – “Terminal Phase Finalization” was the total delta-
velocity that had to be executed at intercept to null 
relative motion.  In reality TPF was not executed.  
Braking gates at specified ranges were performed instead.  
This acronym was used in Gemini and Apollo 
documentation. 
 
TPI – A “Terminal Phase Initiation” burn placed the 
chaser on an intercept trajectory with the target on Gemini 
and Apollo (lunar, Skylab, Apollo/Soyuz).  For Orion it 
targeted the chaser for the Transition to Docking Axis 
(TDA) point.  TPI is executed while the chaser is on an 
orbit that is coelliptic with the target spacecraft. 
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Ti – “Transition initiation” was the shuttle equivalent of 
TPI.  On the stable orbit profile it placed the shuttle on an 
intercept trajectory with the target spacecraft.   On an 
ORBT profile Ti targeted the shuttle for the MC-4 burn 
point.  Immediately after MC-4 the manual piloting phase 
began.  A lowercase “i” was used in “Ti” to avoid 
confusion with another Shuttle Program rendezvous 
acronym, T1.  T1 and T2 were used in the on-board 
Lambert targeting software to denote the start and end 
times of a transfer. 
 
TPMn, MCC-n or MC-n – Terminal Phase Midcourse or 
Mid-Course Correction burns are executed after TPI or Ti 
to adjust the intercept trajectory based on relative sensor 
measurements. 
 
VBNn – nth V Bar Null maneuver that nulls relative 
motion on the V Bar or establishes coelliptic motion at a 
point near the V bar.   
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A = Assembly 
AGS = Abort Guidance System 
ALS = Advanced Logistics System 
ASTP = Apollo Soyuz Test Project 
ATDA = Augmented Target Docking Adapter 
ATV = Automated Transfer Vehicle 
AVGS = Advanced Video Guidance Sensor 
CETA = Crew and Equipment Translation Aid 
CIRC = circularization burn 
CM = Command Module 
COAS = Crew Optical Alignment Sight  
CRISTA = Cryogenic Infrared Spectrometers and 
Telescopes for the Atmospheric 
CMG = Control Moment Gyro 
CSM = Command/Service Module 
DART = Demonstration of Autonomous Rendezvous 
DM = Docking Module 
ESA = European Space Agency 
ESOC = European Space Operations Center 
ET = External Tank 
EURECA = European Retrievable Carrier 
EVA = Extra Vehicular Activity  
FA = Fly Around 
GATV = Gemini Agena Target Vehicle 
GPS = Global Positioning System 
GRO = Gamma Ray Observatory 
HHL = Hand Held Laser 
HST = Hubble Space Telescope 
IAE = Inflatable Antenna Experiment 
IBSS = Infrared Background Signature Survey 
IFM = In Flight Maintenance 
IMU = Inertial Measurement Unit 
INS = Insertion 
INTELSAT = International Telecommunications 
Satellite 
IRT = Integrated Rendezvous Target 
ISS = International Space Station 
JSC = Johnson Space Center 
KSC = Kennedy Space Center 
LDEF = Long Duration Exposure Facility 
LEO = Low Earth orbit 
LF = Logistics Flight 
LM = Lunar Module 
LOR = Lunar Orbit Rendezvous 
LVC = Local Vertical Curvilinear coordinate frame. 
LVLH = Local Vertical Local Horizontal 
M = docking on the mth revolution 
MAHRSI = Middle Atmosphere High Resolution 
Spectograph Investigation 
MC-n = nth Mid-course Correction burn 
MMU = Manned Maneuvering Unit 
MORAD = Manned Orbital Rendezvous and Docking 
MPAD = Mission Planning and Analysis Division 
MPLM = Multi-Purpose Logistics Module 
MSC = Manned Spacecraft Center 
APPENDIX I – ACRONYMS  
NC-n = nth phasing burn 
NCC = Corrective Combination burn 
NH = Height burn 
NPC = plane change burn 
NSR = coelliptic burn 
OAST = Office of Aeronautics and Space Technology 
ODS = Orbiter Docking System 
OEX DAP = Orbital Experiments Digital Autopilot 
OFT = Orbital Flight Test 
OMP = Orbit Maneuver Processor 
OMS-n = nth Orbital Maneuvering System burn 
ORBT = Optimized R-Bar Targeted Rendezvous 
ORFEUS = Orbiting and Retrievable Far and Extreme 
Ultraviolet Spectrometer 
PAM = Payload Assist Module 
PAMS-STU = Passive Aerodynamically Stabilized 
Magnetically Damped Satellite-Satellite Test Unit 
PMA = Pressurized Mating Adapter 
PDP = Plasma Diagnostics Package 
RCS = Reaction Control System 
REP = Radar Evaluation Pod 
RMS = Remote Manipulator System 
Rndz = Rendezvous 
RPM = R Bar Pitch Maneuver 
Rtrv = Retrieve 
S-IVB = Second stage of the Saturn IB or third stage of 
the Saturn V 
SAINT = Satellite Inspector 
SEP = Separation 
SFU = Space Flyer Unit 
SLA = Spacecraft LM Adapter 
Short = Direct Rendezvous  
SK = Station-Keeping 
SORn = nth Stable Orbit Rendezvous burn 
SPARTAN = Shuttle Pointed Autonomous Tool For 
Astronomy 
SPAS = Shuttle Pallet Satellite 
SPS = Service Propulsion System 
STORRM DTO = Sensor Test for Orion RelNav Risk 
Mitigation Detailed Test Objective 
SYNCOM = Synchronous Communication 
TACAN = Tactical Air Navigation 
TCS = Trajectory Control Sensor 
TDRSS = Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System 
TRS = Teleoperator Retrieval System 
Ti = Transition initiation 
TIG = Time of Ignition 
TORRA = Twice Orbital Rate R Bar Approach 
TORVA = Twice Orbital Rate V Bar Approach 
TPI = Terminal Phase Initiation 
TPM = Terminal Phase Mid-course correction 
Transposition = Transposition and docking maneuver to 
extract the LM from the S-IVB 
UF = Utilization Flight 
VBNn = nth V Bar Null burn 
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VGS = Video Guidance Sensor 
VHF = Very High Frequency 
WSF = Wake Shield Facility 
ΔH = delta height 
ΔV = delta velocity 
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Comments 
  
Captured Zarya with RMS, attached Unity Node with PMA 1 & 2. 
 
First docking with ISS.  ISS resupply and outfitting. 
 
ISS resupply and outfitting. 
ISS resupply and outfitting. 
Radar failure.  Z1 Truss, PMA 3, Ku comm,  & CMGs installed. 
Delivered P6 truss (with solar arrays & radiators). 
 
Delivered Destiny lab.   
Tail forward approach. MPLM resupply. Crew exchange. 
Tail forward approach. Installed robotic arm. MPLM resupply.  
Delivered Quest Airlock (installed with ISS robotic arm). 
MPLM resupply. Crew exchange. 
MPLM resupply. Crew exchange. 
 
Delivered S0 truss and Mobile Transporter. 
MPLM resupply. Mobile base installation.  Crew exchange. 
Delivered S1 truss, radiators & CETA cart A. 
Delivered P1 truss, radiators & CETA cart B.  Crew exchange. 
 
MPLM Resupply.  CMG replacement.  First RPM. 
 
MPLM Resupply.  Add third ISS crewmember. 
P3/P4 truss. 
P5 Truss, SPACEHAB 
 
S3/S4 Truss  
S5 Truss  
U.S. Node 2, first flight of Lambert guidance upgrade. 
 
Columbus Laboratory  
Kibo Logistics Module, Dextre Robotics System  
Kibo Pressurized Module, Japanese Remote Manipulator System  
MPLM 
 
S6 truss segment  
Kibo JEM EF, Kibo Japanese ELM-ES 
Leonardo MPLM, LMPESSC, Vernier RCS failure. 
ELC1, ELC2 
 
Tranquility Node 3, Cupola.  TCS failure during approach. 
Leonardo MPLM, radar fail. 
ICC, MRM1, COAS bulb replacement. 
 
ELC4, Leonardo PMM 
ELC3, AMS-2, STORRM DTO during rndz & docking. 
Raffaello MPLM, LMC, return to Earth of failed ammonia pump. 
ISS yaw maneuver after orbiter undocking to facilitate engineering 
photos during orbiter half-lap fly-around. 
Mission  
 
ISS  
Assembly  
and  
Supply  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Flight
  
88 (2A) 
 
96 (2A.1) 
 
101 (2A.2a) 
106 (2A.2b) 
92 (3A) 
97 (4A) 
 
98 (5A) 
102 (5A.1) 
100 (6A) 
104 (7A) 
105 (7A.1) 
108 (UF-1) 
 
110 (8A) 
111 (UF-2) 
112 (9A) 
113 (11A) 
 
114 (LF-1) 
 
121 (ULF-1.1) 
115 (12A) 
116 (12A.1) 
 
117 (13A) 
118 (13A.1) 
120 (10A) 
 
122 (1E) 
123 (1J/A) 
124 (1J) 
126 (ULF2) 
 
119 (15A) 
127 92J/A) 
128 (17A) 
129 (ULF3) 
 
STS-130 (20A) 
STS-131 (19A) 
STS-132 (ULF4) 
 
STS-133 (ULF5) 
STS-134 (ULF6) 
STS-135 (ULF7) 
Year
  
1998 
 
1999 
 
2000 
2000 
2000 
2000 
 
2001 
2001 
2001 
2001 
2001 
2001 
 
2002 
2002 
2002 
2002 
 
2005 
 
2006 
2006 
2006 
 
2007 
2007
2007 
 
2008
2008
2008
2008 
 
2009
2009 
2009 
2009 
 
2010
2010
2010 
 
2011
2011
2011
  
Profile  
  
Ground-Up 
 
Ground-Up 
 
Ground-Up 
Ground-Up 
Ground-Up 
Ground-Up 
 
Ground-Up 
Ground-Up 
Ground-Up 
Ground-Up 
Ground-Up 
Ground-Up 
 
Ground-Up 
Ground-Up 
Ground-Up 
Ground-Up 
 
Ground-Up 
 
Ground-Up 
Ground-Up 
Ground-Up 
 
Ground-Up 
Ground-Up 
Ground-Up 
 
Ground-Up 
Ground-Up 
Ground-Up 
Ground-Up 
 
Ground-Up 
Ground-Up 
Ground-Up 
Ground-Up 
 
Ground-Up 
Ground-Up 
Ground-Up 
 
Ground-Up 
Ground-Up 
Ground-Up 
Target 
  
ISS 
 
ISS 
 
ISS 
ISS 
ISS 
ISS 
 
ISS 
ISS 
ISS 
ISS 
ISS 
ISS 
 
ISS 
ISS 
ISS 
ISS 
 
ISS 
 
ISS 
ISS 
ISS 
 
ISS 
ISS 
ISS 
 
ISS 
ISS 
ISS 
ISS 
 
ISS 
ISS 
ISS 
ISS 
 
ISS 
ISS 
ISS 
 
ISS 
ISS 
ISS
  
Space Shuttle Rendezvous and Proximity Operations Missions to the ISS (See Inside Front Cover For Other Shuttle Missions) 
A = Assembly, AMS = Alpha Magnetic Spectrometer, ATV = Automated Transfer Vehicle, CETA = Crew and Equipment Translation Aid, CMG = 
Control Moment Gyro, ELC = EXPRESS Logistics Carrier, ELM-ES = Experiment Logistics Module - Exposed Section, EVA = Extra Vehicular 
Activity, ICC = Integrated Cargo Carrier, JEM EF = Japanese Experiment Module Exposed Facility, LF = Logistics Flight, LMC = Lightweight Multi-
purpose Carrier, LMPESSC = Lightweight Multi-Purpose Experiment Support Structure Carrier, MPLM = Multi-Purpose Logistics Module, MRM = 
Mini Research Module, ORBT = Optimized R-Bar Targeted Rendezvous, PMA = Pressurized Mating Adapter, PMM = Permanent Multi-Purpose 
Module, Rndz = Rendezvous, RPM = R Bar Pitch Maneuver, STORRM DTO = Sensor Test for Orion Relnav Risk Mitigation Detailed Test Objective, 
TORRA = Twice Orbital Rate R Bar Approach, TORVA = Twice Orbital Rate V Bar Approach, UF = Utilization Flight, ULF = Utilization & Logistics 
Flight 
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